dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s dismissal based on its identification of Ogden and Stern as the Appellants, I must respectfully dissent.
In the first two sentences of its Discussion, the majority states:
Although this appeal is styled as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of Trea-cy’s request for counsel at public expense, no such denial is actually claimed. This appeal is, in fact, an appeal prosecuted by Ogden and Stern on their own behalf in an attempt to have the MCPDA reimburse them for representing Treacy.
Op. at 635. Yet, the first Section of the Appellant’s Brief is entitled: “The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Provide Timothy-Patrick Treacy, an Indigent Defendant, with Counsel at Public Expense.” (Amended Br. of Appellant at 11.) Trea-cy’s brief argues the State and Federal constitutions require the trial court to appoint counsel at public expense for indigent defendants, the trial court found Treacy to be indigent, the public defender’s office “refused” to represent him, (id.), and the court should have appointed “conflict counsel.” (Id.) The majority is correct that the lawyer who wrote Treacy’s brief wants the MCPDA to pay him. But I do not believe we can ignore, just because of counsel’s motivation, that Treacy’s brief did, in fact, argue Treacy was denied his constitutional right to trial counsel at public expense.
The record indicates Treacy attended at least two of the three hearings held by the trial court regarding who was responsible for paying his attorney fees. This suggests Treacy cared about whether MCPDA would be responsible for those costs. As well he should have — if MCPDA does not pay for Treacy’s trial counsel, then those fees presumably become Trea-cy’s responsibility. From that, F would infer Treacy has sufficient interest to remain the Appellant in this proceeding. See, e.g., KeyBank Nat. Ass’n v. Michael, 737 N.E.2d 834, 851 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding a secured creditor has standing to appeal a ruling that impacted its financial interest in collateral).
Based on Treacy’s involvement in this proceeding and the arguments in his appellate brief, I cannot agree with the majority that this appeal is “prosecuted by Ogden and Stern on their own behalf.” Op. at 635. Rather, I believe Treacy remains a party to this appeal prosecuted in his name.3
*638Neither can I concur with the majority’s assertion that an appeal from the underlying cause of action is an improper forum for deciding who should be responsible for attorney fees on the premise “neither Ogden, Stern, nor the MCPDA ... could have become a proper party to the criminal action below.” Id. at 636. Our Indiana Supreme Court has addressed, in direct appeals from underlying action, who is responsible for the payment of attorney fees. See, e.g., Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1126-1128 (Ind.2002) (addressing pauper child’s request that court order his parents to pay his counsel, who had not been appointed); Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156 (Ind.2001) (considering within appeal of trial court’s refusal to set aside default judgment of divorce whether trial court had authority to appoint and pay for counsel). And see In re the Termination of Parental Relationship of J.G., 911 N.E.2d 36 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (addressing court’s order that DCS pay cost of mother’s court-appointed lawyer for termination proceedings); and In re Guardianship of M.K., 844 N.E.2d 555, 557-558 (Ind.Ct. App.2006) (holding trial court should have ordered payment of son’s attorney fees from mother’s property, after son successfully petitioned for guardianship of mother). The law does not prohibit a party from raising on appeal, or us from deciding, who is responsible for payment of that party’s attorney fees.
Turning to the issue Treacy raises, I would hold Treacy waived any error in the trial court’s handling of his alleged need for appointed counsel because he did not raise that issue in his direct appeal from his criminal conviction. See Treacy v. State, Cause No. 49A02-0910-CR-1031, 2010 WL 3496797 (Ind.Ct.App. Sept. 8, 2010) (asserting error only in the trial court’s failure to discharge Treacy pursuant to Ind.Crim. Rule 4(C)). By the time of that appeal, the court allegedly prevented Treacy from firing Stern. That, in essence, forced Treacy to proceed to trial with Stern and Ogden as his counsel. Because all the facts necessary to resolve whether the trial court violated Treacy’s right to appointed counsel were available at the time of Treacy’s direct appeal of his conviction, the “issue was known and available” on direct appeal and thus is waived. See Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind.2001) (allegations of error not raised in direct appeal are waived in future proceedings).
