dissenting.
I agree with the concurrence that the trial court erred in failing to comply with ORS 426.100(l)(e) by failing to tell appellant that he had the right to represent himself or to *756be represented by an attorney of his choice. The concurrence errs, however, in concluding that the trial court’s error was harmless. The error was not harmless, and, as a consequence, we should reverse the judgment in this case.
The legislature adopted ORS 426.100 to give people whom the state seeks to commit information to enable them to participate as fully as possible in their commitment proceedings. It does that by requiring courts before which the proceedings are held to begin each proceeding by telling the allegedly mentally ill person a variety of things about the proceeding, including the rights that the person has regarding representation by attorneys. If the legislature intended the information to serve a purpose, and we must assume that it did, it necessarily intended the recipients of the information to be able to use it to the extent possible. Consequently, an evaluation to determine whether it was harmless to fail to give the required advice about the choices available to a person regarding representation should focus on whether the person could have taken advantage of the choices.1 The focus should not be on whether the result would have been different if the person had selected one of the alternative choices.
The concurrence uses the correct approach with regard to the first of the two available choices about which appellant should have been advised: the right to select an attorney of his choice. The concurrence says that the failure to advise appellant of that choice was harmless because the record establishes that appellant did not have the money to hire an attorney, so he could not have acted on the advice if it had been given. Although I disagree that appellant’s lack of money means that he could not have taken advantage of his right to choose his own attorney, I agree that the issue is the one framed by the concurrence: whether appellant could have acted on the advice. I disagree that appellant’s lack of money resolves the issue because appellant conceivably could have obtained pro bono legal services or financial assistance from a friend, relative, or other source. Without evidence to *757exclude those possibilities, we cannot conclude that appellant could not have been represented by an attorney other than the one whom the court appointed for him. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the failure to advise him of his right to be represented by an attorney of his choice was harmless.
The concurrence shifts its harmless error analysis on the second of the two choices about which the court failed to advise appellant — the right to choose to represent himself — from whether appellant could have acted on the advice to whether the result of the proceeding would have been different if he had. That is not the right focus. If it were, it would apply to the first choice — appellant’s right to select an attorney of his choice — as well. Under that approach, harmlessness would not turn on whether appellant could have acted on the advice by choosing his own attorney but on whether the result of the case would have been different if he had. The record shows that appointed counsel did a competent job of defending appellant against the state’s commitment effort, so, if the issue were whether the denial of the right to choose a different attorney affected the result in the proceeding, the answer presumably would be no.
But, as I have indicated, that is not the right focus.2 Most people whom the state seeks to commit on the ground that they are mentally ill would be better served if they were represented by attorneys than if they represented themselves, but they have a right to ask to represent themselves, and the legislature wanted them to know that. Consequently, the issue is not whether appellant would have done a better job on his behalf than did his appointed attorney but whether *758appellant could have represented himself at all. I am not prepared to say on this record that he could not have done so. Consequently, I cannot say that the court’s failure to comply with ORS 426.100(l)(e) by telling appellant that he had the right to represent himself was harmless when measured against the purpose served by the statute. I respectfully dissent.
This assumes that a harmless error analysis has a place in cases involving a trial court’s failure to comply with ORS 426.100. There is reason to question that it does. See State v. Buffum, 166 Or App 552, 558-63, 999 P2d 541 (Armstrong, J., dissenting and rejecting majority’s harmless error analysis), rev allowed 331 Or 361 (2000).
Long v. State of Oregon, 130 Or App 198, 204, 880 P2d 509 (1994), supports that conclusion. Long was a post-conviction proceeding in which the petitioner contended that constitutionally deficient advice from his trial attorney had led him to agree to a stipulated-facts trial. On the issue of prejudice, we held that the issue was not whether the result would have been different if the case had been tried on other than stipulated facts but whether the petitioner would have accepted the offer of a stipulated-facts trial if he had received constitutionally sufficient legal advice. That is the very distinction that distinguishes the concurrence’s harmless error analysis from mine on whether the court’s failure to advise appellant of his right to represent himself was harmless error. See also Buffum, 166 Or App at 558-63; State v. Zabransky, 166 Or App 672, 673, 674 (Edmonds and Armstrong, JJ., dissenting), rev held in abeyance pending decision in State v. Buffum (2000).