dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that K.S.A. 17-1265(a)(l) confers authority upon the Securities Commissioner to unilaterally impose gag orders in conjunction with subpoenas issued in “private investigations.” The upshot of this decision gives the Commissioner a green light to impose gag orders without prior judicial review and, within the context of this litigation, regardless of whether the customers whose records are sought are targets of the investigation.
“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. [Citation omitted.] The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. [Citation omitted.] Stated another way, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute. [Citation omitted.]” In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998).
K.S.A. 17-1265(a)(l) is plain and unambiguous. Therefore, there is no rationale to apply the Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute. Absent an ambiguity in the language of the statute, the doctrine of operative construction is not applicable. Cf. Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburg State Univ. Chap. of K-NEA, 233 Kan. 801, 809, 667 P.2d 306 (1983).
The majority states: “A review of the parties’ opposing arguments suggests that the meaning of private’ in K.S.A. 17-1265(a)(1), so clear to each, may be ambiguous.” 272 Kan. at 189. I do not believe the disagreement of interested litigants as to the meaning of a statute is considered a recognized canon of legislative construction.
*197The court also reasons that “private” and “secret” are synonyms for “confidential,” relying upon various dictionary definitions, suggesting the Commissioner s interpretation has merit. The difficulty with this approach is that the court ignores comparable legislative enactments regarding similar subject matter.
For instance, under K.S.A. 50-153 et seq., the attorney general and county attorneys, when conducting an inquisition in antitrust cases, are specifically authorized to issue subpoenas, but there is no mention of a concurrent power to impose a gag order on witnesses. Similarly, in criminal inquisitions, subpoena powers do not provide for the imposition of gag orders. See K.S.A. 22-3001 et seq. (grand jury proceedings) and K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 22-3101 (inquisitions). Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, I conclude the legislature did not intend to confer upon the Commissioner such an unexpressed power when it is denied to the prosecutors of Kansas in grand jury proceedings and inquisitions.
The district court finds persuasive SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984), a decision clearly distinguishable from the facts at hand. In O’Brien, the issue was whether the S.E.C. was obligated to advise the target of an investigation that subpoenas had been issued to third parties. This has nothing whatsoever to do with whether a state agency has the implied power to issue a gag order in conjunction with a subpoena.
Parenthetically, I would also note that while the majority notes the similarity between K.S.A. 17-1265(a)(l) and the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, § 407 (Investigations and Subpoenas), the court has been unable to point to a federal rule, regulation, or court decision that gives persuasive support to its holding.
Finally, I respectfully suggest the majority has failed to give proper recognition to the privacy interests of the Bank’s customers in interpreting K.S.A. 17-1265. See, for example, the majority’s discussion of Winfield v. Div. Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). Although I concede a bank customer in Kansas has no constitutional expectation of privacy in his or her bank records, most customers surely believe their banker will notify them if some government agency is snooping around in their records and accounts. I do not believe the legislature intended to negate that *198entirely rational and understandable expectation by the banking public.
For the foregoing reasons, I would deny the Commissioner’s application and enter judgment in favor of the Bank.
Allegrucci, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.