dissenting.
¶ 34 My view of what constitutes an “unreasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment differs from that of my colleagues. The trial judge’s ruling that the search was constitutional should be sustained as it falls within the emergency aid doctrine and/or the community caretaker function as set forth in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-50, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 237-41, 686 P.2d 750, 760-64 (1984); and related cases.
I.
¶ 35 The officers here were responding to a 911 call from a frantic mother who believed her fourteen-year-old daughter was going to commit suicide. When the officers were dispatched they were informed that
It was an emergency high traffic pertaining to a domestic violence and a female possibly — well, indicating she was trying to kill herself or wanting to kill herself.
(Emphasis added.) When asked by the trial court why the officer seized the purse, he responded, “I immediately seized her purse due to the totality of the information that she was possibly wanting to commit suicide.” (Emphasis added.) He testified that he thought the purse might contain some “type of weapon to harm herself or me.” The officer noted that “we have a call 911 of domestic violence, and it said on the call the daughter’s completely out of control.” (Em*379phasis added.) He indicated that “the mother had said, she’s gonna commit suicide.”
¶ 36 The initial facts observed at the scene were consistent with the 911 call. When the officers arrived at the scene, they never even made it to the apartment complex “because the mom waved me down because the Defendant had run from the apartment.” When the officer first contacted the daughter, he described her demeanor as being “very agitated, mad, angry, verbal, loud.” She was also holding a blue purse.
¶ 37 The mother’s testimony of what was happening at the scene confirmed the information that the officer had prior to and upon arrival:
Q: What happened?
A: Well, her and I had been arguing, okay? And it’s not so much that we had been arguing. Tiffany goes and Tiffany is psychotic. I call them psychotic — okay? That’s all I can say. Ever since she’s been on her medicine, I have never seen it, her sister’s never seen it, nobody’s ever seen it. But, she just goes — okay? And that’s why I was saying, I think she’s on drugs, you know? And that’s why I said I wanted her tested. We always get negative, but, you know, yet she still acts like this.
(Emphasis added.) The officer also testified that there was no one at the scene with whom he could safely leave an unopened purse:
The Court: But then again, once you take the purse, you could have given the purse to Mom instead of opening it up and it would have been just as safe at that circumstance?
The Witness: I don’t believe so because I don’t know her. I’ve never seen her before.
The Court: I see. With Mom coming then, you could have given the purse to Mom?
The Witness: Well, it was a hostile situation. She was very irritated.
¶ 38 On appeal we are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling. State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 335, ¶ 2, 4 P.3d 388, 390 (App.1999). While we review conclusions of law, and the application of facts to law, de novo, In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, 21, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 543, 545 (App.2002), we are not free on appeal to resolve conflicting facts or factual inferences in a different fashion. In re Adoption of Baby Boy, 106 Ariz. 195, 202, 472 P.2d 64, 71 (Ariz.1970). Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling, the facts that we must apply to the law show a young teenage woman who was “completely out of control,” “psychotic,” was “gonna commit suicide,” and had the purse at issue in her hand.
II.
A.
¶ 39 The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Emphasis added.) From my perspective, the threshold question here is whether the opening of the purse was an “unreasonable search” and thus prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, -, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (“[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”).4 *380If the search was “unreasonable,” it is prohibited. If it was not an “unreasonable search,” it is not prohibited.
¶ 40 This dissent first discusses the emergency aid doctrine and then the community caretaker function in concluding that the search of the purse here was not unreasonable.
B.
¶ 41 In Mincey, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of police to respond to emergency situations.5 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408. This right is based on the need to respond to exigencies, as recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (approving a warrantless search “necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm an officer or others nearby”). Mincey involved the warrantless search of an apartment after a drug raid. Id. at 387-88, 98 S.Ct. 2408. The Court in Mincey rejected the claim that a “four-day search” was a reasonable response to an emergency. Id. at 388-91, 98 S.Ct. 2408. However, in doing so, the Court made clear that the police must be able to appropriately respond, without a warrant, when emergency aid is required:
We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making war-rantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.
Id. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408. When the police are in such a situation, “[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be illegal otherwise.” Id. at 392-93, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963) (Burger, J., concurring)). The Court noted that the “warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’ ” Id. at 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868).
