concurring: I concur with the result reached by the majority, but only because the State failed to provide evidence that anyone actually attempted to serve Thaddeus J. Myers with the probation violation warrant at his last known address.
State v. Haines, 30 Kan. App. 2d 110, 39 P.3d 95, rev. denied 273 Kan. 1038 (2002), is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Haines, the defendant had been informed that if he paid off his fines and court costs, he would no longer be required *256to report on probation. The defendant understood that his ex-wife had paid the fines and court costs, but apparently this never happened. The defendant then moved to Ohio where he lived openly and maintained steady employment. A probation violation warrant was issued, and the defendant was arrested 16 years later in Ohio. The record indicated that the State’s efforts to locate the defendant during this time were limited to two letters, one sent to the defendant’s ex-wife and one sent to the defendant’s mother. Under these circumstances, the court held that the State had failed to execute the probation violation warrant within a reasonable time. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 112-13.
State v. Bennett, 36 Kan. App. 2d 381, 138 P.3d 1284, rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 (2006), is also distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Bennett, a probation violation warrant issued for the defendant was not executed for more than 2 years. During most of this time, the defendant lived at her Wichita address which had been provided to the probation office. The defendant never moved outside the city. According to the defendant’s motion to quash the warrant, the defendant did not malee any effort to secrete herself and she attempted to turn herself in on two occasions and was told that someone would be by to pick her up, but no one ever came. The testimony at the probation violation hearing indicated that the State never attempted to contact the defendant at the address listed on the warrant. Furthermore, the State made no substantial effort to locate the defendant other than to include her name in a local “felon of the day” program. Under these circumstances, the court held that the State had failed to execute the probation violation warrant within a reasonable time. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 386-87.
Here, it is important to note that the conditions of Myers’ probation included that he report to his probation officer on a regular basis and that he notify his probation officer of any change of address. Myers was also ordered not to leave the state of Kansas without first obtaining permission from his probation officer. Myers flagrantly violated these conditions and moved to Oklahoma without permission where he lived for 2 years. During this time, Myers had a continuing duty to report to Iris probation officer and *257to notify his probation officer of his new address. Myers was certainly aware that he was in violation of his probation and that a probation violation warrant probably had been issued for his arrest.
Under these circumstances, I believe it would have been reasonable for the sheriff s office to make one attempt to serve Myers with the probation violation warrant at Myers’ last known address and, if this failed, to place the warrant with the National Crime Information Center or some other computerized database for tracking warrants. I take exception to the language in Haines and Bennett that imposes a duty on the State to “investigate” a probation absconder’s whereabouts. For instance, Haines suggests that if a probationer initially cannot be found, then the State should attempt to locate the probationer through his or her driver’s license, social security number, employer, or other means. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 113. I disagree. Law enforcement officers throughout Kansas are assigned the task of executing thousands of probation violation warrants in misdemeanor and felony cases. They have limited resources to accomplish this task. Courts should not impose a duty on law enforcement officers, including probation officers, to “investigate” the whereabouts of probation absconders in addition to their many other duties.
Myers was never entitled to be placed on probation in the first place. This was an act of grace by the court. Therefore, it should generally take an unusual set of circumstances, like the court was faced with in Haines, in order for the court to determine that Myers’ due process rights have been violated. Quite frankly, there is nothing unusual about taking 2 years to execute a misdemeanor probation violation warrant, especially when the defendant has absconded from the state. Probation violation hearings similar to the one in Myers’ case are conducted on a regular basis in courts throughout Kansas. Courts are sending the wrong message to probation violators if they are allowed to believe that all they need to do to be released from probation is move out of state and avoid being arrested for 2 years.
Nevertheless, because the record here reflects that the State failed to make a single attempt to serve Myers with the probation *258violation warrant at his last known address, I agree with the majority that the State’s inaction constituted a waiver of the probation violation.