dissenting.
Defendant was traveling on a curvy road with which he was very familiar. A cautionary speed sign and three cautionary arrow signs warned of a sharp curve. Defendant *491approached the blind uphill curve at 45 to 50 miles per hour, well in excess of the posted recommended speed of 25 miles per hour. One or two seconds before he entered the curve, he looked down while adjusting his radio. When he looked up, he began to apply the brakes. As he went into the curve, he realized that he was going too fast to negotiate it and hit the brakes hard, causing the wheels to lock up and the car to slide into the oncoming lane, where he collided with plaintiff.
The question before us is whether a jury could find that defendant was driving recklessly when he collided with plaintiff. Under ORS 161.085(9), “recklessly” means
“that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”
In my view, a jury could find that driving too fast into a sharp blind corner created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of crossing into the other lane and hitting an oncoming vehicle and that doing so was a gross deviation from the standard of care. It could also find that defendant’s taking his eyes off the road while approaching the corner heightened the risk, because it prevented him from recognizing in time that he would, in fact, cross into the other lane unless he slowed down. Given defendant’s familiarity with the road, I also believe that a jury could find that he was aware of the risk of crossing into the other lane and hitting an oncoming vehicle and consciously disregarded it.
The majority concludes that, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Bland v. Williams, 225 Or 193, 357 P2d 258 (1960), no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict in plaintiffs favor. 235 Or App at 489-90. This case and Bland are distinguishable. In Bland, the defendant was driving at 60 mph in patchy fog that frequently limited visibility to 50 feet. 225 Or at 195. He glanced away from the road momentarily to push a button that tuned the radio. At that moment, the road began curving to the left; the car continued to go straight. Id. at 196. Almost immediately, the right wheels went off the road and into the ditch along the road. *492The defendant was unable to regain control of the car, and an accident ensued.
It was undisputed that the defendant was driving at least negligently. The question was whether there was sufficient evidence of a reckless state of mind. The Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff could not recover unless the court could “say that intentionally driving at the speed testified to under the conditions existing amounted to evidence of a ‘reckless disregard’ of the safety of others.” Id. at 198. It stated further that, “[i]n most of the guest-passenger cases, the quest for the state of mind of the host driver involves working back from evidence of objective facts.” Id. at 198-99. The court observed that the circumstances of the accident could not serve as evidence of a reckless state of mind unless those circumstances were shown to be causally connected with the accident. Id. at 199. It concluded that nothing in the evidence indicated that either the speed or the fog contributed to the accident. Accordingly, it held that the plaintiff had not proved recklessness.
In this case, the speed at which defendant was driving did contribute to the accident. Speed affects the ability of a car to negotiate a curve. Had defendant been driving more slowly, he may not have slid across the center line, and the accident may not have occurred. As noted above, the fact that defendant took his eyes off the road also may have contributed to the accident, because it prevented him from slowing down in time to avoid crossing into the other lane.
Bland does not preclude a jury from finding that defendant drove recklessly in this case. Bland stands for the unremarkable proposition that a jury cannot infer recklessness from a driver’s disregard of circumstances that did not contribute to the accident. In this case, the circumstances that defendant disregarded did contribute to the accident. In my view, a jury could “work back” from the evidence of defendant’s speed and conduct, the nature of the road, the posted warning signs, and defendant’s familiarity with the road and infer that he was aware of the circumstances and consciously disregarded them. See id. at 198-99 (“[T]he quest for the state of mind of the * * * driver involves working back from evidence of objective facts.”); State v. Ryan, 89 Or App 129,131, *493747 P2d 408 (1987), rev den, 305 Or 672 (1988) (“Generally, proof of a defendant’s mental state must rest on inferences drawn from evidence concerning ‘the action element’ of the offense * * *.”).
I do not mean to suggest that a jury would be compelled to find that defendant drove recklessly. It would certainly be entitled to find that defendant’s conduct was no more than negligent. But I believe that the evidence is sufficient to create a jury question on recklessness and, thus, that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Schuman and Ortega, JJ., join in this dissent.