dissenting.
¶ 126 In State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 23, 951 P.2d 869, 888 (1997), we stated:
In deciding whether death is an appropriate sentence ... we must look at more than just the facts of the crime. We must focus on the defendant in order to make an individualized sentencing determination as required by both the Arizona and United States Constitutions. In carrying out this responsibility, “we are sometimes called upon to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment even in cases where the facts are aggravated and the tragedy immense.”
(quoting State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 605, 863 P.2d 881, 897 (1993)). I believe the majority fails to heed this admonition. In affirming Hoskins’ capital sentence, today’s opinion overlooks a clear contradiction between the jury verdict and the trial court’s pecuniary gain finding.9 It also ignores, or at least minimizes, substantial mitigating evidence. Taken as a whole, the facts and the law raise serious doubts here about the appropriateness of the death penalty. See State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 250, 645 P.2d 239, 241 (1982)(“Where there is a doubt whether the death sentence should be imposed, we will resolve that doubt in favor of a life sentence.”).
The Pecuniary Gain Finding
¶ 127 The only aggravating factor applied by the trial court, that the instant murder was committed “as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value,” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F)(5), finds no support in the jury verdict. The jurors were instructed as follows with respect to felony murder:
The crime of first degree felony murder requires proof of the following two things: *155Number one, the defendant, acting either alone or with one or more persons, committed the offense of kidnapping, armed robbery or robbery; and, number two, in the course of and in furtherance of such offense or immediate flight from such offense, the defendant or another person caused the death of Crystel Cabral.
A special written interrogatory requested “the particular theory used by each juror in rendering the verdict of guilty of First Degree Murder.” It gave the jurors a choice of premeditated murder, felony murder, or both. Nine of them voted for premeditated murder only, and the remaining three voted for both theories. None voted for felony murder alone.
¶ 128 In State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 161, 692 P.2d 991,1010 (1984), we stated that “[t]he court may find the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain when the basis of the first degree murder conviction is felony murder and the felony is robbery.” In the present case, the jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and kidnapping, thus satisfying the first prong of the given instruction. However, nine of the twelve jurors failed to convict on the felony murder theory, strongly suggesting an unwillingness or inability to find the second prong beyond a reasonable doubt, to wit, that the murder was committed “in the course of and in furtherance of,” or during “immediate flight” from, those offenses. As a result, I believe the pecuniary gain aggravator is highly suspect.
¶ 129 In Carriger, we explained that “[t]o prove robbery, the state must show a taking of property from the victim; to prove pecuniary gain, the state must show the actor’s motivation was the expectation of pecuniary gain. Proving a taking in a robbery does not necessarily prove the motivation for a murder____” Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).. Thus, “the state must prove additional facts to prove the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain once it has proved the robbery.” Id.; see also Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F.Supp. 1388,1420 (D.Ariz.1995) (“[A] defendant found guilty of murder committed during the course of a robbery does not necessarily qualify for the death penalty pursuant to the pecuniary gain factor.”); State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 164, 823 P.2d 22, 31 (1991). In Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir.1996), the Ninth Circuit elaborated on this distinction by noting that not “everyone convicted of robbery felony-murder is automatically death eligible. The State needs to prove at sentencing that the killing was done with the expectation of pecuniary gain.” (Emphasis added). In other words, the state must prove more than the underlying crime to justify the aggravator.
¶ 130 Here, proof of motive for the killing was circumstantial at best. The fact that the jury did not convict the defendant of felony murder causes me to wonder how the trial judge could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the proof reached the level required for a finding of pecuniary gain. We have said that if the conclusions of the trial court at sentencing are not supported by the verdict, this court should not resort to “mental gymnastics to refute the findings of the jury.” State v. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 146, 685 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1984) (holding that pecuniary gain was not established where the jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated robbery and theft).
