concurring.
I concur in the majority’s analysis and ultimate conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the second count charging him with first-degree sexual abuse.
I write separately to state my view that, but for the forcible compulsion that defendant exerted over the victim in *169the first sexual contact, the evidence pertaining to defendant’s ensuing conduct did not suffice to permit a reasonable juror to find that defendant exerted forcible compulsion over the victim in the second contact. That ensuing evidence, in context, which included defendant’s and the victim’s ages, and the nature of their relationship, defendant’s location on the bed in relation to the victim and the wall, his rubbing the victim’s back, and the eventual placement of his hand under her clothes and on her buttock, did not, by itself, demonstrate the use of forcible compulsion.
However, in the broader context of defendant’s interaction with the victim while they were on the bed, including the first instance of sexual abuse, a reasonable juror could find, for the reasons explained by the majority, that defendant forcibly compelled the victim to submit to the second sexual contact.
Although the issue of whether consideration of that broader context of interaction is permissible has been ably argued by the dissent, I believe that the majority has the better of the argument. Accordingly, I concur.
Edmonds, S. J., joins in this concurrence.