concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur with the majority that the State was properly dismissed, I dissent from the majority’s extension of retirement credit purchases to former State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS) employees with reduced benefits. In 1999, our Legislature made a policy decision to privatize SIIS into the Employer’s Insurance Company of Nevada (EICON). To do so, the Legislature adopted SB 37, which established the legal framework for abolishing this state agency.
Concerned with the privatization’s impact on state employees, the Legislature created a number of protections for SIIS workers who changed jobs by the privatization or who chose not to accept employment with EICON. These protections included priority re*129hiring from the state reemployment list, extended time for remaining on the reemployment list, and a lifting of the then-existing state hiring freeze for SHS employees who had difficulty obtaining other employment.
The Legislature also provided a benefit to employees joining EICON who were close to retirement and wanted to retire early. Section 134(1) of SB 37 required EICON to purchase credit for not more than 5 years of service for employees who would be made eligible to receive an unreduced service retirement allowance pursuant to Chapter 286 of NRS. In this, the Legislature was advised that this benefit would extend to the approximately 150 SHS employees who were eligible for retirement under NRS 286.510(1).
Today, in derogation of the Legislature’s plan to privatize SIIS and the express provisions in section 134(1) of SB 37, the majority extends the purchase of retirement credits to former SHS employees with either full or reduced benefits. Respectfully, I must dissent.
The majority claims that the district court should have determined whether appellants could proceed under the buyout provisions contained in NRS 286.3007. But NRS 286.3007 does not apply to this case for three reasons. First, privatizing SIIS did not invoke the reduction-in-force provision in NRS 286.3007(3). Second, appellants do not satisfy the other requirements of NRS 286.3007(3) to qualify for benefits. And third, the majority’s interpretation of NRS 286.3007(3)(b) contradicts the Legislature’s express intent in adopting SB 37, section 134(1).
First, the majority acknowledges that even under NRS 286.3007(3), a reduction in force must be found before there is any obligation for the state to purchase service credits. NRS 286.3007(3) provides that “[i]f a state agency is required to reduce the number of its employees, it shall purchase credit for service pursuant to NRS 286.300.” Without recognizing the existence of an ambiguity in the term “reduce” or determining the legislative history or intent with respect to that word, the majority summarily concludes that a reduction in force occurred when SIIS was privatized. However, the privatization of a state agency is not the same as a reduction in force under NRS 286.3007(3).
If a statute is clear on its face, a court cannot go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent.1 However, a statute, or portion of a statute, is ambiguous when it is “ ‘capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.’”2 When a statutory provision is ambiguous, this *130court should look to the Legislature’s intent.3 Legislative intent can be determined by examining the legislative history of the statute in question.4 Additionally, “a court may examine the context and spirit of the statute in question, together with the subject matter and policy involved.’ ’5
The term “reduce” in NRS 286.3007(3) is not clear on its face. Reasonably well-informed persons can understand the term “reduce” to mean a complete extinction of the work force or, simply, a reduction of the work force when the state agency continues to be a part of state government. Thus, because the term “reduce” in NRS 286.3007(3) is ambiguous, this court may look to the Legislature’s intent to determine its meaning.
An examination of the legislative history of NRS 286.3007(3) shows that the Legislature did not intend NRS 286.3007(3) to apply when it completely closes a state agency. The purpose of this provision was to aid in expediting the early retirement of older, higher paid employees when budget issues arose.6 Mr. Bible, the Director of the Department of Administration, stated that the provision was intended to create some guidelines when a state agency was forced to reduce its work force. He explained that NRS 286.3007(3) applied “in the case where you had budget reductions and you wanted to retire some of the older, higher-paid employees. You could in effect . . . use this as a device to encourage retirement, by having the state buy some prior service credit.”7
The legislative history demonstrates that NRS 286.3007(3) applies in the context of a state agency facing budget shortages but not going out of business. The spirit of the provision is to reduce payroll liabilities through early retirement of longer-term employees without having to cut jobs. Utilizing well-established rules of statutory interpretation compels the conclusion that NRS 286.3007(3) applies to situations in which a state agency reduces its work force but remains in business, not as here, when the state closes the agency altogether.
Second, the majority has overlooked the fact that appellants cannot satisfy the other requirements set forth in NRS 286.3007(3) to obtain benefits. In SNEA v. State, Employment Security Department, this court made clear that the benefits provided under NRS 286.3007(3) are narrowly tailored to the employee who is the sub*131ject of a reduction in force and agrees to retire upon completion of the purchase.8 Nothing in the record shows that appellants agreed to retire upon purchase of the benefits. To the contrary, they were provided with opportunities to obtain other state jobs or continue employment with EICON.
Third, and finally, the majority’s application of NRS 286.3007(3)(b) to this case contradicts the Legislature’s express intention to deal with the purchase of service credits as part of the overall plan to privatize SIIS. SB 37, section 134(l)(a) sets forth the circumstances under which EICON would be required to purchase service credits on behalf of its employees who were previously employed with SIIS. These select employees would be eligible if, among other things, EICON reduced the number of its employees and the terminated employee was eligible to receive an unreduced service retirement allowance.9 Robert Gagnier, Executive Director of the State of Nevada Employees Association (SNEA), testified before the legislative committees considering the privatization of SIIS that the retirement benefit offered under SB 37 was different — and better — than the purchase of retirement credits offered under NRS 286.3007. This testimony shows that even SNEA did not interpret NRS 286.3007 in the manner reached by the majority. At no time did Mr. Gagnier suggest that SIIS employees would be entitled to the purchase of retirement service credits if they were not eligible to retire at unreduced benefits. To the contrary, Mr. Gagnier acknowledged on behalf of SNEA, which included appellants, that retirement eligibility under SB 37 extended to individuals who “would either have to be 60 years old or older, or have 25 or more years of service”10 under NRS 286.510(1).
Ignoring the express provisions of SB 37, the majority concludes that the purchase of service credits applies to employees with either full or reduced benefits. Nothing in the legislative history or in the record before the district court supports this conclusion. As the district court found, “|T]t was not the intent of the legislature to require purchase of retirement service credit for all employees whether or not they were eligible for ‘unreduced’ or ‘reduced’ retirement coverage eligibility pursuant to NRS 286.510.” I would affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of EICON and the State.
White v. Warden, 96 Nev. 634, 636, 614 P.2d 536, 537 (1980).
Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983) (quoting Madison Met. Sewer Dist. v. Department of Nat. Res., 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1974)).
Metz v. Metz, 120 Nev. 786, 792, 101 P.3d 779, 783 (2004).
Attorney General v. Board of Regents, 114 Nev. 388, 394, 956 P.2d 770, 774 (1998).
Metz, 120 Nev. at 792, 101 P.3d at 783.
Hearing on S.B. 447 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 63d Leg. (Nev., May 10, 1985).
Id. at 2.
107 Nev. 622, 624, 817 P.2d 708, 709 (1991); NRS 286.3007(3)(c).
See 1999 Nev. Stat., ch. 388, § 134, at 1841.
Hearing on S.B. 37 Before the Assembly Comm, on Commerce and Labor, 70th Leg. (Nev., May 10, 1999). Although Mr. Gagnier testified that individuals would have to have 25 years or more of service, the statute has always required 30 years.