Terrance Robert Henderson (“Henderson”) argues in this appeal that the Circuit Court of Arlington County (“circuit court”) violated his due process right to confront the witnesses against him during a probation revocation hearing when it admitted Arlington Detective Rosa Ortiz’s hearsay testimony *370concerning other offenses, which either never resulted in charges against Henderson or were nolle prosequied.
I. BACKGROUND
Henderson was convicted in the circuit court on January 26, 2001 of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment with all but six years and eight months suspended. Upon his release from incarceration, the circuit court ordered him to be placed on probation for five years or less if the circuit court or probation officer released him sooner. On September 14, 2009, Henderson was released from prison and began his probation.1
On October 14, 2009, Henderson’s probation officer sent a letter to the circuit court noting that Henderson had been arrested and charged with robbery on October 8, 2009, in Arlington County, Virginia, setting forth the specific probation conditions that Henderson violated,2 and recommending that the circuit court issue a bench warrant as a detainer and return Henderson to the circuit court for him to show cause as to why his probation should not be revoked. The probation officer’s letter recommended that “the balance of the suspended sentence be imposed and the case be closed.” The robbery charge referred to in this letter was later nolle prosequied prior to the revocation hearing.
On February 26, 2010, the circuit court held a probation revocation hearing. At the hearing, the Commonwealth added an additional allegation that Henderson was also in violation of the condition of his probation that he be of general good *371behavior to the previously alleged list of probation violations.3 However, although a total of three conditions of probation were alleged to have been violated, the Commonwealth did not present any evidence regarding Henderson’s alleged violation of Condition # 2, his alleged failure to report an arrest to his probation officer. Indeed, the only evidence offered in support of any of the alleged violations of the conditions of probation was the testimony of Detective Rosa Ortiz (“Ortiz”) who testified regarding two alleged robberies that she had investigated in October 2009. No charges were brought against Henderson in connection with one of these robberies, and the other robbery charge was nolle prosequied. During the Commonwealth’s questioning of Ortiz, Henderson’s counsel objected to her testimony regarding what the witnesses in both cases told her.4 The following colloquy took place regarding his objection:
[Henderson’s counsel]: Your Honor, at this point I’m going to object on hearsay. And I understand that hearsay is admissible in these types of proceedings, but I think we have—there is a qualifier to that case.
I mean, I understand that the Davis case controls the hearsay question. However, in the Davis case the Court was referencing and admitting what they determined to be reliable hearsay, meaning hearsay from one government agent to another.
To the extent that the detective’s testimony is going to cover information not reported from another government agent, or reported from another government agent but from *372someone who was not a government agent, like one police officer interviews a victim and then the victim reports this crime, to the extent that we are getting into evidence that would be a victim’s report of a crime, I think that that is the type of hearsay that should not be allowed in this type of proceeding.
Secondly, if that hearsay is admitted, that violates his right of confrontation, which he is guaranteed in probation violation hearings.
[Prosecutor]: Two things, Judge. The right of confrontation only attaches at trial. We are post-trial in this case. We are at a revocation proceeding.
Secondarily, I believe that the Court is in a good position to give the testimony that you are about to hear the appropriate weight that it’s entitled to.
Certainly, to the extent that a victim or a person may report to a police officer is something that this Court can weigh and decide how much credibility should attach to that. So I would ask the Court to allow its admissibility and to weigh it appropriately.
The COURT: Overruled.
(Emphasis added).
Ortiz then proceeded to testify regarding the two alleged robberies. The first attempted robbery occurred on October 2, 2009, and Ortiz spoke with the alleged victim and his ■daughter by telephone on October 6, 2009. Ortiz testified that the victim informed her that he had received a phone call on his cell phone from an unknown number asking him to leave his apartment and to go to the courthouse to sign some legal documents regarding a family member. Upon leaving his apartment, a man approached the victim, and unsuccessfully tried to take the victim’s bag, “a men’s purse.” The victim and his daughter advised Ortiz that they had discovered that the call to the victim was made from Henderson’s cell phone and that they called Henderson and had him come to their house to talk with the victim regarding the incident. Henderson informed them that he lends his phone to a lot of *373people, and he could not remember whom he had loaned it to that day. When Ortiz spoke with Henderson, he told her “basically the same thing,” and later “that his phone was stolen and miraculously ... appeared on his porch two days later.” The victim then “explained to [Ortiz that] he really didn’t want to file charges because people knew his daughter, and they all were in the neighborhood, they lived in the same neighborhood, they knew where he lived.” Apparently, no charges were ever brought against Henderson in connection with this incident.
The second robbery Ortiz investigated was the October 8, 2009 home invasion robbery which was the basis for Henderson’s October 8, 2009 arrest. This charge was later nolle prosequied. Ortiz testified that her supervisor called her “at night at her house” to come to the police station “to investigate a home invasion robbery.” She went to the police station, and met with the victim on October 8, 2009. Ortiz testified that the victim informed her that three individuals came to his house, knocked oh the front door, opened the unlocked front door after the victim ignored them because he looked and saw who they were, and then entered his home. Ortiz then testified that the victim identified one of the individuals as Henderson whom he had met a few weeks prior to the robbery at the probation office. After they entered his home, the victim explained to Ortiz that one of the other individuals was carrying a gun and displayed the firearm and that they stole some of his personal property. The victim then picked Henderson out of a photo lineup that Ortiz prepared.
Ortiz further testified that when she met with the victim and his mother, both ultimately refused to testify because they were scared of retaliation. The victim’s mother informed Ortiz “she [had] heard gunshots around the house” the day before, “and that really scared her.” Ortiz stated that she never found a gun in this case, but that she had heard one of the other individuals arrested in the second alleged robbery speaking with his girlfriend from jail during a recorded telephone conversation about a gun by reference in a safe. The *374individual gave the girlfriend the code for the safe, and later said repeatedly that the girlfriend had the gun. Ortiz also testified that in the course of the recorded telephone conversations from jail she heard this other individual state that “they got me and they got Terrence.”
After his arrest, Henderson informed Ortiz that people in the neighborhood “simply didn’t like him, and that’s why his name came up on these two different cases.” Henderson also told Ortiz that “between 8:00 and midnight, the day of the incident, he was on his porch talking to people and there were other people on the porch.” Ortiz also testified regarding a recorded telephone conversation that Henderson had with his mother while he was in jail. During that conversation, Henderson’s mother informed him that the second victim’s mother was asking for money in exchange for making the charges drop, but that she was not going to pay off the victim’s mother. Henderson’s mother also testified at the hearing, and reiterated that one of the girlfriends of the other individuals in the second alleged crime told her that the mother of the second victim was requesting money, but she was “not going to pay any money to her because [Henderson] didn’t do anything.” Henderson’s mother also testified that on the night of October 8, 2009, Henderson was not out on the porch when she arrived home at 10:20 p.m., but that he was upstairs in his bedroom and he did not leave the house that night.
The hearing concluded, and the circuit court found that Henderson had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked Henderson’s probation, and reinstated his previously suspended sentence. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
“The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review its decision only for abuse of discretion.” Dickens v. Commonwealth, 52 Va.App. 412, 417, 663 S.E.2d 548, 550 (2008) (citing Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988)). “How*375ever, whether appellant’s due process right of confrontation was violated is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 461, 465, 624 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2006)).
A. Waiver: Rule 5A:18
The Commonwealth contends that Henderson waived his right under Rule 5A: 18 to claim a violation of his due process right to confrontation because he did not present this claim to the circuit court. At trial, Henderson’s counsel objected to the admittance of the hearsay testimony stating “if the hearsay is admitted, that violates his right of confrontation, which he is guaranteed in probation violation hearings.” The Commonwealth contends that Henderson’s objection was based exclusively on the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause since the Commonwealth’s response was that, “[t]he right of confrontation only attaches at trial. We are post-trial in this case. We are at a revocation proceeding.” The basis for the Commonwealth’s contention is that Henderson’s counsel did not explain his objection after the Commonwealth’s response, and thus the circuit court had no reason to know that the right to confrontation objection was based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Sixth Amendment.
Rule 5A:18 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o ruling of the trial court ... will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.”5 Therefore, “in order to preserve an issue *376for appeal, ‘an objection must be timely made and the grounds stated with specificity.’” Kovalaske v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 224, 229, 692 S.E.2d 641, 645 (2010) (quoting McDuffie v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 170, 177, 638 S.E.2d 139, 142 (2006)). “[T]he main purpose of the rule is to ensure the trial court can ‘consider the issue intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials.’ ” Id. at 230, 692 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 524, 530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992)).
In this case, the issue was sufficiently preserved. The record establishes that the circuit court was aware of Henderson’s objection to the admissibility of Ortiz’s testimony based upon his right of confrontation as it applied in a probation revocation hearing. See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184, 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) (“ ‘Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.’ ” (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62, 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) (“This means the ‘judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.’ ” (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165, 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88, 91 n. 3 (2003))).
The record further establishes that the circuit court knew the action that Henderson desired the circuit court to take and his legal basis for it. The circuit court had the opportunity to consider the issue intelligently, and to take any corrective action it deemed necessary. Contrary to the implication inherent in the Commonwealth’s argument, Henderson’s objection was sufficiently specific for the circuit court to understand the nature of his objection—that the evidence should not be admitted—and the grounds therefor—that it violated his constitutional right to confront that evidence as that right applied in a probation revocation hearing. The Commonwealth’s response to Henderson’s objection may well suggest that the prosecutor was unaware that a limited due process right of *377confrontation exists in the context of a probation revocation hearing outside the parameters of Sixth Amendment trial rights. However, any theoretical lack of knowledge of the law on the part of the prosecutor cannot be imputed to the circuit court. Nor does a mistake of law on the part of counsel for the opposing party mandate a response or clarification by counsel for the objecting party as long as the original objection satisfies the requirements of Rule 5A:18 by putting the court on adequate notice of the nature and grounds of the objection. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the Commonwealth that Henderson should have responded to the prosecutor’s argument, the record reflects that he had no opportunity to do so since the circuit court ruled immediately after hearing the Commonwealth’s response. Therefore, we reach the merits of the issue on appeal.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Confrontation
Henderson alleges that the circuit court violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to confrontation when it admitted Ortiz’s hearsay testimony.6
*378“[B]oth the United States Supreme Court and this Court have ... held that probation revocation hearings are not a stage of criminal prosecution and therefore a probationer is not entitled to the same due process protections afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution.” Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417, 663 S.E.2d at 550 (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 81, 84, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991)); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2599-2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).7 However, *379“[probation revocation, like parole revocation, ... does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly ... a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer.” Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782, 93 S.Ct. at 1759-60; see Davis, 12 Va.App. at 84, 402 S.E.2d at 686. In Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court required that the following “minimum requirements of due process” for a revocation hearing be provided:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation];
(b) disclosure to the [probationer] of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need to be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation],
408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added).8
“Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has stated that in revocation hearings ‘formal procedures and rules of *380evidence are not employed,’ Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789, 93 S.Ct. at 1763, and that the process of revocation hearings ‘should be flexible enough to consider evidence ... that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial,’ Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604.” Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 421, 663 S.E.2d at 552. “Thus, hearsay evidence, which would normally be inadmissible in a criminal trial, may be admitted into evidence in a revocation hearing based on the court’s discretion,” id. (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604), if the circuit court “specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added). Neither our Supreme Court nor this Court have squarely addressed what constitutes “good cause” for denial of the due process right of confrontation in the wake of the many changes wrought by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and its progeny’s construction of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
1. Testimonial Evidence & the Due Process Right to Confrontation
However, before determining whether “good cause” existed to excuse denying Henderson the right to confrontation, we must first determine whether any due process right to confrontation applicable in the context of a revocation hearing attaches to the testimony of Ortiz in the first place—i.e. whether the evidence sought to be presented constitutes “testimonial hearsay,” which in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, and in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-26, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274-76, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (holding the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay after stating this holding was “suggested in Crawford, even if not explicitly held,” and noting “[a] limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter”), is a predicate to the applicability of the right of confrontation under any circumstances. See also Michigan v. Bryant, — *381U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1153, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (“We therefore limited the Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements .... ” (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1373-74)).
