(dissenting):
[ 11 I dissent because today's decision has the effect of obviating our ruling in Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171 (Kelley I). In Kelley I, we held that Sonia Kelley's (Wife) entitlement to alimony from her previous marriage terminated when her common law marriage began, and her entitlement to alimony from her common law marriage was limited to five years absent extenuating circumstances. Id. at 128. Since the trial court had not made an explicit finding of extenuating cireumstances, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-5(7)(h) (1998),1 we " 'remand[ed] for the entry of further findings addressing whether extenuating cireum-stances exist as to satisfy section 30-3-5(7)(Lb)'" Kelley I, 2000 UT App 236 at ¶ 28, 9 P.3d 171 (quoting Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41,¶ 14, 974 P.2d 306). On remand, the trial court "found" the very cireamstance that created the five year limitation-the unique marital relationship of the Kelleys-to be an extenuating cireumstance. I disagree with this cireular reasoning.
112 On remand the trial court made the standard findings supporting an award of alimony, one of which is the length of the marriage.2 Here, the length of the marriage *431from which Wife claims alimony is five years, not sixteen years. -It is inappropriate for the trial judge to simply change this standard finding into an extenuating cireumstance. If, in Kelley I, we had viewed the Kelleys' relationship as a single marriage notwithstanding their shenanigans,3 we would have said so, and there would have been no need to remand to determine whether extenuating circumstances justified extending alimony beyond five years.
{13 We concluded in Rehkn that "a court must explicitly make a finding of 'extenuating cireumstances' in order to extend the alimony period beyond the duration of the marriage." 1999 UT App 41 at ¶ 14, 974 P.2d 306. The trial court in this case simply labeled the length of the Kelleys' relationship as an extenuating circumstance; I believe Rehn requires more. When analyzing the factors under section 80-8-5(7)(h), "the trial court must make detailed findings on all material issues, le. the Jones [v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985),] factors, which 'should ... include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached"" Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at ¶ 6, 974 P.2d 306 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). Aside from perfunctory findings, the trial court does not articulate why the unique marital relationship of the Kelleys, against the backdrop of Kelley I, should be considered an extenuating cireumstance. The additional findings made by the court justify only a conclusion that alimony should be awarded, not that it should be extended past the five years.
T 14 I am also concerned that our approval of a prior relationship as an extenuating circumstance renders the limitation of section 30-3-5(7)(h) meaningless in such cases.
€ 15 Although Utah courts have not directly addressed the issue of what constitutes extenuating cireumstances, in my view, it must be something other than the length of the marriage which is already an alimony factor and the very focus of the limitation of section 80-8-5(7)(b). In my view, a more typical extenuating circumstance is one which implicates the physical health, mental health, or well-being of a spouse. Other jurisdictions have approached the issue in various ways. "Texas limits support to three years regardless of the duration of the marriage, except in cases of "incapacitating physical or mental disability." Indiana simply sets a three-year limit, except in cases of the physical or mental incapacity of the recipient, or of a child whose custodian must forego employment." Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 Harv. Women's L.J. 28, 62 n. 161 (2001) (citations omitted). Florida appears to follow a similar approach. See Blumberg v. Blumberg, 561 So.2d 1187, 1188 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (per curiam) (extension of the alimony period appropriate upon wife's showing of unanticipated and substantial medical expenses); Reaves v. Reaves, 514 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (holding that wife alleged a proper argument to extend the alimony period where serious illness prevented her rehabilitation before the end of the alimony period).
[ 16 Under the facts and cireumstances of this case, the trial court's modification of the length of the marriage was not, and did not, create an extenuating cireumstance.
. The 2003 version of this statute has renumbered this provision as Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) (Supp.2003), but for the sake of clarity and consistency, I will refer to the previous version of the statute.
. When making a determination of alimony, Utah courts consider the following factors, first mentioned in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); "[1] the needs of the recipient *431spouse; [2] the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; [3] the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, [4] the length of the marriage." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 6, 974 P.2d 306. While the fourth factor was not originally listed as a factor in Jones, it appears that this court now considers it as part of the determination whether to award alimony. See Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at ¶ 6, 974 P.2d 306; Uiah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(b) (Supp.2002).
. For whatever reason, in Kelley I, Wife sought a common law marriage rather than seeking to set aside or modify the existing decree of divorce. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, ¶ 7, 9 P.3d 171.