concurring.
The Georgia Constitution of 1983 gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (8). Because murder cases are a class of cases in which a sentence of death could be imposed, this provision gives this Court jurisdiction to decide direct appeals in life-imprisonment murder cases.
Jurisdiction Over Capital Felonies
Throughout its history, the Georgia Supreme Court has had appellate jurisdiction to consider appeals in murder cases. As the sole appellate court from 1845 until 1906, this Court received all appeals from the superior courts. See Dawson v. State, 130 Ga. 127, 129-130 (60 SE 315) (1908). In 1906, the Court of Appeals was established by a constitutional amendment that also set out the jurisdiction of both courts. Among the cases assigned to the Supreme Court were “all cases of conviction of a capital felony.” Ga. L. 1906, p. 24. The following year, this Court considered whether it had jurisdiction over *568the appeal of a murder case when the accused was imprisoned for life, instead of being sentenced to death. See Caesar v. State, 127 Ga. 710 (1) (57 SE 66) (1907). In Caesar, the Court interpreted “capital felony” to mean felonies in which the death penalty may be affixed as a punishment, as distinguished from the class of felonies in which death can never be imposed under any circumstance. Id. at 712-713. Thus, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction in every capital felony where the law provides for punishment by death as a penalty, whether or not the penalty is imposed in the specific case.
The language assigning capital felony convictions to the Supreme Court was carried forward unchanged in the Georgia Constitutions of 1945 and 1976. Ga. Const, of 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (“in all cases of conviction of a capital felony”); Ga. Const, of 1945, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (same). Similarly, this Court continued to interpret the “conviction of a capital felony” language as conferring on the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over cases in which the accused was found guilty of a capital felony. See, e.g., Mika v. State, 196 Ga. 473 (2) (26 SE2d 616) (1943) (jurisdiction depends on whether there is a conviction of a capital felony and not on what punishment is actually imposed). See also Dawson, 130 Ga. at 132 (constitutional amendment gives the Supreme Court the “power of ultimate determination of jurisdictional questions between the two courts”).
In 1977, this Court reexamined our jurisdiction over capital felonies after the Georgia General Assembly enacted a law affecting the jurisdiction of the state’s two appellate courts. The act gave the Court of Appeals jurisdiction of appeals in cases involving armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping where the death penalty had not been imposed and the Supreme Court jurisdiction in cases involving state revenue, election contests, and the validity of municipal ordinances. Ga. L. 1977, p. 710, § 1. Inquiring into our own jurisdiction, we held that the legislative attempt to enlarge our jurisdiction by transferring certain appeals from the Court of Appeals to this Court was unconstitutional. Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400 (1) (236 SE2d 759) (1977). To effectuate the act’s legislative intent, we adopted an order under our inherent powers directing the Court of Appeals to transfer cases involving state revenues, election contests, and the constitutionality of municipal ordinances to the Supreme Court. See id. at 403.
On the issue of transfers to the Court of Appeals, this Court determined that the constitution permitted the change of appellate jurisdiction of armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping cases from our Court to the Court of Appeals. Citing our 1907 decision in Caesar v. State, we reaffirmed that the term “capital felony” applies to felonies to which the death penalty may be imposed under certain circum*569stances. Collins, 239 Ga. at 402. Since the death penalty could no longer be imposed for the crimes of armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping where the victim was not killed, we concluded that they were not capital felonies and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of appeals involving those crimes. Id. at 402-403. This ruling left unchanged our jurisdiction over all life-imprisonment murder cases, see id. at 404 (Jordan, J., concurring specially), since the crime of murder remained a felony to which the death penalty could be affixed as punishment under specific circumstances.
Jurisdiction Over Cases in Which the Death Penalty Can Be Imposed
Under the 1983 Constitution, the Supreme Court has general appellate jurisdiction of all cases in which a sentence of death “was imposed or could be imposed.” Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (8). Although the 1983 Constitution altered the language used to describe this Court’s general appellate jurisdiction over murder cases, it did not change our jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals involving life-imprisonment murder convictions. The addition or modification of language in a constitution may create a presumption that the framers intended to change existing law, Collins v. American Tel. &c. Co., 265 Ga. 37 (456 SE2d 50) (1995), but that presumption may be rebutted if the constitutional history does not support giving a new meaning to the provision. See Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 (2) (418 SE2d 27) (1992) (interpreting the equal protection clause).
When construing a constitutional provision, we must give words their ordinary meaning. The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the legislative intent, keeping in view the old law, the evil, and the remedy. OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). When the language is capable of more than one meaning, we construe the provision so as to carry out the legislative intent. Judicial Council of Ga. v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294 (702 SE2d 894) (2010).
Both the could-be-imposed language and its constitutional history support interpreting our constitution as giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over life-imprisonment murder cases. Our homicide statute provides that a “person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for life.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (d) (2011). Under this law, murder is clearly a crime in which a defendant, upon conviction, can be punished by death as compared to other crimes, such as rape, where a sentence of death can never be imposed. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (97 SC 2861, 53 LE2d 982) (1977) (holding death penalty for rape can no longer be imposed under the Eighth Amendment when the victim is not killed). Thus, direct appeals of murder convictions are subject to the jurisdiction of the *570Supreme Court under our State Constitution.
