(dissenting). People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470 [1998]) was a mistake, and a serious one — so serious that in the 13 years since LaFontaine was decided we have never followed it, though we have had several cases that called for its application. The People argue here that LaFontaine should be overruled. I had hoped that this would provide the occasion for giving that case a decent burial, but the majority ill-advisedly resurrects it.
*202LaFontaine holds that the Appellate Division, in reviewing a judgment, sentence or order of a trial-level criminal court, may not consider any issue of law or fact that the lower court did not decide against the appellant. Thus, under LaFontaine, it is impossible for the Appellate Division ever to affirm on a ground that the trial court either did not reach or decided, erroneously, in the appellant’s favor. LaFontaine also holds that our Court is limited, in reviewing an Appellate Division affirmance of a lower criminal court’s judgment, to matters that were “raised or considered” in the Appellate Division, or that could have been raised or considered under LaFontaine’s restricted view of the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction (see 92 NY2d at 474; CPL 470.35 [1]). LaFontaine inflicts a large, completely unwarranted and unacceptable impairment on the jurisdiction of appellate courts.
Affirming a lower court judgment on a ground other than the one the lower court relied on is something appellate courts do all the time. It is a gross waste of judicial resources to require a new trial or other proceeding where the lower court has reached the right result, even if it did so for the wrong reason. We recognized in LaFontaine that our holding was undesirable from a policy point of view, saying that it “blocks . . . sensible management of this case” (92 NY2d at 475). We thought that we had no choice, however, because “the anomaly rests on unavoidable statutory language” (id.).
We did not explain in LaFontaine why we thought that statutory language made our holding “unavoidable.” In fact, we were wrong to think so. CPL 470.15 (1) says:
“Upon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment, sentence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected the appellant.”
In LaFontaine, we apparently assumed that the word “involving” means “claimed to have caused”; in other words, that the Appellate Division is limited to reviewing questions of law and issues of fact which, the appellant claims, caused an error or defect that adversely affected him. But “involving” could equally well be read to mean “necessary to decide a claim of’ — so that the Appellate Division could review any issue necessary to a determination of whether there was an error or *203defect adversely affecting the appellant. This, it seems to me, is the meaning the Legislature is much more likely to have intended. No one, so far as I know, has ever suggested a reason why the Legislature should forbid appellate courts from affirming on grounds other than those adopted by the court below.
As I read the statutory language, it permits what the Appellate Division did in this case. Appellant claimed, in the Appellate Division, that he had been “adversely affected” by an “error or defect in the criminal court proceedings” — i.e., that Supreme Court had wrongly denied suppression of the cocaine. In order to determine whether appellant was correct, the Appellate Division had to “consider and determine” not only the inevitable discovery issue that Supreme Court decided in the People’s favor, but also the issue of consent to the search, on which Supreme Court agreed with appellant. The consent issue was one “involving” appellant’s claim that there was an “error or defect in the criminal court proceedings” that adversely affected him. If — as the Appellate Division decided — he did consent to the search, he was not “adversely affected” by any error.
We may have thought, when we decided LaFontaine, that our prior cases had foreclosed the issue, but I believe we accepted that conclusion too readily. We relied on two earlier decisions, People v Romero (91 NY2d 750 [1998]) and People v Goodfriend (64 NY2d 695 [1984]), which do indeed say — also without doing any analysis to demonstrate the point — that CPL 470.15 means what LaFontaine says it means. Romero is distinguishable; the issue that we found unreviewable there had not been preserved in the trial court (see 91 NY2d at 753 [the alternative argument was raised “for the first time” in the Appellate Division]). Good-friend may be distinguishable also. The appeal to the Appellate Division in that case was by the People, from an order vacating a verdict on grounds of repugnancy; it is not clear from our brief memorandum opinion whether the alternative grounds urged by the defendant would logically have supported the trial court’s order. Our even briefer memorandum in People v Karp (76 NY2d 1006 [1990]) (not cited in the LaFontaine opinion) merely relies on Goodfriend.
The majority attempts no defense of LaFontaine, either as a matter of policy or logic. It merely insists that LaFontaine “settled” the law (majority op at 201) — in other words, that, even if it was a mistake, we cannot correct it. Of course, this is the general rule. Stare decisis ordinarily requires us to follow *204our previous decisions, even when we think they were wrong. This is an excellent case, however, for making an exception.
While we recognized in LaFontaine that our decision would have adverse practical consequences, we underestimated their extent. Indeed, we appeared to think that LaFontaine was almost sui generis; our opinion refers to “the unusual procedural posture of this case” (92 NY2d at 472) and to “the exceptional procedural twist” that confronted us (id. at 475). But there is nothing particularly unusual in an appellate court’s affirming a decision below on alternative grounds. In fact, we have done it ourselves more than half a dozen times since LaFontaine was decided, without citing LaFontaine once. (Until today, our only citation of LaFontaine was in People v Sparber [10 NY3d 457, 472 n 8 (2008)], where we distinguished it.)
Thus in People v Wheeler (2 NY3d 370 [2004]), a case involving denial of a motion to suppress, Supreme Court and the Appellate Division (302 AD2d 411 [2004]) had denied suppression on a “protective sweep” theory; we affirmed “under a different rationale” — that “the officers legitimately focused their attention on defendant during the execution of the arrest warrants” (2 NY3d at 373, 374). In People v Parris (4 NY3d 41 [2004]) we affirmed the denial of a reconstruction hearing “on grounds different from those stated by the Appellate Division” (id. at 45). In People v Paulman (5 NY3d 122, 128 [2005]), we affirmed the suppression of several of the defendant’s statements “[although our analysis differs in some respects from that of the Appellate Division.” In People v Caban (5 NY3d 143, 148-150 [2005]), we affirmed a conviction, concluding that certain statements, held below to be within an exception to the hearsay rule (see People v Caban, 4 AD3d 274 [1st Dept 2004]), were not hearsay at all. In People v Carvajal (6 NY3d 305, 311 [2005]), the Appellate Division affirmed a conviction on the ground “that territorial jurisdiction . . . had been established under CPL 20.20 (1) (a)”; we affirmed under CPL 20.20 (1) (c), “[w]ithout reaching” the CPL 20.20 (1) (a) issue (6 NY3d at 311).
In People v Lewis (5 NY3d 546 [2005]), we reviewed an Appellate Division decision affirming a conviction. The Appellate Division had held that entry into premises in violation of a court order could, by itself, satisfy the “unlawful entry” element of the crime of burglary (see People v Lewis, 13 AD3d 208, 211 [1st Dept 2004]); we disagreed with that conclusion, but affirmed on the alternative ground that the trial court’s charge (to the extent that any objection to it was preserved) was consistent with a correct view of the law. And in People v Fuentes *205(12 NY3d 259, 263 [2009]), the Appellate Division affirmed a conviction on the ground that defendant had been given an adequate opportunity to use a particular document (48 AD3d 479 [2009]). We affirmed “employing a different rationale” (12 NY3d at 263) — that the document in question was not material (id. at 260).
In not one of these post-LaFontaine cases did we discuss or cite LaFontaine. Today’s majority atones for the omission by analyzing all seven. It virtually admits that there was LaFontaine error in one of them, Paulman, and tries to reconcile the other six with the LaFontaine holding. As to three of the cases—Parris, Carvajal and Fuentes—the majority may have a point. (The point is debatable in each, but I will not pause to debate it.) But the majority is clearly wrong about Wheeler, Caban and Lewis.
The majority, relying on our reference in Wheeler to the trial court’s “broad holding encompassing two legal standards” (2 NY3d at 373), implies that the trial court relied in part on the ground we adopted on appeal (majority op at 198); but the record shows that the trial court relied on a single ground, which we did not endorse: that the actions of the officers were “reasonable” because “the officers were in the same position as when they perform a protective sweep” (Wheeler, Appendix for Defendant-Appellant, at A-84). Similarly, the majority speculates that in Caban the trial court may have relied on the ground that was the basis for our affirmance (majority op at 199); but the record refutes the speculation, showing that the trial court admitted the evidence in question under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (Caban, Appendix for Defendant-Appellant, at A-46)—not for the reason we gave, that the evidence, to the extent relevant to the appeal, was “nonhearsay” (5 NY3d at 150). (The trial court did later say that there were other grounds for its ruling, but it did not say what they were [Caban, Appendix at A-48].) In discussing Lewis, the majority focuses only on the legal sufficiency issue, ignoring the relevant part of our holding: that the trial court’s original charge to the jury was correct, for reasons other than those relied on by the courts below (see 5 NY3d at 551; compare majority op at 200).
