dissenting.
My colleagues state that the facts of this case are similar to Greer v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), and conclude that Butler, like Greer, waived his right to counsel because he admitted violating his probation.
The following exchange between the trial court and Butler is the entirety of the record regarding the waiver of counsel:
COURT: If it’s found you’ve violated your probation, whether you admit or it’s found at a hearing, the maximum penalty the Court can impose is the four (4) years that was suspended. The minimum is zero (0) additional days in jail. Do you understand what the potential penalties are Mr. Butler?
DEFENDANT BUTLER: Yes sir.
COURT: You have a right to have a lawyer represent you in this proceeding. If you’d like to have one, can’t afford one, one will be appointed for you. Mr. Butler, do you wish to have a lawyer represent you?
DEFENDANT BUTLER: No.
COURT: You’re gonna proceed today without a lawyer?
DEFENDANT BUTLER: Yes.
COURT: Okay. And you understand you have a right to a lawyer?
DEFENDANT BUTLER: Yes.
COURT: Mr. Butler then do you admit or deny that you violated the terms of your probation?
DEFENDANT BUTLER: Yes.
COURT: Okay, does that mean you admit — I need, I need to either hear that you admit it or deny it.
DEFENDANT BUTLER: I admit it.
Tr. 7-28 at 6-7.
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons:
First, as noted in the majority opinion, our Supreme Court abrogated Greer in Hopper v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1086 (Ind. 2010).
Second, in Greer, Greer voluntarily admitted that he planned on pleading guilty while the trial court was in the process of advising Greer of his right to counsel, as shown by the following exchange:
COURT: [y]ou have a right to be represented by an attorney. And if you wish to have an attorney and can’t afford one an attorney will be appointed to represent you. Let me ask Mr. Curtis Greer first, are you making an arrangement to get an attorney?
CURTIS GREER: No, ma’am. I just plan on pleading — just plead guilty and ...
Greer, 690 N.E.2d at 1215. Here, there was no such voluntary interjection. Rather, Butler’s admission came about in direct response to questioning from the court. Tr. 7-28 at 6-7. Thus, unlike the situation in Greer where the defendant himself injected the fact that he wished to plead guilty, the admission here came about in response to the court’s direct questioning.
*264Third, “ ‘whenever a defendant proceeds without the benefit of counsel, the record must reflect that the right to counsel was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived.’ ” Cooper v. State, 900 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). That is, in a probation revocation proceeding, the trial court must both determine the defendant’s competency to represent himself. Id. Here, as shown by the above exchange, there was no determination of Butler’s competency.
Fourth, to ensure that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the defendant must be made aware of the perils of self-representation. Redington v. State, 678 N.E.2d 114 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, where we observed:
The record must demonstrate that [the criminal defendant] is fully aware of the nature, extent and importance of the right he has waived and the possible consequences thereof so “his choice is made with his eyes open.” The consequence of proceeding pro se is the polestar of any admonishment or warning concerning waiving the right to counsel. There is no rigid mandate which sets forth specific inquiries or warnings which a trial court should make before determining that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent. Accordingly, [the law of Indiana generally requires] a warning to the effect that a defendant will be held to the “ground rules” of trial procedure, that the defendant will be treated like an attorney, responsible for making objections and following procedural and evi-dentiary rules, and that the defendant be made aware of the pitfalls of self-representation.
Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted).
We explained that “[t]he reasons for the above warnings are obvious”:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 118 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)). Again, an examination of the exchange set forth above fails to establish that Butler was so informed.
Fifth, although the trial court found that Butler admitted to probation violations, the record is unclear as to the extent of was such admission which, at best, was qualified and equivocal:
DEFENDANT BUTLER: Your Honor, I — on the, on the drugs screens, they, they wasn’t even thirty (30) days apart; and the cocaine, a person handed me the cocaine and I gave it back to the person, and the day that that happened, I, I had a drug screen and I told the, the field officer what happened. He said don’t worry about it, and I took it as that. I haven’t — and the only reason I was behind on my home detention, be*265cause someone stole my money, my money out of my room at the house, and I told my counselor that and she, and I told her that I was gonna pay, catch up this month, and she said it was okay.
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DEFENDANT BUTLER: They told me that they was, turn myself in, and I turned myself in. They told me that they was gonna treat this as daily reporting. My girlfriend’s right here, and she heard them say it too. And on the breathalyser [sic], they only gave me one (1) breathalyser [sic] sir, and that was the zero point eight-nine (0.89) as you said. They did not test me twice for no breathalyser [sic]. And I, and this, that was it.
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DEFENDANT BUTLER: And over there at the, at work release, I was asking to speak to my counsel- or, because I wanted to know why, why are, why did you lie to me. You told me that turn, turn this box in; we was gonna do this as daily reporting, and she never did come until Monday. They wouldn’t even call her or let me talk to her or anything. That was my understanding of the reason to come to there. But I still turned myself in.
Tr. 7-28 at 7-10.
Sixth and finally, my colleagues note that Butler’s criminal history reveals a familiarity with the criminal justice system supporting the conclusion that his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court made no mention of Butler’s criminal history during the hearing at which it determined that Butler had waived his right to counsel and had admitted his probation violation. Further, there is no evidence in the record before us that either career criminals generally or Butler specifically possess a specialized legal knowledge or intelligence rendering them capable of making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of their rights in the absence of a full and adequate disclosure of the nature, extent and importance of such rights and the consequences of waiving them. Indeed, the conclusion could be easily drawn that an extensive criminal history is more likely reflective of the lack of critical thinking skills, not their presence.