Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed August 28, 2023
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Nos. 05-22-00318-CR,
05-22-00319-CR
ROYNECO TIUN HARRIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1975527-R, F19-75498-R
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
In four issues, appellant Royneco Tiun Harris challenges his convictions for
murder and aggravated assault arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the
convictions. Harris also asks this Court to reform the judgments. The State raises a
cross-appeal issue asking us to additionally modify the judgments. We affirm as
modified.
BACKGROUND
Harris was convicted of the death of Clifton Norton and the aggravated assault
of his son, K.N.1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1)–(2); 22.02(a)(1)–(2). Harris
and Clifton had known each other since junior high. Harris and Jennifer Norton,
Clifton’s sister, were neighbors, and Clifton’s mother, Mary Davis, stated she
practically raised Harris. Davis identified Harris’s nickname as “Slim.” Davis
described Harris and Clifton as having an on-going disagreement regarding a vehicle
Harris had purchased from Clifton. Harris had paid Clifton some of the money owed
on the vehicle, but not the full amount. At some point, the vehicle was towed and
Harris blamed Clifton.
Jennifer confirmed Clifton and Harris’s feud was over a vehicle Clifton had
sold Harris. She said she knew Harris’s vehicle had been towed but did not know
who towed it. A week before Clifton’s murder, Harris “busted” into Jennifer’s house
extremely angry, demanding to know where Clifton was. Harris believed Clifton had
towed the car. Harris and another male left and went to Clifton’s home, but he was
not there. Jennifer stated she followed Harris to make sure nothing happened
between the men. Later the same day, Clifton arrived at Jennifer’s house with Davis
and the two men got in each other’s faces. During this altercation, Clifton pulled out
a handgun and pointed it at Harris’s chest. Harris was also carrying a handgun at the
1
To protect the identity of the minor complainant, we use initials or pronouns to identify him. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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time but did not point it at Clifton. Bystanders intervened, and the men finally cooled
off and returned to their homes without further incident. Clifton’s family believed
the incident resolved the issues related to the towed car.
On the evening of March 31, 2019, Dejanique Cooper was at Jennifer’s home
to drop off K.N. from a weekend playdate with her siblings. Cooper stated when she
pulled up to Jennifer’s home, she noticed the neighbor’s door open and saw a male
figure in the doorway but did not think anything of it at the time.
Cooper’s best friend was Kristian Garcia, Jennifer’s daughter. Garcia said
K.N. waited at her house for Clifton to pick him up. She was not sure of the exact
time Clifton arrived, but knew it was dark outside. After K.N. gathered his
belongings, she walked him outside to Clifton’s waiting vehicle. Clifton’s driver side
was facing her house. Before her hand released the doorknob after walking inside,
Garcia heard five gunshots. She heard the neighbor’s front door open and close right
as she went inside her house. She thought the gunshots sounded close, and worried
her house was being shot at. Garcia opened her front door again to see Clifton
“driving in a circle” and coming back towards her house. Clifton crashed into the
house and Garcia saw him climb out of the vehicle holding his neck. Clifton
stumbled into her house and fell on the ground. Garcia stated Clifton was trying to
talk but was not able to. She noticed he drew an “S” in a pool of blood on the floor.
As people in the house tended to Clifton, Garcia’s brother noticed K.N. had been
shot in the leg.
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According to Jennifer’s testimony, K.N. was dropped off at her house around
10:30 p.m. She recalled hearing five to six gunshots as soon as Garcia returned back
inside from walking K.N. out. As she ran outside, she saw Clifton drive up the street,
drive around a tree, and head straight towards them. Clifton crashed into the house,
and Jennifer ran to the car as Clifton got out staggering and holding his neck. She
said Clifton pointed to his neck and said “Slim.” Jennifer described Clifton as saying
“Slim” multiple times. As he staggered into her home, Clifton sat on the couch and
then fell to the floor. In a puddle of blood, he wrote the letter “S” and told her he
was not going to make it. She held him in her arms until emergency personnel
arrived. Jennifer later learned Clifton had died.
Eleven-year-old K.N. testified regarding the events of March 31, 2019. He
stated he was seated in the front passenger seat as Clifton drove off, and he
remembered hearing the window break and loud noises. He said this happened while
Clifton was driving and he hid under his coat to protect himself. K.N. testified they
were still close to Jennifer’s house and Clifton ended up crashing into the house with
the car. K.N. did not realize he had been shot until his cousin pointed it out to him.
