concurring in the judgment:
At issue in these voting rights cases is whether the State of Alabama properly submitted Alabama Code § 17 — 10—5(a), as amended by Alabama Act No. 96-885, to the United States Attorney General for preclearance review as required by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that § 17 — 10—5(a) was not properly submitted and therefore did not receive pre-clearance, both the panel opinion by Judge Carnes and the special concurrence by Judge DeMent contain language which, I believe, could potentially undermine the remedial scheme prescribed by Congress in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. For that reason, I concur only in the judgment of the court.
I.
I take issue primarily with the panel opinion’s suggestion in dictum that the amendment to § 17-10-5(a) might have been properly submitted if the State had “clearly stated in its submission letter that all changes indicated on the face of the enclosed redlined version of [Act No. 96-885] should be treated as voting changes submitted for preclearance by the Attorney General.” Ante, at 972. In my view, to suggest that such a general request for preclearance could constitute a proper submission under § 5 would invite the State and other jurisdictions subject to § 5 to undermine the preclearance process by making their submissions as broad and as ambiguous as possible.
The Supreme Court has held that when a jurisdiction subject to § 5 wishes to utilize the administrative preclearance process, it must “in some unambiguous and recordable manner submit any legislation or regulation in question directly to the Attorney General with a request for his consideration pursuant to the Act.” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 571, 89 S.Ct. 817, 834, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). But it is not enough for a State to send a piece of legislation to the Attorney General along with a general request for preclearanee. See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 247-48, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 1045, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984). The submitting authority “must identify with specificity each change that it wishes the Attorney General to consider.” Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 658, 111 S.Ct. 2096, 2104, 114 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991) (emphasis added).
As the Court explained in Clark, the requirement that a State identify each change is necessary if the Attorney General is to perform her already considerable duties under § 5. 500 U.S. at 658, 111 S.Ct. at 2104. The Attorney General reviews literally thousands of voting changes each year and must for each one analyze, within the 60-day pre-clearance period, demographic data, voting patterns and other factors in order to make *976the statutory judgment whether the change has a discriminatory purpose or effect. Id.
Congress recognized that the Attorney General could not, in addition to these duties, also monitor and identify every voting change in every jurisdiction subject to § 5. Id. “Because of the acknowledged and anticipated inability of the Justice Department— given limited resources — to investigate independently all changes with respect to voting enacted by States and subdivisions covered by the Act,” Congress placed the burden on the jurisdictions subject to § 5 to identify, submit, and receive approval for each and all such changes as a condition of their implementation. Id. (quoting McCain, 465 U.S. at 247, 104 S.Ct. at 1044-45); see also Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, -, 117 S.Ct. 1228, 1237, 137 L.Ed.2d 448 (1997) (summarizing McCain, 465 U.S. at 249, 255-57 104 S.Ct. at 1045-46, 1048-50). The State’s burden is not simply to identify all changes clearly, as the majority suggests, but rather to identify, in an unambiguous and recordable manner, each change for which it seeks preclearance.
In my view, the State could not have satisfied its burden in this case by stating in its submission letter that the Attorney General should review all changes indicated on the face of the enclosed legislation. A request to preclear all changes on the face of some attached legislation does not identify, in an unambiguous and recordable manner, each change for which preclearance is sought. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the adequacy, under § 5, of such ‘blanket submissions’ of legislation for pre-clearance. See Clark, 500 U.S. at 659, 111 S.Ct. at 2104; McCain, 465 U.S. at 256-57, 104 S.Ct. at 1049-50; Allen, 393 U.S. at 571, 89 S.Ct. at 834. When a copy of new legislation is sent to the Attorney General along with a general request for preclearance, the Court has observed, the potential for ambiguity is “particularly pronounced.” McCain, 465 U.S. at 247, 104 S.Ct. at 1045.
Indeed, the regulations the Attorney General has promulgated to enforce § 5 reflect this important concern. 28 C.F.R. § 51.27(c) provides: “If the change affecting voting either is not readily apparent on the face of the documents, provided under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section or is not embodied in a document, a clear statement of the change explaining the difference between the submitted change and the prior law or practice, or explanatory materials adequate to disclose to the Attorney General the difference between the prior and proposed situation with respect to voting.”1 The majority appears *977to read this subsection very narrowly, suggesting that the State may be able to submit a large and complex piece of legislation and need only “note generally” that all the changes “affect voting.” Subsection (c) does not say “the fact” that there is a “change affecting voting” must be “readily apparent on the face of the documents ... or ... embodied in a document,” but that the change itself must be readily apparent. The change as it affects voting may or may not be readily apparent from the face of the legislation or embodied in it, and it may or may not be apparent from any added redlining as well. Additional “explanatory materials adequate to disclose to the Attorney General the difference between the prior and proposed situation with respect to voting” may be necessary to give context to the change and thereby reflect the nature of the change. It may be necessary to look beyond the redlining and the face of the legislation, perhaps even to other legislation, to understand “the difference between the prior and proposed situation with respect to voting.” In other words, redlining may or may not be sufficient to meet subsection (c)’s requirements.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that to relax the requirement that a submission clearly identify each change submitted would not only “add to the Attorney General’s already redoubtable obligations,” but also “diminish covered jurisdictions’ responsibilities for self-monitoring” and create an incentive for States to makes their submissions as broad and as ambiguous as possible. Clark, 500 U.S. at 658, 111 S.Ct. at 2104. My concern is that, by suggesting that a State can be absolved of the specificity requirement, the majority implicitly creates just such an incentive. The thrust of the majority opinion is in the wrong direction. Rather, faithful to Clark, the court should be inviting the State to be more open and forthcoming with information, not less so.2 The issue is how § 5 can be effectively enforced, not how it may be gotten around.
We must remember that Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in response to nearly a century of “unremitting and ingenious defiance” of the fifteenth amendment in certain parts of the country.3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Congress concluded that case-by-case litigation under previous voting rights legislation had been inadequate to uncover and remedy systematic voting discrimination. Id. at 328, 86 S.Ct. at 818. Even successful lawsuits under previous regimes were unusually time-consuming and too often resulted merely in the enactment of new, more ingenious practices of discrimination. See McCain, 465 U.S. at 243-44, 104 S.Ct. at 1043-44 (citing the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act). With the preclearance mechanism of § 5, Congress attempted “to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of *978the evil to its victims.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328, 86 S.Ct. at 818.
Were the State to follow the majority’s suggestion, the advantage of time and inertia would shift away from the victims and back to the State. The Attorney General would then bear the burden of uncovering voting changes. She would further bear the burden of doing so within the 60-day statutory time limit and with limited financial resources. The administrative preclearanee mechanism would cease to function effectively, both as a speedy alternative to the judicial preelear-anee mechanism and as a way to ensure that all new voting changes are in fact scrutinized by the federal government before they can be enforced. Our task, whatever our individual views on a particular course chosen by Congress, is to enforce the law vigorously (rather than reluctantly), as we find it, to assure that its enforcement mechanism remains a real, rather than a paper, tiger.
Finally, after I wrote this concurrence, the majority expanded its opinion to address some of the concerns I raise. To the extent my concurrence has generated a clarification by the majority that they and I are not at odds, I am pleased.
II.
I also take issue with Judge DeMent’s assertion that § 5 is unconstitutional and has proved to be burdensome. With all due respect to Judge DeMent, the Supreme Court has expressed its final judgment on the constitutionality of § 5, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335, 86 S.Ct. at 822, and Congress has expressed its views on the burden issue not once but repeatedly, see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 438 (1965); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970) (extending the preclearance requirement for five years); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub.L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400 (1975) (extending the preclearance requirement for seven years); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-205, § 2(a)-(b), 96 Stat. 131-33 (1982) (extending the pre-clearance requirement until 2007); see also S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 43-62 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 221; Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 Tenn.L.Rev. 1, 47-54 (1983).
■ Finally, Congress has rejected Judge DeMent’s suggestion that a case-by-case approach is adequate to address what Congress found to be systemic voting-rights violations in certain areas of this country. As I have already stated, because even successful lawsuits under previous regimes were unusually time-consuming and too often resulted merely in the enactment of new, more ingenious practices of discrimination, see McCain, 465 U.S. at 243-44, 104 S.Ct. at 1043-44 (citing the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act), Congress enacted § 5 so as “to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328, 86 S.Ct. at 818.
. Section 51.27 provides in full:
"Each submission should contain the following information or documents to enable the Attorney General to make the required determination pursuant to Section 5 with respect to the submitted change affecting voting:
(a) A copy of any ordinance, enactment, order, or regulation embodying a change affecting voting.
(b) A copy of any ordinance, enactment, order, or regulation embodying the voting practice that is proposed to be repealed, amended, or otherwise changed.
(c) If the change affecting voting either is not readily apparent on the face of the documents, provided under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section or is not embodied in a document, a clear statement of the change explaining the difference between the submitted change and the prior law or practice, or explanatory materials adequate to disclose to the Attorney General the difference between the prior and proposed situation with respect to voting.
(d) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the person making the submission.
(e) The name of the submitting authority and the name of the jurisdiction responsible for the change, if different.
(f) If the submission is not from a State or county, the name of the county and State in which the submitting authority is located.
(g) Identification of the person or body responsible for making the change and the mode of decision (e.g., act of State legislature, ordinance of city council, administrative decision by registrar).
(h) A statement identifying the statutory or other authority under which the jurisdiction undertakes the change and a description of the procedures the jurisdiction was required to follow in deciding to undertake the change.
(i) The date of adoption of the change affecting voting.
(j) The date on which the change is to take effect.
(k) A statement that the change has not yet been enforced or administered, or an explanation of why such a statement cannot be made.
(l) Where the change will affect less than the entire jurisdiction, an explanation of the scope of the change.
(m) A statement of the reasons for the change.
(n) A statement of the anticipated effect of the change on members of racial or language minority groups.
*977(o) A statement identifying any past or pending litigation concerning the change or related voting practices.
(p) A statement that the prior practice has been precleared (with the date) or is not subject to the preclearance requirement and a statement that the procedure for the adoption of the change has been precleared (with the date) or is not subject to the preclearance requirement, or an explanation of why such statements cannot be made.
(q) For redistrictings and annexations: the items listed under § 51.28(a)(1) and (b)(1); for annexations only: the items listed under § 51.28(c)(3).
(r) Other information that the Attorney General determines is required for an evaluation of the purpose or effect of the change. Such information may include items listed in § 51.28 and is most likely to be needed with respect to redistrictings, annexations, and other complex changes. In the interest of time such information should be furnished with ‘the initial submission relating to voting changes of this type. When such information is required, but not provided, the Attorney General shall notify the submitting authority in the manner provided in § 51.37.”
. Indeed, the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, in particular 28 C.F.R. § 51.27, reflect this purpose. See supra note 1.
. The fifteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”