dissenting.
Because the employees of an independent contractor are not “others” who can avail themselves of the exception to employer non-liability set forth in section 414, and because I agree with the trial judge that the plaintiff presented no evidence to sustain her claim under sections 343 or 343A, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Employer’s Liability Under Section 414
From the Court of Appeals’ decision in Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 32 V.I. 425, 53 F.3d 1381 (3d Cir.1995), the trial judge below soundly *647derived the proposition that an independent contractor’s employees may not sue the contractor’s employer under any provision of chapter 15 of the Restatement. The majority, on the other hand, reads Monk as not only limited to the peculiar risk provisions of chapter 15, but also as somehow incapable of this ineluctable extension. According to the majority, the reasoning of Monk cannot be extended to section 414 because that section cannot be characterized as one involving peculiar risk. And, the majority’s analysis goes, limiting Monk to the peculiar risk provisions is predetermined by barriers both inherent in the concept of “peculiar risk” and the Virgin Islands Legislature’s rejection of the “borrowed employee” doctrine as a defense to employer liability. Yet the majority never explains what it is about the nature of “peculiar risk” that serves under Monk to shield from liability the employer who deals in work presenting peculiar risks (sections 413, 416 and 427), while exposing to liability the employer who deals in only ordinary risks of harm to the contractor’s employees (section 414). Further, the majority makes no attempt to reconcile with its decision how section 411, another provision of chapter 15 grounded on ordinary negligence and not peculiar risk, has been held by the California Supreme Court to prohibit a contractor’s employee from suing the employer for ordinary negligence in selecting the contractor. The significance of this omission stems from the majority’s heavy reliance on another decision of the California Supreme Court for its interpretation of section 414.
Finally, the majority’s reliance on the Legislature’s modification of the workers’ compensation act by abrogating the borrowed employee doctrine in 1984 at 24 V.I.C. § 263a, and adding 284(b) in 1986 is utterly misplaced. The majority apparently would like to characterize HOVIC as Figueroa’s “secondary employer” who is not immune from suit just because United Ogden, her “primary employer,” is protected by workers’ compensation. There is absolutely nothing in the record to even suggest that United Ogden loaned Figueroa to HOVIC to work in the Port-A-Kamp cafeteria or that she was otherwise HOV-IC’s direct employee. Figueroa was the employee of United Ogden, plain and simple. Her only relation to HOVIC is that she worked for United Ogden, whom HOVIC employed to do certain work. Even the majority recognizes that section 263a, by its very language, refers only to borrowed employees as defined therein. That section therefore cannot apply to Figueroa. The workers’ compensation provisions do not create tort causes of action for injured employees and the amendments simply removed the “borrowing” or “secondary employer” from the exclusive remedy provisions of section 284. Since Figueroa is not HOVIC’s borrowed employee and HOVIC is not Figueroa’s “secondary employer,” these provisions have nothing to do with the facts of this case. In any event, the majority’s attempt to rely upon 24 V.I.C. §§ 263a and 284(b) to give Figueroa a cause of action against HOVIC under section 414 has already been foreclosed by Monk itself.
In my view, the very structure and purpose of chapter 15 presupposes that the employee of the independent contractor is never to be included in the class of persons referred to as “others” or “third persons” or “another” throughout the various sections. Because the majority gives short shrift to the overall structure of chapter 15,1 begin by providing an overview of the general lack of liability of the employer of an independent contractor for the negligent acts of that contractor or its servants. It will then be clear that the majority’s statements, that section 414 “does not depend on the conduct of the independent *648contractor,” that “[t]he doctrine of peculiar' risk is premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability,” and that “the peculiar risk provisions provide for derivative liability for a hirer of an independent contractor-that is, liability for another’s negligence,” are simply mischaracterizations of section 414, or indeed any, section of chapter 15, including its peculiar risk provisions. It will be just as clear that Figueroa has no claim to the exception to the general rale of non-liability embodied in section 414 in the context of Monk and Virgin Islands Law.
A. Restatement Chapter 15 — Statutory Construction
Chapter 15 of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the general rule of non-liability of the employer for the negligent acts and omissions of its independent contractor, and then compiles in several sections the circumstances in which the employer of an independent contractor can nevertheless be held liable for injuries to others caused by the negligence of the contractor and its employees. See Restatement (Seoond) of Torts div. 2, ch. 15, at 369 [hereinafter “Restatement”]. The first provision, section 409, sets forth the general rule of non-liability of the employer for the negligence of its independent contractor:
General Principle. Except as stated in §§ 410-429, the employer of an independent contractor is not hable for physical harm caused to another by an ad or omission of the contractor or his servants.
Restatement § 409 (emphasis added).1 It could not be more clearly stated that the negligence of the independent contractor or its servants is a precondition for the application of all and any of the exceptions to non-liability recited in sections 410 through 429. Thus, the majority’s statement that section 414 is “utterly distinguishable from” the peculiar risk sections (e.g., sections 413 & 416) in that section 414 “does not depend on the conduct of the independent contractor” is utterly without foundation and simply wrong. (Maj. op. at 640.)
Similarly, there is no basis in either logic or chapter 15 to define “others” one way for the peculiar risk provisions, i.e., as excluding the independent contractor’s employees, and another way for section 414, ie., as including the independent contractor’s employees. The comment to section 409 makes no such distinction:
In general, the exceptions may be said to fall into three very broad categories:
1. Negligence of the employer in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor.
2. Non-delegable duties of the employer, arising out of some relation toward the public or the particular plaintiff.
3. Work which is specially, peculiarly, or “inherently” dangerous.
Restatement § 409 cmt. b. The persons protected by the exceptions to the general rule do not vary from category to category; the “others” or “another” are the same whether the employer’s negligence in hiring, instructing, or supervising the con*649tractor, non-delegable duties, or peculiarly or inherently dangerous work, are involved. The exceptions summarized in sections 410-429 are only differentiated by personal fault (direct liability) or lack of fault on the part of the employer (vicarious liability).2
By the common definition and meaning of words, the servant or employee of the contractor cannot be “another” injured “by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.” The servant herself cannot be the “other” she harms. Equally, the contractor cannot be the “other” harmed by itself or one of its servants, which means that a servant who is injured by a coworker also cannot be “another” because the act of its servant is imputed to the contractor. A fortiori, the wording of the phrase “liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants” in section 409 excludes the contractor and its servants from the coverage of chapter 15. Section 409 thus clearly refers to “another” as someone other than the servant/employee of the contractor. The very language of section 409’s general principle of non-liability cabins the scope of chapter 15 to third-party “others” who are strangers to the contract and relationship between the employer and the independent contractor.
