dissenting.
Based on the record before us, I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case. However, because I find Cornelius's conduct was not willful or egregious, it did not prejudice Op-posers, and less drastic sanctions were available, I conclude the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
A trial court has discretion to dismiss an action with prejudice when a plaintiff fails to prosecute the action with due diligence. C.R.C.P. 41(b). However, that discretion is not without limits. "The rules which permit a court to dismiss a case for inactivity are not meant to be rules of forfeiture, but rather guides for the efficient and orderly administration of the courts." Mizar v. Jones, 157 Colo. 535, 537, 403 P.2d 767, 769 (1965), repudiated on other grounds by Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mut. Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 n. 5 (Colo.1985). Because the primary purpose of the courts is to provide a forum to settle litigable matters, a dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sancetion to be applied only in extreme situations. Tell v. McElroy, 39 Colo.App. 431, 566 P.2d 374, 375 (1977), repudiated on other grounds by Lake Meredith Reservoir Co., 698 P.2d at 1344 n. 5.
When deciding whether to dismiss a case with prejudice, a trial court must balance the desire to prevent unreasonable delays with the policy favoring resolution of disputes on the merits. Lake Meredith Reservoir Co., 698 P.2d at 1345. A trial court should weigh a number of factors: the length and reasons for the delay; whether the plaintiff's conduct was willful; whether the plaintiff has resumed prosecution (including the nature and extent of those efforts); the prejudice that could result to the defendant by allowing the matter to continue; and the difficulty of trying the case as a result of the delay. Id. at *5741344 n. 5, 1845. In addition, a trial court should consider whether there are less drastic alternatives available-such as a dismissal without prejudiece-to balance the goal of effective case management with the responsibility to provide a forum for dispute resolution. Tell, 566 P.2d at 375; see also Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402-03 (Colo.1982) (explaining that a motion for default judgment, an extreme remedy, should be liberally construed in favor of resolution of disputes on the merits). An analysis of these considerations demonstrates that the dismissal with prejudice was inappropriately punitive and therefore an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
I. Cornelius's Conduct Was Not Willful
The delay in this case was inadvertent and was caused by Cornelius's lack of knowledge about legal proceedings. It is evident from the record that Cornelius had no idea which rules applied, what deadlines existed, and what information had to be disclosed. Cornelius's uncontroverted position was that he relied on advice from a water court clerk, who indicated that Cornelius had as long as he needed and that it generally takes years to gather sufficient information about each well. As such, it is not surprising that Cornelius missed discovery deadlines and failed to disclose necessary information altogether.
In addition, Cornelius was making a good faith effort to comply with this timeframe, based on his assertion that he was in the process of gathering the materials for a substantial number of wells. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Cornelius willfully failed to comply with discovery rules, or that he abandoned preparation of the case.
II. The Delay Occasioned by the Discovery Violations Did Not Prejudice the Defendants
The majority erroneously concludes that there was sufficient prejudice to Opposers to warrant a dismissal with prejudice because Opposers expended energy and resources in opposing Cornelius's applications. There are two errors in that conclusion: first, the majority applies the wrong standard for "prejudice to the defendant"; and, second, when the correct standard is applied, there is little or no prejudice to Opposers.
As noted above, in Lake Meredith Reservoir Co., we said "the prejudice that will result to the defendant by allowing the matter to continue" is a factor to be considered. 698 P.2d at 1345 (emphasis added). We did not list as a factor-nor have subsequent decisions considered-the prejudice to a defendant in litigating the case up to the time of dismissal. See id. at 1346-47 (explaining that after a 87-year delay, defendant would be prejudiced because the substantive law had changed and fact witnesses would no longer be available); Cullen v. Phillips, 30 P.3d 828, 833-35 (Colo.App.2001) (defining prejudice-for purposes of laches and failure to prosecute-as loss of evidence, death of witnesses, or other cireurstances arising during the delay that affect the defendant's ability to defend).
A correct understanding of the "prejudice to the defendant" factor requires an assessment of the defendant's ability to defend if the matter continues, not of the expenses incurred so far. Thus, the majority erroneously found relevant and persuasive that Op-posers expended time and money defending the case. The fact that a defendant must expend time and money to defend an action is not unique to this case,6 and certainly should not be grounds to grant a motion to dismiss with prejudice. Suggesting otherwise in effect makes every case with a discovery delay or dispute a good candidate for a dismissal with prejudice.
Moreover, Opposers failed to show they would suffer any prejudice if the matter were to continue. There was no showing that evidence or witnesses were no longer available or that the delay in any other way *575precluded them from properly defending their rights.
III. Less Drastic Alternatives Should Have Been Considered
Before imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice, the trial court was not given the opportunity to consider less drastic alternatives pursuant to C.R.C.P. 37, which could have resolved the discovery issues. As noted in the Committee Comment to Rule 37, the disclosure and discovery rules form a part of a comprehensive case management system, intended to aid both the parties and the court in preparing a case for trial.
To that end, the discovery rules recognize that an aggrieved party must expend some effort in resolving discovery violations. Specifically, a moving party must demonstrate that it, "in good faith, has conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action." C.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). Therefore, while a defendant has no obligation to prod a plaintiff into action, I cannot conclude-as the majority does-that it was acceptable for Opposers to sit back for several months, do nothing in an attempt to rectify the discovery violations, and then expect the trial court-whose purpose is to provide a forum to litigate disputes-to dismiss the action with prejudice. Yet, this is precisely what occurred. The first application was filed in June 2006, providing for a discovery deadline in January 2007. Aside from the Statements of Opposition and the Consultation Report filed by the Division Engineer, almost nothing occurred in the initial months of the case. In March 2007, a trial date was set for February of the following year. From March until January 2008, when Opposers filed their motion to dismiss, there was no activity in the case. The record shows no effort, on the part of Opposers or the trial court, to resolve discovery disputes under Rule 37 or otherwise address Cornelius's failures.
The majority dismisses Rule 37 sanctions as a viable alternative, concluding that discovery sanctions would have been tantamount to dismissal. - However, that conclusion assumes the only remedy available under Rule 37 was the exclusion from trial of any evidence not disclosed. This assumption fails to recognize that intermediate remedies available under Rule 37 may have allowed Cornelius to understand his failures and comply. In any event, Opposers did not pursue Rule 37 sanctions. Rather, they filed a C.R.C.P. 41 motion, seeking the most drastic remedy available to them, namely, a dismissal with prejudice.
Finally, Opposers did not in good faith comply with the provisions of C.R.C.P. 121 when they filed their C.R.C.P. 41 motion. Rule 121, section 1-10 requires "due notice to the opposite party" before a motion to dismiss is filed, and Rule 121, section 1-15(8) states that "[mJoving counsel shall confer with opposing counsel before filing a motion ..., [and] if no conference has occurred, the reason why shall be stated."7 In the motion to dismiss, Opposers assert that they complied with Rule 121 by attempting to confer with Cornelius before filing the motion. Counsel states she sent a letter to Cornelius about the motion and received no response. Yet, the letter was mailed on December 28, 2007-a Friday-and the motion was filed just a few days later on January 2, 2008. Not only was the letter sent over a holiday weekend, but only two of the five days between mailing and filing were business days. This "attempt" to confer with the opposing party before filing a motion was meaningless: it is unlikely Cornelius even received the letter by the time the motion was filed.8
*576Summary
I conclude that none of the factors set forth in Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. favor dismissal with prejudice in this case. Corne-linus should be afforded the opportunity to refile his applications and resolve the dispute on the merits. Dismissal without prejudice would be appropriate to assist the trial court with the orderly and efficient administration of its docket, but dismissal with prejudice needlessly punishes Cornelfus. Accordingly, I conclude the trial court abused its discretion and I would reverse the portion of the trial court's order dismissing the case with prejudice. I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice COATS joins in this dissent.
. In any event, the expenditures incurred by Op-posers in this action were minimal. There was no activity from March 2007 until the motion to dismiss was filed in January 2008, and the activity before March 2007 was minor, consisting of filing Statements of Opposition and setting a trial date. Additionally, as Opposers concede, they did not have discovery, so they were unable to spend time and money preparing for trial.
. The Committee Comment to Rule 121, section 1-15 suggests that conferring may not be appropriate in all cases, such as where conferring would be useless under the circumstances. As previously discussed, there are many ways to remedy a discovery violation, including remedies available under Rule 37. Conferring with Cornelius may have resolved some of the discovery violations and therefore conferring with him would not be "useless."
. The only other evidence suggesting that Op-posers attempted to obtain the undisclosed information is in a letter from counsel dated November 17, 2006, wherein counsel asked for information about ownership rights in the wells at issue. However, this letter was sent *576before the discovery deadline (January 2007), and so could not serve to address Cornelius's subsequent violation of discovery rules.