concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur with the Court’s determination that the UNC-Chapel Hill EPA Non-Faculty Grievance Procedure did not violate petitioner’s rights to procedural due process or equal protection of the laws under the North Carolina Constitution. I also concur with the Court’s decision to remand this case to the Orange County Superior Court. However, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding that EPA Non-Faculty employees such as petitioner are entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act. As a result, I concur in the Court’s decision in part, concur in the result reached in the Court’s decision in part, and dissent from the Court’s decision in part.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5(cl) states that the North Carolina Whistle-blower Act does not apply to “[a] State employee who is not a career state employee as defined by this Chapter.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5(cl) (2009). A career state employee under this chapter is defined as one who:
(1) Is in a permanent position appointment; and
(2) Has been continuously employed by the State of North Carolina or a local entity as provided in G.S. 126 5(a)(2) in a position subject to the State Personnel Act for the immediate 24 preceding months.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-1.1 (2009).
Here, petitioner was not in a permanent employment position. Her position was for the term of one year, and it was subject to the continued availability of funds. Furthermore, as the majority has correctly determined, petitioner’s position as an EPA Non-Faculty employee was not subject to the State Personnel Act. Therefore, the North Carolina Whistleblower Act did not apply to petitioner.
The majority cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5(c5) as the basis for protection of petitioner under the Whistleblower Act. However, this section of the statute specifically states that, “[notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, Article 14 of this Chapter shall apply to all State employees, public school employees, and community college employees.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5(c5) (2009). The very language of this section itself clearly indicates that § 126-5(c5) only applies notwithstanding any other provision. This language clearly indicates that § 126-5(c5) is meant to operate as a residuary, or catchall, provision that is applicable only when the statute does not other*208wise provide to the contrary. Here, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5(cl) very clearly articulates that the Whistleblower Act does not apply to a state employee who is not a career state employee. The statute further provides a very precise definition of a career state employee. Here, petitioner clearly does not satisfy either part of the definition of a career state employee. Petitioner was 1) not in a permanent employment position, and 2) her position was not subject to the State Personnel Act.
As a result, I am unable to agree with the Court’s determination that petitioner was entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act. I agree with the Court’s determination that this case should be remanded to the superior court. However, I conclude that remand would be proper only with instructions to the trial court to affirm the final decision of the Board of Governors consistent with this dissent.