dissenting.
Because the facts in this case clearly demonstrate that the Infangers should be es-topped from challenging the validity of the vacation ordinance and the resulting land transactions, I respectfully dissent.
The respondents correctly urge that the appellants should be estopped from challenging the validity of the vacation ordinance because they are the successors in interest to the Bowlands, who were the beneficiaries of the ordinance. The respondents have not asserted that the Infangers or the Bowlands ever made misrepresentations; rather, they argue that the Infangers cannot be allowed to reap the benefits of assuming a position contrary to that of their predecessors in interest. In essence, the respondents seek application of a form of equitable estoppel known as quasi-estoppel, rather than common, reliance-based equitable estoppel. See Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372, 378 (1998).
A. The Bowlands Would Be Estopped From Challenging The Validity Of The Vacation Ordinance.
As this Court has explained,
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to another’s disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit.
Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994).
“Quasi estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other.” Lunders, 131 Idaho at 695, 963 P.2d at 378; see also, e.g., Willig v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). However, to apply the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in the absence of reliance, it must be shown that “the act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some disadvantage to another.” Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1061 (1980); see also KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281, 486 P.2d 992, 994 (1971).
*51In applying the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, this Court must weigh the equities of the particular case at hand, considering all the circumstances presented, rather than engage in the application of strict standards or of strained analogies to the facts of prior estoppel decisions. See Williams Lake Lands, Inc. v. LeMoyne Dev., Inc., 108 Idaho 826, 830, 702 P.2d 864, 868 (1985) (“Because quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine, its application depends upon a case by case analysis of the equities involved, rather than upon precise definitional standards.”); KTVB, Inc., 94 Idaho at 282, 486 P.2d at 995 (“[T]he essence of the proper application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel is the focus of the Court’s attention upon the specific facts and circumstances of the ease at bar.”).
Here, the inquiry should begin with determining whether the Bowlands, the predecessors in interest to the Infangers, gained some advantage for themselves in soliciting and supporting the City’s decision to vacate the Edwards Street property and in subsequently accepting the validity of the vacation ordinance once it was adopted.
Assuming that the street was properly vacated, the effect was to incorporate one half of the width of the vacated street into the abutting properties on each side. See I.C. § 50-3011; Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 278, 985 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1999). Thus, the Bowlands, in their capacities as owners of Lots 6 and 7, received the benefits of the vacation ordinance. Specifically, the Bow-lands received a substantial enhancement in the value of Lots 6 and 7, as was testified to by Mr. Bowland, and an increase in potential uses to which the lots could be put, due to their increased size. Additionally, the Bow-lands suggested the vacation of Edwards Street to the City, acquiesced in the City’s passage of an ordinance aimed at vacation, and accepted the City’s conveyance of the property. Consequently, the Bowlands received a benefit from their encouragement of and acquiescence in the vacation ordinance, and a later challenge to that same ordinance would most surely be inconsistent with their prior position.
Next, the inquiry should turn to whether it would be unconscionable to allow this challenge. Notably, the record indicates that the Infangers failed to voice any objection to the Benders’ construction of a $121,000 structure on the Edwards Street property until approximately one year after it was completed. They acquiesced without comment as the Benders constructed an expensive building on property the Infangers now claim to be their own. While it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the Infangers are es-topped by their own inequitable conduct, their acquiescence warrants mention in this equitable analysis, because it makes the situation unconscionable from the Benders’ perspective, regardless of whether it was the predecessor or successor who encouraged the City to vacate the street.
The Benders have expended over $121,000 and constructed a permanent structure on the contested portion of the vacated street as an ultimate result of the vacation ordinance in which the Bowlands acquiesced. It would be unconscionable to allow this challenge to the ordinance, the validity of which went unchallenged for nearly ten years, and the creation of which was encouraged by the Bowlands. To do so could result in the Benders being thrust into the position of owning an expensive structure, the construction of which was acquiesced in by the party challenging their ownership of the property, situated on land for which they have paid consideration, but do not own. The Bow-lands would be estopped if they were the party attempting to challenge the vacation ordinance.
B. The Infangers Should Be Estopped as Successors to the Bowlands.
Among the Idaho cases in which successor estoppel has been a potential issue, few have squarely addressed the issue, because it was mooted by holdings on other issues, like failure of proof of inequitable conduct by the predecessors, see, e.g., Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 662-63, 962 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1998); Herrmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 922, 693 P.2d 1118, 1124 (Ct.App.1985), and failure of the party claiming estoppel to properly raise the issue in pleadings, see, e.g., Argyle v. *52Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 669-70, 691 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (Ct.App.1984).
