Specially Concurring.
I concur in Parts L, II., III. B and C, and I concur in the result in Parts III. A and IV.
On February 16, 1995, Delbert Hayward (Delbert) died. For tactical reasons, the personal representative of his estate filed two lawsuits regarding his treatment and death. The personal representative, who was Delbert’s son Alfred, filed a wrongful death action in federal court and a survival action in state court.1 In the federal lawsuit, the personal representative sought to recover “[f]or Plaintiffs loss of love and companionship of his father, Delbert Lewis Hayward.” In the state lawsuit, the personal representative sought to recover “[f]or Plaintiffs medical expenses and costs associated with his hospitalization, treatment, and death to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000).”2 The federal lawsuit was dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction, and the personal representative then moved to amend the state lawsuit to add a claim for wrongful death. The proposed second amended complaint would have added in the prayer a request to recover “[f]or Plaintiffs loss of love and companionship of his father, Delbert Lewis Hayward.”
The defendants’ motions for summary judgment were heard and granted before the district court ruled on the plaintiffs motion to filed a second amended complaint adding a claim for wrongful death. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration seeking clarification as to whether the district court intended to dismiss the plaintiffs wrongful death claim and seeking permission to file the second amended complaint.3 The district court denied the motion for reconsideration upon *352the ground that a claim for wrongful death would be barred by the statute of limitations because it would not relate back under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). In so holding, the district court stated in its decision, “Where the original complaint does not give notice of the legal theory in an amended complaint, the amendment is a new cause of action which does not relate back. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984).”
The majority finds that “the original complaint gave notice of the legal theory based on a wrongful death action.” I cannot agree with the majority because the original complaint in the state lawsuit was carefully drafted so that it alleged a survival cause of action, not a wrongful death cause of action. Counsel for the personal representative conceded during oral argument that the complaint in the state lawsuit was intended to allege a survival action, not a wrongful death action.4 Although defendants’ counsel argued in federal court that the state lawsuit was a wrongful death action, the nature of the cause of action alleged in the complaint should be based upon the wording of the complaint, not upon the arguments made by defense counsel in a related case. The district court was correct in stating that the original complaint in the state lawsuit did not give notice of a cause of action for wrongful death.
Although I cannot agree that the original complaint in the state lawsuit gave notice of a wrongful death action, I agree that the district court erred in holding that a claim for wrongful death would not relate back to the date of the original complaint. The district court held that a claim for wrongful death would not relate back because it was a new cause of action. Relation back under Rule 15(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does not depend upon whether a new cause of action is being asserted. Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 713 P.2d 1374 (1985). That rule states, “Whenever the claim ... asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” Here, the claim for wrongful death arose out of the conduct or occurrence set forth in the original complaint in the state lawsuit. The factual allegations in the original complaint in the state lawsuit were identical to the factual allegations in the proposed second amended complaint. The original complaint included the allegation, “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence and tortuous conduct to Delbert Lewis Hayward, he suffered serious physical injuries, and ultimately died.” The only material change that would be made by the proposed amended complaint would be to add in the prayer a request to recover “[f]or Plaintiffs loss of love and companionship of his father, Delbert Lewis Hayward.” Thus, under Rule 15(c) the proposed amended complaint seeking to add a cause of action for wrongful death would relate back to the date of the original complaint because the claim for wrongful death “arose out of the conduct ... or occurrence set forth ... in the original pleading.”
Our decision in Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984), is not to the con*353trary. In Wing, the amended complaints did not relate back because they “alleged wrongful conduct by DuPont arising at a different time and with regard to a different set of facts than those involved in the original complaint.” Id. at 270, 688 P.2d at 1175.
The majority next addresses the combined application of Rules 15(e) and 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The majority states that “Alfred mistakenly named the incorrect party in the complaint” and concludes that he “should be allowed to substitute the real party in interest and relate the amendment back to the date of the original complaint.” The facts in this case do not raise any issue regarding substitution of the real party in interest, nor did the plaintiff ever request permission to do so.
The plaintiff, as identified in the caption of the original complaint in the state court lawsuit, is “Alfred S. Hayward, Personal Representative of the Estate of Delbert Lewis Hayward, Deceased.” The proposed second amended complaint would not have changed the named plaintiff, nor is there any need to do so. The personal representative can bring an action for wrongful death,5 and need not join the heirs as parties. “[A] personal representative ... may sue in this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.” IDAHO R. CIV. P. 17(a). As personal representative, Alfred could bring an action to recover any claims the estate may have, and he could bring a wrongful death action to recover for Delbert’s death. There is no need to expressly allege that an action brought by the personal representative is prosecuted “on behalf of the estate” or “on behalf of the heirs.” Alfred’s capacity is that of personal representative, and in that capacity he could bring either a survival action (if Idaho recognized such action) or a wrongful death action.
Where, as here, the plaintiff in the original complaint could have brought the claim sought to be added by the amendment, and where the claim sought to be added “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original pleading,” the amendment would relate back to the date of the original pleading. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the proposed amendment on the ground that the claim to be added would be barred by the statute of limitations.
. The state court lawsuit alleged false imprisonment of Hayward in the nursing home, negligence in treating him, and breach of a contractual agreement to exercise reasonable care in treating him. Because the basis of all claims was the provision of or failure to provide health care, the action was one for medical malpractice. IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (1998).
. A survival action is for the damages the deceased suffered and could have sued for had he survived, while a wrongful death action involves the damages suffered by the heirs of the decedent because of his death, such as loss of guidance, support, etc. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980). They are two entirely separate causes of action. Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944). At common law a tort action for personal injuries abated upon the death either of the injured person or of the tortfeasor. Stucki v. Loveland, 94 Idaho 621, 495 P.2d 571 (1972). If the tortfeasor died, his personal representative was not liable in his official capacity for personal injuries caused by the decedent during his lifetime. Id. Likewise, if the victim of the tort died before recovering a judgment, his cause of action also died. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). If a person’s death was caused by the wrongful act of another, the relatives and dependents of the decedent did not have any cause of action at common law. Id. When actions for wrongful death were authorized in Idaho by the enactment of Idaho Code § 5-311, this Court held that the common law rule, preventing recovery from the personal representative of the deceased tortfeasor, remained in force. Id. In response, the legislature enacted a survival statute that permitted tort actions, except actions for slander or libel, to survive the death of the wrongdoer. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (1998). Under Idaho law, however, an action for personal injuries does not survive the death of the victim of the tort. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990).
.The district court granted the motions for summary judgment and entered an order stating, "That all of the Plaintiffs claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed as to Defendants, Valley Vista Care Corporation, Scott F. Burpee, Jan Burpee and Nancy Renfrew (Valley Vista) and the Estate of W. Dyce Thurston.” Although it dismissed the claims in "Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint,” the district court had never entered an order granting the plaintiff permission to file the second amended complaint.
. Excerpts of the argument are as follows:
JUSTICE EISMANN: Well, if you look at the pleadings, though, there are differences between the two complaints, and it’s clear that those differences are because the federal action was intended to be a wrongful death action and the state action was intended to be an action for torts that occurred prior to death. Is that correct?
DEBRA L. STEPHENS: Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE EISMANN: But one was a wrongful death action and the other was to assert claims that arose before death.
DEBRA L. STEPHENS: True, your Honor.
JUSTICE EISMANN: I know now you want to say the state court action was a wrongful death action, but it’s clear that that’s not the way it was filed.
DEBRA L. STEPHENS: True, and we’re not disputing that. Again, our argument is that—
JUSTICE EISMANN: So if you take it based upon the pleadings, it was not a wrongful death action.
DEBRA L. STEPHENS: Depends on how you read the pleadings. Did we intend a wrongful death action? No.
JUSTICE KIDWELL: Well, I’m a little bit concerned because you said that you did not, you acknowledged that you did not intend to file a wrongful death action.
DEBRA L. STEPHENS: Right.
. Idaho Code § 5-311(1) provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her death, his or her personal representatives. In every action under this section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be just.
A decedent’s “heirs or personal representatives on their behalf” may maintain an action to recover damages for wrongful death.
The statute is ambiguous as to whether the phrase "personal representatives” means the personal representatives of the decedent or the personal representatives of the heirs. The statute could be read to have "personal representatives" refer to the personal representatives of the heirs. That argument would be based upon the fact that a decedent usually has only one personal representative. Thus, the reference to "personal representatives” (plural) must refer to the personal representatives of more than one person, and "heirs” is the only plural noun to which the phrase could refer. Later in the statute, however, the phrase "personal representatives” clearly refers to the personal representatives (plural) of a single decedent. The statute states, "If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her death, his or her personal representatives." If “personal representatives” were read to mean the personal representatives of the "heirs” of the decedent, it would transform Idaho Code § 5-311 into a form of survival action. That reading would provide that an heir’s claim for wrongful death would survive the heir's death and could be brought by the heir’s personal representative. There is nothing indicating that Idaho Code § 5-311 was intended by the legislature to be in part a survival statute. Therefore, the phrase "personal representatives” should be read as referring to the personal representatives of the decedent.