concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the rule it espouses in part I of the opinion may better comport with the expectations of workers’ compensation claimants, and, as a matter of public policy, would be more fair to claimants than the result reached by the Panel.
However, section 8 — 43—203(2)(b)(II), C.R.S. 2007, provides that a case is closed if the claimant does not contest the FAL in writing within thirty days. See Peregoy v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 87 P.3d 261, 264 (Colo.App.2004) (discussing automatic nature of case closure where no objection is filed within thirty days). That section contains no provision of additional time for claimants to respond in the event the employer files an amended FAL within the thirty-day period to contest the original FAL. Therefore, by operation of the statute, the case automatically closed before claimant filed her objection.
The automatic closure of issues raised in an uncontested FAL is “part of a statutory scheme designed to promote, encourage, and ensure prompt payment of compensation to an injured worker without the necessity of a formal administrative determination in cases not presenting a legitimate controversy.” Dyrkopp v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 30 P.3d 821, 822 (Colo.App.2001). Once a case has automatically closed by operation of the statute, “the issues resolved by the FAL are not subject to further litigation unless they are reopened pursuant to [section] 8-43-303, C.R.S. [2007].” Berg v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 128 P.3d 270, 272 (Colo.App.2005).
Because the ease closed before claimant filed her objection, and the issues were not reopened under section 8-43-303, I respectfully dissent with respect to part I of the opinion.
However, I concur in part II of the opinion.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Panel.