Heather Thomas, the firearms examiner, examined a single bullet casing
found at the scene, a bullet found lodged in K.N.’s jacket, and a projectile recovered
from Clifton’s body. She was able to determine they had the same class
characteristics–.38 caliber–and were fired from a gun with eight lands and grooves
with a right twist. Thomas testified she was unable to determine whether the same
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gun fired the bullet casing and bullet recovered from the coat, and no gun was
recovered to compare them with. The Dallas County medical examiner testified to
Clifton’s manner of death as a homicide and stated the bullet went through his
trachea and carotid artery. Although he surmised Clifton expired quickly, he did state
it would have been possible for him to speak immediately after being shot.
Dallas Police Department Detective Chris Walton explained to the jury how
he determined Harris killed Clifton. At the scene, he learned another officer had
spoken to Harris on the phone and asked him to return to his home, but Harris never
returned. A few days later, Harris came into the police station and gave a statement.
Harris said he and his son had gone to the barber, then the family went to Wal-Mart,
and he went to visit a friend in Garland on March 31, 2019. However, cell phone
records show Harris’s phone was in the murder vicinity at the time it occurred. The
records also showed he was near the barber and Wal-Mart as he stated earlier in the
night, but never went to Garland. Detective Walton explained he believed Harris
committed the murder based on the witness statements, inconsistencies in Harris’s
story, Clifton’s dying declaration of “Slim,” phone records, and motive. He agreed
there was no forensic evidence linking Harris to the murder, and because they did
not find the weapon used, there were no projectiles or casings that could be linked
to a particular handgun. Detective Walton said Harris’s cell phone was never located
and he heard Harris carried a revolver which would account for the lack of ballistic
evidence at the scene.
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After finding Harris guilty and the two enhancement paragraphs true, Harris
was sentenced to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for the murder and sixty years’
imprisonment for the aggravated assault and this appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first two issues, Harris argues the evidence was insufficient to establish
identity and support the convictions.
We review a sufficiency challenge by considering all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and determine, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
318–19 (1979); Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the fact
finder’s credibility and weight determinations because the fact finder is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We presume the
factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer
to its resolution. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 922. The fact finder can choose to believe
all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805
S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence
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alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). Evidence is sufficient if “the inferences necessary to establish
guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when
considered in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900,
903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is the
person who committed the offense charged. Palomo v. State, No. 05-16-01459-CR,
2018 WL 636105, at *3 (Tex. App—Dallas Jan. 31, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Identity may be proved by “either direct or
circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence.”
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The testimony of a
single eyewitness may be sufficient evidence to identify a defendant as a perpetrator.
Palomo, 2018 WL 636105, at *3.
Although there was no forensic evidence tying Harris to Clifton’s murder,
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to believe. The jury heard
testimony from multiple family members of an ongoing disagreement between
Harris and Clifton over the towed vehicle. There was evidence of the previous
altercation between the two men where they both drew their handguns. Witnesses
stated they heard Harris’s door open and close at different times around the time of
the shooting. Jennifer testified to Clifton’s dying declaration of “Slim” and of the
“S” he drew in his own blood before dying. Detective Walton testified regarding his
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investigation and how Harris’s story did not line up with the information they knew.
Harris’s cell phone records put him in the vicinity of the murder scene and also
proved he did not travel to Garland, as he told Detective Walton.
Even though a majority of the evidence was circumstantial, it can be as
“probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. The
jury could make the necessary inferences to establish identity and guilt based upon
all of the evidence presented. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903. Because we defer to the
fact finder, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish identity and support the
convictions for the murder of Clifton and the aggravated assault of K.N. See Winfrey,
393 S.W.3d at 768. We overrule Harris’s first and second issues.
B. Reformation of the Judgments
In his third and fourth issue, Harris asks us to reform the judgments. In its
cross-issue, the State also asks us to modify the judgments. Harris first requests this
Court delete the court costs in No. 05-22-00318-CR because it is duplicative of the
court costs assessed in No. 05-22-00319-CR. In his fourth issue, Harris asks this
Court to correct the statute listed in No. 05-22-00319-CR. The State agrees with
Harris on both issues. Additionally, the State asks us to correct the judgments to
properly reflect the statute for the offense, the deadly-weapon findings, Harris’s
pleas to the enhancement paragraphs, the jury’s findings on the enhancement
paragraphs, the sentence commencement dates, and Harris’s punishment elections.
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We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the
necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d
26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). When there is a conflict between the oral
pronouncement of a sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement
controls. Shuler v. State, 650 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.)
(citing Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). When the oral
pronouncement and the written judgment conflict, the remedy is to reform the
judgment. See Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In
our review of the record, we sustain Harris’s issues, as well as the State’s cross-
appeal issue.
Harris first requests we delete the duplicative court costs from one of his two
judgments. Each judgment contains a “Criminal Court Fee Docket” which lists
multiple fees totaling $340.00. When a defendant is convicted of two or more
offenses in a single criminal trial, the trial court may assess each court costs or fee
only once against the defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.073(a). The
amount of each fee or cost assessed is determined by using the highest category of
offense that is possible based on the defendant’s convictions. Id. art. 102.073(b).
When a trial court imposes duplicative court costs and fees in two or more cases in
a single criminal action, the appellate court must delete the court costs and fees
assessed in the lower degree offense. Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 2013) (noting that the proper remedy to rectify the assessment of certain
court costs and fees not supported by the record is to delete the improper costs and
fees from the order). Harris was convicted of murder and aggravated assault in the
same trial–out of a single criminal action. Shuler v. State, 650 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.). Therefore, the court costs from No. 05-22-00318-CR
should be deleted.
Harris next requests this Court modify the statute listed for the offense in No.
05-22-00319-CR from Texas Penal Code section 19.02(A)(1) to Texas Penal Code
section 19.02(b). The correct offense Harris was convicted under was penal code
section 19.02(b) and the judgment should be modified accordingly.
The State raises a cross-appeal issue requesting additional modifications of
both of Harris’s judgments. In No. 05-22-00318-CR, the State alleges the statute of
offense is incorrect and should reflect penal code section 22.02(a), instead of penal
code section 22.02(A)(2). Additionally, both judgments reflect “N/A” under pleas
to the enhancement paragraphs, when Harris actually pleaded “Not True.” The
judgments also state “N/A” on the jury findings on the enhancement paragraphs
instead of the proper finding of “True.” The “Punishment Assessed by Jury” section
also incorrectly states there was “No Election” and should state “Jury” and the “Date
Sentence Commenced” should state April 1, 2022, instead of October 22, 2021, as
Harris absconded prior to sentencing. Case No. 05-22-00319-CR also should reflect
the finding of a deadly weapon–a firearm, instead of “N/A.”
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CONCLUSION
Based on the record before us, we sustain Harris’s third and fourth issues,
sustain the State’s cross-appeal issue, and modify the judgments as stated above. We
overrule Harris’s first and second issues and affirm as modified.
/Robbie Partida-Kipness/
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
220318F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ROYNECO TIUN HARRIS, On Appeal from the 265th Judicial
Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1975527-R.
No. 05-22-00318-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
Kipness. Justices Reichek and Miskel
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
delete the duplicative court costs, modify the offense section to state
“Penal Code § 22.02(a), change the pleas to the enhancement
paragraphs from “N/A” to “Not True”, change the jury findings to the
enhancement paragraphs from “N/A” to “True”, change the
“Punishment Assessed by Jury” from “No Election” to “Jury”, and
change the “Date Sentence Commenced” from “October 1, 2021” to
“April 1, 2022”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 28th day of August 2023.
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ROYNECO TIUN HARRIS, On Appeal from the 265th Judicial
Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1975498-R.
No. 05-22-00319-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
Kipness. Justices Reichek and Miskel
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
modify the offense section to state “Penal Code § 19.02(b), change the
pleas to the enhancement paragraphs from “N/A” to “Not True”, change
the jury findings to the enhancement paragraphs from “N/A” to “True”,
change the “Punishment Assessed by Jury” from “No Election” to
“Jury”, change the “Date Sentence Commenced” from “October 1,
2021” to “April 1, 2022”, and change the deadly weapon finding from
“N/A” to an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon–a firearm
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 28th day of August 2023.
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