As this Court noted in Dickens, “the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a more rigorous right than the due process requirement in a revocation context because a revocation hearing is not a ‘criminal proceeding’ and the full panoply of rights due a defendant ‘does not apply to [probation] revocation.’ ” 52 Va.App. at 421-22, 663 S.E.2d at 552 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600). Thus, if the Sixth Amendment confrontation right attaches only to testimonial hearsay, then it follows that the more flexible due process right of confrontation in a probation revocation hearing also attaches only to testimonial hearsay. See id. at 417, 663 S.E.2d at 550 (“[I]n order to understand the Fourteenth Amendment[’s] due process [implicit] right to confrontation, we must begin with a review of the Sixth Amendment’s explicit] right to confrontation.”).
Prior to Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), controlled the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence through the application of an “indicia of reliability” test. Crawford expressly overruled Roberts. In Roberts, the Supreme Court specifically held
when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. In other words, prior to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause was satisfied if the witness was unavailable and the hearsay statement was suffi*382ciently reliable to satisfy a long-standing exception to the rule barring hearsay.
In Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1894-95, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), the United States Supreme Court clarified what it meant in Roberts when it held that the hearsay statements had to fall within “a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” The Supreme Court stated, “a hearsay exception [is] ‘firmly rooted’ if, in light of ‘longstanding judicial and legislative experience,’ it ‘rests [on] such [a] solid foundation that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’ ” Id. at 126, 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). “Established practice, in short, must confirm that statements falling within a category of hearsay inherently ‘carry special guarantees of credibility’ essentially equivalent to, or greater than, those produced by the Constitution’s preference for cross-examined trial testimony.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court then concluded, “accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 134, 119 S.Ct. at 1899.
The Supreme Court then overruled the so-called “indicia of reliability” test set forth in Roberts and Lilly in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] (2004), [and] held that the Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial hearsay and in order for such hearsay to be admissible, the witness must be unavailable and the accused must have had an opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 68 [124 S.Ct. at 1373-74]. The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause targeted a specific “evil,” namely the “civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” Id. at 49 [124 S.Ct. at 1362-63]. The Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause protects against “testimonial” statements because, it only “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’ ” Id. at 51 [124 S.Ct. at 1364] (quoting 2 N. *383Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 418, 663 S.E.2d at 551. “The [Supreme] Court stated ‘[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.’ ” Crawford v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 84, 97, 704 S.E.2d 107, 115 (2011) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, 124 S.Ct. at 1374).
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), the United States Supreme Court noted
[o]ur opinion [in Crawford ] described the class of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause as follows: “Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used proseeutorially; extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”
Id. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Crawford, 281 Va. at 97-98, 704 S.E.2d at 115 (noting the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements” provided by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364).
In Crawford, the Supreme Court provided that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. at 1364. The Supreme Court went on to hold that, “[statements *384taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.” Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364. “In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.” Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. at 1365. However, the Supreme Court did not define what it meant by “interrogation” in Crawford, but provided that “[w]e use the term ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense,” and further that “one can imagine various definitions ..., and we need not select among them in this case.” Id. at 53 n. 4, 124 S.Ct. at 1365.
The United States Supreme Court was given the opportunity in Davis and Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 1213, 126 S.Ct. 1457, 164 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006), to consider whether statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call and at a crime scene were testimonial, and specifically addressed what it meant by “interrogation” when it was required “to determine more precisely which police interrogations produce testimony.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273. In making this determination, the United States Supreme Court
further clarified what constitutes a “testimonial” statement: “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
Crawford, 281 Va. at 98, 704 S.E.2d at 116 (emphasis added) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74). The United States Supreme Court explained that when it said in Crawford that
“interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class” of testimonial hearsay, we had immedi*385ately in mind (for that was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 126 S.Ct. at 2276 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 124 S.Ct. at 1365). Thus, “a statement is testimonial if it is given while ‘[tjhere was no emergency in progress,’ and is made for the purpose of ‘establishing] or proving] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Crawford, 281 Va. at 98, 704 S.E.2d at 116 (alterations in original) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 829, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 2277-78).
The United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, and further expounded upon how a court determines whether the “primary purpose” of a police interrogation objectively indicates that it was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 1150. In considering whether the statements of a dying man made to the police were testimonial, the Supreme Court noted that, “the most important instances in which the [Confrontation] Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.” Id. at 1155. However, the Supreme Court went on and explained,
[w]hen, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an “ongoing emergency,” its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause. But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant. Where no such primary purpose exists, *386the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.”
Id. (emphasis in original).9
In determining “whether the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation is ‘to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,’ which would render the resulting statements nontestimonial, we objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.” Id. at 1156 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273). Unlike in Davis, Hammon, and Bryant, the context in the present case involves a detective apparently questioning witnesses at some point after two alleged robberies had already occurred, and there was no evidence of any immediate threat to either the witnesses or the detective. Id. (“Davis and Hammon arose in the domestic *387violence context.... We now face a new context: a nondomestic dispute, involving a victim found in a public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time the police located the victim. Thus, we confront for the first time circumstances in which the ‘ongoing emergency’ discussed in Davis extends beyond an initial victim to a potential threat to the responding police and the public at large.”).
As the Supreme Court held in Hammon, “[i]t is entirely clear from the circumstances [in this case] that the interrogation[s were] part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct,” Davis, 547 U.S. at 829, 126 S.Ct. at 2278, and thus the primary purpose of the interrogations was “ ‘for the purpose of establishing] or proving] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,’ ” Crawford, 281 Va. at 98, 704 S.E.2d at 116 (alterations in original) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2274). As stated, the challenged evidence in the present case is a detective’s testimony that included, and was based on, information provided to her by witnesses during her investigation of two alleged robberies after they had occurred—“ ‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’ ” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364).
With regard to the first alleged crime that took place on October 2, 2009, Ortiz spoke with the victim and his daughter by telephone four days after it had occurred and after the initial officers had done a full preliminary investigation in order to obtain the facts regarding the alleged robbery. On October 8, 2009, Ortiz was called to come down to the police station regarding the second alleged crime that had occurred that day, and she stated that she met with the victim at the police station that day regarding the alleged home invasion robbery. When she spoke with the individuals, it was in the formal setting of a police officer investigating a past crime by seeking facts regarding each alleged robbery for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting the perpetrator. Bryant, *388131 S.Ct. at 1160 (“Formality is not the sole touchstone of our primary purpose inquiry because, although formality suggests the absence of an emergency and therefore an increased likelihood that the purpose of the interrogation is to ‘establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,’ [Davis, 547 U.S.] at 822, 126 S.Ct. [at 2274], informality does not necessarily indicate the presence of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent.”).
In addition, the information was not provided during an ongoing emergency in order to enable police to meet the emergency and to understand what was happening; but rather, the detective was seeking to determine what had already occurred, and to preserve it for later use in connection with court proceedings. Crawford, 281 Va. at 98, 704 S.E.2d at 116. Ortiz obtained the information from ex parte communication with the witnesses after the alleged robberies had occurred during her investigation of the alleged crimes—“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. at 1363. Further, Ortiz was engaged “in the more traditional law enforcement functions of observation and investigation of crime,” which is an adversarial setting. Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 419, 663 S.E.2d at 551 (noting that the reports in Michels did not resemble ex parte communication because they “ ‘were prepared in a non-adversarial setting in which the factors likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more traditional law enforcement functions of observation and investigation of crime are simply not present’ ” (quoting Michels, 47 Va.App. at 469-70, 624 S.E.2d at 680)). Lastly, none of the “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable” are applicable to Ortiz’s testimony such that the “admissibility of [the] statements] is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, [and] not the Confrontation Clause.” Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155.
Thus, we conclude that Ortiz’s testimony was testimonial hearsay, to which the limited Fourteenth Amendment due process right of confrontation applies.
*3892. “Good Cause” Exception
In turning to the relaxed standards of, and the “good cause” exception to, the right to confrontation applicable at probation revocation hearings, we note that a defendant is permitted the “right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation) .... ” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added). In determining whether to admit testimonial hearsay evidence under the “good cause” exception, other courts have adopted either of two methods in determining whether evidence admitted at a probation revocation hearing violated the limited due process right to confrontation and cross-examination. In Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind.2007), the Indiana Supreme Court explained both methods:
In one, the trial court employs a balancing test that weighs the probationer’s interest in confronting a witness against the interests of the State in not producing the witness. E.g., United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844-45 (8th Cir.2004). In the balancing test, the State is required to show good cause for denying confrontation. See United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.2005). In another test, the trial court determines whether the evidence reaches a certain level of reliability, or if it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness. E.g., United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir.2006). The requirement, found in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593 [at 2604], that the trial court find “good cause” before denying the right to confrontation plays an explicit role when a trial court performs a balancing test; however, this does not mean that Morrissey’s good cause requirement is not addressed in the substantial trustworthiness test---[T]he substantial trustworthiness test implicitly incorporates good cause into its calculus.
See also People v. Breeding, 284 Mich.App. 471, 485, 772 N.W.2d 810 (2009) (quoting Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 441).
*390While Virginia has not expressly adopted a specific approach, standard, or test to be applied to determine whether “good cause” exists to deny the right of confrontation, this Court briefly discussed both tests in Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417, 663 S.E.2d at 550. In Dickens, this Court reviewed the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in order to understand the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to confrontation, found “no need to embrace [the] balancing test since the reliability of official records has long been established,” and concluded the hearsay evidence—an affidavit that was an official record—was nontestimonial, fell within the official records hearsay exception, and was reliable. Id. at 419-20, 422-23, 663 S.E.2d at 551-52, 553. While not explicitly stating which test the circuit courts must apply in these situations, this Court, in dicta, implicitly approved the reliability test in Dickens when we noted, “the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that hearsay evidence is admissible in probation revocation hearings if it is sufficiently reliable.” Id. at 423, 663 S.E.2d at 553 (citing United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir.1982));10 see also Turner v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 739, 742, 685 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2009) (“Hearsay evidence has been held admissible in federal probation and parole revocation proceedings where the evidence is ‘demonstrably reliable.’ In Dickens, [this Court] reached a similar conclusion in the context of the reliability of official records.” (citations omitted)).11
*391Although the Supreme Court of the United States has yet to review either due process test applied for finding “good cause” to deny the right of confrontation, both tests have been found by various of our sister states to pass current constitutional muster.