¶ 131 I respectfully submit that if this homicide was committed as part of a robbery, which was the state’s allegation all along, there should have been a felony murder finding. Because there was none, it is reasonable to suppose that the jurors were not convinced the killing occurred during the course of, or to facilitate, the robbery. Perhaps the defendant killed the victim for some other reason, or for no reason at all. The murder was certainly not necessary to complete the robbery. The perpetrators could have taken the car without committing a homicide. The jury also might have determined that the defendant completed the robbery or theft before forming an intent to kill; or it might simply have felt that the evidence was not strong enough to come to any firm conclusion in this regard-a reasonable position given that nothing in the record reveals details of the events immediately leading up *156to and including the murder itself.10
¶ 132 One thing, however, seems clear: if pecuniary gain was conclusively established as the impetus for the murder, the jury should have found that the killing was committed “in the course of and in furtherance of’ or during “immediate flight from” the robbery.11 It did not. Thus, the verdict throws considerable doubt on the trial court’s (F)(5) finding.12
Mitigation Evidence
¶ 133 Even if we had a solid pecuniary gain aggravator, I would still believe that death is an inappropriate sentence here in light of the significant mitigating circumstances.
Sentencing Disparity
¶ 134 I find it most troublesome that Scott DeShaw, whose involvement in this crime was at least equal to that of the defendant, received a natural life sentence. See State v. Mann, 188 Ariz. 220, 230, 934 P.2d 784, 794 (1997) (unexplained disparity in sentences of defendant and accomplice is mitigating); State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 72, 786 P.2d 395, 402 (1989) (“[Disparity between the sentences of accomplices ... must be considered and may be found as a mitigating circumstance and weighed against any aggravating circumstances, in determining whether to impose the death penalty.”).
11135 Sentencing differences in cases like this are often explained by the fact that one accomplice played a greater role in the killing than the other. White, 194 Ariz. at 352, 982 P.2d at 827; Mann, 188 Ariz. at 230, 934 P.2d at 794. This is not such a situation. We do not know who committed the murder. The prosecutor admitted as much at the sentencing hearing: “We do not know for sure which defendant put the gun to [the victim’s] head and pulled the trigger.” She then relied on circumstantial evidence, such as the fact that the defendant had the gun in his pants when arrested and that he seemed to be in charge when the Walkers came upon him and DeShaw at the overturned vehicle, to assert that the defendant must have been the shooter. I respectfully submit that we should not base a life or death decision on such indefinite proof.
¶ 136 The majority acknowledges, but makes little effort to justify, this sentencing disparity. Supra at ¶ 106. It briefly mentions the “evidence of [Hoskins’] actual culpability,” and then asserts that “most importantly, [the defendant] masterminded the car-jacking and theft of the vehicle.” Supra at ¶ 106. I cannot reconcile this statement with the trial court’s special verdict, which found beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant and his co-defendant Scott Deshaw both participated in the discussion and planning of a car-jacking murder, and equally, participated in the execution of their plan.”
¶ 137 In my view, the disparate sentences of the defendant and DeShaw have not been explained or justified. I seriously doubt that a reasoned explanation is possible.
*157 Age and Emotional Immaturity
¶ 138 Both the trial court and the majority conclude that the defendant’s age of twenty years, three months does not deserve significant weight as a statutory mitigator because of his average intelligence and alleged maturity. I respectfully disagree. In Trostle, we held that the defendant’s agé, also twenty years, was a mitigator when evidence showed that he was “a follower, easily manipulated,” and had never lived as an “independent functioning adult”-this, despite the fact that Trostle was found to have average intelligence. 191 Ariz. at 21, 951 P.2d at 886.
