I respectfully dissent. On February 8, 1991, Michael A. Taylor pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. Thereafter a judge, rather than a jury, acted as fact-finder in *653his punishment phase trial. The judge determined that the facts warranted the imposition of a death sentence under section 565.030.4, RSMo 1986. In 1994, after that sentence was vacated, a different judge, after a second punishment-phase trial, again found that the facts warranted the imposition of a death sentence. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the United States Supreme Court thereafter held that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the facts on which guilt is based and that all defendants, including those who plead guilty, have a separate Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to impose punishment.
Applying these principles, this Court has recognized that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when a judge, rather than the jury, finds the facts necessary for imposition of a sentence of death after the jury is unable to agree upon punishment, State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2003), and that this ruling applies retroactively under Missouri’s retroactivity principles to all death penalty cases in which the jury was unable to agree upon the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Id. Further, in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant could not waive a constitutional right that was not yet recognized and was not inherently waived by a plea of guilty. Therefore, by pleading nolo con-tendere, Halbert did not waive his constitutional right to appointed counsel on first-tier appellate review, despite a Michigan statute stating that a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere waives any right to counsel on appeal, as that right had not yet been recognized.
Based on these authorities, Mr. Taylor seeks a writ of habeas corpus arguing that his death sentence is unconstitutional because the facts necessary to impose a sentence of death were found by a judge rather than a jury. I agree with Mr. Taylor that the principles set out in Ring, Blakely and Whitfield apply here. This Court held on Mr. Taylor’s prior appeal that he had no right to a jury determination of punishment as the United States Constitution as then interpreted did not provide a right to a jury determination of all facts that are essential to punishment and Missouri statutes did not give such a right to a defendant who, like Mr. Taylor, pleaded guilty. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor did not waive any right to jury sentencing. State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 217, 218-19 (Mo. banc 1996). This holding that Mr. Taylor did not have a right which he could waive and so waiver principles do not apply to him is law of the case. State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 545 (Mo. banc 2010).
Now that the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a separate Sixth Amendment right to have the jury find the facts at sentencing, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), it would violate equal protection principles to apply this Sixth Amendment right to those denied a jury determination of punishment due to a jury dead-lock but not those so denied it because they pleaded guilty. Further, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that one cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right that has not yet been recognized. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005).
Finally, even were Mr. Taylor able to waive a right he did not know he had, and even were this Court’s holding that he did not waive his right to a jury determination of facts on prior appeal not law of the case, *654as a factual matter he did not affirmatively waive or even know he could have had a right to a jury trial on the issue of sentence. The guilty plea transcript shows merely that he knew that by pleading guilty he would not be afforded a jury trial on punishment, not that he affirmatively wanted to avoid a jury trial on punishment or knew that he could have requested a jury trial on punishment.
Moreover, the principal opinion’s reliance on excerpts of Mr. Taylor’s testimony at a post-conviction motion hearing is misplaced because, in context, it is evident that Mr. Taylor was stating that he wanted to avoid a jury trial on guilt and realized that this meant that he would not be entitled to a jury trial on punishment, not that he affirmatively wished to avoid a jury trial on punishment, as the principal opinion erroneously infers.1 As his counsel’s testimony confirms, there simply was no discussion of that issue prior to his plea or the punishment-phase trial.
Mr. Taylor’s testimony thereby demonstrated that he did not make an independent affirmative waiver of jury sentencing when he made the knowing choice to plead guilty. For all these reasons, I believe Mr. Taylor’s death sentence must be set aside and the case sent back for a new punishment-phase jury trial.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 22, 1989, Michael A. Taylor and a companion abducted, raped and murdered Ann Harrison, a 15-year-old high school student. The details of that crime are set out in this Court’s opinion on Mr. Taylor’s prior appeal, Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209.
Mr. Taylor was charged with first-degree murder. On February 8, 1991, he appeared before the Jackson County circuit court and entered a plea of guilty to the murder charge in open court and on the record. At that time, as now, section 565.006.2, RSMo 1986, provided “No defendant who pleads guilty to a homicide offense ... shall be permitted a trial by jury on the issue of the punishment to be imposed, except by agreement of the state.” At the guilty plea hearing, Mr. Taylor was questioned about this legal consequence of his plea:
Q: Do you also understand that if you plead guilty it will be up to the Judge to decide the sentence on all charges?
A: Yes.
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Q: Do you know that by pleading guilty here today that instead of 12 people deciding, there will only be one person deciding [on sentence], this Judge: do you understand that?
A: Yes, I do.
Mr. Taylor reaffirmed his knowledge that a jury would sentence him as a result of his plea a number of additional times and that he pleaded guilty so knowing. Indeed, as this point is undisputed, the only purpose of the majority’s decision to spend pages and pages quoting at length from the transcript to show this statutory waiver must be to emphasize this point just for effect, for nowhere in those many pages is Mr. Taylor told he has a separate constitutional right to jury trial, nor is he asked whether he wishes to waive that right or would do so if he were permitted to plead guilty and also have a jury trial on punishment.
*655This is not surprising because, without question, Missouri statutes prohibited a person such a Mr. Taylor, who said he desired to plead guilty rather than have a jury trial on guilt, from having a jury trial on punishment or the facts necessary to impose punishment. § 565.006.2. As this Court noted on prior appeal of Taylor, this means he had no right to a jury trial on punishment once he waived a jury trial on guilt. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 217-19. Thereafter, the circuit court conducted a punishment phase trial with the court serving as fact-fínder. The circuit court sentenced Mr. Taylor to death after making the factual findings statutorily required to impose that punishment. § 565.030.4.
Mr. Taylor moved for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035 challenging his guilty plea and sentence. He asked to be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and to have a jury trial on guilt and sentencing because the sentencing judge had consumed alcohol at lunch before imposing a death sentence and because of other errors in his sentencing. Because of these allegations, the entire bench of the Jackson County Circuit Court recused itself from the post-conviction litigation and this Court appointed a special judge.
In his post-conviction hearing, Mr. Taylor was asked in detail about whether he had pleaded guilty because he was trying to avoid a jury trial on punishment and he believed a judge might be more lenient. He said this was not the case; that he pleaded guilty because he had confessed, so there was no point to a jury trial; and that he feared a jury would hold his confession against him in the sentencing phase if he first forced the issue of guilt to trial. But he said he was not afraid of a jury and did not know whether a judge or a jury would have been more likely to give him a death sentence, nor did his attorneys discuss this issue with him. His counsel basically confirmed his testimony.
Mr. Taylor’s post-conviction testimony on this issue, in full, is as follows:
Q: In your discussions with your attorneys did you go over the way a jury would look at the evidence against you?
A. No, my attorneys and I went over the possibility of going to trial, which I told them I didn’t want to go to trial.
Q. And you didn’t want to go to trial because your opinion was that this evidence would really make a jury mad?
A. I don’t know what would have made the jury mad. I knew it was a murder, I was confessing that I did it and I didn’t want to go to trial. We didn’t discuss that in a debate.
Q. Did you discuss the likelihood of receiving a death sentence if you went in front of a jury?
A. Yes.
Q. And your opinion as to the likelihood of receiving a death sentence was that it would be very high?
A. I really couldn’t answer that.
Q. Well, did you think that your chances of not getting death were real good in front of a jury?
A. I knew that I didn’t want to go in front of a jury.
Q. And why was that, Mr. Taylor?
A. Because I was admitting to my guilt.
Q. I’m not talking about the issue of guilt, I’m talking about the issue of punishment. Did you want to go in front of a jury for them to decide whether you would live or die?
*656A. Not then but now I do.
Q. And why didn’t you want to then?
A. Because I was admitting my guilt.
Q. Do you understand that under any circumstances no matter what happens in this case nothing can take away that videotaped confession that you’ve admitted to?
A. Yes.
Q. So no matter what happens you have already admitted your guilt, do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. So let me ask you, why is it that you avoided a jury in your decision that you made when you decided to plead in front of Judge Randall? What was it that you were afraid of in front of a jury?
A. It wasn’t that I was afraid, it just didn’t — I preferred not to go to a jury trial.
Q. Did you have any doubt in your mind that a jury would sentence you to death?
A. Did I have any doubt? I didn’t know.
Q. You didn’t have an opinion, is what you’re telling us under oath, as to what a jury would do?
A. I can’t answer that because I’m not the jury. I mean, I would hope that they would understand me accepting — my willingness to admit that I committed this crime and have mercy.
Q. Is the way that you were raised that if you commit a crime and you get caught and you say, “I did it,” that that erases punishment?
A. No, it’s not.
Q. Okay. And your testimony before this Judge is that you don’t recall any discussions with your attorneys about the likelihood of receiving death in front of a jury?
A. No.
Q. You don’t recall and you’re telling us under oath in front of this Judge that you don’t recall any real discussions about the death penalty likelihood at all?
A. We discussed the issues concerning the First Degree Murder charge of life without parole and possibility of the death penalty. But as far as discussing what I probably would get going to a jury, we really didn’t discuss that.
Q. Why did you decide to plead in front of a Judge? Why did you want to plead in front of Judge Meyers?
A. Because of my videotaped statement.
Q. Did you think that the Judge would be more or less likely to give a death penalty than a jury?
A. I really don’t know.
Q. So you just really didn’t know anything about this?
A. Yes, I did. I knew that I was admitting to my guilt.
Q. Well, I think we’ve accepted — everybody’s accepted that you’re guilty of Murder First Degree, Armed Criminal Action, Kidnapping and Rape. The issue is punishment. You had no discussions, no opinion as to the relative benefits between a Judge or jury for punishment, is that what you’re telling us?
A. Yes.'
(emphasis added). As the above complete quotation of Mr. Taylor’s testimony demonstrates, when considered in context, his comments did not imply that he purposely avoided a jury trial of punishment but in *657fact showed that it was a jury trial of guilt he wanted to avoid; he was not even aware that there was an option of a jury trial of punishment.
Mr. Taylor’s counsel confirmed that they had not discussed with him the possibility that he could seek a jury trial of punishment even if he pleaded guilty. Counsel Martin McLain testified that he was unaware that section 565.006 gave the State an option to agree to a jury trial of punishment even if defendant pleaded guilty, and so he never told Mr. Taylor there was a third option to either a complete jury trial or a complete judge trial — pleading guilty and then seeking jury sentencing. Mr. McClain’s “memory was the choice was between the jury and pleading guilty and having the Judge sentence.” Mr. McClain said that he recommended going to trial before Judge Meyers or Judge Randall as he thought Mr. Taylor had a better chance with a judge than with a jury. In particular, Mr. McClain “discussed with Mr. Taylor that [he] believed that the videotaped confession would be very damaging at a guilt phase proceeding.” They concentrated on how a jury would react if he contested guilt and went to trial, and in light of the facts, the publicity, and his confession they thought a “jury would convict him” if he went to trial and that as a consequence “a death sentence was more likely than not.”
Mr. McClain “was concerned with how bad the confession would look to a jury of twelve and how bad it would look that [they] were contesting his guilt when he had made that confession.” Mr. McClain was “not familiar of a case where someone went in and said they were guilty and asked the jury for leniency at any kind of a sentencing proceeding.” Mr. Taylor did not learn from him that there was a chance that he could plead guilty and then ask for jury sentencing.
Co-counsel was Leslie Delk. She, too, confirmed that because “the evidence clearly was not good,” she told Mr. Taylor to plead guilty before Judge Meyers and later Judge Randall. But, while she was aware of section 565.006 due to the post-conviction litigation, she did not discuss with Mr. Taylor that section 565.006 gave a defendant a right to plead guilty and then ask the prosecutor to agree to jury sentencing. She could not say what she would have done had she known of this possibility. Some of the same factors that led her to recommend that Mr. Taylor plead guilty would have led her to recommend judge sentencing. But, there were other factors that favored jury sentencing, particularly Mr. Taylor’s remorse and his family support, which would both be strong mitigators. Ms. Delk failed to discuss any of this with him and testified that she failed in her obligation to advise him of all of his options.
These failures of counsel may be explained by the fact that Ms. Delk was required to leave the public defender system a short time after the guilty plea and before sentencing and only continued representing Mr. Taylor by court appointment, and that prior to the plea, Mr. McClain quit to take another job and was working on the case from Florida, while extremely ill. Both admitted they did not spend the time on the case that they wished. The only other person assigned to the case was a paralegal who had been employed by the public defender system, as her first job, for only six months. None of them discussed with Mr. Taylor an option of pleading guilty and trying punishment to a jury. The judge nonetheless denied post-conviction relief.
Mr. Taylor then brought to this Court a consolidated appeal challenging the guilty plea, the imposition of the death penalty and the overruling of the Rule 24.035 mo*658tion for post-conviction relief. On June 29, 1993, after the appeal had been briefed and argued, this Court did not issue an opinion considering the merits of any of these rulings but rather issued its order vacating the judgment below, stating: “Judgment vacated. Cause remanded for new penalty hearing, imposition of sentence, and entry of new judgment.”
On remand, a new trial judge was assigned to hear the retrial of the punishment phase. Thereafter, on January 11, 1994, Mr. Taylor again filed a motion in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea. This motion again was overruled. Mr. Taylor also requested that a jury be the fact-finder in the punishment phase trial, but the request was denied. Mr. Taylor’s second punishment phase trial began May 2, 1994. Following the trial, the trial court made oral and written findings that the state had proved six statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt as well as three non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The judge found the existence of one mitigating cir-. cumstance, rejecting several others offered by Mr. Taylor, and found that the mitigating circumstance did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The judge then concluded that the aggravating circumstances warranted a death sentence.2
In September 1994, Mr. Taylor filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035, challenging his guilty plea and challenging his second sentencing proceeding and sentence of death. The circuit court overruled the motion in an order accompanied with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Mr. Taylor then brought a consolidated appeal limited to this Court’s mandatory proportionality review, § 565.035.5, RSMo 1994, and review of the overruling of the motion to withdraw plea and the denial of post-conviction relief. This Court affirmed in Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209. This Court there rejected Mr. Taylor’s argument that he had a right to but was denied a jury trial on the issue of punishment on remand. In so doing, this Court stated that “where a defendant previously had a right to have a jury impose sentence, section 565.035.5(3) does allow ‘a new jury’ to be selected for purposes of imposing sentence.” Id. at 219. But, “section 565.035.5(3) does not provide a defendant a right to a jury trial on the imposition of sentence where such a right did not exist prior to remand.”3 Id.
Taylor therefore made the propriety of allowing a judge rather than a jury determine the facts necessary for punishment at Mr. Taylor’s second trial dependent on whether Mr. Taylor had a right to have a jury conduct sentencing fact-finding at the time of his initial trial. Taylor stated that under the United States Supreme Court’s *659decision in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), a “ ‘defendant has no constitutional right to have a jury assess punishment.’ ” Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 219, quoting, State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Mo. banc 1992) (emphasis added). Therefore, if Mr. Taylor had a right to a jury trial on punishment, it would have to be based on Missouri statutes. But, Taylor held, it is “obvious from the language of’ section 565.006.2 that a defendant who pleads guilty has no statutory right to jury sentencing. Therefore:
jury sentencing after a guilty plea is not a right for the defendant to waive, rather a privilege for the State to grant. Taylor did not waive sentencing by a jury because he could only obtain jury sentencing if the State agreed to it. The State did not agree. Therefore, there was nothing of which to inform him.
Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 217 (emphasis added). Taylor concluded that “section 565.035.5(3) does not entitle Taylor to ‘a new jury1 for imposition of punishment because he never obtained nor possessed the right to a jury for imposition of punishment prior to this Court’s remand order.” Id. at 219. This Court affirmed Taylor’s death sentence. Id.
Mr. Taylor now petitions for habeas relief arguing that, under cases decided since this Court denied his appeal and motion for post-conviction relief, he is entitled to have his death sentence set aside and to have a sentence of life imprisonment imposed or, alternatively, is entitled to a jury trial on punishment. The majority rejects Mr. Taylor’s habeas claim, concluding, inter alia, that Mr. Taylor purposefully waived his retroactive right to jury determination of the facts necessary to impose death. For the reasons discussed below, I disagree.
II. MR. TAYLOR IS ENTITLED TO HABEAS RELIEF
A. Defendants Who Plead Guilty Have a Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Factr-Finding Necessary to Impose Death
Mr. Taylor contends that he is entitled to habeas relief under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring and Blakely. These decisions were handed down by the United States Supreme Court only after Mr. Taylor’s death sentence was affirmed by this Court in State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209 (1996). These cases, he argues, rejected this Court’s stated premise in Taylor that a “defendant has no constitutional right to have a jury assess punishment,” 929 S.W.2d at 219. I agree.
Apprendi held that under the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, any fact, except the fact of prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the maximum allowed by the facts found by the jury also must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Ring made clear that in a capital case this means, “Capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.” 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact — no matter how the State labels it — must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The only exception is when the increase is conditioned on the existence of prior convictions; those findings need not be made by the jury. Id. at 597 n. 4, 600, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
*660In reaching its holding in Ring, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Edüd 511 (1990), which had held that there is no Sixth Amendment violation where a judge finds an aggravating factor because aggravating factors are mere sentencing considerations, not “element[s] of the offense of capital murder.”
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Ring in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). It clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding as to punishment is separate from the right to a jury trial on guilt, and, although a particular defendant is free to choose not to take advantage of that right, as when that defendant makes a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of that constitutional right, otherwise the right to a jury determination of punishment applies even if a defendant has pleaded guilty, because the right to jury fact-finding “is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531.
A year after Ring, this Court set aside Joseph Whitfield’s death sentence (which it had affirmed on appeal before Ring was decided) “because the judge rather than the jury made the factual determinations on which his eligibility for the death sen-fence was predicated.” 107 S.W.3d at 256. The judge had determined the factual issues necessary for imposition of the death penalty in Whitfield because after finding Mr. Whitfield guilty of first-degree murder, the jury was unable to reach a verdict in the punishment phase. In the punishment phase, the jury was required to impose a life sentence unless it made three specific findings beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) at least one statutory aggravating factor was present in the defendant’s case; (2) the aggravating evidence “warrant[ed] imposing the death sentence”; and (3) any mitigating evidence was not “sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation of punishment found by the trier.”4 § 565.030.4, RSMo 1994. As the Whitfield jury was unable to agree on punishment, the trial judge conducted the section 565.030.4 step-by-step analysis and imposed the death penalty. In this way, the judge rather than the jury found the essential facts under section 565.030.4 to impose death.
This was error for, as this Court specifically held in affirming Mr. Whitfield’s initial appeal in 1992, State v. Whitfield, 837 S.WÜd 503, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1992), steps 1, 2 and 3 of the statute set out required factual findings the jury must make to impose death. In the absence of any one of these findings, the jury must impose life. As such, the statute gives no discretion to *661the jury — it must impose a life sentence unless it makes each of these factual findings in favor of the state. Id. For this reason, in its 2003 Whitfield decision, this Court held it “clearly violated the requirement of Ring that the jury rather than the judge determine the facts on which the death penalty is based.” Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 262; accord, People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 496 (Colo.2007) (“in the death penalty context, the facts essential to punishment that fall under the Apprendi-Ring-Blakely rule consist of those facts needed to make a death penalty determination,” including finding aggravating circumstances, finding mitigating circumstances, and weighing all of these circumstances).
Whitfield then observed that the burden shifted to the State to show that the Ring error was harmless and that the State could not carry its burden because there was no way to know, based on the jury deadlock, whether the jury’s impasse came at step 2 or 3, which Ring requires a jury to find, or if it came at the point where the jury considers whether to give mercy under section 565.030.4(4) — a determination that a judge may make. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 262-64.
B. Ring Applies Retroactively
Whitfield also determined that the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all the facts necessary to impose punishment recognized in Apprendi, Ring and Blakely would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review under the three-part Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity analysis long used in Missouri. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 266, 268, citing, Spidle v. State, 446 S.W.2d 793 (Mo.1969); State v. Ussery, 452 S.W.2d 146 (Mo.1970); McCulley v. State, 486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.1972).5
Missouri’s Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity analysis requires a court to determine retroactivity by considering: “(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.” Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268. Whitfield held that consideration of the three Linkletter-Stovall factors required retroactive application of the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury rather than a judge determine the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty. In so doing, Whitfield noted that “the purpose to be served by the rule set out in Ring is to ensure a jury of defendant’s peers finds each of the factual elements necessary to his conviction and sentence of death.” Id.
*662Whitfield also noted that the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule was small and the effect on the administration of justice of applying the new rule would be minimal, as the number of affected cases would be small, because “in Missouri juries have always made the decision whether to impose the death penalty except in those few cases in which the jury was unable to reach a verdict.” Id. Whitfield itself identified five such cases in addition to Whitfield but recognized that a small number of other similar cases might later be identified and that the retroactivity analysis necessarily also would be applied to them. Id. at 269.
In the ensuing years, a number of additional cases, some pending and some no longer pending or on collateral review, have been identified in which a judge rather than a jury found the facts necessary to impose punishment. The Apprendi-Ring-Blakely analysis has been applied to each of them, as required by Whitfield. As this Court described the principle in applying Whitfield in State ex rel. Baker v. Kendrick, 136 S.W.Sd 491 (Mo. banc 2004), which was pending at the time that Whitfield was decided:
Because this case was tried after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the princi-plés set out in Ring must be applied to it. As stated in Whitfield, this means that, where, as here, the jury was unable to agree on punishment and the record fails to show that the jury found all facts necessary to impose a sentence of death, the trial court’s only authority was to enter a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of probation or parole.
Id. at 491.6
Mr. Taylor correctly notes that he presents yet another of these cases in which a judge rather than a jury determined the facts necessary to impose a death sentence and that he too is entitled under Appren-di-Ring-Blakely-Whitfield to have his death sentence set aside. He argues that, having determined in Whitfield that the right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to punishment applies retroactively, the state cannot pick and choose to which defendants or in which fact situations that right will be retroactively applied without violating equal protection principles.
I agree. Indeed, the state concedes in its brief that “[tjhere is no dispute that Ring ... applies retroactively to Missouri cases under State v. Whitfield ...”. The reason for this concession is evident. While in his case a jury deadlock was not *663the reason that a judge imposed punishment, Ring and its progeny were not based on jury deadlock. In fact, Ring itself did not involve a jury deadlock. Rather, it involved a jury verdict of guilt, but the judge then found additional facts that justified an increase in punishment over that which would have been authorized by the charge submitted to the jury. It was this additional fact-finding that Ring found improper. 536 U.S. at 592-93, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Likewise, neither Appren-di nor Blakely involved a deadlocked jury — the defendants in both of those cases first pleaded guilty and thereafter sentences were imposed based on judge-found facts. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300-01, 124 S.Ct. 2531.
Therefore, it is settled that the Sixth Amendment right is to have a jury determine the facts necessary to impose punishment, whatever the context in which that right was denied. In Whitfield and the other Missouri cases that the courts have considered to date, that context was a jury deadlock resulting in judge sentencing.7 Whitfield held that it would not deviate from Missouri’s traditional Linkletter-Sto-vall test for retroactivity and that under that test the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to impose punishment applied retroactively to those whose sentence had been imposed based on facts found by a judge. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268.
The majority argues that the above ret-roactivity analysis is irrelevant because the facts of this case are different, in that Mr. Taylor did not get sentenced to death after the jury was unable to agree on punishment but instead pleaded guilty without knowing he had a right to a jury trial on the facts necessary to impose death. While this factual distinction is present, it does not affect the retroactivity analysis, for in all legally relevant respects, Mr. Taylor is in the same position, in that he was denied a jury trial of the facts underlying punishment in violation of Apprendi-Ring-Blakely, just as in Whitfield and the other cases cited.
Having chosen in Whitfield to retroactively apply the right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to punishment, this Court must do so uniformly to all similarly situated persons:
It is the general doctrine that the law, relative to those who may be charged and convicted of crime, as well as the punishment to be inflicted therefore, shall operate equally upon every citizen or inhabitant of this state.”
State v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 S.W.2d 319, 325 (1938). O’Malley held it unconstitutional to allow ballot records to be preserved and used against those committing fraud in cities of .more than 100,000 inhabitants for a longer period than against those committing fraud in smaller communities, stating:
Every one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, but would be such an arbitrary mandate as *664is not within the province of free governments.
Id.
Similarly, in State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. banc 1975), this Court held that a statute that mandated consecutive sentences for defendants convicted of two crimes, but did so only if they had not yet been sentenced for either crime, violated equal protection because the chronological order in which they were sentenced was immaterial to the reasons why a consecutive sentence might be appropriate. For this reason, for equal protection purposes, they were similarly situated and must be similarly treated, for “Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.” Id. at 129.
As noted in Smith v. State, 680 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Mo.App.1984), citing State v. Brown, 554 S.W.2d 574 (Mo.App.1977), “[sjubsequent cases applied Baker retroactively and required that all defendants sentenced under its guidelines must be resen-tenced.” See also State v. Davis, 765 S.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Mo. banc 1989) (equal protection requires equal treatment of those similarly situated and discrimination based “upon a ground wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the legislative objective” violates equal protection principles).
To allow defendants who plead guilty, such as Mr. Taylor, to be singled out and deprived of the right to jury determination of the facts on which punishment is based runs afoul of this basic principle of equal treatment. As the Ninth Circuit has stated the point in holding that the California Supreme Court would violate the equal protection clause if it gave one class of persons but not another the benefit of retroactive application of its rule providing defendants a right to an impartial jury:
The equal protection clause prohibits a state from affording one person (other than the litigant whose case is the vehicle for the promulgation of a new rule) the retroactive benefit of a ruling on a state constitution’s right to an impartial jury while denying it to another.
Myers v. Ylst, 897 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1990).
Similarly in LaRue v. McCarthy, 833 F.2d 140 (9th Cir.1987), the Ninth Circuit held that California could not pick and chose those to whom it would retroactively apply a rule that prohibited basing felony murder charges on child abuse. Rather, the state must apply its rule retroactively in all cases or in none because “once a state has established a rule it must be applied evenhandedly.” Id. at 142, citing, Johnson v. Arizona, 462 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.1972). Johnson had held that Arizona could not apply a decision striking down determinant sentences retroactively in some cases but not all without violating equal protection principles. Id. at 1354.
Other courts ai'e in accord. Hill v. Roberts, 793 F.Supp. 1044 (D.Ks.1992), stated that a state is free to choose whether to apply many constitutional rules retroactively. But, it said:
The equal protection clause clearly prohibits a state from affording one person the retroactive benefit of a ruling and denying it to another who is similarly situated.
Id. at 1046. To the contrary, “once a state establishes a new rule, it must be applied evenhandedly.” Id. Hill found that the state had applied its new rule only to pending cases and, therefore, had not violated the equal protection clause.
Here, unlike in Hill, this Court has applied its new rule retroactively to cases that were not pending at the time of the new rule. It cannot now choose not to *665apply it retroactively to some but not other cases in which that Sixth Amendment right was violated. While the particular reasons that Mr. Taylor and Mr. Whitfield were denied jury sentencing — a guilty plea as opposed to a hung jury — may be different, they are similarly situated insofar as the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the facts on which punishment is based is concerned.
Apprendi, Ring, Blakely and Whitfield all involved very different fact situations, but all reached the same result because, in the only relevant respect, all were identical — in each the defendant was denied a jury determination of the facts necessary for punishment. Ring states that allowing a judge rather than a jury to find the facts necessary to impose death violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Blakely says that this principle extends to situations in which a defendant has pleaded guilty. Even in the case of a plea agreement, therefore, the state cannot violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial on all facts necessary to impose a sentence.
Here, Mr. Taylor did not receive a jury trial on punishment, although he had a right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose the death penalty. As this Court noted on the prior appeal of this case in discussing the statutory right to jury trial, where “a defendant previously had a right to have a jury impose sentence, section 565.035.5(3) does allow ‘a new jury’ to be selected for purposes of imposing sentence.” Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 219. Mr. Taylor was denied this right here.
C. Mr. Taylor Did Not Waive A Right to Have a Jury Determine the Facts Necessary to Punishment By Pleading Guilty
The State does not disagree that Ring and Whitfield would apply retroactively here if Mr. Taylor had asked for but been denied a jury trial on the facts necessary to impose punishment. It instead bases its position that Mr. Taylor’s death sentence should not be set aside on the assertion that Mr. Taylor waived any statutory right to jury sentencing by pleading guilty in 1991 and that in doing so he should be held also to have waived any constitutional right to jury sentencing. For this reason, the majority quotes at length from the guilty plea hearing transcript to show Mr. Taylor knew that by pleading guilty he would not receive a jury trial on the facts necessary to impose punishment. That issue is not in doubt; however, it simply is not the relevant question.
I agree with the. State that a defendant may choose to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose a sentence, just as a defendant may choose to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial on guilt. This legal issue is not controverted by any party, nor could it be. Further, nothing has been cited that requires a trial court to accept a guilty plea; therefore, there is nothing that appears to prohibit a court from refusing to accept such a plea from a defendant who has demanded jury sentencing.
But, in Mr. Taylor’s case, a jury trial on punishment was not denied based on an affirmative knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of Mr. Taylor’s Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding. Neither did the trial court refuse to accept Mr. Taylor’s guilty plea because Mr. Taylor wanted a jury trial on the facts on which punishment would be based. To the contrary, Mr. Taylor was denied a jury trial solely based on the fact that section 565.006.2 barred him from being allowed a jury trial on punishment because he pleaded guilty.
*666Mr. Taylor agrees that he acknowledged his awareness that this was the effect of section 565.006.2 and, so, that by pleading guilty he knew he would try the punishment phase before a judge, not a jury. His counsel also knew this was the effect of his plea.
But, Mr. Taylor says, he did not agree to legally waive any such right, for there was no statutory right under section 565.006.2 for him to waive. And, even were there such a right, he did not and could not have waived his constitutional right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose the sentence. This is because, contrary to the state’s unsupported opposing argument, and as Taylor itself expressly recognized, no such Sixth Amendment right had been recognized at the time of his plea. 929 S.W.2d at 219. As Taylor noted in regard to the statutory right to a jury trial, Mr. Taylor could not waive a right he did not have. Id. Moreover, the transcript of the post-conviction motion hearing makes it clear that his counsel did not inform him that he could have a jury trial of punishment if he pleaded guilty, for they did not believe this legally was allowed.
After this Court’s ruling in Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants do have an independent, Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding as to any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the maximum a judge may impose based solely on the facts admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. But, the concept set out in Taylor that one cannot waive a right that does not exist or has not been recognized is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s approach to the concept of waiver in other cases in which it has been alleged that a defendant had waived a constitutional right by pleading guilty.
Waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a knoum right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (emphasis added). A waiver of a constitutional right must be made “knowingly and intelligently.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Courts are to “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019. “The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent and sufficiently aware if the defendant understands the nature of the right and how it would apply in general in the circumstances ... ”. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 91, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004).
The State says that by acknowledging he would not receive a jury trial on punishment if he pleaded guilty, he waived the as yet unknown constitutional right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to punishment as well, even though he was not aware of its existence. But, the State cites no law saying that one can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily relinquish a right that has not yet been established.
Two United States Supreme Court cases are directly on point, however, and state that such a waiver is not permissible. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 89 S.Ct. 277, 21 L.Ed.2d 246 (1968), involving a state prisoner’s right to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for federal habeas corpus, rejects a very similar argument. At the time the petitioner first sought federal habeas corpus in 1961, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953), was the controlling law. Under it, the district court believed that the petitioner had no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on the federal habeas petition. Petitioner’s counsel agreed, stating that they did not need one anyway. After the decision in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. *667293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), expanded the right of habeas petitioners to an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner again sought habeas relief: The federal court of appeals held that his attorney had waived petitioner’s right to an evidentiary hearing in the 1961 proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the fact that counsel said he was not sure whether there was a right to such a hearing but that he relinquished it did not constitute a waiver, for:
Whatever counsel’s reasons for this obscure gesture of noblesse oblige, we cannot now ... presume that he intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461), when the right or privilege was of doubtful existence at the time of the supposed waiver.
Yeager, 393 U.S. at 125, 89 S.Ct. 277 (emphasis added). The majority’s attempt to distinguish Yeager on the basis that here it was definitely known that there was no statutory right confuses the very point at issue here — that everyone believed there was no parallel constitutional right, indeed Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), specifically had so held, and therefore that right could not have been waived even if the statutory right was waived.
