dissenting.
H.B. 02-1396 contains two provisions that are in square conflict regarding the date of applicability for the tolling provision. Section 2, which amends 18-3-411(2)(b), tolls the ten-year statute of limitations until the alleged victim turns eighteen, and states that the new tolling "shall apply to all felony offenses specified in subsection (1) of this section which are alleged to have occurred on or after July 1, 1998." Ch. 288, see. 2, § 18-3-411(2)(b), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1128 (emphasis added). Section 5(1) states, on the other hand, that the act "shall apply to offenses committed on or after [the date of passage, June 3, 2008]." Ch. 288, see. 5(1), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1130 (emphasis added). The parties agree, as does the majority, that 18-3-411(2)(b) and section 5(1) cannot be reconciled, in that they both define the coverage of the tolling provision using different dates. Therefore, either the 1992 date or the 2002 date is a mistake. One must go.
When faced with such a conflict in the statutory language, "we seek the interpretation that will make the most consistent whole of the statute." State v. A.N.J., 98 N.J. 421, 487 A.2d 324, 325 (1985); cf. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46, 50 (Colo.2008) ("To effectuate the General Assembly's intent, we will read and consider the statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts."); People v. Texas, 85 Colo. 289, 294, 275 P. 896, 898 (1929) (we must strive to "give effect to every word, clause, and seetion, if it can be done"). Unlike the majority, I would give effect to the 1992 date contained in 18-8-411(2)(b). While this interpretation does not give meaning to the 2002 date contained in section 5(1), it preserves the language of the tolling provision itself, as well as (1) the overall structure of H.B. 02-1396, *261which is keyed off the 1992 date; (2) the legislation's appropriations and charging provisions, which only make sense if the 1992 date is used; and (8) the subsequent statutory amendments, which rest on the assumption that the tolling provision applies to crimes committed on or after 1992. By contrast, the majority's interpretation preserves section 5(1)'s 2002 date itself, but renders much of the rest of the statute senseless and superfluous-a result we should seek to avoid. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 84-85, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001) (adopting the only "reasonable reading of the statute" even though that interpretation rendered inconsistent phrase "surplusage"; describing inconsistent phrase as "simply a drafting mistake"; and declining to give meaning to inconsistent phrase because doing so would require "seriously rewriting the language of the rest of the statute").
Nor would I resort to the rule of lenity, upon which the majority depends, maj. op. at 258, because one statutory interpretation (the one giving effect to the 1992 date) is far more consistent with the statute as a whole than the other (the one giving effect to the 2002 date). In other words, there is no "tie" that the rule of lenity must break. See United States v. Santos, - U.S. -, -, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) (Sealia, J., plurality opinion) (noting that the rule of lenity applies to break a tie) Because I would give effect to the 1992 language, and because the charges against the defendant are not time-barred under that date, I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
Before the 2002 amendments, the relevant portions of section 16-5-401 and section 18-3-411 established a flat ten-year statute of limitations for felony sex offenses. The statute of limitations began running from the date the offense was committed. In 2002, the General Assembly revisited the statute of limitations provisions by adopting H.B. 02-1396. HB. 02-1896 continued to provide a ten-year statute of limitations but tolled the limitations period until the alleged victim turned eighteen. As initially introduced and then as ultimately adopted, section 2 amending 18-8-411(2)(b) stated:
No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for an unlawful sexual offense charged as a felony unless the indictment, information, complaint, or action for the same is found or instituted within ten years after the victim reaches the age of eighteen years. The ten-year statute of limitations shall apply to all felony offenses specified in subsection (1) of this section which are alleged to have occurred on or after July 1, 1998."
Ch. 288, sec. 2, § 18-3-411(2)(b), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1128 (emphasis added). In other words, the new tolling provision would apply to all crimes for which the ten-year statute of limitations had not already run-that is, to erimes committed on or after July 1, 1992.
When H.B. 02-1896 was first introduced, then section 8, the clause outlining the bill's effective date and its date of applicability, was consistent with the tolling provision language in 18-3-411(2)(b). Specifically, it stated that "[this act shall take effect July 1, 2002 and shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1992." HB. 02-1396, 63rd Gen. Assem. 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.2002). After the bill was introduced, and in order to facilitate compliance with appropriations requirements, the Office of the Colorado Legislative Council prepared a fiscal impact analysis. This analysis concluded that the bill would result in one additional incarceration by 2008. As a result of the fiscal impact, H.B. 02-1896 could only be passed contingent upon the availability of appropriations funds, which depended upon the passage of a separate bill. In other words, the funding bill had to pass in order for H.B. 02-1896 to become effective.
