Zanchi v. Lane

JACK CARTER, Justice,

concurring.

The Legislature has commanded that expert reports be served on a party or the party’s attorney “not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed.” Tex. Civ. PraC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351 (West 2011). Here, it is undisputed that Michael A. Zanchi, M.D., was served in accordance with Rule 21a within that time period. Those facts should end the discussion, but of course it does not; Dr. Zanchi argues that he was not a “party” and/or he was not “served.”

The first argument presented here is that this service of the expert report is not valid because Dr. Zanchi was not a “party,” even though the petition had been filed naming him as such. Chief Justice Morriss has fully explained that the case apparently relied on by some courts for that proposition, Mapco,15 does not hold *106that service of process must be completed before the defendant qualifies as a party. His opinion further contains a logical and coherent explanation of this issue. This Court is unanimous on this issue — Dr. Zanchi was a party. I fully agree with the analysis by the Chief Justice and see no need for further elaboration.

The dissenting opinion opines that Dr. Zanchi was not “served” with the expert report even though it was addressed and mailed to him by certified letter and received at the hospital where the alleged negligence occurred. The Legislature, while giving many mandates in this statute, failed to define the word “serve” as it relates to the expert report. This Court and many others, having no statutory guidance, have concluded compliance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is the most logical and consistent manner that should be employed in deciding if the report was served. Goforth v. Bradshaw, 296 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (“Under Section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, ‘service’ of expert reports and CVs means the same thing as ‘service’ under Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”) (citing Amaya v. Enriquez, 296 S.W.3d 781, 783 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, pet. denied); Poland v. Ott, 278 S.W.3d 39 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Herrera v. Seton Nw. Hosp., 212 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex.App.Austin 2006, no pet.); Kendrick v. Garcia, 171 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, pet. denied)).

Citing no authority, the dissenting opinion posits that serving an expert report is not governed by Rule 21a unless the defendant has previously been served with citation; no other suggestion or definition is proposed, only that Rule 21a should not be used. One reason for the employment of Rule 21a is to avoid the classic “he said-she said” argument about whether the report was served or received. That Rule provides standards and makes service complete when the document is properly addressed, stamped, and sent by registered or certified mail to the last known address. Certifying that action was taken provides prima facie evidence of service, subject to presentation of evidence of non-receipt. Here, an affidavit is in the clerk’s file evidencing that the report was properly addressed and sent by certified mail to Dr. Zanchi at the Paris Regional Medical Center. A receipt showed that the document was received at the hospital, and Dr. Zanchi did not attempt to present contrary evidence. Based on this information, the report was served on Dr. Zanchi. Very simply, within 120 days from filing the original petition against Dr. Zanchi, he was served with the expert report in compliance with the statute.

The dissent argues that appellate courts have held that service of citation on one other than the addressee is defective, but the cited cases involve the service of citation, not notices. This distinction makes all the difference in the world. Citation must be served in strict accordance with *107the statutes, rules, and court imposed regulations because it is the manner in which a court acquires jurisdiction of a party; without strict compliance the courts will not allow a default judgment to stand. Hubicki v. Festina, 226 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex.2007). Rule 21a specifically states that it governs notices and other documents “other than the citation to be served upon filing of a cause of action.” So the cases cited for the proposition that strict compliance by serving the addressee only in serving citation, are not relevant to the issue in this case.

Finally, I will respond to the dissenting opinion that allowing service of the expert report before citation has been completed requires the defendant to file an objection to the expert report before having the duty to respond to the suit itself. The question seems to answer itself; if the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction of the defendant, that party is not required to do anything, including submitting an objection to the expert report. When the court does obtain jurisdiction, by the proper service of citation, just as the defendant has to answer the suit, likewise the time begins to run on filing of the objections to the report. The trial court could not require the defendant to file an objection before it acquired jurisdiction. In essence, receiving the expert report prior to service of citation places the defendant in the same position as if the citation and expert report were served simultaneously. See Stroud v. Grubb, 328 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (expert report filed one day after serving citation). In this instance, the defendant, after being served with citation, had the opportunity to file an objection to the expert report, but instead he attempted to persuade the trial court that he was not a party or he was not served. Just as in Stroud where the defendant was served one day after the citation was served, Dr. Zanchi had twenty-one days to challenge the report. In failing to do so, Dr. Zanchi waived any objection. Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a). So to that extent, I disagree with Chief Justice Morriss’ opinion that Dr. Zanchi may now object. That objection has been waived.

The Legislature determined that expert reports must be filed in order to avoid costly, unnecessary, and unmerited legal proceedings, but unfortunately, in this case, that goal has not been accomplished. Here, a thirty-one-page detailed report from a board-certified anesthesiologist was served within 120 days from the filing of the original petition. Instead of engaging in expensive and time-consuming trial and appellate litigation attempting to establish that the simple words “part/’ and “serve” have abstruse meanings, these parties should be preparing for and trying their case.

I concur with the result reached in the opinion of the Chief Justice.

. Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.1991) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court stated that the issue in Mapco was "whether a judgment may be entered against a party, not before the trial court.” Id. at 686. The plaintiffs sued Mapco Underground Storage of Texas, Inc. (MUST) for waste and to partition a mineral estate. Mapco, Inc., was a separate legal entity. From the discussion in the opinion, it is clear that Mapco, Inc., was never named as a party to the lawsuit (“the Carters’ pleadings identified only MUST as a party ... ”), Id. at 687, but a judgment was entered against Mapco, Inc. The holding of the Texas Supreme Court was simply that Mapco, Inc. (not MUST) was never named as a party in the proceeding, did not voluntarily appear, and therefore, any judgment against it was erroneous. In the appellant’s brief, the following statement is *106made: "Merely being named in a petition as a defendant does not make one a 'party' to the lawsuit.” The Mapco case is the only cited authority for that proposition. After carefully reading the Mapco case, we cannot find any such statement; Mapco’s holding is that a judgment cannot be rendered against a corporation that was never named or appeared as a party, but Mapco does not give any support to the appellant's statement that "being named in a petition as a defendant does not make one a 'party' to the lawsuit.” We call this major improper attribution to the attention of counsel and remind counsel of the duty of candor to the court.