dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is well settled that “a person on probation is entitled to certain due process rights, including, among other rights, disclosure of the evidence against him.” Weatherly v. State, 564 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). A probationer’s due process rights are codified at Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3, which provides in pertinent part that the trial court “shall conduct” a hearing concerning an alleged probation violation. Ind.Code § 35 — 38—2—3(d). The statute further provides that “[t]he state must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence shall be presented in open court. The [probationer] is entitled to confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e) (emphasis added).
No evidentiary hearing was held in this case. It is true, as the majority observes, that when a probationer admits to a probation violation, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. Vernon v. State, 903 N.E.2d 533, 537 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. Here, however, the transcript before us does not contain such an admission. In fact, it does not contain even a single reference to such an admission. The State attempts to explain this away by saying that “[p]resumably, [Beeler’s] admissions occurred off the record and no record was made concerning the admissions.” Appellee’s Br. at 3 n.7. The State candidly “acknowledges that it would be a better practice for the trial court to record a defendant’s admissions on the record or to at least make a record of his admissions which occurred off-record” but goes on to argue that “this Court should be able to rely upon the trial court’s assertions in its docket [i.e., the CCS] to establish the truth of events even where the transcript does not specifically verify them.” Id. at 7.
Given the fundamental due process and liberty interests at stake, and given that the transcript actually contradicts the CCS’s version of events, I disagree with the State’s position. Likewise, I disagree with the majority’s reliance on Epps and Trojnar. If Beeler admitted to a probation violation off the record — a fact that Beeler does not concede on appeal — it was incumbent upon the State to ensure that *832the admission was repeated on the record.2 This it failed to do. In sum, I believe that Beeler has established fundamental error, and therefore I would reverse the revocation of his probation.
. Because the State must prove a probation violation in open court, see Ind.Code § 35-3 8-2-3 (e), it seems only logical that an admission to a probation violation must be made in open court.