concurring fully and specially.
I agree with all that is said in the opinion of the Court, and I join it in full. I write separately only to identify an alternative basis on which some of us also would affirm the denial of Patricia Curry’s motion to suppress.
The trial court in this case found that Curry agreed to the special conditions through her lawyer and that, even if she had not done so, the police officers who searched her residence acted reasonably when they relied upon the consent provision contained in the special *342conditions. Implicit in the opinion of the Court is the notion that a lawyer may be authorized, at least in some cases, to waive his client’s rights under the Fourth Amendment when securing her release on bond.4 And because a lawyer sometimes may be authorized to consent to a search of his client’s property, the officers in this case were entitled to rely upon the consent provision contained in the special conditions that Curry’s lawyer signed.
Here, the police officers indisputably relied upon this consent provision when they searched Curry’s residence, and one testified that the officers were “confident” that the special conditions were “proper.” It was reasonable for the officers to believe that the special conditions had been properly executed — especially considering that they were signed by a judge of the superior court and an assistant district attorney whose signatures were known to, and authenticated by, the officers — and, therefore, that whoever signed the special conditions as the “Defendant/Defendant’s Attorney” had authority to do so.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 (110 SC 2793, 111 LE2d 148) (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that a search is reasonable when it is based on the consent of a person whom officers reasonably, but erroneously, believe has authority to consent to the search. See id. at 186 (III) (B). As the Supreme Court explained in Rodriguez, the Fourth Amendment does not require that officers “always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.” Id. at 185 (III) (B). The existence of authority to consent to a search, the Supreme Court said, “is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably.” Id. at 186 (III) (B). Citing Rodriguez, our Court has endorsed this principle in several decisions. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 (691 SE2d 888) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”); Warner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 56, 59 (1) (681 SE2d 624) (2009) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the *343police to reasonably believe that the parents had that authority, and therefore the search was valid.”); Pike v. State, 265 Ga. App. 575, 577 (1) (594 SE2d 753) (2004) (“[A] warrantless search based on unauthorized consent could nonetheless be upheld if the law enforcement officer conducting the search reasonably (albeit erroneously) believed the consent given was valid.”) (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted); Ford v. State, 214 Ga. App. 284, 286 (3) (447 SE2d 334) (1994) (en banc) (same). Because the officers were entitled to conclude that whoever signed the special conditions on behalf of Curry had authority to consent to a search, their search of Curry’s residence was reasonable.5
There is no evidence that any of the officers had any reason to believe that Curry had not agreed to the consent provision through her lawyer.6 Indeed, when the officers arrived at her residence, they informed Curry that they intended to conduct a search pursuant to the terms of her bond, and although she attempted to physically prevent them from conducting the search, there is no evidence that she then expressed an unawareness of the special conditions or disputed that she had agreed to them. In these circumstances, the officers were entitled to reasonably rely upon the consent provision in the special conditions, and the search of Curry’s residence was, therefore, reasonable.
No one disputes that the officers reasonably believed that Curry had consented to the search, either herself or through her lawyer. Instead, Curry argues that we cannot consider the reasonable beliefs of the officers because Georgia rejects the good faith exception. See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 575-576 (422 SE2d 426) (1992) (rejecting good faith exception as inconsistent with statutory exclusionary rule, OCGA § 17-5-30). Curry, however, misapprehends the nature of the good faith exception and our rejection of it in Georgia. The Fourth Amendment secures individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the exclusionary rule secures individuals against the *344use in judicial proceedings of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (I) (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983) (“The question whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 13 (115 SC 1185, 131 LE2d 34) (1995) (“[T]he issue of exclusion is separate from whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. . . .”). The good faith exception is an exception to the exclusionary rule, not the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment or its preference for warrants. Because a search is reasonable when officers obtain the consent of a person whom the officers reasonably, but erroneously, believe is authorized to consent to the search, see Rodriguez, 497 U. S. at 185-186 (III) (B), such a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The exclusionary rule — and, therefore, an exception to the exclusionary rule — has no application when there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment. For this reason, the rejection in Georgia of the good faith exception has no bearing upon a proper resolution of this case.
Both for these reasons and the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court, I would affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews, Judge Mikell and Judge Dillard join in this opinion.
This notion is consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent, which has held that an individual properly may waive her rights under the Fourth Amendment in a variety of ways, whether “directly or through an agent.” Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 489 (84 SC 889, 11 LE2d 856) (1964). It also is consistent with the principle that “[a]ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any action or proceeding by any agreement in relation to the cause, made in writing, and by signing judgments, entering appeals, and entering such matters, when permissible, on the dockets of the court.” OCGA § 15-19-5.
I reject the notion that officers may never rely reasonably upon consent given in writing unless they also have face-to-face contact with the person signing the consent. While it is true, I think, that officers cannot rely upon just any piece of paper that purports to have been signed by one with authority to consent, the officers here were relying upon a court filing, the authenticity of which was indisputable. When a judge of the superior court has approved an agreement between an assistant district attorney and a defense lawyer, I think a police officer reasonably may rely — absent information to the contrary — upon the validity of the agreement and the authority of the defense lawyer to enter the agreement on behalf of his client.
This fact distinguishes this case from State v. Kuhnhausen, 289 Ga. App. 489 (657 SE2d 592) (2008), in which this Court held that the consent of a probationer to a search of his residence did not entitle officers to search the adjacent residence of his brother, notwdthstand-ing that the officers may genuinely have believed that they were a single residence. Any such belief, though genuine, was unreasonable because one of the officers “knew that the structure was divided into two separate residences.” 289 Ga. App. at 490 (1).