In re R.C. CA2/1

Filed 8/30/23 In re R.C. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re R.C. et al., Persons B322826
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01404)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS or the agency) initiated juvenile
dependency proceedings concerning R.C., who was then 15, and
her sister, A.C., who was 13. DCFS alleged that R.C. had mental
and emotional problems causing her to attempt suicide and harm
herself, and that her mother and father were unable to provide
the care and supervision necessary to address those problems.
The juvenile court sustained this jurisdictional allegation,
declared both children dependents of the court, let the children
remain in parental custody, and ordered DCFS to provide family
maintenance services to mother, father, and the children.
On appeal, mother challenges the juvenile court’s assertion
of jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. insofar as it was premised on
mother’s failure to provide adequate care and supervision.1 She
contends that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, there was
no risk of serious physical harm to the minors because she had
completed a parenting class and enrolled R.C. and A.C. in
therapy, R.C. had stabilized emotionally, and DCFS
recommended terminating jurisdiction with a family custody
order awarding mother sole physical and joint legal custody of
the children.

1 Father is not a party to this appeal. As set forth in
Discussion, part A, post, we nonetheless exercise our discretion to
review mother’s challenge to dependency jurisdiction based on
her conduct.

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 We conclude that substantial evidence supported
dependency jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. At the beginning of
DCFS’s investigation, mother minimized the severity of R.C.’s
mental and emotional problems, and R.C. had been in therapy for
only three months prior to the jurisdictional hearing. Mother has
not directed us to any evidence that upon completing her
parenting course, she changed her dismissive attitude toward
R.C.’s mental and emotional challenges, which included suicidal
ideations. As for jurisdiction over A.C., although A.C. had not
attempted to harm herself, she was nonetheless exposed to
substantial risk of serious physical harm because she too had
mental and emotional problems and endured stressors akin to
those R.C. confronted, that is, A.C. had witnessed mother and
father engage in acts of domestic violence, and A.C. had difficulty
communicating her feelings to father.
Applying our deferential substantial evidence standard of
review, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in taking
jurisdiction over the children. We thus affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to this appeal.
In 2018, mother divorced father and obtained sole legal and
physical custody of R.C. and A.C. Although the judgment of

2 We derive part of our Factual and Procedural
Background from undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate
briefing. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275,
fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a
party’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing
court may make use of statements therein as admissions against
the party.’ ”].)

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dissolution grants a “[r]easonable right of visitation” to father, it
does not include a visitation schedule.
On April 12, 2022, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency
petition concerning R.C., then 15 years old, and A.C., then 13,
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j). Among other things, DCFS
alleged that R.C. had “mental and emotional problems including
suicidal and self-harming behaviors,” and that mother and father
were “unable to provide appropriate parental care and
supervision of the child due to the child’s mental and emotional
problems.”
At the outset of DCFS’s investigation on February 22, 2022,
R.C. told the agency she had disclosed on a form at a medical
appointment that she had cut herself in the past.4 R.C. stated
her mother took her to a hospital the following day. R.C.
informed the agency that she left the hospital before the
psychiatric team could assess her because R.C. believed the
process was taking too long.
R.C. told DCFS that she had “feelings of sadness since she
was seven,” and that “she believe[d] she has had feelings of
wanting to hurt herself because of her lack of [a] close
relationship with her parents and [her] feelings of sadness.” R.C.
disclosed that she tried to kill herself twice, and that she had
previously cut herself on her forearms and inner thighs. R.C.
indicated that the last time she had cut herself was

3 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
4 The remainder of this paragraph and the following three
paragraphs summarize certain portions of DCFS’s nondetention
report filed in April 2022.

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approximately six months prior to her February 2022
hospitalization, and that the last time she “ha[d] feelings of
wanting to end her life” was approximately one month prior to
her hospitalization. R.C. stated she had concealed the cuts on
her body from mother and father. After this interview, the
psychiatric mobile response team placed R.C. on a 72-hour
psychiatric hold and transported her to a hospital.
During her February 22, 2022 interview with DCFS,
mother told the agency that she did “not understand what [was]
going on with” R.C., and mother expressed her beliefs that R.C.
was “being very manipulative,” R.C. “only want[ed] attention,”
and R.C. “ha[d] threatened to hurt herself because mother ha[d]
restricted piercings/tattoos on [R.C.] and made her go to school
when she did not want to.” Mother also related that (1) she
asked R.C. “what [the] child is ‘depressed about’ if she has
everything,” (2) R.C. responded that “she [was] traumatized
because father used to hit mother,” and (3) mother in turn told
the child that because “mother and father ha[d] separated, . . .
[the] child should not be thinking about it anymore.”
Similarly, R.C. informed DCFS that although “she told
father once and mother multiple times” that she “has had feelings
of sadness,” her parents responded by stating words to the effect
that she has “nothing to be sad about.” R.C. indicated that, as a
consequence, “she stop[ped] talking [to mother and father] about”
her feelings of sadness.
At an April 2022 hearing, the juvenile court (1) found
father is the presumed father of R.C. and A.C.; (2) found a prima
facie case of dependency jurisdiction over the children;
(3) ordered the children remain in parental custody under
DCFS’s supervision; (4) ordered DCFS provide referrals for

5
“parenting counseling for teens and individual counseling”; and
(5) instructed the agency to provide father referrals for anger
management counseling.
On August 10, 2022, DCFS filed a first amended petition
reasserting the allegations of the original petition and adding a
count averring that jurisdiction was proper under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) because father expressed his desire in R.C.’s
and A.C.’s presence to “terminate his parental rights.”
On August 16, 2022, the juvenile court held the
adjudication and disposition hearing. The court sustained a
version of count b-1 of the first amended petition that the
juvenile court amended by interlineation, and dismissed the
remainder of the petition, including the count alleging that father
had expressed his desire to terminate his parental rights in R.C.’s
and A.C.’s presence.
As amended by the juvenile court, sustained count b-1
reads as follows: “The child, [R.C.,] has mental and emotional
problems including suicidal and self-harming behaviors. On
02/19/2022, the child was hospitalized for the evaluation and
treatment of the child’s psychiatric condition. The child’s
mother . . . and father . . . are unable to provide appropriate
parental care and supervision of the child due to the child’s
mental and emotional problems.”5

5 In her appellate briefing, mother tacitly assumes the
juvenile court struck the following sentence from count b-1: “The
mother[’s] and father’s inability to provide care and supervision
of the child endangers the child’s physical health and safety and
places the child and the child’s sibling, [A.C.,] at risk of serious
harm, damage and danger.” (Italics added.) Conversely, DCFS
proceeds on the assumption that the court did not strike that
sentence from count b-1. We need not resolve this discrepancy

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 As to the disposition phase of the hearing, the juvenile
court declared R.C. and A.C. dependents of the court, ordered the
children remain in parental custody, and ordered DCFS provide
family maintenance services to mother, father, and the children.
Mother’s case plan required her to complete a developmentally
appropriate parenting class and participate in (a) individual
counseling to address case issues, and (b) conjoint counseling
with father and the children. The court also ordered DCFS
provide R.C. with age-appropriate counseling to address case
issues.
Mother timely appealed the orders from the
August 16, 2022 hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent part
that dependency jurisdiction is proper if “[t]he child has suffered,
or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or

because mother does not challenge the facial adequacy of the
version of count b-1 sustained by the juvenile court, but, instead,
contests only the evidentiary sufficiency of the court’s decision to
assert jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). (See In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th
1117, 1123 [differentiating between facial and evidentiary
challenges to jurisdiction, and observing that “ ‘ “[i]f the
jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the
adequacy of the petition is irrelevant” ’ ” unless “ ‘a parent claims
[the] petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual
allegations’ ”].) Mother does not contend she lacked notice that
DCFS was requesting that the juvenile court exercise dependency
jurisdiction over both children.