Moreover, the constitutional history of the 1983 Constitution makes clear that the framers intended for the division of jurisdiction between the two appellate courts to remain unchanged, with this Court continuing to hear all appeals from murder convictions, whether a sentence of death or life imprisonment is imposed. Initial drafts of the Judicial Article provided that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction “in all cases imposing a sentence of death,” thus giving the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals in life-imprisonment murder cases. See Select Committee on Constitutional Review, Committee to Revise Article VI, Transcripts of Meetings, Oct. 7, 1977, pp. 52-54. The Article VI Committee voted to amend this initial draft to give this Court jurisdiction “in all cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed.” Id. at 53. The rationale was that habeas corpus cases involving the death penalty should be treated in the same way as direct appeals in death penalty cases. While there were extended discussions about changing the structure of the appellate courts and restricting direct appeals to the Supreme Court, no committee members voiced any dissent to the proposition that the state’s highest court should review cases in which the death penalty was imposed. See, e.g., Article VI Committee, Transcripts, Sept. 23, 1977, pp. 14, 62 (voting unanimously for the Supreme Court to retain direct appeals in cases where death penalty is imposed while recommending that its jurisdiction be primarily discretionary).
The same unanimity did not apply to appeals in other cases, such as non-death penalty murder cases. The members of the Court of Appeals consistently opposed the provision to redistribute life-imprisonment murder cases to their court, but failed in their motion that all life-sentence murder cases go to the Supreme Court. See Article VI Committee, Transcripts, Oct. 3, 1980, pp. 91-94. The Article VI Committee’s final draft recommended that the Supreme Court exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all “cases in which a sentence of death was imposed.” Id., Index, Proposed Draft (Oct. 28, 1980), p. 4.
The Legislative Overview Committee, however, rejected the committee’s recommendation. Select Committee on Constitutional Revision, Legislative Overview Committee, Transcript of Meetings, Aug. 7, 1981, p. 140. Instead, it substituted language from a draft proposed by House Speaker Tom Murphy that added “could be imposed” to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in all murder cases in which a life sentence was imposed. Id. at 142. The intent was to “leave the jurisdiction of the two appellate courts substantially as it is now, or exactly.” Id. at 143. Both the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals agreed to leave the *571jurisdiction of their courts unchanged, as the following excerpt shows.
Chief Justice Jordan: What we wanted to do, Mr. Speaker, and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is here, he and I tried to work it out so that the jurisdiction shall remain exactly as it is now.
Chief Judge Quillian: Exactly.
Speaker Murphy: I took their Number (1), Mr. Chief Justice, in all cases where the sentence of death was imposed, and I added “or could be imposed” ....
Chief Justice Jordan: If the Overview Committee were to adopt the committee’s report, then we would accept that.. . .
Governor Busbee: Is there any objection in order to make it the same where we can expedite this just to take (1) of Paragraph II [on exclusive Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction] and make it Paragraph (8) in Paragraph III [on general appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court], and that’s the existing law; isn’t that right, Judge Quillian?
Chief Judge Quillian: That’s right.
Chief Justice Jordan: I have no objection.
Governor Busbee: Both the Chief Justice and the Chief Judge agree.
Id. at 143-144. Subsequently, the General Assembly and voters approved the 1983 Constitution with the language that was intended to maintain the existing jurisdiction of the appellate courts.
The primary argument against interpreting the could-be-imposed language to include all murder cases is our decision in State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524 (1) (322 SE2d 711) (1984). In that case, the State appealed the grant of a motion to suppress in a murder case to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court. We concluded that the case was not a case in which a sentence of death could be imposed because the district attorney did not give timely notice that the State intended to seek the death penalty. Nevertheless, as a matter of policy, we determined that this Court should review all murder cases and adopted an order directing the Court of Appeals “to transfer to the Supreme Court all cases in which either a sentence of death or of life imprisonment has been imposed upon conviction of murder, and all pre-conviction appeals in murder cases.” Id. at 524.
As has been pointed out, “[f]or a case with such significant *572consequences, Thornton provides little reasoning for its holdings.” State v. Murray, 286 Ga. 258, 264 (687 SE2d 790) (2009) (Nahmias, J., dissenting). Neither Thornton nor any subsequent opinion reviewed the could-be-imposed provision’s constitutional history as set out in the transcripts of committee meetings related to Article VI. Since Thornton, the justices who have considered the interpretation of the same constitutional language have expressed different views on what it means. Compare Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 741 (524 SE2d 452) (1999) (Benham, C. J., concurring specially) (the phrase “ ‘could be imposed’. . . speaks to the future and is applicable to those cases in which the possibility of the imposition of the death penalty still exists”) with State v. Murray, 286 Ga. at 260 (Carley, E J., concurring) (the language placing appellate jurisdiction in this Court over all cases in which a death sentence could be imposed “may be broad enough to include appeals in all murder cases”).
Although the could-be-imposed language can be interpreted two ways, its constitutional history shows that the framers of the 1983 Constitution intended it to apply to all murder cases, whether the death penalty or life imprisonment was imposed. Relying on this intent, this Court should interpret our State Constitution as giving us jurisdiction over life-imprisonment murder convictions, thus making unnecessary the transfer order adopted in Thornton. Nevertheless, as Fresiding Justice Carley has stated, the order “has provided a practical, bright-line rule which continues to serve both Georgia appellate courts well.” Murray, 286 Ga. at 260 (Carley, E J, concurring). For these reasons, I would overrule Thornton and Rhyne v. State, 264 Ga. 176 (442 SE2d 742) (1994), to the extent they hold that the 1983 Constitution gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over direct appeals in life-imprisonment murder convictions.
There are several good policy reasons for defining our jurisdiction more narrowly to limit the number of murder cases that come to this Court by direct appeal, as the discussion among the constitution’s framers shows. See generally Article VI Committee, Transcripts, Sept. 23, 1977, pp. 7-71. Any efforts, however, to change our appellate jurisdiction in life-imprisonment murder cases under the 1983 Constitution should be directed to the legislature.
I am authorized to state that Fresiding Justice Carley, Justice Benham, Justice Thompson, Justice Hines, Justice Melton, and Justice Nahmias join in this concurrence.