Because section 414 is an exception to section 409’s general rule, it necessarily incorporates the unequivocal distinction between “another” and the contractor’s servant as stated in section 409. Even without the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Monk, Figueroa has no cause of action against HOVIC as United Ogden’s servant/employee under section 414 or any other exception to the general rule of non-liability set forth in chapter 15. Figueroa of course retains whatever causes of action she might have against HOVIC based on HOVIC’s own negligence as set forth in other provisions of the Restatement, such as sections 343 and 343A if she is an invitee on the property of the contractor’s employer. This statutory construction is confirmed by the language permeating chapter 15.
The exceptions to the general rule of non-liability as stated in sections 410 through 429 of chapter 15 are divided into two topics. “Topic 1. Harm Caused by Fault of Employers of Independent Contractors” (direct liability) and “Topic 2. Harm Caused by Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent Contractor” (vicarious liability). Topic 1, sections 410 through 415, covers those situations in which the employer’s own fault, although not sufficient by itself for a cause of action against the employer, nevertheless contributes to and joins with the negligence of the contractor to cause harm to another. Again, any fault of the employer is in addition to the negligence of the contractor or the contractor’s servants. The introductory note to topic 1 makes this clear.
The rules stated in this Topic are principally important if, as is often the case (see § 409), the work entrusted to the contractor is such that the employer is not answerable for the negligence of the contractor which makes the work inadequate, or which consists of the improper manner in which the contractor and his servants perform the operative details of the work. In such a case, the employer’s liability must be based upon his own personal negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care ... to employ only contractors competent to do the *650work with reasonable assurance of safety to others (see § 411); ... to exercise reasonable care to provide for the taking of such precautions, either by the contractor whom he employs or otherwise, as in advance are recognizable as necessary to enable the work to be safely done (see § 413); to exercise with reasonable care such control over the doing of the work as he retains to himself (see § 414).... If the employer fails to exercise care in any one of these particulars and thereby causes injury to others to whom he owes a duty of care, he is answerable because of his personal fault.
Restatement, div. 2, ch. 15, topic 1, introductory note, at 371 (emphasis added).
Sections 416 through 429 make up topic 2 and address those situations in which the employer, regardless of its fault, is vicariously liable for the negligence of its carefully selected independent contractor.
The rules stated in the following §§ 416-429, unlike those stated in the preceding §§ 410-415, do not rest upon any personal negligence of the employer. They are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective of whether the employer has himself been at fault. They arise in situations in which, for reasons of policy, the employer is not permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work to the contractor. The liability imposed is closely analogous to that of a master for the negligence of his servant.
The statement commonly made in such cases is that the employer is under a duty which he is not free to delegate to the contractor. Such a “non-delegable duty” requires the person upon whom it is imposed to answer for it that care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent contractor, to whom the performance of the duty is entrusted. Such duties have been recognized in a series of exceptions to the “general rule” of non-liability stated in § 409, which are stated in the following Sections [416 — 429] in this Topic.
Restatement div. 2, ch. 15, topic 2, introductory note, at 394 (emphasis added). Even under these vicarious liability exceptions, it is always and necessarily the negligent act or omission of the contractor that triggers the potential liability of the employer.
“ ‘Peculiar’ does not mean that the risk must be one which is abnormal to the type of work done, or that it must be an abnormally great risk. It has reference only to a special, recognizable danger arising out of the work itself.” Restatement § 413 cmt. b. These “peculiar risk” provisions are found in both the direct liability sections of topic 1 and the vicarious liability sections of topic 2. It is only for those vicarious liability sections in topic 2 that peculiar risk in itself provides derivative liability. By chapter 15’s definition of direct liability, the peculiar risk doctrine, in and of itself, simply does not provide “for derivative liability for a hirer of an independent contractor — that is, liability for another’s negligence” under section 413, as the majority would have us believe (without citing any authority or reference to the Restatement). (Maj. op. at 639.) The very first comment to section 413 eliminates any possibility that a peculiar risk all by itself can be the basis for the employer’s direct liability:
This Section states the rule as to the liability of the employer who fails to provide in the contract, or in some other manner, that the contractor shall take the required precautions. As to the liability of the employer who does so provide, see [vicarious liability] § 416 [in topic 2].
*651Restatement § 413 cmt. a. Since Monk’s ruling involved “peculiar risk” provisions from both topics, namely, the direct liability section 413 and the vicarious liability sections 416 and 427, they are reproduced in the margin.3
B. Restatement Chapter 15, Monk, and Virgin Islands Law
In 1975, then-Chief Judge Almene L. Christian held that the term “others” does not include the employees of the independent contractor in the situations involving “peculiar risk” and “special danger” covered by the vicarious liability provisions of sections 416 and 427 of topic 2 of chapter 15 of the Restatement. See Munson v. Duval, 11 V.I. 615, 630-33 (D.V.I.1975). In 1985, this ruling was expanded to include all the direct liability provisions of chapter 15. See Gibson v. Sullivan Trail Coal Co., 21 V.I. 374, 377, 608 F.Supp. 390, 392 (D.Vi.) (“[T]he rule in this territory [is] that an employee of an independent contractor is not included in the class of persons protected in Chapter 15, Restatement of Torts, (Second).”), affd, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.1985). Of particular significance is that the plaintiff in Gibson proceeded under a retained control theory under section 414, the same direct liability provision of chapter 15 that Figueroa raises here. See id. at 375, 608 F.Supp. at 391 (referring to the plaintiffs factual assertions with respect to “the degree of supervision and control retained by [the defendant employer] over the work in progress”).
As noted by the Court of Appeals in Monk, later Virgin Islands courts “attempted to limit such holdings to situations in which the employers were sued under a vicarious liability theory.” Monk, 53 F.3d at 1390 n. 24 (citing, e.g., Henry v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., Civ. No.1987-345, slip op. at 24 (D.V.I. St. Croix Div. Feb. 7, 1991)). The Court of Appeals observed that “while the Virgin Islands courts agree that employers cannot be held vicariously hable to employees of their independent contractor, they are divided on whether such employees can sue the employers for their direct negligence based on Chapter 15 of the Restatement.” Id. The Court of Appeals resolved this division in our cases by hold*652ing expressly that there is no distinction between the direct liability exceptions to employer non-liability based on the employer’s fault, e.g., section 413, and those vicarious liability exceptions grounded only on the independent contractor’s negligence, e.g., sections 416 and 427.4 There is nothing in Monk’s logic or language to restrict the rational of its holding to section 413 only. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion here, there is no inference to be drawn from the fact that the Monk court did not give an advisory opinion “that an employee of an independent contractor could never sue an employer of the independent contractor thereunder.” (See maj. op. at 639.) The Court did not do so because it only had before it the peculiar risk provisions of sections 413, 416 and 427.
In holding that the employer is not liable to its contractor’s employees under section 413, the Court of Appeals joined courts in the majority of other jurisdictions that have held that an employer is not hable to its contractor’s employees under the peculiar risk provisions of chapter 15, ie., sections 413, 416, and 427. See Monk, 53 F.3d at 1391-92 & nn. 28 & 30-31 (citing state and federal cases). The Court of Appeals held that employees of an independent contractor are not “others” protected by the peculiar risk provisions of chapter 15, regardless of whether the provision at issue is one providing for direct liability or vicarious liability. See id. at 1393.
Just like the District Court Trial Division’s 1985 Gibson decision, Monk is founded on the reasoning of an unadopted special note to chapter 15 of the tentative draft of the Second Restatement. See Gibson, 21 V.I. at 376-77, 608 F.Supp. at 392; Monk, 53 F.3d at 1390-91.5 As observed by the special note, at the time of the drafting of the second Restatement, the employee of the independent contractor was not protected in the majority of jurisdictions by any of the exceptions stated in chapter 15.
[I]t is still largely true that the [contractor’s employer] has no responsibility to the contractor’s servants. One reason why such responsibility has not developed has been that the workman’s recovery is now, with relatively few exceptions, regulated by workmen’s compensation acts, the theory of which is that the insurance out of which the compensation is to be paid is to be carried by the workman’s own employer, and of course premiums are to be calculated on that basis.... [I]t has not been regarded as necessary to impose [third-party] liability upon one who hires the eontrac*653tor, since it is to be expected that the cost of the workmen’s compensation insurance will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the work, and so will in any case ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him. Again, when the Sections in this Chapter speak of liability to “another” or “others,” or to “third persons,” it is to be understood that the employees of the contractor, as well as those of the defendant himself, are not included.
Restatement (Seoond) of ToRts ch. 15, special note, at 17-18 (Tentative Draft No. 7,1962) [hereinafter “Special Note”].6
Following the reasoning of this special note, as well as various elaborations by courts in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals in Monk concluded that it would be “inequitable” for the workers’ compensation scheme to protect the independent contractor, but not the contractor’s employer, from employee lawsuits under chapter 15, particularly when the employer is indirectly paying the cost of the workers’ compensation premiums. See Monk, 53 F.3d at 1392; see also, e.g., Privette v. Superior CL, 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721, 728 (1993) (en banc) (“[T]he ‘principal’ who hires an independent contractor should be subject to no greater liability ‘than its [independent contractor] agent,’ whose exposure for injury to an employee is limited to providing workers’ compensation insurance.”) (citation omitted); Toland v. Sunland Hous. Group, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 253, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d 504 (1998) (expressly extending Privette’s reasoning to bar employee suits under section 413). As explained by Monk, the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation should equally protect the contractor’s employer, who indirectly funds the cost of workers’ insurance coverage through the contract price. See Monk, 53 F.3d at 1392. It bears noting that the Trial Division of this Court decided Gibson in 1985, after the Legislature’s abrogation in 1981 of the “borrowed employee doctrine.” The Court of Appeals likewise did not find that this modification of the Virgin Islands workers’ compensation scheme had any relevance to its determination of the meaning of “others” in chapter 15 when it decided Monk in 1995.
Further following the reasoning of the special note, Monk pointed out that employees of independent contractors, as invitees of a landowner employer, can still sue for injuries caused by latent defects in the land or for “known or obvious” dangers whose harms the landowning employer should have anticipated, even if the employees are precluded from bringing suit under the provisions of chapter 15. See id. at 1393 (citing Restatement §§ 343, 343A; Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash.2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 430 (1981) (en banc); Special Note at 17-18). In this way, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the earlier reliance by the Trial Division of this Court on the special note when it held in Gibson that “an employee of an independent contractor is not included in the class of persons protected in Chapter 15, Restatement of Torts, (Second).” See Gibson, 21 V.I. at 377, 608 F.Supp. at 392.
C. Beyond Monk
I do not agree with the majority that Monk’s reasoning was or must be limited to the peculiar risk provisions of chapter 15. Both section 413 and section 414 (indeed, all of chapter 15’s provisions) are premised on some personal fault of the *654contractor and its employees. That section 413 involves a peculiar risk of harm while section 414 involves only an ordinary risk of harm does not change the fact that both sections involve work entrusted to the contractor for which “the employer [HOV-IC] is not answerable for the negligence of the contractor [United Ogden] ... which consists of the improper manner in which the contractor and his servants perform the operative details of the work.” See Restatement, div. 2, ch. 15, topic 1, introductory note, at 871. Similarly, there is no logical distinction between theories of liability that are both, in some sense, forms of derivative liability — the one based on the negligent employer who fails to provide special precautions for peculiarly risky work, which the contractor performs in a negligent manner, see id. § 413, and the other based on the employer who fails to exercise with reasonable care some retained control over the safety aspects of the work to be done, which the contractor performs in an unsafe manner, see id. § 414. Both theories precondition any liability of the employer on the negligence of the contractor or its servants.
In a recent Trial Division decision, I carefully examined the holding and analysis in Monk and concluded that the employee of an independent contractor is not an “other” under section 414 for the same reasons that Monk bars employee suits under the peculiar risk provisions. See Gass v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 149 F.Supp.2d 205, 219 (D.Vi.2001). In Gass, I reasoned that, by rejecting a categorical distinction between direct and vicarious liability, Monk set the stage for extending its reasoning and analysis to other direct liability provisions not involving peculiar risk. This is because no matter how much the majority would like to believe otherwise, the employer’s liability under section 413 is premised on some fault of its own, irrespective of the peculiarly risky nature of the work the employer hired the independent contractor to do. Since there is no longer any distinction in this jurisdiction between the at-fault employer and the “faultless” employer under the exceptions to non-liability set out in chapter 15, I concluded in Gass that it “would make no sense whatsoever” to shield from liability the at-fault employer who hires out work posing peculiar risks to its contractor’s employees (section 413), and yet not to shield the negligent employer who deals in work posing only ordinary risks of harm.” See id. at 218. It remains my position that such a result would be not only illogical, but also unfair.
It cannot be over-emphasized that chapter 15 first sets forth the general rule that an employer will not be liable for the negligence of its independent contractor. See Restatement § 409. This general rule flows logically from the fact that the independent contractor is not the employer’s servant, and thus is outside the control and supervision of the employer. See id. cmt. a (defining “independent contractor” as “any person who does work for another under conditions which are not sufficient to make him a servant of the other”); id. § 220 (defining “servant” for purposes of respondeat superior). Not unlike the policies animating the principle of respondeat superior, the exceptions set forth in chapter 15 were developed to include as potentially liable the employer of an independent contractor who is to some degree involved in the circumstances creating the unreasonable risk of harm caused by the negligence of its independent contractors. See id. § 409 cmt. b. In this way, the provisions of chapter 15 provide a basis for holding the employer liable when work it hires a contractor to do causes injury to a person who does not have any connection with the relationship or to have had the *655opportunity to bargain for encountering the risks involved.
The definitive independence of the contractor is illustrated by section 414 itself. That section, entitled “Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer,” provides:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
Id. § 414. Under section 414, the control retained by the employer that potentially subjects it to liability is not sufficient to render the independent contractor a servant for whose acts the employer will be vicariously liable under the doctrine of re-spondeat superior. See id. § 414 cmt. a (“The employer may ... retain a control less than that which is necessary to subject him to liability as master.”). Instead, the employer is liable for some fault of its own in failing to reasonably exercise the limited control it has retained over doing a part of the work which causes the injury.
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations.... There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.
Id. § 414 cmt. c. Nevertheless, the fault attributed to the employer under these circumstances is still secondary to the negligence of the independent contractor, which is the immediate cause of the harm and is a precondition for the application of any of the provisions of chapter 15.
As I stated in Gass and restate here, the analysis in Monk applies equally to bar suits by employees under section 414. First, “[i]t is as consistent with the purposes of the Virgin Islands workers’ compensation act to interpret ... the word “others” in section 414 as excluding the independent contractor’s employees as it was for Monk to so interpret the peculiar risk provisions.” Gass, 149 F.Supp.2d at 219. The goal of workers’ compensation, namely, to relieve employers and employees of the burden of civil litigation without impairing the purpose of providing prompt payment to injured employees without regard to fault, is no more compromised by barring employee suits under section 414 than by barring such suits under section 413. See Chinnery v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 865 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1989), quoted in Monk, 53 F.3d at 1393-94. Second, “to allow the employee to recover against the independent contractor’s employer ... under section! ] 414 would produce the same ‘inequitable’ and anomalous result as under the peculiar risk provisions.” Gass, 149 F.Supp.2d at 219 (citing Privette, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d at 727-28). This is so because to allow an employee such as Figueroa to sue for injuries caused by United Ogden’s negligence in performing work HOVIC contracted out to United Ogden would give Figueroa greater rights and remedies as an employee of HOVIC’s contractor than she would have if she had worked directly for HOV-IC. Figueroa clearly could not sue HOV-IC if HOVIC had hired her to take care of the salad bar at its Port-A-Kamp cafeteria and another HOVIC employee had negligently allowed the water to pool on the *656floor. It would be both inequitable and a circumvention of the Virgin Islands workers’ compensation scheme to allow Figueroa to sue HOVIC simply because HOVIC chose to contract out work involving risks of only an ordinary nature. The lack of any evidence that any control HOVIC retained may have contributed to United Ogden’s negligent acts or omissions that in turn caused Figueroa’s injuries only serves to highlight the inequity and circumvention.
The majority’s implication that I would hold that “one who hires an independent contractor cannot be held hable for his own negligence outside of the ‘peculiar risk’ arena” is at best a red herring. (Maj. op. at 639 (emphasis in original).) As I have discussed above, my opinion in Gass is in full accord with the tort law of the Virgin Islands. Thus, following Gass is not “to undertake ... a sweeping change in the tort law of this jurisdiction.” (Id.) While the local workers’ compensation law allows an injured employee to sue any person reasonably responsible for his injuries, it does not create a substantive basis for the lawsuit, contrary to the majority’s implication. (See id. at 641.) The worker still must have a cause of action by which to hold the contractor’s employer legally responsible, and section 414 simply does not provide one.