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inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child[, or] [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he willful or negligent
failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with
adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” (See
§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(C).)6
“[S]ection 300, subdivision (b)(1) . . . require[s] DCFS to
demonstrate three elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) one or more of the statutorily specified omissions in providing
care for the child[;] . . . (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical
harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm
or illness.” (See In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.)
“ ‘ “The third element . . . effectively requires a showing that at
the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial
risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing
a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur.)” ’
[Citation.] Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current
conditions. [Citation.] To establish a defined risk of harm at the
time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere
speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)

6 After the August 16, 2022 hearing, the Legislature
enacted an amendment to section 300 that became effective on
January 1, 2023. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1 [filed with Sec’y of
State on Sept. 29, 2022]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1)
[providing that this amendment to § 300 became effective on
Jan. 1, 2023].) That amendment did not make any substantive
changes to the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that
are applicable to this case. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1
[indicating that the new amendment did not change the
substance of the provisions of § 300, subd. (b)(1) that are quoted
above].)

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 Although a juvenile court’s “jurisdictional order is not
appealable[,] a challenge to [its] jurisdictional findings [may
typically] be raised in an appeal from the dispositional order.
(See In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723, 729.) “ ‘In reviewing
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings [of the juvenile court,] . . . we determine if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the [juvenile] court.”
[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the [juvenile] court.
[Citations.]” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
“ ‘The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
94, 103 (Lana S.).)

DISCUSSION

A. We Exercise Our Discretion To Consider the Merits
of Mother’s Appeal
As noted in our Factual and Procedural Background, ante,
the juvenile court sustained amended count b-1 based on
mother’s and father’s inability to supervise and properly care for
R.C. Mother acknowledges this finding and the fact that father
has not appealed it. Mother states she is challenging only “the

9
allegations pertaining to her failure to provide appropriate
parental care to the minors . . . .” (Italics added.)
“ ‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good
against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the
actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the
statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘For
this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the
evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional
findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 297, 308.) A reviewing court may nonetheless elect
to reach the merits of any such “[non]justiciable” appeal if a
“single jurisdictional finding was the difference between [the
parent] being an offending parent versus a nonoffending
parent . . . .” (See id. at pp. 308–309, italics omitted from first
quotation.) Because amended count b-1 was the only
jurisdictional allegation sustained against mother, we exercise
our discretion to address her challenge to that finding.

B. Mother Fails To Demonstrate that the Juvenile
Court’s Jurisdictional Finding Is Not Supported by
Substantial Evidence
Mother argues that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors were at
current risk of harm due to mother’s purported failure to provide
appropriate parental care and supervision to the minors.”
(Boldface omitted.) Mother maintains that “the juvenile court
based its jurisdictional findings on speculation that the family
would not follow through with [R.C.’s] therapy.” She asserts that
“by the time of the contested hearing in August 2022, mother had
completed her parenting class and [R.C.] was enrolled in therapy,
and doing so well[ that DCFS] actually . . . recommended . . .

10
closing . . . the case due to [R.C.’s] emotional stability.” Mother
further claims that R.C. informed the agency that “it was mother
who took [R.C.] to the hospital for her depression and related
behaviors . . . one day after [R.C.’s] need for psychiatric care was
first brought to mother’s attention at the doctor’s office . . . .”
Similarly, mother insists she enrolled R.C. in therapy “almost
immediately” after R.C. was released from her psychiatric hold.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude mother fails to
establish that the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency
jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. lacks sufficient evidentiary
support.

1. Mother fails to demonstrate that insufficient evidence
supported the juvenile court’s finding that R.C. was at
substantial risk of serious physical harm as of the
date of the jurisdictional hearing
As we explained in our Factual and Procedural
Background, ante, the nondetention report shows that at the
beginning of the case, mother minimized the danger presented by
R.C.’s mental and emotional problems. For instance, mother
intimated that R.C. claimed to have suicidal tendencies only
because she wanted attention, and R.C. indicated that she
stopped talking to her mother and father about her feelings of
sadness after they told her she has nothing to be sad about.
Based on this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could have
found that absent DCFS’s and the court’s intervention, there was
a substantial risk that mother would not have taken the steps
necessary to protect R.C. from her suicidal and self-harming
behaviors. (Cf. Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 856, 858–859, 865 [holding that “a parent’s lack of
insight may be considered by the juvenile court when assessing