H.B. 02-1396 was thus amended in order to reflect that the bill was now contingent upon sufficient appropriations. Section 3 became section 5, and the bill's effective date and date of applicability were changed to the date of the bill's passage. Section 5(1), as adopted, provides, "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, this act shall take effect upon passage, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after said *262date." Ch. 288, see. 5(1), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1130 (emphasis added). In sum, although 18-3-411(2)(b) applies the tolling provision to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1992, section 5(1) states that the act applies only to crimes committed on or after the date of passage, June 3, 2002.
The parties and the majority agree that the language in section 5(1) and in 18-3-411(2)(b) cannot be reconciled because they both define the coverage of the tolling provision using different dates. Either the 1992 date or the 2002 date is a mistake. We must give effect to one date; the other must go.
When faced with such a conflict in the statutory language, "we seek the interpretation that will make the most consistent whole of the statute." A.N.J., 487 A.2d at 325; cf. O'Donnell, 186 P.3d at 50 (when interpreting a statute we seek to effectuate the General Assembly's intent by reading the statute as a whole); People v. Texas, 85 Colo. at 294, 275 P. at 898 (we must strive to "give effect to every word, clause, and section, if it can be done"). In my view, we should give effect to the 1992 date contained 18-38-411(2)(b)'s tolling provision. Admittedly, this interpretation does not give meaning to the 2002 date contained in section 5(1). However, this interpretation keeps the rest of the statutory scheme intact, in addition to preserving the tolling provision itself. More specifically, by giving effect to the 1992 date, this interpretation preserves (1) the overall structure of H.B. 02-1896, which is keyed off the 1992 date; (2) the legislation's appropriations and charging provisions, which only make sense if the 1992 date is used; and (8) the subsequent statutory amendments, which rest on the assumption that the tolling provision applies to crimes committed prior to 1992. By contrast, the majority's interpretation preserves section 5(1) itself, but gives no effect to the 1992 date contained in 18-3-411(2)(b). Moreover, its interpretation renders much of the remainder of the statute (and subsequent amendments) senseless and superfluous-a result we should seek to avoid. See Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 84-85, 122 S.Ct. 528 (adopting the only "reasonable reading of the statute" even though that interpretation rendered inconsistent phrase "surplusage"; describing inconsistent phrase as "simply a drafting mistake"; and declining to give meaning to inconsistent phrase because doing so would require "seriously rewriting the language of the rest of the statute").
First, the overall structure of H.B. 02-1896 depends on the 1992 date. In two different places, the legislation specifies that the new tolling provision applies only to crimes for which the ten-year statute of limitations had not run. As noted above, the tolling provision itself states that it applies to crimes that occurred on or after July 1, 1992. Ch. 288, see. 2, § 18-8-411(2)(b), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1128. In addition, the July 1, 1992 coverage date is repeated in the provision of the amendments subjecting various felonies committed prior to July 1, 1992 to a ten-year statute of limitations, without tolling. Ch. 288, see. 2, § 18-3-411(2)(a), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1128. ("The ten-year statute of limitations shall apply to all offenses specified in subsection (1) of this seetion which are alleged to have occurred on or after July 1, 1979, but prior to July 1, 1992."). Thus, under the statutory scheme, crimes committed prior to July 1, 1992 are subject to a flat ten-year statute of limitations, and those occurring after that date are subject to the ten-year statute of limitations, but with tolling, until the age of eighteen.
The General Assembly's selection of the July 1, 1992 date in two separate provisions of the statutory amendments was not a fluke. We have held that the legislature may extend the statute of limitations for crimes already committed without violating ex post facto principles as long as the statute of limitations has not run on those crimes. See People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119, 120 (Colo.1985). Through amending 18-3-411(2)(a) and (b), the General Assembly subjected already committed crimes to the new tolling provision as permitted by the Constitution-that is, it applied the new tolling provision to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1992 for which the statute of limitations had not run. The July 1, 1992 date is thus not only specifically expressed in two provisions of H.B. 02-1396, it is critical to the structure of the entire legislative scheme.
*263Moreover, the lengthy appropriations provisions contained in the statutory amendments would be rendered meaningless unless H.B. 02-1396 applies to crimes already committed for which the statute of limitations had not yet run. Appropriations requirements mandate that any bill generating an increase in the number of persons incarcerated must provide for the immediate capital cost and operating cost for the first five years the bill has an impact. In order to comply with these requirements, the General Assembly used the Office of the Colorado Legislative Council's fiscal impact analysis to determine how much money was needed to pay for the first five years of H.B. 02-1396. More specifically, as adopted, the General Assembly specified the funding for H.B. 02-1396 in five separate provisions-for fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Seq, e.g., ch. 288, see. 8, § 17-1-139(1)(a), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1128. ("For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2002, in addition to any other appropriation, there is hereby appropriated from the capital construction fund ... the sum of ... ($69,467)."); id. at 1129 (specifically § 17-1-139(1)(b)-(e) ).
There would only be costs in the first five years, however, if the bill affects erimes committed on or after July 1, 1992. Specifically, in order for the bill to have a fiscal impact in 2002, it would have to permit prosecution of an offense that would, in the absence of the bill, be barred from prosecution in 2002. In other words, it would have to permit prosecution of additional crimes that would lead to an additional fiscal impact for the Department of Corrections.
If, as section 5(1) suggests, the legislation applied only to crimes committed after the date of passage, there would be no fiscal impact in the first five years and no reason to include the appropriations provisions in H.B. 02-1396. In other words, if the legislation only applies to crimes committed after the date of passage (June 3, 2002), the statute of limitations for those erimes could run-at the earliest-in 2012. It would have been irrational, then, for the General Assembly to have allocated money for the five years following the bill, if the bill would have no fiscal impact until 2012. Stated somewhat differently, under the majority's interpretation applying the 2002 date, the appropriations provisions-specifically, section 8 amending 17-1-139-are rendered senseless, as is the language in section 5(2)(a) of the effective date clause, which eross references those provisions.
If, on the other hand, the legislation applies to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1992 for which the statute of limitations had not run, as 18-3-411(2)(b) suggests, there would be a fiscal impact from the legislation in the first five years. By way of example, under the legislative scheme prior to H.B. 02-1396, a crime committed in July 1992 would have to be prosecuted within ten years, or by July 2002. Under 18-3-411(2)(b)'s tolling provision, however, that same crime-if it involved an alleged victim under the age of eighteen-could be prosecuted after July 2002 because the limitations period would be tolled until the alleged vice-tim turned eighteen. As noted above, it was estimated that this tolling provision could lead to a fiscal impact by raising the Department of Corrections costs thus giving rise to the appropriations provisions. In sum, interpreting H.B. 02-1896 as applying to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1992 avoids rendering the appropriations provisions a nullity.
Similarly, the provisions of H.B. 02-1896 pertaining to the substantive crimes with which defendants could be charged make sense only if the legislation is interpreted to apply to already committed crimes. For example, language in H.B. 02-1896's amendment to section 16-5-401(8)(a.8) states, "[T)he period of time during which an adult person or juvenile may be prosecuted shall be ten years after such victim reaches the age of eighteen years as to any offense or delinquent act: (I) Charged as a felony under ... 18-83-4083, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000." Ch. 288, see. 1, § 16-5-401(8)(a.3), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1128 (emphasis added). In 2000, the crime of sexual assault in the second degree contained in section 18-3-403 was repealed. But because individuals must be charged under the statutory provision defining the crime as it existed the year the crime was allegedly committed, the new *26416-5-401(8)(a.3) specified that the tolling provision would apply to crimes charged under the 2000 version of the sexual assault statute. It would make no sense for the General Assembly to have specified that the tolling provision applied to already committed crimes (Le., those committed in 2000) if H.B. 02-1396 only applied to crimes committed after the date of passage (June 3, 2002), as section 5(1) suggests. Again, reading H.B. 02-1896 as applying to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1992 avoids rendering the charging provisions a nullity.
Finally, reading H.B. 02-1396 as applying to already committed erimes comports with 2006 legislation that repealed the statute of limitations entirely for certain crimes. See ch. 119, see. 1, § 16-5-401, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 410, 410-13. Specifically, the General Assembly added language applying the new no-statute-of-limitations to certain offenses committed "before July 1, 1996, if the applicable statute of limitations, as it existed prior to July 1, 2006, has not yet run on July 1, 2006." Ch. 119, see. 1, §$ 16-5-401(1.5)(b), 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 410, 411 {emphasis added). Section 1 amending 16-5-401(1.5)'s language and applying the new no-statute-of-limitations language to crimes committed pri- or to July 1, 1996 would make sense only if there existed offenses that were not time-barred even though they were over ten years old, meaning they were committed before July 1, 1996. If the tolling provision is interpreted to apply only to crimes committed after the effective date of the legislation (June 8, 2002), there would be no crimes committed prior to 1996 for which the statute had not run. Again, the only way that 16-5-401(1.5), as amended in 2006, is not rendered a nullity would be if the tolling provision of H.B. 02-1396 applies to crimes committed prior to 1996-in other words, by giving ef-feet to the language in H.B. 02-1896 that applies the tolling provision to erimes committed on or after July 1, 1992.