a. Reliability Test12
Under the reliability test, “the trial court determines whether the evidence reaches a certain level of reliability, or if it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness,” and “the substantial trustworthiness test implicitly incorporates good cause into its calculus.” Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 441 (citations *392omitted); see also Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692; Crawford, v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123, 131 (D.C.Cir.2003); Hampton v. State, 203 P.3d 179, 184-85 (Okla.Crim.App.2009). “Hearsay evidence has been held admissible in federal probation and parole revocation proceedings where the evidence is ‘demonstrably reliable.’ ” Turner, 278 Va. at 742, 685 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting McCollum, 677 F.2d at 1026). In Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir.2010), the court noted the following “[ejxamples of evidence possess[ed] recognized indicia of reliability”:
(1) the conventional substitutes for live testimony (e.g., affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence), (2) statements falling under an established exception to the hearsay rule, (3) statements corroborated by detailed police investigative reports, and (4) statements corroborated by the releasee’s own statements. See [Scarpelli], 411 U.S. at 782 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1756 [at 1760]; Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir.1978) (evidence falling under the “business record” hearsay exception is reliable); Jackson, 323 F.3d at 130-31 (evidence corroborated by observations in a police investigative report is reliable); McCallum, 677 F.2d at 1026 (evidence corroborated by the releasee’s testimony is reliable).
See also United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 224 (5th Cir.1995) (concluding that “[substantial evidence enhanced the reliability of the information contained in the ... report”); United States v. Garcia, 771 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir.1985) (holding evidence reliable where defendant’s in-court statements supported the evidence and he pled guilty on numerous charges before several different judges). In United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 345 (3d Cir.2009), the court noted,
[h]earsay given under oath, [United States v.] Comito, 177 F.3d [1166,] 1171 [ (9th Cir.1999) ]; Crawford, 323 F.3d at 129, replete with detail, United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir.1986); Crawford, 323 F.3d at 129, or supported by corroborating evidence, Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692; Martin, 382 F.3d at 846, has been recognized as reliable. Conversely, out-of-court statements reflecting an adversarial relationship with the accused, Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171, or contain*393ing multiple layers of hearsay, United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, 813 (10th Cir.1995); Crawford, 323 F.3d at 129, have been recognized as unreliable.
In turning to the facts in this case, Ortiz’s hearsay testimony regarding both alleged crimes based solely on her conversations with the witnesses does not rise to the level of demonstrable reliability required for admissibility. The hearsay statements used to establish that Henderson violated the conditions of probation meet no firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule that implies their inherent reliability. In addition, the record does not convey whether Ortiz was speaking purely from her memory in conveying the statements of the witnesses, or whether she was utilizing a police report or her notes thus further diminishing the reliability of her testimony. See Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171 (concluding that “[u]nsworn verbal allegations are, in general, the least reliable type of hearsay ... ”); United States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir.1995) (holding the officer’s hearsay testimony was reliable because it was consistent with the written statements of the victim in addition to other corroborating information).
With regard to the first incident, Ortiz spoke with both the victim and his daughter four days after the incident had occurred, and after both witnesses had spoken with Henderson in person regarding the phone calls.13 While *394Henderson spoke with Ortiz and she testified that “[h]e tells me basically the same thing,” Henderson’s corroboration would have been limited to the fact that he had told the victim and his daughter that “he lends his phone to a lot of people and he do[esn’t] remember who he loaned it to that day.” While the rest of the victim’s statements to Ortiz were detailed regarding the rest of the alleged robbery and the actual individual committing the robbery, the only portion relating to Henderson was regarding the initial phone call to the victim, and the fact that it came from his cell phone.
In turning to the second alleged crime, the victim gave his eyewitness testimony to Ortiz at the police station at some point after the incident occurred, but the record is not clear at what point it took place.14 In addition, the information regarding the alleged home invasion robbery was not detailed. Ortiz testified that the victim informed her that three subjects knocked on his front door, entered the unlocked door, and stole some of his personal property. Ortiz stated that the victim told her subject number one had a gun and that subject number two was “Terrence” whom he had met a couple of weeks prior at the probation office. The victim then picked Henderson as one of the individuals out of a series of photos that Ortiz showed him. With regard to the second alleged crime, Henderson’s statement to Ortiz only corroborated that he knew one of the co-defendants and that he had been in the *395vehicle that was involved in the investigation in which some of the stolen property was later discovered by the police.
Because the out-of-court statements made to Ortiz were neither inherently reliable by satisfying a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule nor were the statements corroborated by other evidence presented at the revocation hearing, the hearsay evidence offered by Ortiz does not rise to the level of being so demonstrably reliable that Henderson’s limited right to confrontation in a probation revocation hearing should have been denied.
b. Balancing Test
Alternatively, under the balancing test, the court “weighs the probationer’s interest in confronting a witness against the interests of the State in not producing the witness,” and the “State is required to show good cause for denying confrontation.” Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 441 (citations omitted); see also Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 344-45; United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir.2004); Martin, 382 F.3d at 846; Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171-72.
In assessing the probationer’s interest in confronting a witness,
although every releasee has the right to confrontation, this right is not static, but is of greater or lesser significance depending on the circumstances. [United States v.] Martin, 984 F.2d [308,] 310-11 [ (9th Cir.1993) ]. The weight to be given the right to confrontation in a particular case depends on two primary factors: the importance of the hearsay evidence to the court’s ultimate finding and the nature of the facts to be proven by the hearsay evidence. See id. at 311. As the Martin court emphasized, “the more significant particular evidence is to a finding, the more important it is that the releasee be given an opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered evidence does not reflect Verified fact.’ ” Id. So, too, the more subject to question the accuracy and reliability of the proffered evidence, the greater the releas*396ee’s interest in testing it by exercising his right to confrontation.
Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171. However,
[i]n the balancing process, the defendant’s interest in confronting the declarant is entitled to little, if any, weight where the declarant’s absence is the result of intimidation by the defendant: Where a defendant has procured the declarant’s unavailability “by chicanery, ... by threats, ... or by actual violence or murder,” the defendant is deemed to have “waived his sixth amendment rights and, a fortiori, his hearsay objection” to the admission of the declarant’s statements.
Williams, 443 F.3d at 45 (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 2385, 81 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984)).
“In assessing the government’s position, the [court] should consider, first, ‘the explanation the government offers of why confrontation is undesirable or impracticable’ and, second, ‘the reliability of the evidence which the government offers in place of live testimony.’ ” Martin, 382 F.3d at 845 (quoting Bell, 785 F.2d at 643). “ Where the government demonstrates that the burden of producing live testimony would be inordinate and offers in its place hearsay evidence that is demonstrably reliable, it has made a strong showing of good cause.’ ” Id. at 845 (quoting Bell, 785 F.2d at 643). “ Where, on the other hand, ... the government neither shows that presenting live testimony would be unreasonably burdensome nor offers hearsay evidence that bears indicia of reliability, the probationer is entitled to confrontation.’ ” Id. at 845 (quoting Bell, 785 F.2d at 643).
Henderson’s interest in confronting the witnesses was high in that the nature of the statements was “ ‘detailing the specific criminal wrongdoing of the defendant’ ” in crimes that he denied any involvement in. Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 419, 663 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting Jasper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 749, 755, 644 S.E.2d 406, 410 (2007)); see also McCormick, 54 F.3d at 222 (“It follows, therefore, that a releasee’s *397interest in cross-examining a laboratory technician regarding a scientific fact is less than would be his interest, for example, in confronting a hearsay declarant regarding what the declarant may have seen. The truth of the former can be verified through methods of science; the truth of the later can best be verified through the rigor of cross-examination, conducted under the circumspect eye of the district court.”).
Henderson was charged with failure to obey the law, failure to be of general good behavior, and failure to report an arrest, and thus the hearsay testimony was important to any finding with respect to the alleged violations. Ortiz’s testimony was a detailed recitation of the facts given to her by the unsworn verbal allegations of witnesses of two alleged crimes. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171 (“Unsworn verbal allegations are, in general, the least reliable type of hearsay____”). The only other evidence in the record supporting Ortiz’s testimony was Henderson’s corroboration of what he told the alleged victim of the first crime and his daughter regarding his phone—that he lends his phone to a lot of people, and he could not remember whom he had loaned it to that day. Further, while Henderson’s mother testified at trial, her testimony of the facts regarding where Henderson was on the night of the alleged second crime was adverse to both Henderson’s and Ortiz’s testimony, and there is no additional evidence in the record corroborating Ortiz’s testimony regarding the witnesses’ statements she testified to. Curtis, 626 F.3d at 547 (“Because the credibility of the victim’s statements are supported by other sources, Curtis has a diminished interest in testing those statements through confrontation.” (citing Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171)). Thus, the hearsay testimony was indisputably important to the circuit court’s finding of a violation.
In turning to any interest on the part of the Commonwealth in denying Henderson an opportunity to confront his accusers, the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing why it should be excused from producing the adverse witnesses for cross-examination, nor is the evidence demonstrably reliable as previously discussed. There is no evidence in the record *398that the Commonwealth made any good faith attempt to subpoena the witnesses or otherwise produce them in court. In addition, there is no evidence in the record that the witnesses had moved or that they could not be located. Id. at 547-48 (“In contrast, the government’s ‘good cause for not allowing confrontation,’ Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2598 [at 2604], was that the victim could not be located.”).
The first alleged victim merely informed Ortiz that he “really didn’t want to file charges because people knew his daughter, and they all were in the neighborhood, they live in the same neighborhood, they knew where he lived.” This does not rise to the level of overcoming Henderson’s interest in confronting the witness, nor is it evidence as to why the Commonwealth could not produce the victim or his daughter at the probation revocation hearing. Ortiz testified that she met with the second alleged victim and his mother who refused to testify because they were scared of retaliation. See Williams, 443 F.3d at 45-47. However, the only evidence of retaliation in the record involved the second victim’s mother who informed Ortiz that she had heard gunshots around her house the day before and that it really scared her. Ortiz testified that she had heard one of the other individuals involved in the second crime and his girlfriend refer to a gun in a telephone conversation, but there was no information provided to the circuit court establishing any link between Henderson, the gun referred to, and the gunshot heard near the house.
In short, the record reflects no reason advanced by the Commonwealth as to what governmental interest was served by not producing the witnesses against Henderson. Thus, Henderson’s interest in confronting the witnesses who spoke with Ortiz necessarily outweighed the interest of the Commonwealth in not producing them. In this case, the Commonwealth neither satisfied Henderson’s due process right to confront the adverse witnesses against him nor adequately justified its failure to do so. Curtis, 626 F.3d at 548 (“Instead of hindering Curtis’s ability to test the victim’s statements, the government did as much as it could to facilitate it.”). Thus, *399the circuit court could not, and therefore did not, balance Henderson’s interest in confronting the witnesses against him against any interest the Commonwealth may have had in denying Henderson that right.
III. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, although the reliability test has been found by some courts to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause, many of those cases pre-date the jurisprudential sea change wrought by Crawford v. Washington and its progeny. Thus, although the circuit court would not necessarily have erred had it applied the reliability test to the testimony of Ortiz, we think that the balancing test ought to be the preferred test utilized in the courts of the Commonwealth since it requires confrontation ab initio unless, and until, the Commonwealth provides a reason sufficient to outweigh an accused’s interest in confronting and cross-examining the evidence against him. Put differently, we hold that in non-trial proceedings involving an accused’s liberty interest, an approach that requires the Commonwealth to explain and justify its failure to provide confrontation before considering the evidentiary admissibility of any testimonial hearsay is more consistent with the overall purpose of both Morrissey, which requires an opportunity to confront testimonial hearsay as the default position for any due process analysis, and the analytical framework found in the post-Roberts cases of Crawford, Davis, Melendez-Diarz, and Bryant. As discussed above, what all of these cases have in common is that they require more than mere considerations of reliability in permitting the use of testimonial hearsay in a trial setting, and thus we think the balancing test is more faithful to current confrontation jurisprudence in the context of providing due process in a non-trial proceeding involving a liberty interest.
However, in any event, in this case the circuit court did not apply either test in overruling Henderson’s objection to Ortiz’s testimony. Thus, the record before us fails to establish “good cause” for denying Henderson an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and therefore the *400circuit court erred in admitting the testimonial hearsay evidence offered by Ortiz.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand for a new probation revocation hearing consistent with this opinion if the Commonwealth is so advised.
Reversed and remanded.
. The March 2, 2001 sentencing order provided for this sentence to run consecutively with all other sentences, which explains the difference between the sentence imposed by the circuit court and the actual time Henderson served.
. The specific conditions that the probation officer’s letter alleged Henderson violated are as follows:
Condition #1: I will obey all Federal, State and local laws and Ordinances.
Condition #2: I will report any arrest, including traffic tickets, within 3 days to the Probation and Parole Officer.
. We note that the probation officer was not called to testify regarding his allegations concerning Henderson's performance on probation, nor was the October 14, 2009 letter from the probation officer to the circuit court asserting that Henderson had violated two of the conditions of probation admitted into evidence at the probation revocation hearing.
. On brief, Henderson also challenged Ortiz’s testimony regarding recorded telephone conversations involving Henderson and a co-defendant, while they were incarcerated, with their family and friends. At oral argument, Henderson’s counsel conceded that they were not challenging the testimony regarding the telephone calls, and thus we do not address them.
. Effective July 1, 2010, Rule 5A:18 was revised and now states, "[n]o ruling of the trial court ... will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling....” Because the proceedings below were completed prior to this revision taking effect, we will rely on the language of Rule 5A:18 that was then in effect. See Fails v. Va. State Bar, 265 Va. 3, 5 n. 1, 574 S.E.2d 530, 531 n. 1 (2003) (applying the Rule of Court in effect at the time of the proceedings below).
. The Commonwealth argues that Henderson’s objection at trial was based solely upon the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and that this objection was properly overruled because the Sixth Amendment does not apply at revocation hearings. “The Sixth Amendment right is limited to 'criminal prosecutions,’ and a revocation hearing is not a 'criminal prosecution.’ ” Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417 n. 1, 663 S.E.2d at 550 n. 1 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). However, Henderson did not below, and does not now, contend that the circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. It is only the Commonwealth that has ever made that assertion. Rather, Henderson argued in the circuit court that Ortiz’s testimony violated his right of confrontation as it applied in probation violation hearings, which, as discussed more fully below, can only be the more limited right of confrontation conferred by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, there is no merit to the Commonwealth’s contention, and we do not address it further.
The Commonwealth also alleges that Henderson forfeited his right to confront the witnesses due to witness intimidation. However, there is no evidence in the record that the circuit court made a factual determination that any witnesses refused to testify at the revocation hearing *378and that such refusal was due to any intimidation by Henderson or his agents; nor is there any evidence in the record before us that would support such an implicit finding. Thus, we likewise do not address this contention on appeal.
. Because probation revocation hearings are not criminal trials and also because Morrissey predates them, the United State Supreme Court’s decision on the contours of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in criminal trials, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and its progeny are not directly implicated or discussed herein except as they apply to the definition of testimonial hearsay, and to facilitate an understanding of the history of the "reliability” test applied by some jurisdictions to due process confrontation issues. See Harper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 21, 27, 29, 675 S.E.2d 841, 844, 845 (2009) ("The Crawford opinion focuses on the necessity of replacing the [Ohio v.] Roberts[, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980),] standard with what the Court considers to be the original understanding of what the confrontation right is, that is, a procedural guarantee to the accused that he may challenge testimonial evidence against him through the process of cross-examination. The opinion does not contain a similar revision of the type of legal proceedings to which the Confrontation Clause applies .... 'The Crawford opinion does not state that its rule applies at sentencing; it does not refer to sentencing. While that rule may eventually be extended to the sentencing context, that has not happened yet.’” (quoting United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (emphasis in original))); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 171 P.3d 253, 258-59 (2007) ("Other jurisdictions that have decided the question appear to be unanimous that Crawford does not change the due process standard for confrontation in a probation revocation hearing.” (citing United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 690-92 (7th Cir.2006); Ash v. Reilly, 431 F.3d 826, 829-30 (D.C.Cir.2005); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1080, 126 S.Ct. 838, 163 L.Ed.2d 714 (2005); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 n. 4 (8th Cir. *3792004); Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804, 807-08 (D.C.2004); Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 n. 1 (Ind.2007); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1247-48 (2006); State v. Divan, 724 N.W.2d 865, 870 (S.D.2006); State v. Abd-Rdhmaan, 154 Wash.2d 280, 111 P.3d 1157, 1160-61 (2005); see also People v. Johnson, 121 Cal.App.4th 1409, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230, 232 (2004); People v. Turley, 109 P.3d 1025, 1026 (Colo.Ct.App.2004); Jackson v. State, 931 So.2d 1062[, 1063] (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006); State v. Palmer, 37 Kan.App.2d 819, 158 P.3d 363, 367 (2007); State v. Michael, 891 So.2d 109, 114-15 (La.App. 2 Cir.2005); State v. Gonzalez, 212 Or.App. 1, 157 P.3d 266, 267 (2007); State v. Pauling, 371 S.C. 435, 639 S.E.2d 680, 682 (S.C.App.2006); Trevino v. State, 218 S.W.3d 234, 238-39 (Tex.App.2007))).
. Virginia cases that cite to Morrissey inexplicably omit the language "(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604; see Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417, 663 S.E.2d at 550; Copeland v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 754, 756, 419 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1992).
. In Bryant, the United States Supreme Court noted that there are
[m]any other exceptions to the hearsay rules [that] similarly rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (statement by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy); 803(4) (Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment); 803(6) (Records of Regularly Conducted Activity); 803(8) (Public Records and Reports); 803(9) (Records of Vital Statistics); 803(11) (Records of Religious Organizations); 803(12) (Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar Certificates); 803(13) (Family Records); 804(b)(3) (Statement Against Interest); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. [2527], 2539-40 [174 L.Ed.2d 314, 329 (2009)] ("Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because-having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial'—they are not testimonial”); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. [353], 376, 128 S.Ct. 2678 [2692-93, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) ] (noting in the context of domestic violence that "[statements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation and statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354 [1367, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] ("Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy”).
131 S.Ct. at 1157 n. 9.
. In Dickens, the record in question was an “affidavit subscribed to and sworn to ... by the custodian of records for the Sex Offender & Crimes Against Minors Registry of the Virginia Department of State Police averring that appellant had not registered with the registry____” 52 Va.App. at 416, 663 S.E.2d at 550. Thus, we note that any implicit approval of the reliability test in Dickens is necessarily dicta since official or business records or the lack thereof, such as those at issue in Dickens, ordinarily do not constitute "testimonial hearsay” triggering applicability of the right of confrontation in the first instance.
. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the Supreme Court of Virginia did not adopt the reliability test in Turner, 278 Va. 739, 685 S.E.2d 665. In Turner, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the evidentiary admissibility, not the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause, of polygraph examination results in probation revocation hearings, and *391held that they are inadmissible based on a “long line of cases” that held, " ‘polygraph examinations are so thoroughly unreliable as to be of no proper evidentiary use.... The point of these cases is that the lie-detector or polygraph has an aura of authority while being wholly unreliable.’ " Id. at 743, 685 S.E.2d at 667 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 191, 194, 583 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2003)). While the Virginia Supreme Court noted the “demonstrably reliable" standard applied in federal proceedings and the "similar conclusion” reached in Dickens, it disagreed with the Commonwealth's assertion that polygraph test results should be admitted under the "relaxed” standard in probation proceedings. The Supreme Court specifically stated that, "[pjolygraph test results fall far short of the 'demonstrably reliable' hearsay evidence that may be admitted under those 'relaxed' standards,” but then proceeded to cite the rule that a court " 'has no discretion to admit clearly inadmissible evidence----”' Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the focus of the decision was the evidentiary admissibility of polygraph tests based upon their lack of scientific reliability and not on their constitutionality as admissible hearsay for Confrontation Clause purposes.
. While it may be reasonable to question the continued applicability of a reliability test in light of the United States Supreme Court's overruling of Roberts in Crawford, as previously noted, we observe that the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is not directly applicable outside of a trial setting, and serves merely as a guide in the application of the limited confrontation right available in probation revocation hearings. In addition, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bryant arguably resurrects some semblance of a reliability analysis even in Sixth Amendment confrontation cases. See Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[TJoday’s decision is not only a gross distortion of the facts. It is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where emergencies and faux emergencies are concerned.” (emphasis added)).
. The dissent contends that Henderson's failure “to present any evidence to contradict the Commonwealth's evidence” further supports the reliability of Ortiz’s hearsay testimony regarding the first incident. We disagree with the dissent’s apparent view that Henderson had any burden to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence as a prerequisite to receiving due process protection. While "formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed” in probation revocation hearings, Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789, 93 S.Ct. at 1763, the Commonwealth was seeking the revocation of Henderson’s probation and the execution of his previously suspended sentence, and thus the burden of persuasion of a probation violation remained with the Commonwealth throughout the hearing as it does with any party seeking a judgment or other relief. See Hall v. Hall, 181 Va. 67, 80, 23 S.E.2d 810, 815-16 (1943) (“The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on the propounder of the will and continues upon him throughout any contest on that question. Dickens v. Bonnewell, 160 Va. 194, 168 S.E. 610 [(1933)]; Good v. *394Dyer, 137 Va. 114, 119 S.E. 277 [(1923)]. This burden of proof is not to be confused with the burden of producing evidence. That burden frequently passes from party to party during the progress of a trial, but the necessity of proving his case always rests upon the plaintiff and never shifts. Riggsby v. Tritton, 143 Va. 903, 129 S.E. 493, 45 A.L.R. 280 [(1925)].”). Therefore, any suggestion by the dissent that Henderson’s failure to rebut the evidence he objected to in the first place somehow shows its constitutional reliability is nothing less than an improper shifting of the burden of persuasion from the Commonwealth to Henderson.
. Ortiz testified that she “received a phone call at night at my house to come in to investigate a home invasion robbery” and that she "came to the station, that was October 8th, met with the victim." She later testified that the home invasion robbery took place “around 11:00 at night.”