dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority. I would affirm the circuit court’s reversal of the Board’s ruling and hold that the injured police officer is entitled to line-of-duty disability benefits. The record is clear that the plaintiff, Officer Filskov (Filskov) was a member of a special team of police officers who were assigned to specific activity. This team was known as the Neighborhood Enforcement Team or NET. As an NET officer, Filskov and his partners were required to drive to specific locations in the city of Northlake in accordance with the gang suppression activities of NET. As Filskov was entering the vehicle in the course of his assignment to drive to a location required of his NET team, the injury occurred. In my view, that puts it squarely within the category of injuries for which line-of-duty disability benefits are payable.
The Board rejected Filskov’s application for line-of-duty disability on the ground that he was not engaged in “an act of duty” at the time of the injury. They go on to say that Filskov’s injury occurred because he “cho[se] to become a passenger in a vehicle.” The Board acknowledges that its analysis is incomplete in that the key consideration is the capacity in which Filskov was acting at the time of the injury.
The Board’s comments about Filskov’s injury suggests that it viewed it in a manner as if he sustained the injury while engaging in some casual activity unrelated to his work as a police officer, and more specifically as a team member of NET. It cannot be rationally argued that Filskov was getting into that particular police vehicle; in that particular location; at that particular time; for personal reasons unrelated to his specific work as a team member of NET. On the contrary, his team had completed a report on a prior activity and were headed out to resume their specialized work. Filskov was not taking a casual car ride with friends. He was engaged in serious, specialized police work when he was injured.
The Board’s comparison of the manner in which Filskov’s injury was sustained, to that of an “[ordinary] citizen who chooses to become a passenger in a vehicle,” begs the question of why Filskov was entering that vehicle at that time. The answer is that he was performing an act of police duty, attendant to his role as a team member of NET and the activity was peculiar to that unit and his work. I believe section 3 — 114.1(a) of the Pension Code given its plain meaning supports Fils-kov’s argument that he is entitled to line-of-duty disability benefits. The relevant portion of the Code states:
“If a police officer as the result of *** injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty, is found to be physically *** disabled ***, the police officer shall be entitled to a disability *** pension ***.” 40 ILCS 5/3—114.1(a) (West 2008).
The majority notes that whether a police officer has suffered a line-of-duty injury is fact specific. They then discuss the facts of several cases as support for their holding in this case. I disagree that any of the cases cited by the majority in their analysis, supports the Board’s ruling and the majority’s holding in this case. I believe the legislature intended that police officers injured while clearly performing an act of police duty, are entitled to line-of-duty disability benefits. In my view, the plaintiff met his burden of proving that his injury occurred within the narrow parameters of performing an act of police duty.
The Board and the majority seem to focus on the argument that the plaintiff was not facing a specific danger, peculiar to NET officers at the precise moment of injury. Filskov, relying on Alm v. Lincolnshire Police Pension Board, 352 Ill. App. 3d 595 (2004), correctly argues that it is the entirety of the circumstances leading to the injury which must be considered. It is uncontroverted that Filskov “was in the middle of a specialized patrol” which required him to go to a location by means of a police motor vehicle. Thus, it is inaccurate for the Board to compare Filskov’s activity at the time of the injury to an ordinary “citizen who chooses to become a passenger in a vehicle.” Using the Board’s logic, any police officer who suffers an injury while on duty, performing a specific act of police work, would never qualify for line-of-duty disability benefits if the injury is of a category that could conceivably be suffered by an ordinary citizen. This reasoning makes little sense when viewed in light of the legislative intent, which is to provide line-of-duty benefits to police officers who are injured while performing an act of police duty. I do not believe and nothing in the record suggests that Filskov had a choice regarding the mode of transportation which he and his team members were required to use as they traveled to their NET assignment. In determining whether an officer is entitled to line-of-duty disability benefits, “ ‘the crux [of the question] is the capacity in which the police officer is acting’ ” at the time of the injury “rather than the precise mechanism of the injury.” Id. at 599 (quoting Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518, 522 (1986)). There can be no doubt that Filskov was acting in his capacity as a team member of NET, engaged in the specific activities of that unit when he was injured.
While deference is due to the findings of the Board, we are not required to ignore the obvious and engage in convoluted reasoning to uphold the Board’s ruling. As our supreme court has said, “[we] are not required to suspend common sense,” where, as here, the facts in evidence clearly support Filskov’s claim that his injury occurred in the line of duty. People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 227 (1995). I believe that the plain meaning of the statute, legislative intent and a solid base of case law provide the bases upon which to affirm the ruling of the circuit court of Cook County, finding the plaintiff, Filskov, eligible for line-of-duty disability benefits. It is for these reasons, that I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority.