dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3609a and related statutes. It is evident that the statute is ambiguous and that there is authority which can be cited to support both the analysis of the Court of Appeals’ majority and the majority of this court. In such a circumstance, we are called upon to determine the legislative intent and to reconcile different provisions in a consistent, harmonious, and sensible manner. See State v. Van Hoet, 277 Kan. 815, Syl. ¶ 2,89 P.3d 606 (2004). The most consistent, harmonious, and sensible construction, in my view, is to construe the provision in a manner which would allow an appeal of a magistrate’s probation revocation order to a district court judge.
Although the majority does not specifically discuss the practical effect of its ruling, it would seem there are two potential outcomes: (1) A defendant would have no right to appeal or (2) the appeal would be to the Court of Appeals. Neither result is consistent with legislative intent.
The most likely outcome of today’s decision would be that a magistrate’s probation revocation order would be appealed to the
*117Court of Appeals under K.S.A. 22-3601(a), which states in material part:
“Any appeal permitted to be taken from a final judgment of a district court in a criminal case shall be taken to the court of appeals, except in those cases reviewable by law in the district court and those cases where a direct appeal to the supreme court is required.”
Since this provision refers to “district court,” rather than “district judge,” it would include final orders of a district magistrate judge, “except in these cases reviewable by law in district court.” In prior cases, this court has accepted jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3601 when the defendant has appealed from a revocation of probation and, thus, implicitly recognized that a probation revocation order is a “final judgment.” See, e.g., State v. Graham, 272 Kan. 2, 3, 30 P.3d 310 (2001).
Under this interpretation of K.S.A. 22-3601, Legero’s appeal should have been docketed with the Court of Appeals. However, because all other judgments of a magistrate judge would be appealed to a district judge, this would mean that probation revocation decisions made by a magistrate would be treated differently than any other of the judge’s final judgments. See K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3609a; K.S.A. 60-2103a. Nothing about the nature of the probation revocation process would suggest a reason why the legislature would intend to have such a decision be the one exception where a. matter would go directly to the Court of Appeals rather than be heard by a district court judge.
The other possible result of the majority opinion would be that there is no right to appeal a magistrate’s decision to revoke probation. This consequence creates an unreasonable dichotomy: a defendant who has his or her probation revoked by a district magistrate has no right of appeal, but a defendant whose probation is revoked by a district judge has a right to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. There may be no difference in the crime committed, the probation violation, or the term of sentence, but the due process rights differ substantially merely because of the whim of a case assignment system within a district or the happenstance that a crime is committed in a district without magistrate judges. *118There is no basis to conclude that this anamoly reflects legislative intent.
The more reasonable construction is that adopted by the Court of Appeals majority which recognized Legero’s right to appeal his probation revocation to a district judge. That construction results from a reading of the various statutes in pari materia. As previously noted, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3609a, relating to appeals of magistrate decisions to the district court, uses the term “any judgment," and K.S.A. 22-3601(a), relating to appeals from the district court to the Court of Appeals, uses the term “final judgment.” If anything, the term “any judgment” is broader than the term “final judgment,” although die majority’s opinion results in a more narrow construction. At a minimum, a construction in pari materia of two similar provisions demands that the two terms be applied in the same manner.
In contrast, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3609, which relates to appeals from municipal courts to the district courts, specifically limits appellate jurisdiction to a “judgment of a municipal court which adjudges the defendant guilty of a violation of the ordinances of any municipality.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3609(1). Because of this limiting statutory language, the majority’s rebanee upon City of Wichita v. Patterson, 22 Kan. App. 2d 557, 559, 919 P.2d 1047, rev. denied 260 Kan. 992 (1996), is misplaced. The language in the statute relating to appeals of a municipal judgment is very hmiting, allowing only appeals from one type of judgment, and stands in sharp contrast to 22-3609a, which allows an appeal from “any judgment.”
The other cases cited by the majority are also distinguishable. In State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 664 P.2d 1358 (1983), the defendant attempted to appeal a magistrate’s order binding the defendant over for arraignment. The district court ruled that the order was not appealable, and its decision was affirmed on appeal. 233 Kan. at 624. Lashley must be considered within the facts presented. As the Court of Appeals’ majority in the present case noted: “An order binding a defendant over for arraignment does not connote finahty of judgment in the district court; there is still an ongoing legal process in the district court before disposition of the case in its *119entirety and the entry of judgment.” 31 Kan. App. 2d at 902. Although there is language in Lashley which limits the interpretation of “judgment” to “convictions,” that language was unnecessaiy to the decision and should be limited to the facts of the case which dealt with a preliminary, preconviction ruling, as opposed to this case which is more similar to Graham where this court recognized its jurisdiction over a probation revocation appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3601.
The other case cited by the majority, State v. Remlinger, 266 Kan. 103, 968 P.2d 671 (1998), is similarly distinguishable. As the Court of Appeals stated:
“The defendant filed a notice of appeal with the district court after he had been convicted by a magistrate but before sentencing. On appeal, the defendant argued 22-3609a authorized his appeal, claiming a finding of guilty was “any judgment” under tire statute. The Remlinger court observed that a criminal judgment requires a pronouncement of guilt and the determination of punishment. Thus, Remlinger required finality of proceedings in the district court as a legal predicate to appellate review. 266 Kan. at 106-07. Here, Legero’s probation was revoked, and his sentence imposed. There was a finality in the proceedings before the district court. Like Lashley, Remlinger speaks only to presentencing orders and judgments, not to probation revocation proceedings that result in the incarceration of a defendant.” 31 Kan. App. 2d at 901.
Thus, none of the decisions cited by the majority require the result reached. The majority indicates that the compelling reason for its interpretation is the language in 22-3609a which relates to the procedure for the appeal. Those provisions allow for a trial de novo upon the original complaint. The majority interprets the procedural provisions to require that the entire proceeding begin again with a new determination of guilt and sentencing. I agree with the majority that this would be an unreasonable result. However, I do not agree that this is the result which is required under the statute.
“Trial" is defined as: “A formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionaiy 1510 (7th ed. 1999). The hearing on a revocation of probation requires an evidentiary hearing, a determination of legal claims, and is an adversarial proceeding. Although the procedure provided for in 22-3609a is written in a manner sufficiently broad to accommodate an appeal after the original sen*120tencing following the conviction, nothing in the procedure restricts application of general principles of appellate procedure, allowing an appeal of only some questions or aspects of a judgment, as long as that judgment is final. The trial de novo would be limited to the judgment from which the appeal was taken — in this case, the judgment that Legero had violated his probation and his probation should be revoked.
For these reasons and others stated in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, I would affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court.