dissenting:
T1 I would deny certiorari because the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) correctly decided this case. Therefore, I dissent.
T2 This case was remanded to the COCA to decide the merits of Tal's claim of trial court bias. Miller Dollarhide P.C. v. Tal, 2006 OK 27, ¶ 17, - P.3d -. The COCA opinion concluded that Tal had failed in his attempt to show bias. When an order of a judge in a civil proceeding denies a disqualification application, that order will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Graham v. Graham, 1967 OK 210, ¶ 8, 434 P.2d 245, 246; Merritt v. Hunter, 1978 OK 18, ¶ 2, 575 P.2d 623, 624. Generally, a clear abuse of discretion occurs when the decision challenged is against, or not justified by, reason and evidence. Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 1185, 1194. "To reverse a trial court on the ground of abuse of discretion it must be found that the trial judge made a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, against reason and evidence." Abel v. Tisdale, 1980 OK 161, ¶ 20, 619 P.2d 608, 612. "It is discretion employed on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, or a discretionary act which is manifestly unreasonable." Patel, 1999 OK 33, ¶ 20, 987 P.2d at 1194. The question before this Court is whether one trial judge and two chief judges of the district court made clearly erroneous conclusions and judgments, against reason and evidence regarding the bias of the trial judge.
13 The trial court entered a default judgment against Tal on October 30, 2003, when he failed to appear. The court subsequently denied his motion to vacate and scheduled a bearing to determine the amount to be awarded the plaintiff law firm. On December 8, 2003, the trial court awarded the law firm $66,408.29, which represented legal fees owed by Tal for his earlier representation by the firm.
[4 When the trial judge denied Tal's request that the judge recuse, he made a formal motion to disqualify. That motion was heard by Judge Caswell, then the Chief Judge of the Oklahoma County District Court. Even though the judge found that Tal failed to comply with the Rule 15 procedure, the judge also found that nothing in the record showed bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. At the November 24, 2003, hearing on Tal's motion to vacate the default judgment, he again asked the trial judge to recuse, and again the judge refused. Tal filed a second formal motion to disqualify the trial judge, and Judge Bass, the new Chief Judge, reviewed the motion on the merits and found no evidence of disqualifying bias occurring since Judge Caswell's decision. These facts are found in this Court's last opinion in this matter. Miller Dollarhide, PC., 2006 OK 27, ¶¶ 2-4, - P.3d -.
[5 In his petition for certiorari Tal makes several assertions of procedural error in holding the hearings before the trial judge regarding bias, but none of his arguments are relevant to bias on the part of the trial judge. Tal argues that the trial court failed to follow Rule 15, and that the opposing counsel was guilty of improper ex parte communications with the trial judge. None of the recognized grounds for certiorari is apparent.
*557T6 Tal had two hearings before the trial judge on bias, two before different chief judges, each of whom found no prejudicial bias, and before the Court of Civil Appeals, which found no bias. There is no "clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, against reason and evidence." Abel, 1980 OK 161, 120, 619 P.2d at 612. There is no substantial ground in this case on which to base a claim for disqualification and error. Even a review of the facts and quotations of transcripts found in the majority opinion shows this to be so. Parties to lawsuits should not be allowed to eliminate trial judges who are ruling against them through the process of claiming bias merely as a trial tactic.
T7 There is no showing of prejudicial bias in this case by the trial judge. There is no support that either of the Chief Judges who reviewed this matter on the merits clearly abused their discretion in concluding that there was no prejudicial bias. There is nothing cited by the majority opinion to show prejudicial bias by the trial judge. I would deny certiorari. Accordingly, I dissent.