dissenting,
with whom KITE, Justice, joins.[¶ 23] In Beaulieu II, this Court held that failure to comply with the constitutional certification and execution requirements of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.' The majority rejects Mr. Wooster’s contention that the holding in Beaulieu II should be applied prospectively only. Because I am convinced that the subject matter classification set forth in Beau-lieu II should not be applied retrospectively, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 24] This Court has on several occasions considered whether a change in law should operate retrospectively or- prospectively. In Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 80 (Wyo.1978), this Court declared Wyoming’s guest statute unconstitutional and limited its holding to prospective application.
Further, cognizant that the determination is ours to make, we conclude that in consideration of all the factors and any prior reliances involved, our holding should be applied prospectively only, i.e., to this action and all causes of action accruing after 30 days following the date of this decision, (citations omitted).
[¶ 25] We determined in Ostwald v. State, 538 P.2d 1298 (Wyo.1975), that a prior decision of the Court declaring a criminal statute unconstitutional should be applied prospectively only.
Linkletter v. Walker, 1965, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, (footnote 10 omitted) brought to a climax and explained the entire field of retroactivity, bringing into focus the actuality and practicality of prospective rather than retroactive application, of court decisions declaring a fundamental phase of the criminal law unconstitutional, in any sphere. It laid to rest as out of tune with the times the concept of Norton v. Shelby County, supra [1886, 118 U.S. 425, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178]. It settled most matters of controversy and concluded that, with respect to reaching a determination of whether a decision should be retrospective or prospective: there is no distinction drawn between civil and criminal litigation; a ruling may be prospective only and it may apply to the invalidity of statutes (footnote 11 omitted) as well as to the effect of a decision overturning long-established common law rules; the constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect and the federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject; and, the accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases in the interests of justice, a court may make its decision prospective.
Id. at 1302-1303.
[¶ 26] In Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wyo.1978), this Court prospectively applied its holding abolishing governmental immunity.
The final question herein is the application of this decision. The court is fully cognizant that a long reliance has been placed upon the rule of immunity and that it will raise certain problems which must be considered and proper arrangements *901made. Based upon these considerations, the doctrine of governmental immunity as it is applied to counties and all other similar governmental subdivisions is abolished as to any and all claims arising on and after July 1,1979.
[¶ 27] In McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.1983), this Court recognized a cause of action against liquor vendors in favor of persons injured by an intoxicated driver. Two years later, in Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo.1985), we held that such cause of action is limited to prospective application. In reaching its determination the Court noted:
It has been repeatedly stated that where a decision might produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, it is appropriate to avoid such hardship or injustice by providing for prospective operation only.
[¶ 28] In Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 177 (Wyo.1989)(emphasis in original), we adopted a three part test for determination of prospective application.
First, the decision to be applied nonret-roactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that “we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, [381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)]. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Cipriano v. City of Houma, [395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969)].
We must apply these standards in order to determine if the “subject matter jurisdiction” holding of Beaulieu II, should be applied prospectively only.
[¶ 29] Initially, we must determine “if the new rule explicitly overruled a past precedent of this court.” Id. at 177 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 325, 107 S.Ct. 708, 714, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)). According to the majority, “... the holding in Beaulieu II that a notice of claim must meet the requirements of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution is not applied prospectively only, because such has always been the law, as was stated in Beaulieu I, three years earlier.” I disagree.
[¶ 30] I do not take issue with the concept that this Court has previously required compliance with the constitutional requirements of Article 16, § 7. I also concede that Beaulieu I reaffirmed the compliance requirement. My point of departure relates to the elevation of non-compliance with the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, § 7 to the level of a subject matter jurisdiction defect.
[¶ 31] Prior to Beaulieu II, an execution defect that violated Article 16, § 7 was treated by this Court as “nothing more than a defect or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional.” Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 958 (Wyo.1990). In Martinez, we rejected appellant’s contention that a plaintiffs failure to certify a claim pursuant to Article 16, § 7 deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
In the last issue asserted in its appeal, the State contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed because Fleetwood failed to comply with Wyo. Const, art. 16, § 7. This constitutional provision requires, inter alia, that any claim against the State be “certified to under penalty of perjury.” Wyo. Const, art. 16, § 7. Specifically, the State asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Martinez, acting on behalf of Fleetwood, failed to make the certification under penalty of perjury when they first presented their claim and that, since proper filing of a claim is a condition precedent to suit, their claim cannot be brought because it was not properly filed. Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342 (1978); Awe v. University of *902Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (1975); Utah Construction Company v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933).
This particular contention by the State is raised for the first time in this appeal. The point was never argued to the district court. The State agrees that this is true, but it contends that an omission of the correct certification results in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised at any time in the proceeding. We do not agree with this contention. The failure to verify or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional. In re Bear River Irrigation District, 51 Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937). The effect of that decision is that this alleged defect is not jurisdictional and, for that reason, the defense cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Id. at 958.
[¶ 32] In Beaulieu I, we reiterated the distinction, from a subject matter jurisdiction perspective, between the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, § 7 and “filing” or “presentment” requirements.
While the court has ruled that the execution requirements of art. 16, § 7 can be waived by failing to assert the issue in the trial court, it has not held that the requirement of filing or presenting the claim is subject to waiver. Instead, we have treated the allegation of the filing of a claim as jurisdictional.
Beaulieu I, ¶ 14. In Beaulieu II, this Court elevated compliance with the signature and certification requirements of Article 16, § 7 to subject matter jurisdiction status. In doing so, it specifically overruled Martinez.
We have, in fact, previously stated [in Martinez ] that the constitutional signature and certification requirements, unlike the statutory filing requirements, are not jurisdictional:
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We now believe that Martinez was wrongly decided and that it must be overruled.
Beaulieu II, ¶ 13.
[¶ 33] The new subject matter jurisdiction status established in Beaulieu II is significant. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental defect which cannot be cured by waiver, consent of the parties or the passage of time. Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 496 (Wyo.1998). Subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings by a party or by the court. Brunsvold v. State, 864 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1993). A court that does not have subject matter jurisdiction “... lacks any authority to proceed and any decision, judgment or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any purpose.” Routh v. State ex rel. Workers’ Comp. Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Wyo.1998).1
[¶ 34] In summary, prior to Beaulieu II, signature and certification defects in the claim could be waived if not raised in a timely manner by the governmental entity. After Beaulieu II, such defect could not be waived. Beaulieu II explicitly overruled clear past precedent of this Court. It established a new principle of law.
[¶ 35] In order to satisfy the second prong of the Hanesworth test, we must determine if the purpose of the new rule would be satisfied by retroactive application. This second prong analysis is inextricably intertwined with the “hardship” and “injustice” criteria set forth in the third part of the Hanesworth test. In Hanesworth, we treated the issue as follows:
*903The purpose of the actual notice requirement is to satisfy the due process requisite stated in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. [v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)] and established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). While that purpose may be furthered by retroactive application of the Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. decision, we conclude that the benefit of avoiding hardships created by retroactivity is an ample basis for nonretroactive application.
Hanesworth, 783 P.2d at 177.
[¶ 36] The stated purpose of requiring certification and execution compliance is taxpayer protection. Beaulieu II, ¶ 13. In governmental claim cases which come before this Court, the governmental entity has had the opportunity to contest the validity of the claim and assert all defenses which it might have to the claim. Taxpayers are protected. Even if it is assumed that the new subject matter jurisdiction classification created in Beaulieu II increases taxpayer protection, this Court should properly recognize, as it did in Hanesivorth, “... that the benefit of avoiding hardships created by retroactivity is an ample basis for non-retroactive application.” Hanesworth, 783 P.2d at 177.
[¶ 37] The third prong of the Hanesworth test requires an examination of the hardship or injustice generated by retroactive application. Id. The hardship and injustice to claimants by retroactive application is dramatically illustrated by the facts of this case.
