*172Opinion on Rehearing
On rehearing, the State complains because we did not directly address its responsive argument that the evidence was adequate to allow the jury to conclude that Wirth was guilty because he was criminally responsible for the acts of his employees. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 7.01, 7.02 (Vernon 2011).
On its merits, the argument fails. The State argues that Wirth could be held criminally responsible for the unlawful actions of his employees. That is certainly true. The State posits that Wirth handled the finances and had sole access to information about the business, that he told employees how to perform their tasks and that based on his direction, they signed the drafts (without knowledge about whether the drafts would ever be honored).
Therefore, the State concludes, since Wirth had that knowledge, and ordered them to issue drafts he knew would not be paid, he is just as culpable as if he had issued the drafts himself.
We have addressed the lack of proof (even reasonably inferred) of Wirth’s criminal intent at length, and will not revisit it here. The State does not argue that the employees had any criminal intent, and we have previously held there is no evidence of criminal intent on the part of Wirth. The State cannot bootstrap such intent into existence merely by adding an additional player to the field. With no evidence of intent by the ones for whom he could be “criminally responsible,” and no evidence of intent on his own part, the argument fails. We overrule the motion for rehearing.