What makes this such a difficult case is the fact that, either way we go, we must render some statutory language without effect. See People v. Texas, 85 Colo. at 294, 275 P. at 898 (we must strive to "give effect to every word, clause, and section, if it can be done" (emphasis added)). Under the majority's interpretation, the 1992 date in 18-8-411(2)(b)'s tolling provision is without meaning; the interpretation I propose, however, fails to give effect to the 2002 date in section 5(1). But while the majority's interpretation preserves the 2002 date of section 5(1), it renders much of the statutory scheme superfluous and senseless. By contrast, the interpretation of H.B. 02-1396 that gives effect to 18-8-411(2)(b)'s 1992 date preserves not only that specific language, but the overall structure of H.B. 02-1896; the legislation's extensive appropriations and charging provisions; and the changes made to 16-5-401(1.5) in 2006. Thus, in my view, section 5(1)'s 2002 date is, "in context, [and using] common sense," "simply a drafting mistake," which, if followed, would require some "serious[s)] rewriting [of] the language of the rest of the statute." Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 84-85, 122 S.Ct. 528.
Finally, unlike the majority, I would not resort to the rule of lenity in this cage. Maj. op. at 258.6 As the majority recognizes, the *265rule of lenity is properly invoked only when, after utilizing the ordinary tools of statutory construction, we are left with "no more than a guess as to what [the General Assembly] intended." People v. Thoro Prods. Co., Inc., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ("The rule of lenity is a rule of last resort, to be invoked only after traditional means of interpreting the statute have been exhausted." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As the United States Supreme Court put it recently, the rule of lenity applies to break a "tie." Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2025 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Here, in my view, there is no "tie," nor are there two "viable alternative[ ]" interpretations. Maj. op. at 258. Instead, the interpretive process leads to the result that one reading of the statute (the one that adopts the seope of coverage in 18-3-411(2)(b)'s tolling provision) is far more consistent with the statute as a whole than the other (the one giving effect to the 2002 date). I therefore would find that the interpretation that better preserves the statute as a whole controls-that is, that the tolling provision applies to all crimes that were committed on or after July 1, 1992 for which the statute of limitations had not already run. Given that there is no "tie" to be broken, resort to the rule of lenity is inappropriate in this case. See maj. op. at 258; but cf. Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2025 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (holding that application of the rule of lenity was appropriate where "[uJnder either [proposed interpretation], all provisions of the [statute in question} are coherent; no provisions are redundant; and the statute is not rendered utterly absurd").
In conclusion, I would hold that H.B. 02-1396 tolled the statute of limitations in this case, and that therefore the prosecution may proceed. I thus respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
. The concurring opinion would not resort to the rule of lenity but instead would justify the selection of section 5(1)'s 2002 date on the ground that courts cannot "excise [that] clear statutory language." Conc. op. at 261. Yet the concurrence acknowledges that the language of the tolling provision is equally as clear. Id. Therefore, I see no basis for its ultimate conclusion that 18-3-411(2)(b)'s 1992 date was somehow "inadequately expressed" and therefore is the proper candidate for excision. Id. The concurrence also places weight on the fact that the 2002 date was added later in the legislative process. Id. at 259-60. However, it was added at the same time the General Assembly cross-referenced the appropriations provisions, which reflect the 1992 date. See ch. 119, sec. 5(2)(a), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1130. In addition, the 1992 date in the tolling provision is more specific than section 5(1), as it applies to a specific amendment of the statute (the tolling provision) rather than the act as a whole. See Jenkins v. Panama Canal Railway Co., 208 P.3d 238, 241-42, 2009 WL 1383620 (Colo. May 18, 2009) (noting that the canon of statutory construction stating that the later statute should be followed if there is a conflict between two statutes is properly invoked only if one statute is not more specific than the other). The concurrence also appears to conclude that the 2002 date must control because it is located in the effective date clause. Conc. op. at 259-60 ("[Tihe subsequent decision to limit the applicability of the entire enactment *265necessarily fixes an outer limit on the applicability of any of its parts."). But this reasoning presumes that the effective date provision must control over the tolling provision, and I see no justification for doing so.