I emphasize that construing section 414 as not giving the contractor’s employee a cause of action in no way affects the availability of tort actions to the employee for harm caused by her contractor’s employer and occurring outside the employer-eon-tractor relationship. The employee has presumably bargained for economic reward in exchange for encountering the risks associated with the work. See Monk, 53 F.3d at 1393 (“ ‘[T]he economic system permits workers who presume to undertake dangerous work to bargain for an enhanced reward for assuming the danger.’ ”) (citation omitted). She cannot fairly be presumed to have bargained for encountering risks completely unrelated with the work being performed under the contract and which have nothing to do with the provisions of chapter 15.
For example, if, while within the scope of her employment with United Ogden, Figueroa had been struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a negligent HOVIC employee, nothing in section 414 or the other provisions of chapter 15 would prevent her from suing HOVIC and its driver for the harm caused by the driver. Or to bring it closer to home, say a HOVIC employee, while picking up a take-out salad at the Porh-A-Kamp cafeteria for his boss, negligently sticks out a leg and trips Figueroa as she passes by. That Figueroa is not an “other” who can sue HOVIC under section 414 for harm caused by the negligence of United Ogden has nothing to do with her cause of action against HOVIC under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of the HOVIC employee who tripped her. To preclude employee suits under section 414 would be to hold that the employer will not be subject to liability when the contractor’s own negligent act or omission in the course of performing the contract causes harm to one of the contractor’s own workers.7
*657D. Further Observations and Other Jurisdictions
Although the analysis in Monk as extended by Gass is convincing enough, I add the following observations. First, Monk’s, analysis is founded on the una-dopted special note, which makes no distinction between the peculiar risk provisions and the other provisions of chapter 15; “when the Sections in this Chapter speak of liability to ‘another’ or ‘others’ or to ‘third persons’, it is to be understood that the employees of the contractor, as well as those of the defendant himself, are not included.” Special Note at 17-18. The majority offers no coherent analysis to explain why Monk’s adoption of the reasons in the special note should somehow foreclose the extension of its analysis beyond the peculiar risk provisions. The majority does not explain what inheres in the nature of the peculiar risk provisions that renders the reasoning in Monk logical with respect to section 413 and illogical when applied to section 414. Nor does it explain how the presence or absence of peculiar risk determines the identity of the “other” to whom the employer owes a duty of care as referred to throughout chapter 15.
Second, I am not the first judge to articulate the logic of barring employee suits under direct liability provisions other than section 413. Several state courts have also concluded that an employee of an independent contractor is barred from suing the hirer of the contractor for negligent exercise of retained control under section 414. See Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.1997) (“[W]hen applying the Restatement [Second of Torts] sections that impose liability on companies hiring independent contractors, we have held that ‘others’ does not include the employees of an independent contractor. This limitation also applies to § 414.”) (citation and footnote omitted); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590, 547 A.2d 1080, 1085 (1988) (“Appellant has not provided the Court with any authority that an employee of an independent contractor injured by the negligence of his own master is a person intended to be included among the class of persons to whom the owner owes a non-delegable duty of reasonable care .... No matter how appellant phrases it, what he is unsuccessfully attempting is an end run on the Worker’s Compensation Law.”); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Ky.1973) (“Nothing in the discussions of Sections 413, 414, 416, and 427 of the Restatement, Torts 2d, indicates that an employee of an independent contractor is within the class of ‘others’ protected by those sections.”). These decisions are no more nor less binding on Virgin Islands courts than the California cases which are cited repeatedly by the majority, yet the majority makes no mention of them or their reasoning.
Third, the California Supreme Court has similarly barred employee suits under section 411,8 a direct liability provision which has nothing to do with the peculiar risk *658doctrine. See Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy, 25 Cal.4th 1235, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 25 P.3d 1096, 1102 (2001) (ruling that a contractor’s employee cannot sue the contractor’s hirer under the “negligent hiring” theory set forth in section 411). Yet, just a couple of months ago, the same court held that a contractor’s employee can sue the contractor’s employer under section 414, another direct liability provision which also has nothing to do with peculiar risk. See Hooker v. Department of Transp., 27 Cal.4th 198, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081 (2002). To reach this conclusion, the California high court had to rewrite section 414 to add a special requirement to make an employer liable to its contractor’s employee:
We conclude that a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable to an employee of the contractor merely because the hirer retained control over safety conditions at a worksite, but that a hirer is liable to an employee of a contractor insofar as a hirer’s exercise of retained control affirmatively contributed to the employee’s injuries.
Hooker, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at 856, 38 P.3d at 1083 (emphasis added).
Thus, in California, there are now two bases for assessing the liability of an employer for the negligence of its independent contractor under section 414:(1) one for “others” actually written into section 414 resulting from the failure of the employer to exercise its retained control with reasonable care, and (2) one for the contractor’s employees judicially written into section 414 resulting from the employer’s exercise of its retained control which “affirmatively contributed to the employee’s injuries.” Under California law, there are two separate standards for liability under section 414, depending on whether the plaintiff is the contractor’s employee “other” or some other “other.” Nothing in section 414, or any provision of chapter 15, supports this judicial revision, and I reject Hooker’s added requirement as utterly inconsistent with the straightforward language of chapter 15, which does not contemplate separate categories of “others” with varying standards for each individual provision.
It is difficult to conceive of a logical analysis that would shield the employer from liability under section 411, but not under section 414. Both are direct liability provisions that impose liability on an employer who has failed to conduct itself with reasonable care, resulting in injury to “third persons” or “others.” Compare Restatement § 411 (employer hable where injury is “caused by [its] failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor”) with id. § 414 (employer liable where injury to “is caused by [its] failure to exercise [its] control with reasonable care”). Neither is a peculiar risk provision. And in both situations, as in all the direct liability provisions of chapter 15, it is the negligent act or omission of the hired contractor that causes the injury in fact. See Restatement § 409 (stating general rule of non-liability for “physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants”). In all of the direct liability exceptions of topic 1, liability is not imputed in the ordinary legal sense of the term, but rather is derived from the causative negligent act or omission of the contractor.