Notwithstanding his waiver, I see no merit in Treacy’s argument that the trial court should have ordered MCPDA to pay for his trial counsel. Our Indiana Supreme Court has addressed whether a pauper appellant could force the trial court retroactively to compensate his trial counsel from public funds:
The short answer to [Appellant’s] claim for attorney fees under section 34-10-1-2 is that his attorney was not appointed. Rather [counsel] appeared as [Appellant’s] attorney in his initial petition to the trial court.
Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1127 (Ind.2002). Dunson addressed Ind.Code § 34-10-1-2, which provides counsel to indigent parties in civil cases, rather than criminal. But it is not apparent why the Dunson reasoning should not apply to a criminal case in which the facts are nearly *639identical: a party makes a post-trial request for public funds to pay counsel, who initially appeared as private counsel and then remained throughout the proceedings.
In addition, we held nearly 40 years ago that a defendant who hires private counsel cannot demand, if his money runs out, that the State pay public funds to hire defendant’s private counsel as the public defender; rather, the decision who to appoint as pauper counsel is left to the discretion of the trial court and reviewable on appeal for only an abuse of that discretion:
A defendant in a criminal trial has a right to have an attorney of his own choice if he is financially able to employ such an attorney. If he is not financially able to do so, it is the' duty of the Court to select a competent attorney for him at public expense.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
While an indigent has an absolute right to the assistance of counsel, he does not have the absolute right to the assistance of the counsel of his choice.
The Indiana Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this principle that the indigent defendant does not have the absolute right to the attorney of his choice in State v. Irvin (1973), [259] Ind. [610], 291 N.E.2d 70. In discussing the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s request for the appointment of counsel other than the counsel selected by the court ... the court ... said:
Since the matter of whom the court will appoint as pauper counsel for an indigent defendant is solely within the trial court’s discretion, a writ of prohibition, which lies to confine a trial court to its lawful jurisdiction, will not issue.
Shorter has no absolute right to the relief requested. Any question concerning the wisdom or propriety of the trial court’s action is a subject for review on appeal, not in proceedings for an extraordinary writ.
State ex rel. Shorter v. Allen Superior Court, 155 Ind.App. 269, 271-72, 292 N.E.2d 286, 287-88 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), reh’g denied.
Stern appeared as private counsel because Treacy’s mother paid a retainer. The court was not required thereafter to appoint Stern as counsel.for Treacy or to order payment of Treacy’s counsel from public funds. If a defendant wishes representation at public expense, he must accept the public defender appointed by the trial court; to permit any other system would undermine the public defender system created by our legislature and increase the cost of providing defense for all indigent defendants.
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal. I would acknowledge and address the argument Treacy made, and affirm the denial of his motion to have his counsel paid from public funds for the reasons discussed herein.
. I agree MCPDA was not a party in the trial court and should not have been permitted to proceed as Appellee. See op. at 636 n. 2. Rather, we should have permitted MCPDA to appear and file a brief as amicus curiae, as it has an interest in the issues Treacy raises. See, e.g., Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156 (Ind.2001) (appearances filed for the following amici: Indiana Civil Liberties Union; Indiana Legal Services, Inc.; Lifers United for Penal Progress, Inc.; Evansville Bar Association; and Hendricks County Bar Associa*638tion). Nevertheless, I would not dismiss Treacy's appeal based on our own improper designation of MCPDA as appellee, rather than as amicus. See Marchand v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 905 N.E.2d 435, 438 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) ("where there is clear authority that the motions panel erred as a matter of law, we may reconsider its ruling”). Rather, I would direct the clerk’s office to modify the docket entry as to the status of MCPDA, and I would accept its amicus brief.