¶ 139 Similarly, although Aaron Hoskins tested at an average level of intelligence, family members and experts alike agreed that he was a follower and easily manipulated. The evidence clearly indicates an extreme lack of maturity. Underlying themes in the defendant’s juvenile records include his tendency to succumb to peer pressure, as well as his need to be cared for and shown the way. Mary Durand, a highly experienced investigator and mitigation specialist, testified that those records were “replete with comments about his inability to fight off peer pressure.” A recurring concern in his parole plan evaluations was the need “to teach him to stand up for himself and to say no.” A psychological evaluation conducted in 1987 described the defendant as being “vulnerable to peer pressure, needing to be liked as well as having impulse control problems.” It also noted his inability to “express anger in a modulated fashion.” The psychologist for the defense, Dr. Lanyon, testified that Hoskins is “pre-adolescent as far as his emotional maturity is concerned.” Even the state’s psychologist, Dr. Bayless, indicated that experts in the MMPI (a test used to measure personality and emotional functioning) would interpret the defendant’s scores as being characteristic of, among other things, an “[ijmmature,” “passive,” and “dependent” person. The defendant’s spouse, Tammy, expressed frustration over being more like a mother than a wife to him. In an interview with Durand, Tammy said that Hoskins “was easily led [and] that other people always controlled him like she had. That he really needed somebody to tell him what to do, when to do it, where to do it, and how to do it.” This evidence plainly contradicts the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s immaturity and impulsivity are “refuted by the record.” Supra at ¶ 121.
¶ 140 The court’s opinion further says, “we do not conclude that [the defendant] ‘never has had the experience of living as an independent functioning adult.’ ” Supra at ¶ 105 (quoting Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 21, 951 P.2d at 886). I reach a contrary conclusion. The defendant moved from his mother’s house to various motel rooms with his wife, and subsequently to his in-laws’ home. He did not have a job and did not support himself or his wife. Indeed, Dr. Bayless testified that the defendant showed consistent signs of irresponsibility by never maintaining employment or honoring financial obligations.
¶ 141 Moreover, contrary to the majority, I submit that the defendant’s criminal history does not demonstrate that he was “very mature for his age.” Supra at ¶ 103 (echoing the trial court’s assertion). A close look at the crimes he committed reveals that most were related to his youth. They begin at eight years of age and do not in any way indicate maturity or sophistication. In fact, they suggest just the opposite. One assault charge stemmed from an incident in which the defendant threw a snowball at another youngster and broke the window of a passing car. The second assault was an after-school fight involving another boy who earlier had struck Hoskins in the face with a whiffle ball. A third assault occurred when the defendant tried to choke another youngster with a plastic necklace after the latter hit him. The weapons offense arose when, at age eleven, he took a gun to school to compare its size with guns brought to school by other boys that same day. A burglary conviction resulted from the defendant having accompanied his older sister when she took $400 from their intoxicated grandmother, who was babysitting them at the time. Finally, an arson conviction came about when he and some friends set fire to a shed.
¶ 142 The contexts in which these crimes occurred confirm the defendant as an immature follower and a child with no parental guidance or supervision. Consequently, I *158conclude that his age of twenty years and three months qualifies as a statutory (G)(5) mitigator and should be given significant weight, as should the nonstatutory mitigating factor of emotional immaturity.
Mental Impairment and Abusive Childhood
¶ 143 The trial court found that the defendant had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired” within the meaning of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13 — 703(G)(1). It also concluded that, for purposes of nonstatutory mitigation, the defendant demonstrated an antisocial or borderline personality disorder but failed to prove a causal nexus between that malady and the killing. The majority agrees that the defendant has “not connected his anti-social or personality disorder to the car-jacking and murder” and gives no weight to this factor. Supra at ¶ 109.
¶ 144 Again I must disagree. In the first place, I reject any suggestion that proof of a causal connection always falls short of the mark in the absence of some magic words uttered by a psychologist or psychiatrist. We are talking about life or death, and insisting upon a formulaic approach to such a complex decision trivializes the inquiry. To my mind, the evidence here links the defendant’s mental impairment and abusive family background to his criminal behavior. Because of their close relationship, I address these mitigating factors together.
¶ 145 Both the trial court and the majority place great emphasis on the testimony of Dr. Bayless, the state’s psychologist. At the same time, they all but dismiss the defense expert, Dr. Lanyon, despite the fact that he has been in practice for over thirty years and is on the faculty at Arizona State University. Dr. Lanyon personally conducted psychological tests on the defendant. Dr. Bayless did not. I have considerable difficulty understanding, in a case where the ultimate decision must be life or death, how Dr. Lanyon’s testimony can be so completely disregarded.