[¶ 38] Mr. Wooster was allegedly injured in a motor vehicle collision caused by the negligence of appellee’s employee. On November 4, 2002, Mr. Wooster filed his complaint. The answer was filed November 21, 2002. Appellee’s answer failed to set forth any allegation that Mr. Wooster had failed to comply with the governmental claims act or Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution. The ease proceeded toward trial for the next year and a half. Trial was scheduled to commence May 10, 2004.
[¶ 39] On March 25, 2004, this Court dropped the Beaulieu II bombshell. The next day, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment asserting, for the first time, a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to meet the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, § 7. Mr. Wooster immediately filed an amended claim in a futile effort to comply with Article 16, § 7. The amended claim was filed too late to meet the time requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114.2 The district court, noting that it had “some sympathy for the position Wooster finds himself in,” granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
[¶ 40] At the time appellee filed its answer, Martinez set forth the applicable law. Pursuant to Martinez, certification and execution defects in a claim could be waived. Appellee failed to challenge Mr. Wooster’s compliance with the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, § 7 until six weeks prior to trial and only after the time had expired for Mr. Wooster to correct errors in his claim. The majority, by failing to provide for prospective application of Beau-lieu II, delivers a catastrophic blow to Mr. Wooster and a corresponding windfall to ap-pellee. The result causes a “hardship” and “injustice” to Mr. Wooster and others similarly situated which satisfies the third prong of the Hanesworth test.
[¶ 41] The majority’s justification for its decision is also troubling in a broader and more fundamental context. The majority refuses to limit Beaulieu II to prospective application because “such has always been the law.” This assertion is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the doctrine of stare decisis.
[¶ 42] The doctrine of stare decisis embodies a concept that serves as “the basis of Anglo-American common law.” Borns ex. rel Gannon v. Voss, 2003 WY 74, ¶ 24, 70 P.3d 262, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2003). We have emphasized the importance of the doctrine. Stare decisis is:
*904... the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.
Id, ¶ 25. We have observed:
... stare decisis “furthers the ‘ “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” ’ ”
Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)).
[¶ 43] We have also recognized that stare decisis is not a law, but a policy and that we should depart from precedent when necessary “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice ...” Id. However, such departure from prior precedent “should occur slowly, deliberately after much experience, and if possible so as not to affect vested rights.” Id. at 272.
[¶ 44] In Martinez, this Court held that failure to comply with the execution and certification requirements of Article 16, § 7 is not a subject matter jurisdiction defect. In Beaulieu II, decided 14 years later, we declared that lack of compliance with the execution and certification requirements is a subject matter jurisdiction defect. This holding of Beaulieu II is a departure from prior precedent. It did not occur “slowly, deliberately after much experience.” It significantly affected Mr. Wooster and others similarly situated.
[¶ 45] Our past precedent also includes that body of ease law epitomized by Hanesworth which allows prospective application of new rules of law in appropriate cases. Proper application of the Hanesworbh principles nurtures stare decisis because it allows development in the common law as occurred in Beaulieu II without negatively impacting those affected by Martinez.
[¶ 46] The common thread running through our decisions involving issues of prospective application is evaluation of the potential inequities resulting from retroactive application of the new rule of law.3 Summary judgment undoubtedly resulted in hardship and injustice to Mr. Wooster. He was deprived of the opportunity to have his claim determined on the merits by the unfortunate timing of the Beaulieu II decision. Retrospective application will cause similar problems for other claimants in Mr. Wooster’s position. Such harsh results can, and should, be avoided by limiting Beaulieu II to prospective application.
[¶ 47] Prospective application will not prejudice any governmental entity which, pursuant to the Martinez requirements, timely raised the issue of claimant’s failure to comply with Article 16, § 7. If a governmental entity has timely asserted lack of compliance, the governmental entity should prevail if plaintiffs claim fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 16, § 7.4 If the governmental *905entity has failed to timely raise the compliance issue, the claim will be determined on the merits. A determination on the merits will provide protection to the taxpayers of this state by insuring that the claim is valid.