This is the very concept underlying the Supreme Court’s recent reaffirmation of the principle that one cannot waive a future right not yet recognized in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005). Halbert noted that the governing Michigan law provided that an accused who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere could appeal by leave of the court only and that, in most circumstances, counsel would not be provided to assist indigents in applying for leave to appeal. The petitioner pleaded nolo contendere and was denied appointment of counsel to assist him in applying for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id. at 614, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Halbert rejected Michigan’s argument that it was not required to provide counsel for indigents who were seeking leave to appeal, holding that the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas; who seek access to first-tier discretionary appellate review.
The state of Michigan alternatively contended that even if there were a constitutional right to have counsel appointed to represent defendant when he sought leave to appeal, the petitioner in Halbert necessarily waived that right because he knew that a Michigan statute provided that a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo con-tendere will not receive the assistance of counsel in applying for discretionary appeal. Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.3a (West 2000). Therefore, by pleading nolo contendere, he had to know that the statute would deny him a right to court-appointed counsel. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582.
The Halbert majority rejected Michigan’s argument. The court held that Mr. Halbert could not have waived his constitutional right to .appeal because, “[a]t the time he entered his plea, Halbert, in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed appellate counsel he could elect to forgo.” Id. (six-person majority, including Justice Kennedy).
In so holding, Halbert rejected the argument by Justice Thomas in dissent that assuming Mr. Halbert did have a statutory right to counsel on appeal, he waived it when he decided to plead guilty with knowledge that the consequence likely would be that he would not get counsel on appeal. Id. at 637-43, 125 S.Ct. 2582 *668(Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, as even Justice Thomas recognized, “Whether Michigan law provides for such counsel says nothing about whether a defendant possesses (and hence can waive) a federal constitutional right to that effect. That Michigan, as a matter of state law, prohibited Halbert from receiving appointed appellate counsel if he pleaded guilty or no contest, is irrelevant to whether Halbert had (and could waive) an independent federal constitutional right to such counsel.” Id. at 640,125 S.Ct. 2582.
The parallel to Mr. Taylor’s case is remarkable. When Mr. Taylor entered his plea, there was no recognized Sixth Amendment right to have a jury make the factual findings on which a death sentence was based. Indeed the question was not even unsettled in 1991; in the death penalty context, the holding of Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) — that the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to find the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose death — had established that no such right existed.
Just as in Yeager and Halbert, Mr. Taylor could not have waived his right to jury fact-finding for (borrowing from the language used in Halbert) “at the time he entered his plea, [Taylor], in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to [a jury determination of the facts relating to punishment] he could elect to forego.” Halbert, 545 U.S. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. While as the majority opinion notes, Mr. Halbert also was not informed that he definitely would be denied counsel on appeal, review of Halbert leaves no doubt that this was not the paramount basis of the Supreme Court’s decision, which turned on whether one can waive a right one does not have, not lack of knowledge of the consequences, as the Halbert dissent makes clear. Id. at 612-14, 623,125 S.Ct. 2582.
Colorado faced a very similar issue in People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007). There, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. In Colorado, as in Missouri, a capital defendant who pleads guilty is denied the right to a jury trial on punishment. 18-1.3-1201(l)(a) C.R.S.2006. Accordingly, the punishment phase trial was held before the judge, who imposed the death penalty. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, stating, “While a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial on sentencing facts, this waiver must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” 157 P.3d at 492. The court found that to the extent that the Colorado statute prohibited a jury trial on punishment solely based on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty, it therefore violated the Sixth Amendment because the statute “fails to effect a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, as the waiver is automatic when a defendant pleads guilty.” Id. In other words, the statute could not constitutionally link the waiver of a jury trial on punishment to the waiver of a jury trial on guilt because that would make such a waiver automatic. While a defendant may waive jury fact-finding during the punishment phase, Blakely requires that waiver to be knowingly, intelligently and separately waived. Id.
The only relevant case cited by the state to the contrary is State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 806-809 (S.D.2006).8 In that *669case, the South Dakota Supreme Court interpreted its death penalty procedure statute as providing for a sentencing hearing at which a jury determines the presence or absence of alleged aggravating factors when a defendant pleads guilty. Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 804. Piper noted that before finding the aggravating factors necessary to impose death, “the [trial] court properly presented Piper with the option of exercising his right to sentencing by a jury as provided by South Dakota’s capital punishment statutory scheme.” Id. at 806. The majority in Piper held that although the Ring right to a jury finding of aggravating factors had not yet been established at the time of the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the defendant had “specifically asked to be sentenced by the circuit court, thereby waiving his constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the alleged aggravating circumstances in his case existed beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Piper, then, is distinguishable from this case because Mr. Taylor never specifically requested that a judge be the fact-finder at his punishment trial; indeed, when his sentencing phase was held after remand in 1994, Mr. Taylor specifically asked for a jury, not a judge. Moreover, at no point did the trial court present Mr. Taylor with the option to have a jury. Instead, by operation of section 565.006.2, the fact-finders at both of Mr. Taylor’s penalty phase trials were judges.
Much more persuasive and relevant is the dissenting opinion in Piper, which adopted the approach taken by this Court in Taylor, stating, “the waiver of a substantive right presupposes the existence of the right in the first place. The language of the statute expressly limits the fact-finding role to the judge in non-jury cases ... the judges ... had no authority to offer jury sentencing.” 709 N.W.2d at 821. The dissenting judge concluded that in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that there is a constitutional right to jury fact-finding, because the required factual findings were not admitted by the defendant or found by a jury, the death sentence imposed by the judge was in violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 822.
The principles set out in Yeager, Halbert and Montour are directly applicable here. Mr. Taylor could not waive a right to punishment-phase jury fact-finding that he did not have. The waiver argument made by the State and accepted by the majority is without merit.
D. Law of the Case Is an Alternative Bar to the State’s Waiver Argument
Even were Halbert not a bar to holding that Mr. Taylor could waive an as yet unrecognized constitutional right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to punishment, the law of the case doctrine bars the state from making such an argument as to Mr. Taylor. This Court already has held that Mr. Taylor did not waive any such right, for he had no right to waive, based on either a statute or the constitution. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 217, 218-219. This Court also has held that where, as here, it is shown that the defendant did have a right to a jury trial prior to reversal and remand for re-sentencing, then “section 565.035.5(3) does allow ‘a *670new jur/ to be selected for purposes of imposing sentence.” Id. at 219.
The majority implicitly argues that law of the case does not apply here because the holding in Mr. Taylor’s first appeal was made in the context of rejecting Mr. Taylor’s argument that his rights were violated when he was not told that he could have jury sentencing if the state agreed to it. But, that is the point, of course. To reject Mr. Taylor’s argument, this Court held that Mr. Taylor never had a right to jury sentencing under Missouri statutes in the first place and, therefore, he had no right he could waive. Now that Mr. Taylor embraces this holding, the majority would have this Court takes the opposite view, stating that he could and did waive his right to jury trial. But, the legal point is the same — there was no right, so there was no waiver. The courts cannot alternate between recognizing and not recognizing such a right depending on the issue before it and the consequences of such recognition. There cannot be “no right to waive” when addressing whether counsel failed to inform him of his rights but then “a right to waive” when the question changes to did he chose to waive unrecognized rights. The majority certainly cites no authority to support its conclusion that there is no inconsistency in its holding simply because it was made in response to a different factual question, when the basis of decision — whether factually there was a waiver — is the same.
Under Missouri authority, the holding that Mr. Taylor did not waive a jury determination of punishment is law of the case. The law of the case doctrine is a neutral principle that can inure to the benefit of either the defendant or the State. Compare State v. Graham, 13 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Mo. banc 2000); Ex Parte Calvin, 689 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (both applying law of the case principles to defendant’s benefit); with Smulls v. State, 71 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Mo. banc 2002); State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 545 (Mo. banc 2010) (both applying law of the case principles to state’s benefit).
Of course, there are exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. Appellate courts will not apply the law of the case doctrine if “the first decision was based on a mistaken fact or resulted in manifest injustice or where a change in the law intervened between the appeals.” Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 545, citing Walton v. City of Berkeley, 223 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Mo. banc 2007); accord, Cross v. State, 37 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Mo.App.2000) (refusing to apply law of case to preclude defendant from raising issue where law changed between first and second appeals). Similarly, a court will not apply the law of the case doctrine if it is “determine^] that a new rule with retroactive effect contradicts the law of the case.” Bejarano v. State, 122 Nev. 1066, 146 P.3d 265, 271 (2006); accord, Tippins v. State, 780 So.2d 147, 148 (Fl.App.2001) (court would not apply law of the case because law had changed and sentence was in excess of that allowed by law, making exception for manifest injustice applicable).
In Mr. Taylor’s case, however, as noted, these exceptions work in his favor. The only change in the law has been to his benefit — the United States Supreme Court has recognized he had a Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding on the issue of punishment, not just on guilt, and Whitfield has recognized that this right applies retroactively in Missouri. For these reasons, the State is precluded from claiming that Taylor waived the right to jury sentencing at his guilty plea hearing. Under the doctrine of the law of the case, the issue has already been decided; there was no waiver.
*671 E. Mr. Taylor Did not Affirmatively Waive Jury Determination of Sentencing as a Factual Matter.
For all of the above reasons, Mr. Taylor could not legally be held to have waived a constitutional right to jury trial that was not yet recognized, and even could he do so, this Court’s prior holding that there was no such waiver is law of the case.
Even were it correct to review Mr. Taylor’s prior statements to see whether he affirmatively stated he knowingly waived a right to jury trial of the facts necessary to punishment, he did not do so. The guilty plea hearing transcript shows without question that he wanted to plead guilty and that he knew that by doing so he would not have a right to a jury trial on punishment. It uses the word “waiver” only once, and only in the context of acknowledging that because he wanted to plead guilty, he knew he therefore would not be getting a jury trial. Of course, at that time, as discussed, he had no constitutional right to a jury trial on punishment once he pleaded guilty, so this was just a statement of fact. He never said that he independently desired that a jury not be permitted to determine the facts necessary to punishment.
The state and the majority try to fill this gap by citing to testimony made by Mr. Taylor in his first post-conviction hearing, discussed in detail above. Of course, the relevant question is not what Mr. Taylor retroactively might have said he previously thought or would have thought had he been offered a right to a jury trial on punishment, but whether he in fact was offered one and waived it at the time of his guilty plea. He was not and did not.
Even more basically, assuming Mr. Taylor’s statements in his post-conviction proceeding about his statutory right to jury trial were the relevant issue, the transcript does not contain the admissions claimed by the State as to waiver. In context, Mr. Taylor clearly states that he wanted to plead guilty because he already had confessed and believed that a trial on guilt made little sense in light of his confession. When the prosecutor asked, “So let me ask you, why is it that you avoided a jury in your decision that you made when you decided to plead in front of Judge Randall? What was it that you were afraid of in front of a jury,” the exchange proceeded as follows:
A. It wasn’t that I was afraid, it just didn’t — I preferred not to go to a jury trial.
Q. Did you have any doubt in your mind that a jury would sentence you to death?
A. Did I have any doubt? I didn’t know.
Q. You didn’t have an opinion, is what you’re telling us under oath, as to what a jury would do?
A. I can’t answer that because I’m not the jury. I mean, I would hope that they would understand me accepting — my willingness to admit that I committed this crime and have mercy-
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Q. Okay. And your testimony before this Judge is that you don’t recall any discussions with your attorneys about the likelihood of receiving death in front of a jury?
A. No.
Q. You don’t recall and you’re telling us under oath in front of this Judge that you don’t recall any real discussions about the death penalty likelihood at all?
A. We discussed the issues concerning the First Degree Murder charge of life without parole and possibility of the death penalty. But as far as *672discussing what I probably would get going to a jury, we really didn’t discuss that.
Q. Why did you decide to plead in front of a Judge? Why did you want to plead in front of Judge Meyers?
A. Because of my videotaped statement.
Did you think that the Judge would be more or less likely to give a death penalty than a jury? O’
I really don’t know. <¡
... You had no discussions, no opinion as to the relative benefits between a Judge or jury for punishment, is that what you’re telling us? O
Yes.
Mr. Taylor does not say he pleaded guilty to waive a jury determination of punishment, as the state contends was the case. Rather, he said that he did not initially want to go to trial before a jury because he had confessed so there was no point to a trial of his guilt and that his counsel did not discuss with him whether a judge or jury would provide him with a better chance for avoiding the death penalty — such a discussion would have been pointless, of course, as he had no opportunity to have a jury trial of punishment once he decided to plead guilty. He did not know which trier of fact would have given him a better chance at avoiding death sentence; that question did not come up and was not an issue his counsel discussed with him because a jury trial of punishment was not an option once he decided to plead guilty.
Counsel confirmed that they did not discuss with Mr. Taylor whether it would be better to have a judge or jury decide the sentence he should receive once he pleaded guilty. Certainly they believed and advised him that he should plead guilty, but it was because, as Mr. McClain testified, he “believed that the videotaped confession would be very damaging at a guilt phase proceeding” and, thus, a trial of the guilt issues before a jury might look like Mr. Taylor was trying to back out of his admissions, which likely would inflame the fact-finder. Mr. McClain testified that he “was concerned with how bad the confession would look to a jury of twelve and how bad it would look that [they] were contesting his guilt when he had made that confession.” Mr. McClain was not aware whether a defendant could go to trial before a jury but then confess guilt, he had never heard of such a possibility and did not consider it or discuss it with Mr. Taylor. Mr. McClain testified that his “memory was the choice was between the jury and pleading guilty and having the Judge sentence.”