¶ 146 Although Dr. Bayless disagreed with Dr. Lanyon’s opinion that the defendant suffered from Bipolar Disorder II, he did diagnose a borderline and/or antisocial personality disorder. According to both expert witnesses, the criteria for this syndrome include a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of others as shown by at least three of the following traits: (1) failure to conform to social-norms, indicated by repeatedly performing unlawful acts; (2) deceitfulness; (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; (4) irritability and aggressiveness; (5) reckless disregard for the safety of self or others; (6) consistent irresponsibility as indicated by the failure to sustain consistent work; and (7) lack of remorse. Although not agreeing in their ultimate diagnoses, both doctors found that the defendant demonstrated those characteristics set forth in numbers two through six. Dr. Bayless testified that, according to the defendant’s MMPI scores, “[h]e doesn’t have the controls necessary,” resulting in “even more poor judgment” and “even more impulsive” traits. According to him, “people who have this have a tendency to act out in outbursts of violence____”
¶ 147 Both experts concurred that the defendant’s family history and life experiences could have been factors in creating his antisocial personality. Having reviewed the circumstances of defendant’s upbringing, Dr. Lanyon testified that “it is certainly sufficient to have created those characteristics. I mean, the difficulties are certainly sufficient. The detachment, the lack of parental control, the abuse of alcohol, the sexual abuse, the neglect, the permissiveness in committing crimes. The modeling for crimes went on.” He further stated, “[f]or a person who had an antisocial personality disorder regardless, the impulsiveness, the disregard of the law and the belief that one is entitled to do what one desires to do, and this is sort of a long-range, a long-range set of beliefs, would certainly be characteristics that would be shown in this particular crime.” (Emphasis added). Dr. Bayless did not challenge or contradict this opinion. In other words, the testimony of the two psychologists together support a causal nexus between the defendant’s traumatic childhood, his resulting mental status, and his criminal behavior.
*159¶ 148 Other evidence points strongly to the same conclusion.13 Mary Durand testified that she spent approximately forty hours with the defendant, far more than either psychologist, over the course of twenty or more visits. She also spent six hours with the defendant’s sister Melissa, nine hours with his wife Tammy, and one day with his mother. Durand testified to the defendant’s manic behavior, which she witnessed during her visits with him. She observed episodes of depression and described suicide attempts that were noted in reports and by the defendant’s family.
¶ 149 The defendant’s juvenile records repeatedly refer to impulsive behavior and vulnerability to peer pressure. They also show that he was a risk to himself and others, had problems with responsibility and decision making, and exhibited a history of aggressive and oppositional behavior.
¶ 150 The history of Hoskins’ dysfunctional family and childhood abuse is well documented. The Arizona Juvenile Needs Assessment Form from the Department of Corrections Youth Parole Plan indicates that his parents were “unwilling or uninterested in caring” for the defendant and that the lack of resources in the home were such that his “parents [were] unable to provide appropriate care.” Durand interviewed the defendant’s mother and opined that she had “never seen a woman express less interest in a child in [her] life.” As examples, Ms. Durand noted that the defendant’s mother did not remember that her son had repeated a grade in school or that he had broken his leg when he was five years old. In addition, the corrections plan confirms that there was considerable fighting and conflict in the home.
¶ 151 Defendant’s juvenile records show that the he had a history of alcohol and drug abuse from an early age and that his sister, Melissa, led him to these addictions. Testimony indicated that he started drinking alcohol as early as age six and used marijuana at age eight. Melissa confirmed this, saying that she provided the defendant with alcohol and drugs when he was very young, and introduced him to crime around age ten. In fact, according to Melissa, the defendant’s mother and grandmother excessively abused alcohol, and both drugs and alcohol were readily available in the home. According to Hoskins’ wife, the drug culture continued to envelop him during their marriage — the two of them consumed enormous amounts of crystal methamphetamine.
¶ 152 A predisposition report indicates that the defendant was physically abused by both his mother and sister. It is also clear that the mother never intervened in any way on her children’s behalf, particularly the defendant’s. In fact, Mary Durand described her own interaction with the defendant’s mother as “one of the most disheartening and uncomfortable interviews because the woman knew absolutely nothing about her child____ She really couldn’t be bothered.” In a report from the Arizona Department of Youth Training and Rehabilitation, an officer recommended that “because of the home situation, the lack of parental supervision by [the defendant’s mother], Aaron’s use of alcohol, drugs, and the continued violence in the *160home involving Aaron, the only answer is that Aaron be sent to the Arizona State Department of Corrections.” Thus, prison was deemed a better environment for the defendant than his own home!
¶ 153 Records from the Department of Corrections indicate that as part of the defendant’s probation he was to have no contact with Melissa. This condition was violated when Melissa continued to live in the home after the defendant was released on probation. He was thereafter returned to custody. Although his mother knew of the probationary condition, she allowed the defendant to be sent back to prison instead of preventing her adult daughter from continuing a relationship with him.
¶ 154 All of the children in the defendant’s home had criminal records. The perversity of the family situation, however, is perhaps best illustrated by Melissa’s conviction on a charge of armed robbery. She admitted committing the crime to be with her girlfriend, who had previously been incarcerated. She then committed additional offenses in prison so that she could be sent to maximum security, where the girlfriend was confined.
¶ 155 According to his juvenile records, Melissa’s testimony, and the mother’s interview with Durand, Hoskins never lived with his father. His mother left that relationship before the defendant was born, when Melissa complained that the man was sexually abusing her. That marriage was the mother’s fourth or fifth, and her four children had three different fathers. She remarked that there had been “a pretty extensive amount of inbreeding” in the family of Hoskins’ father.
¶ 156 In her interview with Durand, the defendant’s wife, Tammy, said that she met him when they were both sixteen years old. On the day they met, the two of them went to her motel room where she provided him with drugs and alcohol. The next day he moved in with her. According to Melissa, Tammy sold drugs, was involved in prostitution and pornography, and physically abused the defendant. The two later lived in the home of Tammy’s mother, where they used alcohol and drugs with her the mother, her boyfriend, and Tammy’s younger brother, co-defendant DeShaw. Defendant’s mother-in-law ultimately died of alcohol-related problems.
¶ 157 Although evidence of the defendant’s sexual abuse is based on his self-reporting, it is significant that he told both his sister and wife about it long before he committed the present crimes. According to Melissa, Hos-kins slept in the same bed with his mother, behind a closed door, until he was approximately ten years old, even though he had his own room. She thought it was definitely possible that the defendant’s mother had sexually abused him. In addition, Durand testified that Dr. Bayless told her the defendant’s mother “would have to maintain that emotional profile [of detachment from her son] to be able to have a sexual relationship with him.” When Hoskins finally moved out of his mother’s room, he moved in with his older sister, Jenise. Melissa testified that when the defendant was fourteen years old, he told her that Jenise was molesting him.
¶ 158 Defendant’s wife was the first person to tell Mary Durand about sexual abuse issues in the family. Tammy said Hoskins confided to her that he had fathered Jenise’s oldest child when he was thirteen years old. The defendant also told Tammy that he once walked in on Jenise and her twin brother, James, having sexual intercourse. Tammy told Durand that Hoskins was “extremely disturbed by this” and that “he was very private about it [and] didn’t want people to know because they would think he was crazy.” Tammy thought that the defendant’s sexual behavior with her had been damaged by his relationships with his mother and sister. In addition, when James later drowned in a lake, the defendant was unable to forgive himself for anger he felt toward his brother because of the latter’s involvement with Jenise. Although the death was considered accidental by the police, the defendant and his family believed it was a drug-related murder.
¶ 159 Finally, the defendant told Melissa in letters from prison that he had been forced to have sex with people when he was a child, after she confided to him about having been raped. Virtually all of the evidence and the testimony of the witnesses is consistent with the defendant’s claims of sexual abuse and *161with what we now know about this young man’s upbringing. Moreover, the fact that the defendant told his sister and wife about the abuse before he committed the offenses herein increases the reliability of the information, and, indeed, the trial court found the evidence credible.
¶ 160 In summary, the above proof is more than sufficient to support a finding that the defendant suffered from an abusive and traumatic childhood. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that no credible evidence exists linking the defendant’s early life to this crime. It defies reason and common experience to suggest that a youngster coming out of the horrific environment described in the evidence was largely unaffected and should be held accountable as a functioning adult. At the age of twenty, he had not lived away from this terribly dysfunctional situation for any significant period of time. There is no evidence that he had ever overcome his past and acted as a mature adult.
¶ 161 The majority cites several cases in which we did not find abusive family backgrounds to be mitigating because the defendants failed to establish any link between their crimes and the past. All are distinguishable from the present case. In State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 427, 773 P.2d 983, 986 (1989) (Wallace II), and State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 524, 898 P.2d 454, 473 (1995), the defendants were adult offenders, ages thirty-three and thirty-eight, respectively. Both failed to show how their family backgrounds influenced their murderous behavior. In Wallace II, the defendant raised the issue of a difficult family background for the first time on appeal and never claimed that it had anything to do with his crime. 160 Ariz. at 426-27, 773 P.2d at 985-86. Similarly, the defendant in State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 189, 920 P.2d 290, 311 (1996), was twenty-seven years old, and we observed that his childhood abuse had occurred long before he robbed and murdered.
¶ 162 State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 282-83, 908 P.2d 1062, 1067-68 (1996), relied on by the majority, is also inapposite. There, the defendant was thirty-three years old at the time of the crime. He feigned a romantic relationship to gain the victim’s confidence and then proceeded to breach her trust in shocking fashion. Thinking she was going on a trip with her “boyfriend,” the woman was persuaded to use her credit card to obtain cash, merchandise, and an airline ticket for him. The defendant also duped her into signing over the title to her car before he killed her. These facts place Spears alongside State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 533-34, 892 P.2d 1319, 1322-23 (1995) (carefully planned killing of one spouse by the other) and State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 120-21, 865 P.2d 779, 781-82 (1993) (plan by mother to have her infant child slain for insurance proceeds) at the extreme end of the (F)(5) spectrum. At the same time, Spears provides little or no detail with respect to that defendant’s mental health and abusive family background. Only one paragraph of the opinion is devoted to the subject. Thus, we have no idea how persuasive that evidence might have been, especially when weighed against a very strong aggravator.
¶ 163 Although the trial court in State v. Murray found that the two defendants, Robert and Roger Murray, suffered from a dysfunctional background, there was no proof that this impacted their criminal behavior. 184 Ariz. 9, 40, 44, 906 P.2d 542, 573, 577 (1995). In Robert’s ease, the forensic psychologist testified that there was no evidence of mental disorder or defect at the time of the crime other than intoxication. Id. at 39, 906 P.2d at 572. In State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 490-91, 917 P.2d 200, 219-20 (1996), the defendant’s stepfather and a court-appointed expert testified that the defendant’s abusive and chaotic childhood “colored his behavior,” but we were unable to find any connection between this history and his conduct on the night of the murders. Finally, in State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 313-14, 896 P.2d 830, 853-54 (1995), the testimony of the defendant’s psychologist, who diagnosed him as being emotionally handicapped and suffering from a conduct disorder, was contested by the state’s expert who was unable to find any acute emotional disorder or signs of a mental defect. Neither psychologist testified that the defendant’s capacity to conform his conduct to the law was impaired. The argument *162that his abusive childhood affected his ability to cope and to control impulses came only from defense counsel. Id. at 314, 896 P.2d at 854.
¶ 164 In stark contrast, Hoskins was only twenty years old and had not yet escaped his dysfunctional family situation. In fact, he apparently committed this crime while on his way to visit and make amends with his mother. He clearly was not free of her influence. Dr. Lanyon testified that the defendant’s early use of drugs and alcohol prevented him from developing emotional maturity, which is the “process of learning to cope intellectually, where you cope by using your thoughts.” This process normally begins in early childhood and continues through adolescence. He also stated that drug and alcohol use during this period served “as an escape so you don’t have to face [emotions] or learn to deal with them.” He concluded that Hoskins “cannot help but be pre-adolescent as far as his emotional maturity is concerned.... I believe he is engaged in none or at least very little of those extensive learning experiences that one needs to have so that one can handle one’s feelings by working them through in one’s head.”
¶ 165 Defendant’s abuse of alcohol at the age of just six years is very different from the substance abuse we have seen in other cases. A child that young cannot be expected to make informed decisions concerning the consumption of such substances. We expect parents and other caretakers to guide children in making healthy choices. Here, however, drugs and alcohol were freely available in the defendant’s home for his entire life, and he was encouraged to participate by the very people who should have been protecting him from these dangerous activities. As Mary Durand testified,
I don’t know that [Hoskins] had an opportunity nor had the maturity at age four or five, six, seven and eight to make decisions to walk away from a family that had already significantly destroyed his ability to think, to reason, to reflect, and to act in appropriate ways because none of them have ever acted appropriately.
To think that such abuse did not directly affect the defendant’s ability to act as a responsible and productive adult is to entertain fantasy. I believe the evidence clearly demonstrates a reasonable connection between Hoskins’ upbringing and-the murder of Crystel Cabral. Defendant has shown, through the testimony of expert witnesses and others, an abnormal mental status resulting from his abusive background, characterized by impulsiveness, a disregard of the law, and a pattern of acting as he desired without considering consequences. Dr. Lanyon’s testimony sensibly links these traits to the present crime.14
¶ 166 In Trostle we recognized that the legislature did not intend to include “character and personality disorders” as mitigation under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13 — 703(G)(1). 191 Ariz. at 20, 951 P.2d at 885. We also noted, however, that “even if a disorder does not rise to the level of mental disease or defect originally contemplated in (G)(1), the inquiry is not over.” Id. There continues to be a duty to examine the facts for their nonstatutory mitigating value, a distinction the majority seems to ignore. Thus, “[i]n considering evidence of mental impairment, our primary task is to determine its mitigating weight, if any.” Id. at 20-21, 951 P.2d at 885-86. The weight given should be proportionate to “a defendant’s ability to conform or appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.” Id. at 21, 951 P.2d at 886.
*163¶ 167 Here, the defendant’s evidence was sufficient to establish by a preponderance-the full extent of his burden — that mental abnormalities impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. In addition, by showing that his mental status was linked to his dysfunctional family background, Hoskins has demonstrated that these unfortunate life experiences directly affected his ability to control his actions. I believe the majority errs in not giving this evidence serious consideration as nonstatutory mitigation.
Independent Reweighing
¶ 168 When there is only one aggravating factor and significant mitigation, a serious question is raised as to whether a death sentence is warranted. State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 72, 786 P.2d 395,402 (1989); State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 16, 775 P.2d 1069, 1080 (1989). When there is doubt about the imposition of the death penalty, the court should resolve the doubt in favor of a life sentence. Marlow, 163 Ariz. at 72, 786 P.2d at 402; Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 16, 775 P.2d at 1080. In this case, the defendant’s age, emotional immaturity, extremely dysfunctional family background, and mental impairment are significant mitigators, while the only aggravator, pecuniary gain, is at least in question.
¶ 169 The death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder but should be reserved for cases where either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime “above the norm of first-degree murders.” State v. Blazak, 131 Ariz. 598, 604, 643 P.2d 694, 700 (1982); see also State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 258, 778 P.2d 602, 623 (1988); State v. Cornell, 148 Ariz. 468, 485, 715 P.2d 721, 738 (1986). There is nothing remarkable about this crime when compared to other first degree murders. I do not in any way excuse the defendant’s conduct but merely conclude that he is no more nor less culpable than his companion/co-defendant. This fact, coupled with the significant mitigation discussed above, mandates that he should not be executed, but instead should spend the rest of his natural life in prison.
