dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, and part ways with the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal. More specifically, I cannot agree that Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 precludes the State from appealing the trial court’s denial of its motion to correct error in this instance.
Indeed, Indiana Code section 35-38^1-2(5) allows the State to appeal from an order suppressing evidence if that ruling *1030effectively precludes further prosecution. However, there is nothing in the statute that requires the State to pursue the appeal through the interlocutory process. In other words, there is no prohibition in the statute that prevents the State from seeking redress of the trial court’s suppression ruling by way of a motion to correct error. State v. Hunter, 904 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).
In accordance with Indiana Appellate Rule 9, an appeal is initiated when a Notice of Appeal is filed within thirty days of a final judgment. However, that period is tolled “if any party files a timely motion to correct error.” Id. Moreover, when a motion to correct error is filed, the time to file a Notice of Appeal does not commence until the motion to correct error is either ruled upon or deemed denied.
Here, the basis for the State’s appeal is the final judgment with regard to the trial court’s granting of the motion to suppress because it effectively ended the prosecution against Holtsclaw. Rather than filing an immediate appeal, the State sought to resolve the issue by filing a motion to correct error. And once the trial court denied the motion to correct error, it is my view that the time for pursuing the appeal began anew, and a Notice of Appeal was required within thirty days to commence the appeal. That is precisely what the State did in this instance when it filed the Notice of Appeal on August 19, 2011, after the trial court had denied the motion to correct error on July 25. Appellant’s App. p. 8, 47, 70.
I see nothing in Indiana Code section 35-38^4-2 stating — or even implying — that the language of Appellate Rule 9 should not apply to appeals initiated by the State.7 In my view, foreclosing the State from seeking redress through a more direct route, such as filing a motion to correct error in circumstances such as these, is simply not a sound application of the language embodied in Indiana Code section 35-38^4-2. Moreover, I do not believe that our General Assembly intended the result reached by the majority in this circumstance when construing the provisions of Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 and our court rules. Such a holding effectively elevates form over substance, which we are loathe to do. State ex. rel Atty. Gen. v. Lake Sup.Ct., 820 N.E.2d 1240, 1252 (Ind.2005).
In short, I do not believe that this case must be dismissed in light of the State’s filing of its Notice of Appeal on August 19, 2011. I vote to reinstate the appeal and address the State’s claims on their merits regarding the propriety of the trial court’s grant of Holtsclaw’s motion to suppress.
. In any event, our Supreme Court’s rules of procedure prevail over statutes. State ex rel. Crawford v. Delaware Cir. Ct., 655 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ind.1995).