concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. Although I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence, I believe we should follow our earlier decisions in Anthony, Hubbard, Marshall and Grayer, and also affirm the trial court’s order requiring defendant to submit an additional DNA sample and pay the $200 DNA analysis fee. See Anthony, 408 Ill. App. 3d 799; Hubbard, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 102; Marshall, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1082; Grayer, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99.
In both Anthony and Hubbard, this court analyzed the statutory language used in section 5 — 4—3 and agreed with the holdings in Grayer and Marshall that a defendant may be ordered to submit a DNA sample and be assessed the DNA fee regardless of whether a DNA sample was previously ordered or the fee was previously assessed. See Anthony, 408 Ill. App. 3d 799; Hubbard, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 103 (citing Grayer, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 801); Marshall, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1082-83. The courts reasoned that although the legislature was clearly aware of recidivism, the language used in the statute itself did not limit the taking of DNA samples or the assessment of the analysis fee to a single instance. See Anthony, 408 Ill. App. 3d 799; Hubbard, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 102; Grayer, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 801; Marshall, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1083. Moreover, the courts found collecting a new DNA sample under section 5 — 4—3 whenever a defendant is newly convicted of a qualifying offense does not cause any injustice or a significant inconvenience, recognizing the ability to obtain fresh samples and the ability to subject the new samples to new methods of collecting, analyzing and categorizing DNA constitute two important reasons for doing so. Hubbard, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 103; Grayer, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 801; Marshall, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1083.
Because the plain language of section 5 — 4—3 clearly authorized the trial court to order defendant to submit his DNA and pay the $200 analysis fee — regardless of whether or not defendant’s DNA was already on file due to an earlier conviction — I would find the trial court’s order assessing the $200 analysis fee should not be vacated. See Anthony, 408 Ill. App. 3d 799; Hubbard, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 102; Marshall, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1082; Grayer, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99.