CONCURRING: STANLEY G. FELDMAN, Justice.. We are once again confronted with a case in which pecuniary gain is the sole aggravating factor. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F)(5). I continue to have grave concerns regarding the application of this aggravator, especially where it stands alone, but will not repeat what I have said before. See, e.g., State v. White, 194 Ariz. 344, 356-57, 982 P.2d 819, 831-32 (1999) (Zlaket, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 1272, 146 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000); State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 445-46, 967 P.2d 106, 120-21 (1998) (Zlaket, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1120, 119 S.Ct. 1772, 143 L.Ed.2d 802 (1999). It is noteworthy, however, that the state has asked us to independently add an aggravating factor not found by the trial judge, perhaps reflecting its own discomfort with pecuniary gain as the sole death qualifier. We have properly denied this request.
. The majority agrees that:
The Cabral vehicle was commandeered and the theft accomplished by the defendant well before the murder was committed. Accordingly, the act of murder occurred after the act of theft was complete, or so the jury may have concluded.
Supra at ¶91. The opinion suggests, however, that because "[p]ecuniary gain was at the very core of defendant’s premeditated plan,” all of his actions on the date in question must have been infected with this original motive. Supra at ¶ 91. I submit that such an expansive view of our felony murder jurisprudence is unwarranted.
. This assumes, as we must, that the jury followed the court’s instructions. State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996).
. The pecuniary gain motive takes on special significance here for yet another reason. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (holding that it is for the jury, not the judge, to decide defendant’s intent for purposes of sentence enhancement); see also, Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 2090, 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). "[W]hether judges rather than jurors may make post-conviction factual determinations which operate to increase the defendant’s sentence,” supra n. 5, is a question legitimately raised by the apparent conflict between the trial court’s sentencing finding and the jury verdict. I disagree with the majority’s decision to avoid it in this case.
. I have no quarrel with mental health practitioners, but find the majority’s abdication of responsibility to them quite alarming. Supra at ¶ 115. In effect, the fate of capital defendants is placed almost exclusively in the hands of expert witnesses who are paid to appear and testify, and who more often than not disagree in important ways. Their "bible,” as the trial judge called the DSM IV, is essentially a litany of possible findings and diagnoses. It represents an admirable attempt to bring order to a field of study that continues to be murky because of the frequent absence of truly objective symptoms and the remarkable individuality of the human mind.
To my knowledge, no previous decision has proclaimed such fierce allegiance to the need for psychiatric or psychological testimony, or such complete reliance upon it. I cannot accept that common sense, human experience, simple observation, and eyewitness accounts are to be left at the door in future searches for the elusive “nexus.” In my opinion, judges must do more than simply choose a “winner” in the battle of hired experts.
Moreover, no consideration seems to have been given by the majority to the clear advantage the state has in procuring such witnesses. Superior resources for prosecutors and the constant battle for funds faced by indigent defendants and their counsel, especially in our rural counties, will perpetuate or perhaps even exacerbate the disparity that already exists between rich and poor. The court’s language regarding experts is most unfortunate and, in my judgment, unnecessary.
. The majority explains that "[wjhere we determine questions of aggravation and mitigation in the sentencing process, the significant point in time for causation is the moment at which the criminal acts are committed.” Supra at ¶ 113. I agree. In affirming this death sentence, however, the opinion concludes that when the murder occurred, the defendant — assuming he was the shooter — did not act on impulse, did not suffer from any lack of judgment or abnormal mental state, and was motivated entirely by pecuniary gain. But there is no evidence in the record about the moment of killing, and/or the events immediately leading up to it. That is precisely why the trial judge refused to find the (F)(6) aggravator (offense committed in a “heinous, cruel or depraved” manner) requested by the state. It is also why I believe(F)(5) was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, supra at ¶¶ 127-32, and why the majority's repudiation of the mitigation evidence is so speculative.