dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Based upon the record, I am unable to conclude that by agreeing to “monitor” this case, the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) “undertook to render services to another” sufficient to assume a duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1964).
*176The uncontroverted evidence establishes that no one seemed to want SRS to be involved in this case.' Neither Terri Tuthill nor Booth Tuthill ever requested or desired assistance from SRS with regard to the upbringing, custody, or care of their son. In fact, they were quite insistent that SRS not be involved. Terri would not even open the door on the last two occasions Mary Keady tried to make a home visit.
After Baby Roe was born, there was a meeting between representatives of SRS, the county mental health center, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The representatives from BIA were quite adamant that SRS should “back off’ because BIA had jurisdiction over the case. BIA agreed to make home visits and provide parenting education to the Tuthills. The mental health center also agreed to provide in-home services for the family. This was acceptable to the Tuthills.
At this point, SRS agreed to “monitor” the case. Keady testified:
“Q.: [Alright.] And what services were to be provided by SRS?
“A.: I don’t believe any at that time other than monitoring it to malee sure that . . . the Bureau of Indian Affairs was there and to keep in contact with the Mental Health Center.”
Keady explained that if she deemed the services of BIA and the mental health center to be inadequate, she would meet with her supervisor and “go from there.”
In its ruling, the district court essentially adopted the defendants’ statement of uncontroverted facts. In addressing whether SRS owed a duty under § 324A, the district court stated:
“In order for plaintiff to have a submiss[i]ble case under 324A, there must be evidence ... that SRS through an affirmative act or agreement assumed an obligation to render services to the child’s parents or intended to render services for the benefit of tíre child’s parents and that the services rendered were more than a limited undertaking, that is, such that SRS recognized that they were necessary for the protection of the child. There is just no evidence here that SRS ever rendered any services to this child’s parents of the quality or nature that is contemplated by §324A.”
I agree with the district court. I think a fair characterization of SRS’s role in this case is that SRS agreed it would be there for the Tuthills if needed. The Tuthills did accept services from BIA and *177the county mental health center. The only evidence that SRS rendered services to the Tuthills was Keady’s statement about monitoring the services. In my opinion, the monitoring of services by others does not rise to the level of assuming a § 324A duty and is incidental at best.
Although this is a frustrating case, given the unfortunate prognosis for a child whose injuries may have been prevented, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants.