concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s decision concerning the division of property issue. Nevertheless, I dissent from the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s judgment not to award spousal maintenance to the appellant, Leona R. Hair.
The question whether Leona is entitled to spousal support hinges on the interpretation and application of the judicial factors outlined by our Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Sommers, 246 Kan. 652, 654-55, 792 P.2d 1005 (1990). In Sommers, our Supreme Court included the following judicial factors in assessing the amount of maintenance to award:
(1) the age of the parties;
(2) the parties’ present and prospective earning capacities;
*487(3) the length of the marriage;
(4) the property owned by the parties;
(5) the parties’ needs;
(6) the time, source and manner of acquisition of property;
(7) the family ties and obligations; and
(8) the parties’ overall financial situation.
See also Williams v. Williams, 219 Kan. 303, 306, 548 P.2d 794 (1976) (fault included). These previously mentioned factors are strikingly similar to the statutory factors listed under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 60-1610(b)(1). Those statutory factors are used by our trial courts as a guide in the property division phase of a divorce action.
As the majority has stated, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision not to award maintenance under an abuse of discretion standard. Typically, when a trial court malees a discretionary decision “ ‘within the legal standards and takes the proper factors into account in the proper way, the [trial court’s] decision is protected even if not wise.’ [Citation omitted.]” However, an “ ‘[a]buse is found when the trial court has gone outside the framework of legal standards or statutory limitations, or when it fails to properly consider factors on that issue given by the higher courts to guide the discretionary determination.’ [Citations omitted.]” Dragon v. Vanguard. Industries, Inc., 282 Kan. 349, 354, 144 P.3d 1279 (2006).
Although trial courts have wide discretion in determining whether to award maintenance, they may not ignore a dependent spouse’s financial need for support and the ability of the other spouse to pay support. In re Marriage of Kuzanek, 32 Kan. App. 2d 329, 330, 82 P.3d 528 (2004), rev’d on other grounds 279 Kan. 156, 105 P.3d 1253 (2005) (spousal maintenance is based on a financial need and a financial ability). In determining whether to award maintenance, trial courts are to consider the eight judicial factors set out in Sommers, 246 Kan. at 654-55, in applying their discretion. See Williams, 219 Kan. at 306 (setting out the original eight factors that should be considered in fixing maintenance). This type of discretion is commonly referred to as guided discretion because it requires trial courts (1) to properly consider judicial factors or legal standards applicable to a particular issue and (2) to *488stay within the framework of those factors or legal standards in applying their discretion. Dragon, 282 Kan. at 354.
Here, the trial court cursorily stated that it had considered the laundry list of factors contained in Sommers. Nevertheless, the record is devoid of any discussion by the trial court on how it specifically considered and applied the eight Sommers’ factors. See Dragon, 282 Kan. at 354 (The provisions of the statute must be applied and rigorously analyzed.). Although the eight Sommers’ factors have not been enacted into statutory factors, these factors were judicially created by our Supreme Court to guide trial courts’ discretionary determination whether to award maintenance. Indeed, if trial courts were allowed to ignore the proper consideration and analysis, on the record, of the Sommers’ factors, appellate courts would be rendered helpless to determine if trial courts have abused their discretion in whether to award maintenance.
Turning to the Sommers’ factors, I note that Leona questions whether the trial court’s consideration and application of the Sommers’ factors are sufficient to support its conclusion not to award maintenance. Leona has conceded for the sake of argument that the following factors are essentially equal as between her and Terry:
(1) the age of the parties;
(6) the time, source and manner of acquisition of property; and
(7) the family ties and obligations.
Nevertheless, Leona árgues that the remaining Sommers’ factors favor an award of maintenance. I agree.
Let us consider the remaining Sommers’ factors. Regarding factor (2), the parties’ present and prospective earning capacities, this factor clearly favors Terry. In determining Terry’s base salary as a teacher, the trial judge stated: “I’m going to find that Mr. Hair’s base salary for school year 2006-2007 is a total of $75,718.29.” This amount represented a gross monthly income of $6,309.86. Significantly, Terry’s monthly gross income of $6,309.86 is almost $300 more per month than the monthly gross income ($6,019.54) that Terry had listed in his domestic relations affidavit. On the other hand, the record shows that Leona had a gross monthly income of $1,629.33. As a result, Terry’s monthly gross income was nearly *489four times that of Leona’s monthly gross income. Moreover, a review of the record shows that the trial court did not consider, on the record, the substantial disparity in earning capacities between Terry and Leona.
In particular, Leona testified that she had been unable to obtain full-time employment. Testifying about her obstacles to finding full-time employment in the nursing field, Leona stated:
“Well, I think that they [prospective employers] tend to want to hire more part time so that they don’t have to offer medical insurance. But I also think that when I went to school, we got a diploma. I don’t have a bachelors. I don’t have a BSN [Bachelor of Science in Nursing]. If they look at one person who has a bachelors. And I have a diploma, and they get people — prefer people with a bachelors. I think when I go in and get interviewed and they see me, it’s easier to pick a younger candidate, and that’s probably just my own feeling about it.”
This statement paints a revealing picture of Leona’s dismal prospects for gaining full-time employment in the nursing field.
In addition, Leona’s age and sex would have reduced her chances at obtaining full-time employment in many other employment areas. For example: Leona was a 54-year-old female when she made that ominous statement about her unsuccessful job searches in the nursing field. Leona’s sex and age should have immediately drawn the trial court’s attention to the following considerations.
