(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
¶21 I concur in parts III, IV, and V. I respectfully dissent from parts I and II. I disagree with the majority opinion that the district court properly granted Defendants’ summary judgment motions on Nguyen’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages claim.
¶ 22 In particular, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court correctly granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion for intentional infliction of emotional distress because no evidence existed to show, as a matter of law, that Defendants intended to cause emotional distress or that the conduct was outrageous. See supra ¶¶ 9, 10. The evidence in this case is such that a reasonable person might conclude that Defendants’ conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Under the circumstances of this case, it would be possible for a jury to reasonably find that Defendants acted in an outrageous manner.
¶23 The evidence before the trial court included testimony that at the time of its use on Derek the sales model ventilator had not been tested, attached to, or previously used to transport anyone; a committee was assembled to test, evaluate, and acquire a new life-flight transport ventilator (the CTM committee); a clinical evaluation previously scheduled had not taken place as arranged; Defendants’ agents were subject to rules governing use of the sales model, which prohibited use on any critically-ill or medically unstable child without obtaining parental *538consent; Derek was critically ill and medically unstable, and Defendants’ agents did not obtain the consent of Derek’s father; Defendants’ agent Dr. Madeline Witte, a CTM committee member, decided to use the sales model on Derek; Defendant’s agent Tammy Bleak, chairperson of the CTM committee, had a duty to assess the reliability of the sales model for patient use pursuant to the hospital’s testing and evaluation requirements before allowing its use on a patient outside of the testing and evaluation parameters; the sales model was used on Derek in the presence of the salesman and personnel assigned to evaluate the sales model; Ramsey Worman, a CTM committee member, testified that he felt inspection of the ventilator was inadequate and he disagreed with the decision to test it on any patients; and during transport the sales model malfunctioned and Derek died.
¶24 Based on this evidence reasonable minds could differ on whether Defendants’ actions would “evoke outrage or revulsion” sufficient to be considered outrageous conduct. See Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, ¶ 53, 194 P.3d 956 (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable jury could determine that Defendants’ agents’ actions were motivated by the need to test the sales model and in complete disregard of the potential risk to the critically-ill child who may not be able to tolerate a brief interruption, and conclude that such actions constituted outrageous conduct. “Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” Id. ¶ 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, I disagree with the majority that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 25 I also disagree with the majority’s determination that the district court properly granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Nguyen’s punitive damages claim. Based on the same facts and conduct summarized above, a reasonable jury could determine that Defendants’ actions to pursue testing of the sales model despite the risks to the critically-ill child were “willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others,” see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a) (2008), as required for Nguyen to prove he is entitled to punitive damages. Therefore, I would hold that the grant of summary judgment on the punitive damages claim was also improper.
¶ 26 I would reverse and remand the matter for a trial on the merits of Nguyen’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages.