dissenting:
DISSENTING OPINION
T 1 The majority's holding that 85 0.8.2001 § 45 codifies the collateral source rule is misguided. The collateral source rule is a rule of tort law that prohibits a tortfeasor from reducing its liability based on benefits the injured party has received from insurance to which the tortfeasor was a stranger, despite the fact that doing so allows the injured party to enjoy a double recovery. Workers' compensation, though, calls for the employer to pay compensation "without regard to fault." 85 0.8.2001 § 11.
T2 It is understandable that the law prohibits those whose wrongdoing make them liable to those they have negligently injured from reducing their Hability in the amount of insurance paid to the injured party, although doing so results in a double recovery for the injured party. But there is no reasonable basis for imposing the same burden on those who are made liable under the Workers Compensation Act, "without regard to fault."
T8 In none of the opinions the majority relies on to support its conclusion that § 45 means that workers' compensation employers may be burdened with a double recovery, was a double recovery involved. Thus, the question whether § 45 codifies the collateral source rule was not presented.
11 4 In Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Ale, 1942 OK 373, 180 P.2d 991, the injured worker suffered a "paralytic condition" as the result of a cerebral hemorrhage, which was aggravated by the worker's on the job injury, and which resulted in permanent injury. The Court noted that there were other payments made to the worker because of his disability, but there is no indication in the opinion that these other payments resulted in a double recovery. Thus, the Court's holding that § 45 allowed the worker to recover benefits from both sources does not stand for the proposition that § 45 "codifies" the collateral source rule.
15 Similarly, in Bill Hodges Truck Co., Inc. v. Humphrey, 1984 OK CIV APP 55, 704 P.2d 94, (approved for publication by the Supreme Court) the injured worker received both workers' compensation benefits for permanent disability and a $12,000 payment from his uninsured motorist carrier. Section 45 was held to allow the injured worker to retain both benefits. As in Tidewater, there is no indication in Humphrey that the court's action in allowing the worker to retain the $12,000 resulted in a double recovery so the collateral source issue was not presented there, either.
"I 6 The other opinions cited by the majority were tort cases, which are inapposite here for the reasons stated above. Here, in contrast to the cases relied on by the majority, an employer who is liable without regard to fault is being required to provide the claimant a windfall by paying to her tens of thousands of dollars for medicines that her insurer has admittedly already paid for. Title 85 0.8.2001 § 14 requires that the employer "shall promptly provide for an injured employee such ... medicine ... as may be necessary after the injury." It does not pro*1031vide that the injured employee shall receive payment for such medicine twice.
T7 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island was presented with this precise question in Moniz v. Providence Chain Company, 618 A.2d 1270, 1271 (R.I.1993). There, the court, after observing the differences between tort liability and that created under workers' compensation law, rejected the notion that the employer should have to pay the worker for medicines that the worker's insurance had already paid for. The court so held in order "to prevent an employee from reaping a financial bonanza from workers' compensation." Here, though, the majority has sance-tioned just such a "financial bonanza."
T8 There is nothing in Oklahoma law to support the majority's notion that § 45 codifies the collateral source rule. In fact, a fair analysis requires the opposite conclusion.
1 9 I respectfully dissent.