with whom Shearing and Rose, JJ., agree, dissenting:
This case is one of pure statutory construction. If the Nevada workers’ compensation death benefit provision at issue here is unambiguous, it is our responsibility to interpret it in accordance with its plain meaning. Only when an ambiguity has been identified are we permitted to resort to other rules of statutory construction.1 Because I believe NRS 616C.505 is not ambiguous, I do not agree that the omission of certain constraints on claims for dependent benefits under NRS 616C.505 mandates that we affirm the decision made by the district court.
It is tempting to draw an analogy to the Nevada wrongful death statute.2 NRS 41.085 restricts wrongful death tort claim eligibility to persons eligible to inherit under our laws of intestate succession, i.e., legal heirs. However, NRS 616C.505, our workers’ compensation death benefit provision, is not as restrictive as the wrongful death statute in its enumeration of persons eligible to pursue claims.
The full 66 2/3 percent benefit payable under NRS 616C.505 *234is payable first to the surviving spouse until death or remarriage,3 then to the surviving children equally until each reaches the age of eighteen years,4 and then to wholly dependent parents and siblings in defined percentages.5 It is only then that subsection eight of NRS 616C.505 comes into play requiring that, “[i]n all other cases involving a question of total or partial dependency[,] (a) [t]he extent of the dependency must be determined.” Thus, in my view, NRS 616C.505(8) expressly provides that other non-enumerated factual dependencies can be considered for death benefit eligibility.
In such cases, however, a threshold determination of total or partial dependency must be made. If the non-enumerated dependency is partial, the formula for compensation is set forth in subsection (b) of NRS 616C.505(8). If the dependency is total, the benefits must not exceed 66 2/3 percent of the decedent’s average monthly wage.6 Although no set time frame for payment of total dependency death benefits under NRS 616C.505(8) is set forth, it is evident that such benefits would terminate on the death of the claimant or the termination of disability. Termination of disability would include death, recovery or rehabilitation from the disability, or remarriage, consistent with the enumerated dependencies.
I would note parenthetically that the claimant in this case cannot meet the requirements as a surviving spouse, having been divorced and not remarried in compliance with Nevada laws governing marriage at the time of the demise of Mr. Banegas.7 Thus, this claimant’s only ground for recovery of workers’ compensation death benefits must be in the context of non-enumerated dependencies under NRS 616C.505(8).
I recognize that NRS 616A.010 legislatively abrogated the common law rule, which required liberal interpretation of our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. However, given my conclusion that NRS 616C.505 unambiguously provides for total dependency benefits for non-enumerated dependents, NRS 616A.010 is not implicated by the construction sought by appellant. I would therefore reverse and remand for a calculation of death benefits in accord with the views expressed above.
See City Council of Reno v. Reno Newspapers, 105 Nev. 886, 891, 784 P.2d 974, 977 (1989).
See NRS 41.085.
See NRS 616C.505(2).
See NRS 616C.505(3) and (5).
See NRS 616C.505(6) and (7).
See NRS 616C.505(7).
See NRS 616C.505(13).