What I believe led the California Supreme Court to rewrite section 414 (which revision has been adopted at least in part by the majority)9 is a fundamental mis-*659characterization of the scope and purpose of chapter 15 of the Second Restatement of Torts. As I have repeatedly emphasized, none of the exceptions to section 409’s general rule of the employer’s non-liability can apply without the underlying negligence of the independent contractor and its employees. Chapter 15 of the Restatement categorizes those exceptions that also involve the fault or negligence of the employer of the independent contractor under the direct liability provisions of sections 410-415. Chapter 15 provides no mechanism for allocating fault between the employer and its independent contractor because it is only restating those instances in which the contractor’s employer is also liable with the contractor “to others,” the contractor already being liable to those others by definition. The contractor is always the one primarily responsible for the workers’ on-the-job injuries. For some reason, the California Supreme Court seems to have felt the need to justify its exclusion of the employer from vicarious liability section 416 in Privette, from direct liability section 413 in Toland, and from direct liability section 411 in Camar-go. The California high court accomplished this by fashioning its own mechanism for allocating relative fault between the contractor and its employer. Flying in the face of the language of chapter 15, the court declared that the employer’s direct liability under section 413 is nevertheless “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative’ in the sense that it derives from the ‘act or omission’ of the hired contractor.” Toland, 955 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added); see Pri-vette, 854 P.2d at 725 n.2. The Pri-vette/Toland court could then conclude for section 413 that the employer was less at fault than the contractor and that “it would be unfair to impose liability on the hiring person when the liability of the contractor, the one primarily responsible for the workers’ on-the-job injuries, is limited to providing workers’ compensation coverage.” Toland, 955 P.2d at 513 (citing, inter alia, Monk, 53 F.3d at 1390-93) (emphasis added); see also Camargo, 25 P.3d at 1102-03. The Camargo court extended this reasoning to section 411: “For the same reasons, an employee of a contractor should be barred from seeking recovery from the hirer under the theory of negligent hiring,” even while acknowledging that section 411 makes the employer liable for “his own negligence under a theory of direct liability” and adopting the Pri-vette/Toland mischaracterization of the employer’s direct liability as essentially vicarious for section 411. Id. (emphasis in original). In this way, the court could find that liability under section 411 is much like liability under section 413 because the contractor is the person “primarily responsible for the worker’s on-the-job injuries.” Camargo, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 25 P.3d at 1102.
Given its erroneous and unnecessary creation that the employer’s direct liability under sections 411 and 413 is nevertheless “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative,’ ” the California Supreme Court was virtually compelled to find the employer liable to the contractor’s employee under section 414 when it could no longer categorize that liability as vicarious or derivative. In situations in which the employer’s actions affirmatively contribute to the employee’s injuries, the court’s judicially constructed fault allocation mechanism fails, leaving no *660way for the court comfortably to conclude that the contractor is primarily responsible for the worker’s on-the-job injuries. The majority seems to have adopted this same approach. I believe that, under Virgin Islands law, the direct liability exception in section 414 must remain as written10 as a means of making the employer of an independent contractor liable only to those “others” not involved in the work and only for its failure to reasonably exercise any retained control over the work which causes injury to those others.11
Finally, I cannot agree with the majority that the Virgin Islands workers’ compensation scheme forecloses my analysis here. If anything, our workers’ compensation act supports my conclusion that chapter 15 provides no cause of action to a contractor’s employee.
E. 24 V.I.C. §§ 263a and 284(b)
Section 263a provides that “it shall not be a defense to any action brought- by or on behalf of an employee, that the employee at the time of his injury or death, was the borrowed, loaned, or rented employee of another employer.” 24 V.I.C. § 263a. Section 284, which sets forth the exclusive remedy provision of our workers’ compensation act, further provides:
For the purposes of this section, a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subcontractor’s employees only if the subcontractor fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter with respect to being an insured employer. The “statutory employer and borrowed servant” doctrine are not recognized in this jurisdiction, and an injured employee may sue any person responsible for his injuries other than the employer named in a certifícate of insurance issued under section 272 of this title.
24 V.I.C. § 284(b). As best I can understand it, the majority’s position is that the Legislature has necessarily “denie[d] the hirer of an independent contractor immunity from suit where the subcontractor is insured for workers’] compensation” because section 284(b) refers to a “subcontractor’s employees,” and the reference to the “borrowed employee” is not to be strictly read. (See maj. op. at 642.) Although section 284(b) does indeed refer to a contractor and subcontractor, it is simply to describe the only circumstance under which the contractor can be deemed the employer of the subcontractor’s employ*661ees. Since HOVIC clearly is not and cannot be deemed the employer of United Ogden’s employees, section 284(b) is irrelevant to the legal issues in this case. The very plain language of sections 263a and 284(b) has nothing to do with this case.
Section 263a was added to our workers’ compensation act in 1984 to abrogate the borrowed employee doctrine in this jurisdiction. The effect of that doctrine was to deem the “borrowed employee” to be the employee of the “borrowing employer”, thereby entirely limiting the borrowed employee to relief under the workers’ compensation act and barring any tort lawsuit against the said “borrowing employer.” See Vanterpool v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 766 F.2d 117, 128 (3d Cir.1985) (superseded by statute). Contrary to the majority’s assertion, barring the contractor’s employee from suit under section 414 is not at all incompatible with the Legislature’s having rejected the borrowed employee doctrine. First and foremost, the employee of the independent contractor, such as Figueroa, is not the “borrowed, loaned, or rented employee of another employer,” nor is she treated as one under any of the provisions of chapter 15 or in any case applying them. She is the employee of an independent contractor, United Ogden, who by very definition is not sufficiently controlled by the hirer, HOVIC, to be considered HOV-IC’s employee. Thus, any statute specific to the defenses available to a borrowing employer, such as section 263a, or the remedies available to a borrowed employee, such as section 284, is wholly irrelevant.
Further, barring employee suits under 414 would not run afoul of section 284(b) of the workers’ compensation act because it does not “deem[] the [contractor’s hirer] the employer of the [contractor’s] employees,” which would indeed be improper under that section. See 24 V.I.C. § 284(b). To write into these workers’ compensation provisions a grander prohibition by the Legislature that would prevent the Court from denying tort recovery under chapter 15 of the Restatement to the employee for “physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants,”12 as the majority does here, is to entirely rewrite both section 414 and the relevant sections of our workers’ compensation law.
Extending Monk to bar employee suits under section 414 simply confirms that a contractor’s employee is not an “other” under section 414. It in no way amounts to limiting the contractor’s employee entirely to the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation for injuries caused by the contractor’s employer, as she would have been under the borrowed servant doctrine. As explained above, Figueroa can sue HOVIC for harm caused by it or its own employees’ negligence in circumstances unrelated to the work being performed, or, as reaffirmed by Monk, under section 343 and 343A of the Restatement.
Most significantly, the majority fails to reconcile its interpretation of sections 263a and 284(b) with the Court of Appeals’ holding in Monk and, indeed, every other Virgin Islands case that has denied liability to contractors’ employees under chapter 15. If section 284(b) means what the majority would have it say — that an employee may sue any third person who may be “responsible” in fact for the injuries — then it should explain why the employer is not “responsible” under sections 411 (per California), and sections 413, 416 & 427 (per Monk, 53 F.3d at 1394), but is “responsible” under section 414.13
*662The majority’s effort to reconcile the employer’s non-liability under the peculiar risk provisions with the employer’s liability under the other provisions of chapter 15 leaves me baffled. The peculiar risk doctrine incorporated in chapter 15 ordinarily provides the basis for subjecting an otherwise “faultless” person to liability, not for protecting that person from liability. In the context of contractor’s employees, however, the Court of Appeals has denied tort recovery under circumstances presenting peculiar risks, observing that liability to the contractor’s employees “is not necessary to achieve the original aims of the doctrine of peculiar risk.” Monk, 53 F.3d at 1392. As explained in Monk, recovery by the contractor’s employee under the peculiar risk doctrine is not necessary because the contractor’s employee already has recourse to a system of recovery without regard to fault, which is exactly what sections 416 and 427 achieve for the non-employee plaintiff. Although the majority attempts to limit the applicability of Monk to peculiar risk provisions by referring to the “historical considerations” underlying the original aims of the doctrine, it does not explain why the result should be any different here where there is likewise no historical need for recovery regardless of fault because the workers’ compensation scheme provides such recovery. Just as with section 413 under Monk, liability is “not necessary” here because the employee has recourse to a system of recovery regardless of fault.
F. Conclusion
In sum, there is no logical distinction between a theory of derivative liability based on the negligent employer who fails to provide for special precautions and one based on the negligent employer who fails to exercise its retained control reasonably to require the contractor to utilize safe work methods. When the contractor is charged with the primary responsibility for the maintenance and operation of a cafeteria, as in this case, its employer is not liable under section 414 for injuries to the contractor’s employee caused by the contractor’s negligence in discharging those duties. Accordingly, I would hold that the contractor’s employee is not an “other” protected by section 414 of chapter 15 of the Restatement and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Figueroa’s retained control claim.
II. HOVIC’s Liability Under Sections 343 & 343A.
Figueroa also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her claim under sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement. Although Figueroa, as an invitee-employee of HOV-IC’s contractor, was protected by these premises liability causes of action, I agree with the trial judge’s finding at the end of the plaintiffs case that Figueroa did not present sufficient evidence to send these claims to the jury.
Section 343 provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land, if, but only if, he (a) knows or by exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an *663unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Restatement § 343 (“Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor”). Section 343A provides in relevant part:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
Restatement § 343A (“Known or Obvious Dangers”). Sections 343 and 343A are to be read together: Section 343 protects invitees from nonobvious dangerous conditions on the land, while section 343A deals with dangers that are known or obvious to the invitee. See Monk, 53 F.3d at 1389.
The question before the trial court was whether, viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to Figueroa and giving her the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find for Figueroa. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); Williams v. Rene, 886 F.Supp. 1214, 1221 (D.Vi.), rev’d on other grounds, 33 V.I. 297, 72 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, in this case, there would have to be enough evidence for the jury reasonably to find either (1) that the dangerous condition of the salad bar hose was not obvious and that HOVIC knew of or could have discovered the nonobvious condition but failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Figueroa, or (2) HOVIC should have anticipated that Figueroa would let herself be harmed by the danger of the water leaking from the salad bar hose onto the floor, even though she admitted she knew about it, and that HOVIC failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Figueroa from it.
After hearing all the plaintiffs evidence, the trial judge found that there was “no evidence provided by any of the plaintiffs witnesses indicating knowledge or discovery of the condition by the defendant.” Figueroa v. HOVIC, Civ. No. 137/1997, slip op. at 9 (Terr.Ct. Nov. 27, 1998). Having carefully reviewed the record below, I agree with the trial judge that Figueroa presented no evidence at trial sufficient to establish the knowledge or constructive knowledge of HOVIC, an essential element for plaintiff to prove under section 343. Ogden Services was clearly responsible for the daily maintenance of the cafeteria, including keeping the floor clean. Figueroa testified that she herself and her coworkers were directly responsible for making sure the floors were clean. She testified further that she herself had cleaned water spilled from the same salad bar hose on more than one occasion. As the trial judge concluded, “[i]t was ... clear that the condition that resulted in the injury was known to [Ogden Services]” and that “no evidence was place on the record attributing knowledge of the condition to HOVIC” before Figueroa fell and was injured. See id. On appeal, Figueroa asserts that the jury could have inferred knowledge based on the evidence that Ogden Services knew of the condition and met periodically with HOVIC regarding safety concerns. This is a wholly insufficient factual basis upon which a reasonable jury could infer that HOVIC had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. It would have been rank speculation to allow the jury to make such an “inference,” and the trial judge correctly dismissed the section 343 claim.