When “the dependent spouse is the wife, the court should consider the impact of sex and age discrimination on the spouse’s ability to obtain full time permanent employment. Although women are able to freely enter the job market, there is still a disparity in their ability to earn.” 2 Elrod and Buchele, Kansas Law and Practice, Kansas Family Law § 10.62, p. 45 (1999). Here, the record shows that Leona had worked only part-time in the nursing field for the last 20 years. In particular, Terry acknowledged that he and Leona had a mutual understanding that she would work only part-time while raising their three daughters. Also, the record shows that Leona lacked a BSN degree, which Leona testified had been an obstacle to her obtaining full-time employment in the nursing field. See In re Marriage of Zimmerman, No. 95,772, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed March 2, 2007 (no abuse of discre*490tion by the trial court when it awarded spousal support of $500 per month for 60 months to a 51-year-old woman who had a high school education, who had worked outside the home for only 4 years during the 27-year marriage, and who had never earned more than minimum wage, while, in contrast, former husband had vocational training, had a long history of steady employment, and had income-producing inherited property).
Under factor (3), the length of the marriage, the record showed that the parties had a 32-year marriage. I could find no mention in the record where die trial court specifically considered the length of the parties’ marriage in determining whether to award maintenance.
With regard to factor (4), the property owned by the parties, the trial court awarded Terry the World Savings accounts — including a $53,631 certificate of deposit (CD) — as inherited property. These accounts represented a substantial liquid asset. In addition, the CD was an income-producing asset. See In re Marriage of Callagan, 19 Kan. App. 2d 335, 340, 869 P.2d 240 (1994); Zimmerman, slip op. at 9 (The court should consider whether one spouse has been awarded income producing property.).
In regard to factor (5), the parties’ needs, Leona detailed her lack of success in obtaining full-time employment, even in employment areas unrelated to the nursing field. Moreover, she testified about her significant financial need, which is discussed under factor (8).
Finally, in regard to factor (8), the parties’ overall financial situation, Leona showed a significant financial need. In fact, Terry’s counsel conceded that Leona had a financial need: “If the Court orders maintenance, I [believe] somewhere around $400 a month for a more limited period of time, maybe six years. But I think that is fair and equitable considering the circumstances here.” Moreover, “I have no doubt that on some level Mrs. Hair needs maintenance to survive.” (Emphasis added.) What a poignant statement! Indeed, this statement came from the lips of Terry’s counsel. Similarly, the trial court also recognized that Leona had a need for spousal support: “The Court acknowledges that [Leona] may have a need for spousal maintenance but also acknowledges that needs *491of parties change as lifestyles change as a result of a divorce, which requires the parties to live two separate lifestyles.”
Further, the housing situation favored Terry. Although Leona was allowed to live in the marital residence until the house could be sold, the trial court made her solely responsible for the monthly mortgage payments on the property. On the other hand, Terry had been favored with rent-free housing: residing in his late father’s home.
In determining whether to award maintenance, courts generally look to “[t]he need of the dependent spouse combined with consideration of the ability of the other spouse to pay . . . .” See 2 Elrod and Buchele, Kansas Law and Practice, Kansas Family Law § 10.62, p. 45; see also In re Marriage of Kuzanek, 32 Kan. App. 2d at 330 (spousal support is based on financial need and financial ability); In re Marriage of Day, 31 Kan. App. 2d 746, 74 P.3d 46 (2003) (no abuse of discretion by the trial court when it awarded spousal support to wife of $311 for 120 months using Johnson County guidelines when wife would have $2,150 per month for her and two minor children and husband would have $2,750 for himself). In summary, the record shows that Leona had a major financial need and that Teriy had the financial ability to pay spousal maintenance.
When a trial court neglects to properly consider the factors given by our Supreme Court to guide a discretionary determination, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, Inc., 277 Kan. 776, 779, 89 P.3d 908 (2004); see In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 162, 159 P.3d 974 (2007) (“If among other things, a district court’s decision goes outside the legal framework or fails to properly consider statutory limitations, it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” [Emphasis added.]); see also State v. Murdock, 286 Kan. 661, 672-73, 187 P.3d 1267 (2008) (establishing judicial factors that would furnish a guide for a trial court’s discretion and for an appellate court when reviewing the exercise of such discretion). Here, the record shows that the trial court abused its guided discretion when it neglected to properly consider and analyze the Sommers’ factors in applying its discretion whether to award maintenance.
*492The majority, however, contends that the trial court did consider the Sommers’ factors in this case. Yet, I note that the majority opinion is lacking any discussion on how and when the trial court specifically considered and applied, on the record, the Sommers’ factors. In Zimmerman, this same panel, in affirming the trial court’s award of maintenance, made specific mention of how the trial court considered and applied, on the record, some of the Sommers’ factors in making an award of maintenance. Slip op at 8-9.
If speculation is the test as to whether the trial court adequately considered and applied the Sommers’ factors, the record more readily supports the contrary inference. In addition, I would maintain that the choice the trial court made in its cursory consideration of the Sommers’ factors, whatever they might have been, was contrary to the evidence.
In brief, there is abundant evidence that Leona has a significant need for spousal support. This leaves but one question: What evidence is there that Terry does not have the ability to pay spousal support? Just from his main occupation as a teacher, the trial court determined that Terry’s gross income is $75,718.29. Terry testified that he planned to teach for another 6 years. Moreover, Terry’s gross income from his summer painting business is $20,000. Terry testified that he planned to continue his painting business for another 3 to 5 years. If Terry’s teaching and painting incomes are added together, his gross income is nearly $96,000, which does not include the income he receives from the $53,631 World Savings’ CD. As a result, the evidence shows that Terry has an ability to pay spousal support. Moreover, Terry’s attorney conceded this telling point in his closing argument to the trial court.
Given the trial court’s generous property division award in Terry’s favor, I would reverse the trial court’s no maintenance award and remand this matter to the trial court to make an appropriate award of spousal maintenance.