[¶ 48] Two other issues deserve comment. The majority notes that Mr. Wooster’s claim was presented to appellee 16 months after publication of Beaulieu I. It is difficult to understand the relevancy of that factor in determining whether Beaulieu II should be limited to prospective application. As previously indicated, Beaulieu I did not hold that a certification defect was jurisdictional. More significantly, such reasoning ignores the reality that retroactive application of Beaulieu II will also negatively impact claims which predate Beaulieu I. At least three such cases are pending before the Court.
[¶ 49] The majority also relies upon the fact that appellee eventually raised the issue of compliance at the district court level to support its holding. Merely raising the defense is not sufficient. The defense must be asserted in a timely fashion. Prejudice to the opposing party is a factor that must be weighed in determining whether the defense was timely. “The controlling consideration is whether the adverse party is prejudiced by the moving party’s delay in raising the defense.” Pickle at 264. Reversal of summary judgment would allow the district court to determine if appellee’s late assertion of the defense unduly prejudiced Mr. Wooster.
[¶ 50] In conclusion, this Court in Beau-lieu II created a new rule of law by overruling Martinez and elevating compliance with the certification and execution requirements of Article 16, § 7 to subject matter jurisdiction status. Retroactive application of Beau-lieu II is devastating to Mr. Wooster and similarly situated claimants. We have consistently rejected retroactive application of a new rule of law where such application will produce substantial inequitable results. This is such a case. The concurring opinion in Giles v. State, 96 P.3d 1027, 1046 (Wyo.2004) states: “[T]he doctrine of stare decisis demands respect. But the underlying principle of our system of justice is justice.” If Beau-lieu II is limited to prospective application we maintain consistency with the doctrine of stare decisis and eliminate any injustice caused by overruling Martinez.
[¶ 51] The decision of the district court should be reversed.
. I do not concede that execution and certification compliance with Article 16, § 7 implicates subject matter jurisdiction. We have previously held that district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims filed under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Pickle v. Board of County Com’rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 264 (Wyo.1989). Because this case can be determined on the narrower issue of prospective application, such a discussion is not necessary at this time. However, the majority's declaration that "such has always been the law” raises concerns. If Beaulieu II is not limited to prospective application and, if all actions of any court that does not have subject matter jurisdiction are "utterly void and of no effect for any purpose," are all governmental claim cases, including Martinez, now open to jurisdictional challenge for lack of compliance with Article 16, § 7?
. If Mr. Wooster’s failure to comply with Article 16, § 7 had been raised in the original answer, Mr. Wooster would have had several months to file an amended claim before his claim would have been tíme barred.
. Appellee relies upon GID v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control, 926 P.2d 943 (Wyo.1996), in support of its position that Beaidieu II should be applied retrospectively. Such reliance is misplaced. In GID, this Court reasserted its position that the appropriateness of prospective application "... depends on whether a substantial injustice would otherwise occur.” Id. at 949 (quoting Hofeldt v. Eyre, 849 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Wyo.1993) (Cardine, J., specially concurring)). The Court in GID rejected prospective application because GID "... failed to explain to our satisfaction how a substantial injustice would befall it when it had notice that its supplemental right might be subject to abandonment for at least a year after our Hofeldt decision and yet, it took no preventive measures to ensure the safety of its water right.”
. See e.g. Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, 86 P.3d 872 (Wyo.2004) and Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465 (Wyo.2004). Both cases were decided by this Court after Beaulieu II. In neither case was the Court required to address the issue of prospective application. Had the Court been required to address the issue it would not have resulted in a different outcome. In both cases, the governmental entity timely raised lack of compliance with Article 16, § 7 in their responsive pleading. The governmental entity would have prevailed because of plaintiffs' noncompliance regardless of whether the law of Martinez or Beaulieu II was applied. In Beaulieu I lack of compliance with the execution and certification requirement of Article 16, § 7 was raised by Beaulieu. Upon remand, the governmental enti*905ty timely raised lack of compliance with Article 16, § 7 regarding the second claim filed by Beau-lieu. The result in Beaulieu II would have been the same for Beaulieu even if the execution and certification defect was not determined to be of subject matter jurisdiction magnitude.