¶ 42 In Fisher, the Arizona Supreme Court cited to Mincey and other courts in applying the emergency aid doctrine. 141 Ariz. at 237, 686 P.2d at 760 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); State v. Wright, 125 Ariz. 36, 607 P.2d 19 (App.1979); People v. Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529 (Colo.1983); United States v. Booth, 455 A.2d 1351 (D.C.App.1983); People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3178, 49 L.Ed.2d 1191 (1976); State v. Jones, 45 Or.App. 617, 608 P.2d 1220 (1980)). The facts in Fisher involved the warrantless search of defendant’s apartment. 141 Ariz. at 235, 686 P.2d at 758. A friend of the defendant became concerned about the welfare of the defendant after a murder had occurred. Id. In responding to the welfare check of the defendant’s apartment, the police found evidence that the defendant was involved in the murder. Id. at 235-36, 686 P.2d at 758-59. The defendant moved to suppress it. Id. at 236, 686 P.2d at 759. The trial court denied the motion, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
¶ 43 Fisher recognized that “[b]ecause it is not unreasonable for police to enter a dwelling for the purposes of providing emergency aid or assistance, such entries are not proscribed by the fourth amendment.” Id. at 237, 686 P.2d at 760. The exception “pro*381vides that officers of the state may enter a dwelling without the benefit of a warrant where they reasonably believe there is someone within in need of immediate aid or assistance.” Id. The court established three elements to determine whether the emergency aid exception applies:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.
Id. at 237-38, 686 P.2d at 760-61 (quoting People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1976)); see also State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 395-96, 937 P.2d 310, 317-18 (1997) (applying the three elements of the emergency aid exception). Although the issue here is the search of a purse, rather than the search of a residence, the same interests apply. Here, there are facts that support each of the three factors from Fisher, as applied to the purse searched here.
¶ 44 As to the first factor, there are facts to support that the officer had “reasonable grounds to believe that there [was] an emergency.” Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 237, 686 P.2d at 760. The officer was responding to an emergency domestic violence 911 call with the mother indicating that the daughter was “completely out of control” and that “she’s gonna commit suicide.”
¶45 The second factor is whether the search was motivated by an “intent to arrest and seize evidence.” Id. The officer testified that he searched the purse for “[a]ny type of weapon to harm herself.” There is no factual basis to suggest that the officer was seeking evidence of a crime when searching the purse. The physical facts at the scene (she was “very agitated, mad, angry” and ran away from the home) were consistent with both the suicide report and an objectively good faith response to a suicide attempt.
¶ 46 The third factor is whether the officer had a “reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Id. at 237-38, 686 P.2d at 760-61 (emphasis added). There is a “reasonable basis” for an officer “to associate” the purse with the emergency on this record because (1) the officers had been told the young woman was “trying to kill herself,” and was “completely out of control”; (2) facts at the scene relative to the young woman’s demeanor (“very agitated, mad, angry, verbal [and] loud”) show her emotional state at the scene was consistent with this report of imminent suicide; (3) the purse is the one item that she took with her when leaving the scene of the domestic violence report; (4) a purse, in the hands of such a person, can contain a weapon that she could use to commit suicide; (5) learning what is in the purse in the context of such a setting would be necessary to know how to respond to the emergency (i.e. an emptied pill box containing evidence of an overdose requiring immediate medical assistance, a loaded weapon ready for use for a suicide, a razor blade that might be used for the same purpose, etc.);6 and (6) the absence of another person at the scene to whom a purse with unknown contents in such a setting, could be given and left. Again, the mother’s description of the scene, that the daughter “goes psychotic,” gives further factual support to the trial court’s decision in this regard.
¶ 47 Thus, there are facts in the record to support all three prongs of the Fisher test. On this record, under the emergency aid doctrine, the trial court should be affirmed.7
*382C.
¶ 48 From my perspective, the emergency aid doctrine, as applied through Fisher, provides an adequate basis for the search of the purse. The community caretaking function, however, may be applied if one considers, as the defense argues and the majority accepts, that the emergency ended when the police seized but did not open the purse. Under the community caretaking function, as expressed in Cady v. Dombrowski, opening the purse would have been appropriate under that version of the facts as well. 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Based on this analysis, I also disagree with what the majority styles as a “general rule,” that a purse once seized should not be opened. Supra ¶ 12 (citing State v. Schellhorn, 95 Or.App. 297, 769 P.2d 221 (1989) and related cases).
¶ 49 In Cady v. Dombrowski, the defendant’s car struck a bridge abutment. 413 U.S. at 435-36, 93 S.Ct. 2523. The defendant-driver was taken to the hospital and was arrested on charges of DUI. Id. at 436-37, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Upon learning that the defendant was a Chicago policeman, and believing that he was required to have a weapon at all times, the officers returned to the car to retrieve the weapon from the vehicle and prevent “the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 443, 93 S.Ct. 2523. In doing so, the police found evidence that linked the defendant to a murder. In upholding the admissibility of the evidence against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court described what it referred to as the community caretaking function of police officers:
Local police officers ... frequently ... engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. The response to an emergency 911 suicide call certainly is part of the police’s community caretaking function. See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1-1.1 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.1986) (The police have “complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal offenses”; among other things, they are expected to provide “assistance to citizens in need of help such as the person who is mentally ill, the chronic alcoholic, or the drug addict.”); Id. § 1-2.2 (“[M]ost police agencies are currently given responsibility, by design or default, to: (c) aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm; ...(f) assist those who cannot care for themselves; ... (g) resolve conflict; ... and (k) provide other services on an emergency basis.”). The community caretaking function does not necessarily require the least intrusive means when the police are serving in that capacity. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523 (“The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less ‘intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.”).
¶ 50 The community caretaking function, as expressed in Cady, has been applied in many state and federal jurisdictions. E.g., Lockhart-Bembery v. Sauro, 498 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.2007); Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (10th Cir.2007); Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir.2006); People v. Ray, 21 Cal.4th 464, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d 928 (1999); In re J.M.E., 38 Kan.App.2d 229, 162 P.3d 835 (2007); State v. Vaughn, 338 Mont. 97, 164 P.3d 873 (2007); State v. Bakewell, 273 Neb. 372, 730 N.W.2d 335 (2007). There is no direct case in Arizona.
*383¶ 51 The California Supreme Court, in People v. Ray, referenced the community caretaker exception and distinguished it from the emergency aid doctrine. 21 Cal.4th 464, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d 928. There the police observed, through an open front door, the ransacked interior of a home. Id. at 468, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 931. They were there in response to a neighbor’s call of concern that something was awry. Id. at 468, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 931-32. The police entered to determine if aid was needed and came across evidence of a crime. Id. at 469, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 932.
¶ 52 The Ray court considered that “under the emergency aid component of community caretaking,” there was a need for “swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property.” Id. at 472, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 934 (citations omitted). The lead opinion found that the record failed to meet that standard for emergency aid, as there was no on-going emergency of that magnitude. Id. at 473, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 934. The lead opinion went on to hold that the police conduct in question met the lesser standard of a community caretaker exception. The court noted that “the appropriate standard under the community caretaker exception is one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?” Id. at 476-77, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 937.
¶ 53 On the facts in the case at hand, my view is that the standard from Fisher for emergency aid has been met. However, if one construes the facts, as the defendant and the majority do, so that the emergency has ended once the police have seized but not opened the purse, a search of the purse would still be appropriate under the community caretaking function as expressed in Cady and Ray.8 As set forth at length above, there was a 911 call of a threatened suicide. It was confirmed at the scene. The young teenage woman who was the subject of the call was “gonna commit suicide,” described by her mother as “psychotic,” and had the purse in her hand. Learning the contents of the purse was crucial to a proper police response. These facts must be viewed objectively. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (“[T] he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant,” as a court need not “discem[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”). A reasonably prudent officer, in the discharge of his or her duties should be expected to open the purse in the exercise of his or her community caretaking obligations in order to adequately respond to this situation. Thus, the trial judge should be affirmed on this basis as well.
III.
A.
¶ 54 The majority asserts that “the necessary facts” do not exist in the record to support applying either the emergency aid doctrine or the community caretaking function in this case. Supra ¶ 21.9 This dissent has set forth at length the facts in the record that support both the emergency aid and the community caretaker exceptions. E.g., supra ¶¶ 35-38, 46-47. In short, Mother called 911 because her teenage daughter was “psychotic” and “trying to kill herself.” This is exactly the type of factual scenario to which the emergency aid doctrine and/or communi*384ty caretaker function apply. On appeal, we do not reweigh the facts, but view them in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling. Smith, 197 Ariz. at 335, ¶ 2, 4 P.3d at 390.
¶ 55 As a practical matter, however, courts have struggled and do struggle with what Fourth Amendment theory to apply when the police are rendering emergency aid or are engaged in their community caretaker functions as contrasted with criminal investigations. See Mary Elizabeth Nauman, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 Am. J.Crim. L. 325, 326 (1999); Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L. J. 297, 308 n. 50 (2005); Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts Should Embrace the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 Boalt J.Crim. L. 3 (2005); see Barone, 330 F.2d at 544-45 (referring to both the “duty of crime prevention” and “[t] he right of police to enter and investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest”); compare Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d at 210, (utilizing the term “exigent circumstances” but not requiring any showing of probable cause) with Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 240, 686 P.2d at 763 (distinguishing exigent circumstances test from emergency aid doctrine on the basis that the latter has no probable cause requirement and the exigent circumstances test does); United States v. Novick, 450 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir.1971) (approving the police officer’s opening of a gun case as it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, to prevent a future suicide, but setting forth no specific doctrine eliminating the need for a warrant).
¶ 56 In this case the officer indicated, subjectively, that he opened the purse based on the suicide attempt. This subjective view supports the emergency aid doctrine and community caretaking function. However, it is an objective view of the facts that matters and that view, too, can only show that the motivation for police intervention was the 911 call that an out-of-control young woman was “gonna commit suicide.” See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717 (officer’s state of mind “does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”); see also Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1948 (“the officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant”). Therefore, the taking and opening of the purse in this case is most accurately viewed not as part of a criminal investigation, but part of responding to the mother’s frantic plea for help with a suicidal teenage daughter.
B.
¶ 57 As the majority correctly notes, a primary issue is whether the police should have reasonably opened the purse once they had possession of it. Referring to both the emergency aid doctrine and the community caretaking function, and why the need to open the purse was reasonable, a hypothetical example may best make the point. In re Andrew C, 215 Ariz. 366, 370, ¶ 21, 160 P.3d 687, 691 (App.2007).
¶ 58 What if the police officers had not opened the purse, but instead returned it to the “hysterical” mother who then gave the purse to the suicidal daughter after the officers left?10 Assume there was a handgun in the purse. The daughter then opens the purse, takes out the handgun, shoots and kills herself.
*385¶ 59 Under the majority’s analysis, the City and police would have acted properly on the theory that there was no constitutional right to open the purse and, accordingly, no possible duty for the police to prevent this scenario from occurring. Supra ¶ 19. Under the analysis in this dissent, the emergency aid and community caretaker doctrines would permit — if not require — the officers to pursue a course similar to the one here to avoid this potential result. As Arizona law provides, “[a] policeman has the duty to be alert to suspicious circumstances and to investigate if necessary, provided that he is acting within constitutional limitations.” State v. Miller, 112 Ariz. 95, 97, 537 P.2d 965, 967 (1975) (emphasis added).
¶ 60 The majority’s analysis draws on the second portion of this correct proposition and reaches the conclusion that the duty does not come into play in this case as the Constitution forbids the officers from investigating further. This dissent points out that there are no such constitutional limitations on the record here as the emergency aid doctrine and community caretaker function apply. Accordingly, consistent with ABA standards, Arizona law, and a plethora of cases from other jurisdictions, the officers not only were permitted to act but likely had a duty to do so, which they appropriately fulfilled here.11 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1-2.2 (“[M]ost police agencies are currently given responsibility, by design or default, to: ... (c) aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm; ... (f) assist those who cannot care for themselves; ... (g) resolve conflict; ... and (k) provide other services on an emergency basis.”); Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 961 P.2d 449 (1998) (affirming the City’s fault at 75% and murderer’s fault at 25% on a combined award of $1.7 million with the City’s fault being based on a breach of its duty to appropriately respond to a 911 call); Novick, 450 F.2d at 1112-13 (“[T]he police were casually looking for weapons to prevent the recurrence of an attempt at suicide ... The officers here would have been derelict in their duties if they had not opened the case.”) (emphasis added); United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir.1993) (applying Cady to the seizure of an individual and noting that “police officers are not only permitted, but expected, to exercise what the Supreme Court has termed ‘community caretaking functions.’”) (emphasis added); Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir.2001) (applying the community caretaking function and rejecting the argument “that the police officers were required simply to walk away from appellee’s vehicle, thus perhaps permitting a possibly intoxicated person to drive the vehicle,” and finding that the officers “would have been derelict in their duties” had they not acted.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Barone, 330 F.2d at 545 (“Their investigation of the cause of the screaming would have been incomplete without finding out who might be in the bathroom and whether anyone there might be in need of aid ... The performance of [the officer’s] duty required him to act as he did.”) (emphasis added); Wayne, 318 F.2d at 213 (Burger, J. concurring) (in “checking a report of a dead, dying, or unconscious woman” had the police “paused for a warrant with the risk that the ‘unconscious woman’ might die while papers were being drawn they could surely merit censure”) (emphasis added).12
*386C.
¶ 61 The majority also responds that the hypothetical scenario references “a worst case scenario of what might have subsequently transpired [that] is pure speculation.” Supra ¶ 19. The majority misses the point. “Frequently, hypothetical examples shed light on the viability, or lack thereof, of an asserted legal principle.” In re Andrew C., 215 Ariz. at 370, ¶ 21, 160 P.3d at 691.
¶ 62 One of the principal tenets of statutory and constitutional interpretation is that we are to consider what the “effects and consequences” of our interpretation will be. Logan v. Forever Living Prods., Int’l, Inc., 203 Ariz. 191, 194, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 760, 763 (2002) (looking to the “effects and consequences” of competing statutory interpretations); Am. Fed’n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2384 v. City of Phoenix, 213 Ariz. 358, 363, ¶ 15, 142 P.3d 234, 239 (App.2006) (“When a constitutional or statutory provision is not clear, we may look to the context, subject matter, historical background, effects, consequences, spirit, and purpose of the law.”); Arizona Minority Coal, for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 211 Ariz. 337, 356, ¶ 67, 121 P.3d 843, 862 (App.2005) (“When a constitutional provision is unclear, we consider its effect, consequences, context, and spirit.”).
¶ 63 The majority wishes to ignore the “effects and consequences” that flow from its interpretation of what the term “unreasonable search” in the Fourth Amendment means. One of those clear “effects and consequences” is the unfortunate scenario described above.
IV.
¶ 64 By its explicit terms, the Fourth Amendment only precludes “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added); Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1947 (“[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”). The search here falls within the parameters of the emergency aid doctrine and/or the community caretaker function.
¶ 65 Applying the language of the Fourth Amendment, I think it would strike the reasonably objective person as odd that we find it “unreasonable” as a matter of law, and indeed, unconstitutional for a police officer to conduct a limited search of a purse for a means of committing suicide when a person is “completely out of control,” “psychotic,” there has been a 911 call that suicide is imminent as the person is “gonna kill herself,” the officers at the scene find facts that confirm that 911 call, the victim has the purse in her hand and there is no rehable other person immediately available to inspect the contents of the purse. If the term “unreasonable” in the text of the Fourth Amendment has any ordinary, common-sense meaning, it does not preclude a search on facts such as these. The emergency aid doctrine and the community caretaker function appropriately act to give effect to that language. I respectfully dissent.
. For a discussion, with different views, of the Fourth Amendment from a reasonableness paradigm as contrasted with a warrant-requirement paradigm, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 757 (1994); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L.Rev. 547 (1999); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L.Rev. 1468 (1985). By focusing on the two exceptions discussed at length (the emergency aid doctrine and the community service function), the analysis in this dis*380sent is intended to satisfy the warrant-requirement paradigm while still being consistent with the plain language of the Fourth Amendment as reflected in the reasonableness paradigm.
. The emergency aid doctrine has been applied in a number of federal circuits and different states. E.g., Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-96, 98 S.Ct. 2408; U.S. v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007); Ostroski v. Town of Southold, 443 F.Supp.2d 325, 344-45 (E.D.N.Y.2006); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 210-14 (D.C.Cir.1963); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2nd Cir.1964); State v. Weaver, 214 Or.App. 633, 168 P.3d 273 (2007); People v. Davis, 442 Mich. 1, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920-21 (1993); Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 994 P.2d 1283 (Utah App.2000); see also Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts Should Embrace the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 Boalt J.Crim. L. 3 (2005); Fern Lynn Kletter, Necessity of Rendering Medical Assistance as Circumstance Permitting Warrantless Entry or Search of Building, 2003 A.L.R.5th 12 (2003).
. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the principles in State v. Amarelle, 190 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.2005) and Terry v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 87, 474 S.E.2d 172 (1996), are very much in play. Those cases invoke the emergency aid doctrine when there was a need to know medical information based on an unresponsive state. Here, that same information was needed based on the threatened imminent suicide.
. Appellant also makes a sufficiency of evidence argument, which was not necessary for the majority to address given their decision on the motion to suppress. As to that argument, the stat*382ute makes it "unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to ... ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body.” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3415(A) (2001). On appeal, "we consider whether the evidence sufficed to permit a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Dayvid S., 199 Ariz. 169, 170, ¶ 4, 15 P.3d 771, 772 (App.2000). Officer Stewart found the marijuana pipe in Appellant’s purse. The officer testified that she said "it was her pipe and she was using it to smoke marijuana” and "she was using marijuana on a regular basis.” The evidence was more than sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, the adjudication and disposition on the merits was proper as well.
. For a discussion of Ray from different points of view, see Jennifer Fink, People v. Ray: The Fourth Amendment and the Community Caretak-ing Exception, 35 U. San Fran. L.Rev., 135 (2000); Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts Should Embrace the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 Boalt J.Crim. L. 3 (2005).
. The majority also asserts these issues were not raised on appeal or below. The emergency aid and community caretaking doctrines are corollaries or subsets of Terry v. Ohio and the Fourth Amendment. As such, they were raised and preserved to the same extent as was the majority's argument that the purse, once seized, should not have been opened.
. The majority also asserts that "to the extent [Officer Stewart] did not feel safe in handing [the purse] to Appellant's Mother, he could have handed the purse to his partner Officer Lilly.” Supra ¶ 18. The majority further posits that “[w]hen the dissent argues that there was no one else at the setting to whom a purse with unknown contents could be given, it ignores the presence of Officer Stewart’s partner, Officer Lilly.” Id.
There is no dispute that the purse could have temporarily been given to Officer Lilly. The problem, however, is that like Officer Stewart, Officer Lilly would be leaving the scene. As the dissent attempts to make clear, there is no one with whom the purse could be "given and left" once the officers had left the scene. Supra ¶ 46 (referencing as a factor "the absence of another person at the scene to whom a purse with unknown contents in such a setting could be given and left.”) (emphasis added).
. It is, obviously, not necessary to determine whether there was a duty in tort as tort liability is not an issue. This is a criminal case and the officers properly fulfilled their responsibilities in responding to the emergency. See Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 150 P.3d 228 (2007) (providing a recent discussion of factors to consider in determining whether a duty in a negligence case is present).
. The majority also cites for support to the Arizona Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz.2007). Supra ¶¶ 7, 13. In Gant, the Arizona Supreme Court examined the search incident to arrest exception as applied to the Fourth Amendment. 216 Ariz. at 1, ¶ 1, 162 P.3d at 641. That issue prompted a three-two division on the court, but the search incident to arrest exception is not at issue here. Gant dealt with an arrested person, secured and handcuffed in the back of a patrol car, with a search then being conducted of the vehicle that the arrested person had been previously driving. The search incident to arrest exception was at issue. Id. at ¶¶ 3—4, 162 P.3d 640. Here, a young girl is threatening to commit suicide and we deal with the police’s response to that emergency. To the extent general principles from Gant are applicable, nothing in this dissent is inconsistent with these principles.