11
whether a child may safely be returned home,” italics &
capitalization omitted].)
In her reply, mother seems to argue that her statements
downplaying the gravity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems
amount to nothing more than “old, stale evidence.” Specifically,
mother contends that “by the time of the August 2022 hearing,”
R.C. “had stabilized emotionally, the minors were safe and happy
in [mother’s] care,” mother had “enrolled the minors in therapy,”
“and [mother] had voluntarily completed a parenting class.”
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s contrary
conclusion.
The parenting class to which mother refers is the
Los Angeles County Office of Education’s “Parent Project
Parenting class . . . .” The record contains a letter dated
July 15, 2022 from the instructor for the program, wherein the
instructor stated that mother was “enrolled and attending the
Parent Project Parenting class,” and mother “[was] set to
complete the parenting class [on] July 20, 2022,” meaning she
would have attended “a total of 10 sessions” on that date.
Furthermore, at the August 16, 2022 hearing, mother’s counsel
represented that her client had “completed her parenting
program”; counsel was presumably referring to the aforesaid
Parent Project Parenting class.
Assuming arguendo that mother actually did complete this
parenting course, that fact does not undermine the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional finding. Mother does not direct us to any
evidence that by virtue of completing this class, she had changed
her perspective and thereby ceased minimizing R.C.’s mental and
emotional problems. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the
only reasonable inference that could be drawn from mother’s

12
completion of this course is that her prior statements were “old”
and “stale.” (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [holding that
under the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court
“ ‘ “draw[s] all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the findings and orders of the dependency court” ’ ”].)
We acknowledge that R.C. and A.C. reported they felt safe
in mother’s care, and that mother told DCFS on March 23, 2022
that R.C. and A.C. had each been scheduled for a therapy
assessment in mid-April 2022. We further acknowledge that in a
last minute information report filed on August 10, 2022, DCFS
suggested that R.C.’s emotional stability had improved by that
point, and the agency recommended “terminating jurisdiction
with a Family Law Order granting mother . . . full physical
custody and joint legal custody.”7
Yet, the record also contains a letter dated July 15, 2022
from R.C.’s mental health provider, wherein the therapist stated:
(1) R.C. had been diagnosed with “Major Depressive Disorder,”
(2) R.C. began receiving “mental health services on 05/09/2022”
and participating in weekly therapy sessions “from 07/08/22 until
present,” and (3) R.C. and her “caregiver would benefit from
continuation of mental health services in order to assist with
restoring [R.C.’s] functioning.” Given that the juvenile court held

7 Mother relies upon the following passage from the last
minute information report: “Due to the current linkage and
emotionally stability [sic] of [R.C.], [DCFS] recommends
terminating jurisdiction with a Family Law Order granting
mother . . . full physical custody and joint legal custody.”
We further note that “a social service agency’s
recommendation is not binding on [a juvenile] court.” (See In re
N.O. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 924.)

13
the jurisdictional hearing approximately one month after the
date of this letter (see Factual & Procedural Background, ante),
the court reasonably could have found that the substantial risk of
serious physical harm arising from R.C.’s mental and emotional
problems had not yet abated.
Furthermore, the record indicates that R.C. and A.C. began
therapy after DCFS became involved in this matter in
February 2022. Given the evidence that mother minimized the
severity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems, and the early
stages of R.C.’s participation in therapy at the time of the
hearing, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to find that
absent DCFS and court involvement, there was a substantial risk
that mother would not ensure that R.C. received the care she
needed to refrain from harming herself. (See § 364, subd. (b)
[indicating that a juvenile court asserts dependency jurisdiction
over a child for the purpose of “eliminating the conditions or
factors requiring court supervision”].)
In sum, mother has not shown that by the August 16, 2022
jurisdictional hearing, R.C. was no longer exposed to a
substantial risk of serious physical harm.

2. Mother fails to establish that dependency jurisdiction
over A.C. was improper
DCFS argues on appeal that A.C. “also was at risk because
she too suffered from feelings of sadness and her physician noted
[she had] mild depression.” Passages from the nondetention
report supply substantial evidence supporting this contention.8
In particular, on February 22, 2022, A.C. told the agency she had

8 The remainder of this paragraph discusses relevant
portions of the nondetention report.

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“feelings of sadness due to not being able to talk to her
father . . . .” A.C. “began to tear” as she informed DCFS that
father had yelled at her and he refused to listen to her when she
told him to “make more time” to see her and R.C. A.C. stated she
stopped talking about that issue with father when “she observe[d]
he [was] upset.” A.C. also told the agency that on “multiple
occasions” “when she was ‘little’ father used to hit mother and
mother used to hit him back to defend herself.” Additionally, a
record from A.C.’s February 19, 2022 visit with a medical
provider indicated that the child had “Mild Depression.”
Mother bears the burden of demonstrating that the juvenile
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over A.C. was not supported by
substantial evidence. (Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at
p. 103.) Yet, in her reply brief, mother fails to respond to DCFS’s
argument that evidence of A.C.’s sadness and mild depression
supported the court’s jurisdictional finding. Instead of
addressing this evidence, mother observes that at the
jurisdictional hearing, the children’s counsel “ask[ed] for [A.C.] to
be dismissed from the petition because she [was] not at risk.”
Because “ ‘unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence’ ” (see
Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276,
281, fn. 5), this remark from the minors’ attorney does not
establish “ ‘there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
nature to support the finding . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Lana S., at
p. 103.)
Furthermore, the record shows that A.C. was exposed to
stressors akin to those R.C. endured. Recall that R.C. had also
witnessed instances in which father hit mother, and R.C. decided
to conceal her feelings of sadness in response to statements made
by her parents. (See Factual & Procedural Background, ante.)

15
R.C.’s depression and sadness had already manifested in two
suicide attempts and cuttings to her forearms and inner thighs,9
and A.C. too suffered depression and sadness after being exposed
to similar stressors. The juvenile court could reasonably consider
the similarities in R.C.’s and A.C.’s circumstances in determining
whether to assert dependency jurisdiction over them. (See
In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 115–116 [“[E]vidence of a
parent’s misconduct with another child is admissible at a hearing
on the section 300 petition. . . . [¶] . . . Implementation of th[e]
purpose [of dependency law] requires the trial court to consider a
broad class of relevant evidence in deciding whether a child is at
substantial risk from a parent’s failure or inability to adequately
protect or supervise the child.”].)10
Although the nondetention report shows that A.C. told the
agency “she has never tried hurting herself nor has she ever had
any thoughts of doing so,” “ ‘[t]he court need not wait until a child
is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the

9 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding
that R.C. “has mental and emotional problems including suicidal
and self-harming behaviors,” nor does she contest evidence that
R.C. was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, and that
R.C. attempted suicide on two occasions and cut her forearms and
inner thighs.
10 We acknowledge that the nondetention report indicates
R.C. disclosed that her maternal aunt’s husband had “touched
her private areas” “during an isolated incident” when she was
five years old, and that A.C. told the agency “she has never been
sexually abused by . . . any . . . adult.” Mother, however, does not
argue that the absence of any sexual abuse to A.C. demonstrates
that A.C. was not at substantial risk of serious physical harm as
of the date of the jurisdictional hearing.

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steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re M.D.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848.) The severity of the potential
harm, here, suicide and cutting one’s body, counsels in favor of a
finding of substantial risk. (See In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
204, 207 [“The Supreme Court has held that ‘ “even . . . a low
degree of probability” ’ can give rise to a substantial risk if ‘ “the
magnitude of the harm is potentially great[,]” ’ ” quoting I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778].) Additionally, mother’s prior
statements downplaying R.C.’s mental and emotional health
issues suggest that she would have the same minimizing attitude
toward her younger daughter if A.C. developed self-harming
behaviors like her sister.
In sum, the similarities between A.C.’s and R.C.’s
circumstances, along with mother’s dismissive attitude toward
R.C.’s mental and emotional challenges, constituted substantial
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency
jurisdiction over A.C. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s August 16, 2022 orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J.

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