Had she thought there was a choice of whether to try punishment to a judge or jury, Ms. Delk testified that she was not sure what she would have recommended, for she saw benefits and detriments to each approach. A judge might better understand Mr. Taylor’s criminal history, but according to Ms. Delk factors that may have made a jury favorable were “the remorse that [Mr. Taylor] felt” as well as “the family situation, the family support, that type of mitigation I think would also go well to a jury.” Because Missouri law did not permit a jury trial of punishment where defendant pleaded guilty, however, once Mr. Taylor took counsel’s advice to plead guilty, Ms. Delk testified that she did not discuss with him these factors tending toward jury sentencing after a plea. Ms. Delk admitted that in this regard she failed in her duty to inform him of all his options.
Far from providing evidence of waiver, the testimony from the original PCR hearing confirms that Mr. Taylor did not waive *673the right to have a jury determination of the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty.
Ill CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, Mr. Taylor’s death sentence is in excess of that authorized by law in that it was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment as it was based upon facts found by a judge, not a jury. I agree with the majority that this right can be knowingly and intelligently waived, but because there was no valid waiver in this case, I believe that Mr. Taylor is entitled to habeas relief and that the death sentence imposed should be vacated.
. In that testimony, Mr. Taylor stated that his counsel did not discuss with him whether it would be better to have a judge or jury determine punishment. Mr. Taylor and his counsel all believed that if he waived a jury trial of guilt, as they all agreed he should do in light of his confession, then he automatically lost the right to a jury trial on punishment.
. Mr. Taylor also received consecutive terms of 50 years for armed criminal action, 15 years for kidnapping and life imprisonment for rape.
. Section 565.035.5(3), RSMo 2000 (emphasis added), states:
5. The supreme court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration. In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the supreme court, with regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to:
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(3) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for retrial of the punishment hearing. A new jury shall be selected or a jury may be waived by agreement of both parties and then the punishment trial shall proceed in accordance with this chapter, with the exception that the evidence of the guilty verdict shall be admissible in the new trial together with the official transcript of any testimony and evidence properly admitted in each stage of the original trial where relevant to determine punishment.
. Even if the jury made these three specific findings, it could decide to recommend a life sentence if it "decide[d] under all the circumstances not to assess and declare the punishment of death.” § 565.030.4(4), RSMo 1994. The jury’s discretion to exercise mercy pursuant to section 565.030.4(4) is not considered a "fact” that a jury must find under Ring. Section 565.030.4, originally contained in RSMo 1986, was amended, mostly cosmetically, in 1993. 1993 H.B. 562. This is the version of the statute at issue in Mr. Taylor’s case. Section 565.030.4 was amended once more in 2001, 2001 S.B. 267, this is the version of the statute that is presently in effect. 565.030.4, RSMo Supp.2010. The penalty phase procedure under the current version of section 565.030.4 still calls for the fact-finder to find at least one statutory ag-gravator and to decide whether the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence (it also retains the section 565.030.4(4) mercy provision) but it added a requirement to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded and abolished the jury’s obligation to decide whether the aggravating factor or factors warrant imposing the death sentence. Id.
. In Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), the United States Supreme Court cited with approval Whitfield's statement that Missouri could adhere to Linkletter-Stovall, holding that "the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed 'nonretroactive' under Teague." 552 U.S. at 282, 128 S.Ct. 1029. Danforth noted that both before and after Teague commentators had advanced "the proposition that state courts may apply new constitutional standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this Court’s decision not to apply the standards retroactively." Id. at 277 n. 14, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotations and alterations omitted), citing Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 Val. U.L.Rev. 421, 443 (2004). The Supreme Court concluded, "It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity ... was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions — not to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State's convictions.” 552 U.S. at 280-81, 128 S.Ct. 1029.
. Accord, State ex rel. Mayes v. Wiggins, 150 S.W.3d 290, 291-92 (Mo. banc 2004) (again ordering judge in pending case in which jury deadlocked that Whitfield required imposition of life sentence); State v. Thompson, 134 S.W.3d 32, 33 (Mo. banc 2004) (mandate recalled and court ordered to impose sentence of life imprisonment after jury deadlocked, in light of Ring and Whitfield). In addition to these cases, Whitfield has been applied to order a judge to impose a life sentence in cases no longer pending or on review in State v. Buchanan, 115 S.W.3d 841, 842 (Mo. banc 2003) (stating defendant “correctly claims that a jury rather than a judge is required to determine each fact on which the legislature conditioned an increase in the maximum punishment”), State ex rel. Lyons v. Lombardi, 303 S.W.3d 523, 525 n. 2 (Mo. banc 2010) (noting that death sentence for Lyons had been set aside in August 2007 because "the jury failed to set out findings necessary to impose death”), as well as in Ervin v. Purkett, 2007 WL 2782332, at *7 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 21, 2007); Richardson v. State, No. 76059, Order Recalling Mandate and Setting Aside Death Sentence (Oct. 29, 2003); Morrow v. State, No. 79112, Order Recalling Mandate and Setting Aside Death Sentence (Oct. 29, 2003); Smith v. State, No. 77337, Order Recalling Mandate and Vacating Death Sentence (Oct. 28, 2003).
. The parties seem to agree that there are only two other cases in which a death sentence was imposed by a judge based on facts found by the judge after a guilty plea, State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. banc 1996), and State v. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d 83 (Mo. banc 1999). Whether this remains an issue in Wor-thington is unclear; the federal district court’s holding that Mr. Worthington’s death sentence should be set aside on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, Worthington v. Roper, 619 F.Supp.2d 661 (E.D.Mo.2009), is now on review in the Eighth Circuit.
. As the State notes, other state supreme courts did distinguish the principle that under. Ring it is a Sixth Amendment violation to deny a jury trial of punishment, noting that the defendant in Ring went to trial while the defendants in their cases pleaded guilty. But, the State neglects to note that three of these cases—Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002); Leone v. Indiana, 797 N.E.2d 743 (Ind.2003); Illinois v. Alton, 338 Ill.App.3d *669355, 272 Ill.Dec. 751, 788 N.E.2d 55, 61 (2003) — were decided prior to, and are at odds with, Blakely, in which the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that, to the contrary, there is a constitutional right to jury fact-finding and that Ring applies even when a defendant pleads guilty. The fourth case cited by the State, South Carolina v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2004), simply relied on the other cases cited and, even though handed down a few months after Blakely, does not cite to or distinguish it.