dissenting: The majority frames the primary issue in this case as a question of whether an implied warranty of merchantability applies to the air conditioner in a used car. They conclude that this determination is a question of law. In my view, this misstates the issue.
The transaction here was for the sale of a car, not an air conditioner. A warranty of merchantability arises as a matter of law when the seller is a merchant as to the type of goods sold. K.S.A. 84-2-314. In this case, the item sold was a used Mercedes, and both parties agree that Johnson was a used-car dealer. Because Johnson was admittedly a merchant with respect to used vehicles, there should be no question as to whether the implied warranty of merchantability applies in this case. The warranty was created by operation of law. See Limestone Farms, Inc. v. Deere & Company, 29 Kan. App. 2d 609, 614, 29 P.3d 457 (2001).
The real issue in this case is whether a faulty air conditioner in a specific used Mercedes that sold for about $17,000 constitutes a breach of that warranty of merchantability. Whether such a breach has occurred is a question of fact, not a question of law. See Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 462, 657 P.2d 517 (1983). For goods to be merchantable, they must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which they are used, and the buyer must show that the goods were not fit for that purpose. K.S.A. 84-2-314(2)(c); Black, 232 Kan. at 467. The Kansas Supreme Court has acknowledged the fact-specific nature of this inquiry by holding that the obligation of a merchant selling used goods is dependent on the circumstances of the transaction. See International Petroleum Services, Inc. v. S & N Well Service, Inc., 230 Kan. 452, 457, 639 P.2d 29 (1982); see also Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 234 Kan. 840, 844, 676 P.2d 744 (1984) (stating that “the implied warranty of merchantability varies with the particular car”).
Kansas law is thus clear that the merchantability — or lack thereof — of a used car is dependent on many factors. See International Petroleum Services, 230 Kan. at 457. To conclude as a matter of law that a faulty air conditioner can never constitute a breach of a warranty of merchantability, as the majority does, is far too sweeping and runs counter to that nuanced philosophy of mer*229chantability. The quality spectrum of used cars is wide. Certainly, the expectations of a buyer and seller of a pristine, late-model luxury car with very low mileage are drastically different than those of the buyer and seller of a beat-up, 20-year-old jalopy that has been driven more than 200,000 miles. While it might be unreasonable to expect a working air conditioner in the jalopy, the expectations for the air conditioner in the luxury car would be quite different — especially if a high price was paid. But while there may be no debate as to whether a broken air conditioner breaches a warranty of merchantability in those respective situations, the area between those extremes is more questionable. Where a vehicle in a transaction falls between those opposites, the district court’s decision as a fact-finder ought to be respected.
We do not have a Kansas appellate case that tells us exactly when the facts supporting an implied warranty of merchantability in a used car may become so outside the realm of fair debate that the matter should be decided as a legal question. But a similar issue arises in other areas in which that issue is ordinarily a question of fact, as with whether a breach of implied warranty has occurred. For example, issues of negligence and causation usually are for the fact-finder to decide. St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 417, 781 P.2d 1043 (1989). Even in such cases, however, we sometimes find that the facts are so far at one end of the spectrum of possible cases that the matter may be decided as a matter of law on summary judgment. E.g., Hale v. Brown, 38 Kan. App. 2d 495, 167 P.3d 362 (2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment on negligence claim based on finding that accident was not sufficiently foreseeable); Berthelson v. Developmental Services of Northwest Kansas, No. 95,274, unpublished opinion filed December 22, 2006, rev. denied 283 Kan. 930 (2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment on negligence claim based on weakness of evidence of causation). See generally 11 Stempel, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.11[6][a] (3d ed. 2007); 10A Wright, Miller, Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2729 (1998).
In this case, the vehicle was an older Mercedes with more than 100,000 miles on it and apparently in good working order. While not exactly new, the car sold for about $17,000 and was certainly *230no jalopy. Under these facts, the car seems to fall squarely between the extremes noted above. The question to be decided here, then, was a question of fact, and we must uphold the decision of the fact-finder if it is supported by substantial evidence. Wilson v. Wilson, 37 Kan. App. 2d 564, 572, 154 P.3d 1136 (2007). The district court’s decision here that a faulty air conditioner in this particular car constituted a breach of the warranty of merchantability is supported by substantial evidence. We should therefore respect and uphold that decision.
Because the majority determined that the Hodges had no claim at all, their opinion does not address some issues that would have been relevant had they agreed with my conclusion that we must affirm the district court’s finding of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The Hodges initiated the appeal on the district court’s decision not to award attorney fees to them. Johnson cross-appealed, claiming both that there was no implied warranty and that the Hodges had not provided sufficient evidence of their damages. Because the majority found no warranty, its opinion did not address the damages issue. And although the majority noted that an award of attorney fees is required by statute for successful appellees from small-claims proceedings, its opinion never reached that issue since the Hodges did not succeed on their claim on appeal.
The district court had ruled in favor of the Hodges and awarded $3,474 in damages. There was testimony before the district court from mechanic Virgil Anderson, and he provided an estimate that the repair costs would be that amount. Although Johnson argues now on appeal that this was merely an estimate and not sufficient to prove the Hodges’ damages, the district court obviously disagreed. When a party challenges the amount of damages awarded, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party to determine whether it supports the judgment. Warren v. Heartland Automotive Services, Inc., 36 Kan. App. 2d 758, 763, 144 P.3d 73 (2006). Because a correct measure of damages is the cost of repair, International Petroleum Services, 230 Kan. at 460, and there was testimony that it would cost $3,474 to repair and replace the faulty air conditioner, the Hodges adequately proved *231their damages. In addition, as the prevailing party, the Hodges would be entitled to attorney fees.
I would therefore affirm the district court’s judgment awarding damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability but reverse as to its denial of attorney fees and remand for a determination of the appropriate fee award.