dissenting.
I do not share the majority’s conclusion that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain Nicholson’s stalking conviction and respectfully dissent. I am in agreement with the panel of this court which stated that “[i]f the legislature had wanted to place parameters on the period of time over which such behavior could occur, it could have done so.” Johnson v. State, 721 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Nicholson repeated essentially the same type of conduct aimed at the same victim. The gap of time between the repeated conduct, occasioned primarily by Nicholson’s incarceration for the first offense against the victim, is a non-factor under the wording of the Indiana stalking statute.3
. I would also deny Nicholson’s challenge to admission of evidence of the 2006 incidents on Rule 404(B) grounds. Far from being evidence of "other” acts, it is evidence of the very acts that establish that Nicholson repeatedly harassed the Wolfes.