I would likewise affirm the trial court’s ruling on section 343A, which deals with *664dangers known to invitees. As already-noted, Figueroa clearly knew about the danger of slipping in the pooled water— she repeatedly cleaned it up. As also already noted, plaintiff did not prove that HOVIC knew anything about the obviously dangerous condition. It follows that if HOVIC knew nothing of the dangerous condition, no jury could reasonably find that HOVIC reasonably should have expected that Figueroa would not exercise care to protect herself or have anticipated that her attention might be distracted from the danger or have foreseen that Figueroa would “proceed to encounter” the condition despite its obviousness to her. See Restatement § 343A cmt. f. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Figueroa’s section 343 claim as well.
. The first comment defines "independent contractor” as "any person who does work for another under conditions which are not sufficient to make him a servant of the other.” See Restatement § 409 cmt. a. Observe that this very first comment describes the quasi-employment relationship addressed by the chapter, one to which the ordinaiy principles of respondent superior do not apply, but for which certain limited exceptions can nonetheless be invoked for imposing liability against the independent contractor's employer. This comparative reference to a true employment relationship continues throughout chapter 15.
. The sections are categorized under topic 1, "Harm Caused by Fault of Employers of Independent Contractors,” or topic 2, "Harm Caused by Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent Contractor,” discussed in text infra.
. Direct liability section 413 is titled: "Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to Contractor.”
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions.
Vicarious liability section 416 is titled: "Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions.”
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.
Vicarious liability section 427 is titled: "Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work."
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.
. Therefore, the post-Monk decisions of the Appellate and Trial Divisions of the District Court appearing to resurrect, without analysis or explanation, a distinction between the direct and vicarious liability provisions of chapter 15 cannot withstand analysis (even though I did not dissent in Carty and authored Ibra-him..). See Carty v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 42 V.I. 125, 130 n. 9, 78 F.Supp.2d 417, 420 n. 9. (D.V.I.1999) ("While an employer of an independent contractor cannot be vicariously liable to an independent contractor’s employees, direct liability for the employer’s own negligence is not so barred.’’); Ibrahim v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., Civ. No. 1992-227. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22548. at *5-6. *9-10, 1996 WL 493172 at *2, *3 (D.V.I. St. Thomas-St. John Div. June 28, 1996) (allowing an employee of an independent contractor to sue the contractor’s employer under section 414 by implicitly relying upon the invalid distinction between direct and vicarious liability made in several pre-Monk decisions).
. The court in Monk also found persuasive the reasoning of courts in the majority of jurisdictions that also relied on the unadopted special note to hold that the contractor’s employees cannot sue the employer under the peculiar risk provisions of chapter 15. See Monk, 53 F.3d at 1391-94.
. Although the special note was not ultimately included in the final draft of the Restatement, the majority of jurisdictions, including the Court of Appeals in this one, have adopted its reasoning in their interpretations of the provisions of chapter 15.
. Contrary to the majority's assertion, such a holding would be wholly compatible with the Virgin Islands workers’ compensation scheme, which provides for employee suits against "responsible” third parties. See 24 V.I.C. § 263. Section 263 provides that an employee entitled to workers' compensation benefits and whose injury "has been cause[d] under circumstances making third persons responsible for such injury ... may claim and recover damages from the third person responsible for said injury,” subject to the sub-rogation rights of the Administrator. For the reasons already stated, a contractor’s employ*657ee who has presumably bargained for encountering the risks associated with the work and who is harmed by the negligence of her own employer during the performance of the contract, as a matter of law, simply has not been injured "under circumstances making [the contractor’s hirer] responsible for such injury.” See id.
. Section 411, entitled "Negligence in Selection of Contractor,” provides:
An employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor
(a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done, or
(b) to perform any duty which the employer owed to third persons.
Restatement §411.
. The majority somewhat selectively quotes the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hooker for the proposition that "liability of the hirer [whose conduct affirmatively con*659tributed to the injury] is not in essence 'vicarious’ or 'derivative' in the sense that it derives from the 'act or omission’ of the hired contractor.” (See maj. op. at 638 n. 10 (quoting Hooker, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at 864, 38 P.3d at 1090).) The majority, however, does not adopt the separate and specially heightened "affirmative conduct” standard for employees articulated in Hoolcer.
. As pointed out by the majority, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "as generally understood and applied,” provides "the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to the contrary.” 1 V.I.C. § 4. The California Supreme Court is not so bound, and is free to reject, accept, or judicially modify a rule set forth in the Restatement. The Hooker court’s new standard for employee "others" under section 414 is a judicially created expression of a continuing evolution of California law, and is simply not derived from the plain language of that section, which controls us here by statute. See Saldana v. Kmart, 260 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.2001) (rejecting Pennsylvania common law to apply the plain language of the Restatement as Virgin Islands law); Monk, 53 F.3d at 1392 n. 30 (“[A]n interpretation of the Restatement by one jurisdiction within this circuit does not compel the same interpretation for another jurisdiction.”).
. There may even be circumstances in which the employer may subject itself to liability under ordinary tort causes of action by sufficiently and affirmatively taking over control of the part of the work that causes injury to the employee. Even though it would relate to the work being performed, the situation then would no longer be governed by section 414 and chapter 15 because the employer itself either performed the work or directed the performance of the work. These facts and this theory, of course, were not before the trial court and are not before us.
. Restatement § 409 (general rule of non-liability) (emphasis added).
. As I read the majority’s opinion, employer ■ liability depends on the degree of the deriva*662tive or vicarious nature of the nominally direct liability provisions. If this is so, it should explain why the peculiar risk provision embodied in section 413 is more "derivative” or "vicarious” in its essence than the other direct liability provisions. It is an incorrect statement of the law to say, as the majority does, that section 414 "does not depend on the conduct of the independent contractor.” (See maj. op. at 12.) All the provisions of chapter 15 are premised at bottom on the negligent acts or omissions of the contractor, whether labeled direct or vicarious. See Restatement § 409.