Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority that Sterling’s challenges to the circuit court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict and the admissibility of investor impact testimony are not preserved for review.11 However, I agree with the argument Sterling made at trial and in his brief that the court’s charge lowered the mens rea for a conviction of securities fraud.
*619The charge given to Sterling’s jury was culled from our decision in State v. Morris, 376 S.C. 189, 656 S.E.2d 359 (2008). The language in the instant case to which Sterling objects reads as follows:
I charge you that a material element of the securities fraud prosecution is the demonstration of the existence of what is called scienter.12
Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Mere negligence will not suffer [sic] for conviction. Allegations of scienter must be based on a substantial factual basis in order to create a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind as required [sic].
I would further charge you that scienter may be established by a showing of knowing misconduct or severe recklessness. Proof of such recklessness would require a showing that the defendant’s conduct was an extreme departure of ordinary care which would present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.
When broken down, this charge permitted the jury to convict Sterling based on any one of three different levels of intent: (1) knowing misconduct; (2) conscious disregard of a known risk; or (3) disregarding a risk that Sterling should have known about, but did not. My objection to the charge is twofold. First, I believe the charge approved by the Court in Morris sanctioning a conscious disregard standard was erroneous and thus the circuit court here did not correctly charge the jury on the law of securities fraud in South Carolina. Second, assuming the correctness of Morris charge, the circuit court’s charge in this case permitted a conviction upon a “should have known” standard, which is an even lower mens rea than that sanctioned by Morris. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
*620I.
In Morris, this Court held that knowing and intentional conduct is not required for a conviction of securities fraud. This holding was grounded in its belief that Section 35-1-508(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2010)13 did not specify a necessary level of intent. 376 S.C. at 201, 656 S.E.2d at 366. Thus, the Court was “extremely reluctant to draw such [a] distinction[ ]” itself. Id. However, this central premise to Morris is erroneous because section 35-1-508 does, in fact, specify a mens rea requirement: it expressly states that a person must act willfully. See S.C.Code Ann. § 35-l-508(a) (Supp.2010) (“A person that wil[l]fully violates this chapter....”).
As the comments to section 35-1-508 provide, willfulness requires “proof that a person acted intentionally in the sense that the person was aware of what he or she was doing. Proof of evil motive or intent to violate the law or knowledge that the law was being violated is not required.” Id. cmt.2. Willfulness in this context thus goes
no further than to denote that the actor had a purpose or willingness to commit a particular act or omission, in which case there is no requirement that the actor specifically intended to violate the law or injure another. In that event, the term “willful” requires only that the prohibited act occur intentionally, and merely implies that a person knows what he or she is doing, intends to do what he or she is doing, and is a free agent. Under this view, the essence of willfulness is that the actor be aware of what he or she is doing, which is to say that his or her actions are intentional, in contrast to that which is thoughtless or accidental.
21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 130 (2011). When read with section 35-1-501(3), section 35-l-508(a) consequently criminalizes actions taken by a person who knowingly and intentionally *621engages in an act, practice, or course of business that operates as a fraud upon another person.
Morris, however, held that a conviction for securities fraud will stand when the defendant either intentionally misled investors or he “knew there was a danger that his conduct would mislead investors.” 376 S.C. at 201, 656 S.E.2d at 365. The Court therefore approved of a recklessness-based conscious disregard standard: the defendant knew there was a risk his statements could mislead investors, but he proceeded anyway. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 127 (“Recklessness involves a subjective realization of a risk of a particular result and a conscious decision to ignore it, but it does not involve intentional conduct, because one who acts recklessly does not have a conscious objective to cause a particular result.”); see also State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 315, 487 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1997) (noting that recklessness “connotes a conscious failure to exercise due care or ordinary care or a conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others or a reckless disregard thereof’). Thus, intentional conduct is not required to convict under this standard. Instead, the actor must merely be aware his actions could mislead and yet still engages in them.
Based on my reading of the statute, I believe this charge does not state the appropriate mens rea under section 35-1-508(a). Contrary to the Court’s holding in Morris and the majority’s position in this case, intentional and knowing conduct is required for criminal securities fraud. A person must therefore act knowing his conduct will operate as a fraud upon another, not simply consciously disregard the risk that his conduct may do so. While Morris may have a persuasive policy rationale in that a person should be prohibited from acting when he knows of the danger, it is not found in the language of the statute.
As to the majority’s contention that my analysis conflates the concepts of the mental state required for one’s conduct and mens rea, I do not dispute this as I see no meaningful difference between the two. Indeed, the majority’s reference to State v. Reid, 383 S.C. 285, 679 S.E.2d 194 (Ct.App.2009), validates my position. It is hornbook law that most crimes require both an actus reus and a mens rea. See id. at 293 n. 2, 679 S.E.2d at 198 n. 2. Section 35-1-501(3) provides the actus reus for this type of securities fraud, viz. engaging in *622conduct that operates as a fraud upon another in connection with the sale of securities. Section 35-l-508(a), in turn, supplies the mens rea by stating a person must do so willfully. The majority, however, holds that a person must willfully defraud another when selling securities (the majority’s actus reus), but he may be convicted for doing so recklessly (the majority’s mens rea). Putting aside the conflicting levels of intent under this view, it is only by combining the mens rea and actus reus requirements found in sections 35-1-501 and 35-1-508 into one actus reus can the majority find room for recklessness in the resulting vacuum. Willfulness in the criminal context, however, is not a type of conduct but instead is unmistakably one of the graduated levels of mental intent. These two statutes therefore provide both the requisite actus reus and mens rea, and I do not believe we as a Court have the opportunity to predicate a conviction for securities fraud upon anything else.
It may be that our disagreement emanates from the confusion occasioned by the statute as to the nature of securities fraud. Comment 2 to section 35-1-508 states that “[pjroof of evil motive or intent to violate the law or knowledge that the law was being violated is not required” in a prosecution for violations of section 35-1-501. Section 35-1-501(3), however, prohibits “engaging] in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another person” when done “in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security.” Thus, the very conduct proscribed by section 35-1-501(3) is fraud, an act which is evil in and of itself. See Huff v. Anderson, 212 Ga. 32, 90 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1955) (“It appears from the authorities to be the rule without exception, that the offense of obtaining money from another by fraud or false pretenses, or larceny after trust, are crimes malum in se, involving moral turpitude.”). Proving that a person’s conduct in contravention of section 35-1-501(3) was intentional, willful, and knowing (which the majority acknowledges is required) therefore necessitates the proof of an evil motive — an intent to deceive. Although section 35-1-508 suggests scienter is not required, the language in section 35-1-501 necessitates 'fraud. Because section 35-1-501(3) is the more specific statute, I believe it controls and intent to defraud is necessary.
*623Accordingly, I believe Moms was wrongly decided and would reverse Sterling’s conviction because the charge given was taken directly from it. I also believe Sterling was prejudiced by the court’s incorrect charge. In my opinion, there is not “abundant evidence” that Sterling intentionally defrauded investors. Rather, there is a significant amount of evidence showing Sterling simply was blind to the risks he may have taken. Indeed, one juror sent a note to the court asking if Sterling could be convicted based only on severe recklessness, thereby arguably expressing his view that the State had not shown a course of intentional conduct.
II.
Even if Morris did correctly hold that criminal recklessness is sufficient under section 35 — 1—508(a),14 I believe the Court may have inadvertently sanctioned the use of a criminal negligence mens rea standard. The charge given in this case followed verbatim a portion of Morris wherein the Court quoted and tacitly approved of a charge which stated that a jury could convict upon finding the defendant took steps “which present! ] a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to [the defendant] or is so obvious that [he] must have been aware of it.”15 376 S.C. at 201, 656 S.E.2d at *624365. (emphasis added). This charge accordingly includes both a “known” and a “should have known” standard.
Crucial to the concept of recklessness is the notion that the actor must subjectively be aware of the risk, and one is not criminally reckless for acting despite a risk he should have known. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 127. In other words, liability for recklessness “cannot be predicated solely on an objective consideration of what a defendant ‘should have known.’ ” Id. A hallmark of criminal negligence, on the other hand, is disregarding a risk one should have known about. State v. Taylor, 323 S.C. 162, 166, 473 S.E.2d 817, 818 (Ct.App. 1996); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 126 (“A person acts with criminal negligence when he or she should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk he or she has created.”). Thus, a defendant’s subjective knowledge of the risk is irrelevant for criminal negligence. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 126. Hence, the charge approved of in Morris includes both recklessness and the lower mens rea of negligence.
However, I do not believe the Morris Court actually intended to approve of criminal negligence as a permissible mens rea for securities fraud. Instead, I read Morris as only criminalizing acting with actual knowledge that one’s conduct may mislead investors. Apart from this language, the Court never mentioned the negligence standard again. Notably, after quoting this “should have known” standard the Court wrote, “Stated differently, the court charged that in order to support a conviction, the jury needed to find that [Morris] intentionally misled investors, or that [Morris] knew that there was a danger that his conduct would mislead investors.” Morris, 376 at 201, 656 S.E.2d at 365. Clearly, the Court believed the charge it was reviewing only concerned recklessness. It accordingly appears the Court unintentionally lowered the standard by implicitly sanctioning the “should have known” language when attempting to hold recklessness will sustain a conviction for securities fraud.16 See State v. Jefferies, 316 *625S.C. 13, 18, 446 S.E.2d 427, 430 (1994) (noting criminal negligence is a lower level of intent than criminal recklessness).
Furthermore, the Court’s ultimate holding was a policy decision rooted in the notion that one should not be able to escape criminal liability for statements made with actual knowledge that they will mislead investors. Id. at 202, 656 S.E.2d at 366. However, this policy was limited by the Court to just acting with actual knowledge of the risk and did not embrace a situation where one should have known of the risk. I therefore read the Court’s decision as only permitting a charge on recklessness, and the Court was neither asked to nor attempted to expand the net cast by section 35-1-508(a) to include negligence. Thus, the Court’s references to the “should have known” standard are dicta. See Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 248 S.C. 412, 418, 150 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1966) (“ ‘[Gjeneral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit ....’” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821))). I can also find nothing in section 35-1-508 itself which permits a conviction of securities fraud to stand on mere criminal negligence.
The majority today opines that the “should have known” language from Morris is not rooted in criminal negligence but instead is a species of knowing misconduct. After parsing the language of the charge, the majority’s contention is that it sanctioned a willful blindness standard, not an accidental blindness one. While I may disagree with the majority’s ultimate reading of the charge and whether it in fact states a willful blindness standard, there is an inherent danger in giving such a charge because it may permit the jury to slip down the slope into negligence. As the Fifth Circuit stated, “Because the instruction permits a jury to convict a defendant without a finding that the defendant was actually aware of the existence of illegal conduct, the deliberate ignorance instruction poses the risk that a jury might convict the defendant on *626a lesser negligence standard.” United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir.1990).
The source of this risk is the potential for confusion about the degree of “deliberateness” required to convert ordinary, innocent ignorance into guilty knowledge. The concern is that once a jury learns that it can convict a defendant despite evidence of a lack of knowledge, it will be misled into thinking that it can convict based on negligent or reckless ignorance rather than intentional ignorance. In other words, the jury may erroneously apply a lesser mens rea requirement: a “should have known” standard of knowledge.
United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 548-49 (5th Cir.2009), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010). While this charge may be warranted under certain facts, I do not find them present in this case.17 Accordingly, the circuit court’s charge here did not state the correct law in South Carolina and permitted the jury to convict Sterling based on criminal negligence.
Even if recklessness is enough for a conviction, I still find sufficient evidence in the record that Sterling was not aware of the risks he took to warrant a finding of prejudice. I would therefore reverse Sterling’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
III.
In sum, I would overrule Morris and hold that intentional and knowing conduct is required for a conviction of securities fraud. Because the charge given to Sterling’s jury permitted a conviction on something less than willfulness, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. However, even assuming Morris correctly held that recklessness is sufficient for crimi*627nal securities fraud, the charge here incorporated criminal negligence, which is even lower than recklessness in the hierarchy of criminal intent. Although the negligence language used by the circuit court in this case came directly from Morris, I do not believe the Morris Court intended to adopt this standard. Accordingly, I would still reverse Sterling’s conviction and remand.
. Nevertheless, I am troubled by the prejudicial nature of the investors' testimony regarding the impact their losses had on their lives and families.
. Although no party has objected to the circuit court’s inclusion of scienter as an element of securities fraud, the Morris Court held the "statutory scheme expressly forecloses” this requirement. 376 S.C. at 202 n. 5, 656 S.E.2d at 366 n. 5. As discussed below, however, I do believe a prosecution for securities fraud necessitates a showing of intent to defraud.
. Section 35-l-508(a) is the vehicle for criminal prosecution for violations of Section 35-1-501 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2010). Sterling was indicted for violating section 35-1-501(3), which provides that "[i]t is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of a security, directly or indirectly, ... to engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another person.”
. Some authorities do suggest that this sort of criminal recklessness can satisfy the willfulness/intent element for securities fraud. See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir.2004); Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C.Cir. 1992); see also State v. Jarrell, 350 S.C. 90, 98, 564 S.E.2d 362, 367 (Ct.App.2002) ("Extreme indifference is in the nature of ‘a culpable mental state ... and therefore is akin to intent.' In this state, indifference in the context of criminal statutes has been compared to the conscious act of disregarding a risk which a person’s conduct has created, or a failure to exercise ordinary or due care.” (citations omitted)). But see United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir.1998) (”[T]he statute provides that a negligent or reckless violation of the securities law cannot result in criminal liability; instead, the defendant must act willfully.”). Morris, however, viewed these levels of intent as wholly separate. If this interpretation were to be adopted with respect to section 35-l-508(a), then Morris may have correctly held that recklessness is sufficient even if it did so for a different reason.
. The author of today’s majority did approve substantively of this charge in Morris, but he would not "endorse the instruction as a model *624charge.” 376 S.C. at 211 n. 12, 656 S.E.2d at 370 n. 12 (Pleicones, J., concurring).
. I believe the circuit court committed the same inadvertent error here. In charging the jury, the circuit court stated that "[mjere *625negligence will not suffer [sic] for conviction.” However, the court repeated the same "should have known” language quoted in Morris.
. In order to be warranted, the evidence adduced at trial must raise two inferences: "(1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct.” Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 951. While the evidence may permit the first inference, which would be in accord with reckless misconduct, I can find nothing in the record which demonstrates Sterling purposefully sought to avoid knowing what was going on.