It is true that in only one of the seven post-LaFontaine cases I have listed, Wheeler, was LaFontaine cited to us. Perhaps that should not matter, since LaFontaine affects our jurisdiction, but in any event all those cases, even the ones that might be reconciled with LaFontaine, prove my basic point—affirmance on alternate grounds, which is forbidden to the Appellate *206Division (and often to us) under LaFontaine, is much more common than our opinion in LaFontaine itself implies. (Affirmance on alternate grounds, though the majority seems to think otherwise, is exactly the same thing as affirmance “on a ground that was not decided adversely to the appealing party” [majority op at 197].)
Indeed, I suspect that the list I have given of alternative-ground affirmances in our court is only a partial one; it is not easy to do a Lexis or Westlaw search for such cases. For similar reasons, I am unable to say how often the Appellate Division does what we often do—simply ignore LaFontaine’s existence— but I am convinced it is very common. A search of Appellate Division cases in Lexis and Westlaw for the year 2010 finds not a single citation to LaFontaine-, a search for 2009 finds one case in which it was followed (People v Falquez, 66 AD3d 918 [2d Dept 2009]), and one in which the court assumed, without deciding, that it was applicable (People v Shepard, 67 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2009]). Here, the Appellate Division ignored LaFontaine, though it is squarely applicable, and I do not have to seek far for another example: Twelve days ago, in People v Hunter (17 NY3d 725 [2011]), we held that the Appellate Division erred in affirming a conviction on a ground that the People had failed to preserve, but there was a LaFontaine error in that case also. Under LaFontaine, the Appellate Division could not affirm on a ground not decided in the trial court, whether the issue was preserved or not. The Appellate Division in Hunter did not cite LaFontaine (see People v Hunter, 70 AD3d 1343 [4th Dept 2010]).
Perhaps the Appellate Division departments, like our Court, have been lucky in that counsel have frequently failed to argue a LaFontaine issue. If that is so, their luck and ours is quite likely to run out after the bar reads today’s decision.
A little thought will suggest the reason why neither the Appellate Division nor our Court has been eager to invoke LaFontaine, even where we should. Its application leads to multiple absurdities. Suppose a case in which the defendant offers a document in evidence at a jury trial, and the People object on two grounds — that the document is hearsay and it is irrelevant. The judge finds the document irrelevant, and does not reach the hearsay question. The Appellate Division disagrees with the trial judge’s ruling on relevance — but it is obvious at a glance that the document is inadmissible hearsay. Must the Appellate Division reverse the defendant’s conviction, so that there can be a new trial at which the document is again offered and again *207excluded, this time on hearsay grounds? Or is the case remanded so that the judge can rule, months or years after the trial, on the hearsay objection — a ruling to be followed by another appeal?
But I do not need to invent hypotheticals to make my point. The majority today remits the case to Supreme Court “for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion” (majority op at 201), the same relief afforded in LaFontaine itself (92 NY2d at 476). Neither in LaFontaine nor here is there any discussion of what those “further proceedings” should be. The majority here decides that defendant’s convictions for weapon possession and assault may stand, but what is going to happen to his drug conviction? Are the drugs to be suppressed, even though the Appellate Division found that defendant consented to the search, and we have not suggested that the Appellate Division was wrong in this? Is it a general rule that where, as here, a trial court is led to the right result by two offsetting errors, the wrong result is required as a matter of law? Or is Supreme Court free to reconsider its previous ruling that defendant’s consent was invalid? In doing so, may it take into account the Appellate Division’s view on that subject — though the majority holds today that the expression of that view exceeded the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction? And what will trial courts do on remittal in future cases, when the Appellate Division, as required by LaFontaine and today’s decision, reverses trial court decisions that may have reached the correct result, without deciding whether the result was in fact correct?
Now that the majority has breathed new life into LaFontaine, I really do not know what will happen. Perhaps the Legislature will rescue the court system by amending the statutes that we have, incorrectly, interpreted to create a major problem. I hope so; but we suggested a legislative change in LaFontaine itself (92 NY2d at 475), without result to date. If there is a workable alternative to the approach that New York appellate courts have taken since the LaFontaine decision — which is, in many cases, to pretend that LaFontaine does not exist — I do not know what that is.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Jones concur with Judge Read; Judge Smith dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs.
Order modified, etc.