The few eases that have addressed this issue have focused on the factually specific question of whether estoppel should run against a foreclosure sale purchaser of property based upon the actions of the prior owner. In a 1917 case this Court held, in part, that a successor may be estopped by the actions of a predecessor when the successor purchased the predecessor’s interest at an execution sale and was not a bona fide purchaser without knowledge. See Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 30 Idaho 559, 571, 166 P. 271, 274 (1917). In Mountain Home Lumber, Garrett, the predecessor in interest, sold a piece of land to a first purchaser. Two months later, Garrett purported to sell the same property to a second purchaser. These actions were sufficient to make Garrett the holder of an equitable trust in favor of the first purchaser, estopping Garrett from questioning the first purchaser’s title. Id. at 570, 166 P. at 273-74. Subsequently, the appellant in the case obtained a civil judgment against Garrett, and believing him to still be the owner of the property in question, executed upon the property, purchasing the property at its own execution sale (foreclosure sale purchaser). This Court held that the foreclosure sale purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser as a matter of debtor/creditor law, and that, as a successor to Garret, the foreclosure sale purchaser was estopped to deny the validity of the title of the first purchaser. Id. at 571, 166 P. at 274. The Court reasoned that the successor could receive “only such title and interest as Garrett had, and must be said to have taken the legal title in trust for [the first purchaser], and subject to every element of estoppel that could be urged against Garrett.” Id.
The holding in Mountain Home Lumber was cited in and bolstered by the holding in Rexburg Lumber Co. v. Purrington, 62 Idaho 461, 468, 113 P.2d 511, 513-14 (1941). In Rexburg Lumber, a judgment creditor foreclosed its lien on a debtor’s property and then purchased the property at its own execution sale. Unknown to the purchasing creditor, the debtor’s property was subject to an equitable trust in favor of another party. After holding that the creditor could not be a bona fide purchaser as a matter of debt- or/creditor law, this Court held that the creditor acquired only the title of the debtor and that its title was consequently subject to hidden equities against the debtor’s title. Id. at 468-69,113 P.2d at 513-14.
The holdings in Mountain Home Lumber and Rexburg Lumber addressed particular factual situations involving collateral issues of debtor/creditor law, but they were based on an underlying equitable principle that is equally applicable to the case at bar — equity will not allow a land possessor to be unconscionably injured by inequitable conduct simply because the perpetrator of the inequitable conduct transferred his or her tainted interests to another party.
This underlying principle is reflected in cases from other jurisdictions, which hold that successors in interest may be estopped by the actions of their predecessors, at least where the successor had notice of the facts giving rise to the estoppel. See Evans v. Wittorff, 869 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); Myers v. Key Bank, N.A., 113 A.D.2d 244, 495 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757 (N.Y.App.Div.1985) aff'd, 68 N.Y.2d 744, 506 N.Y.S.2d 327, 497 N.E.2d 694 (1986); “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex.1972); Bratt v. Peterson, 31 Wis.2d 447, 143 N.W.2d 538, 542 (1966); McCarthy v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 58 Wyo. 308, 131 P.2d 326, 332 (1942).
Estoppel created by the actions of a predecessor in interest should be effective against a successor in interest, at least where the successor can be charged with knowledge of the facts giving rise to the estoppel.
Equitable considerations require the application of successor estoppel in the situation presented here. The Infangers can be charged with notice of all recordings regarding the disputed property, since “[e]very conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, and recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortag(e)es.” I.C. § 55-811. Consequently, they can be charged with no*53tice of the quitclaim deed to the Edwards Street property, filed by the City. Additionally, the Infangers demonstrated knowledge that they might not be the owners of the disputed property when, after purchasing Lots 6 and 7 from Guth in December of 1988, they inquired about buying the Edwards Street property from the Bowlands. Finally, the Infangers acquiesced without comment as the Benders constructed an expensive structure on the disputed property. It would be inequitable to allow a past land transaction to be undone by a successor when the successor had notice of the transaction and his predecessor’s acquiescence in the transaction at the time he purchased the land. Consequently, the Infangers stand in the same position as their predecessor, the Bow-lands, and should be estopped.
The application of successor estoppel is also necessary to preserve Idaho’s public policy as represented in the above-quoted recording statute, I.C. § 55-811. To allow successors to challenge the validity of such transfers would subject real estate sales of this type to unending uncertainty and would effectively remove the efficacy of our recording systems as to this entire category of transactions.
Because the Infangers can be charged with notice of the facts giving rise to an estoppel against their predecessor, I express no opinion as to whether estoppel can run against successors in interest without notice.
C. A Party May be Estopped to Challenge the Validity of an Ordinance Even if It Was Void On Its Face.
The Infangers assert that, even if successors in interest may generally be estopped due to the actions of them predecessors, a party cannot be estopped from challenging a statute or ordinance that was void when passed.
The Infangers rely heavily on this Court’s decision in Hillman v. City of Pocatello, 74 Idaho 69, 72, 256 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1953). In Hillman, this Court carved out an exception to the rule “that one taking advantage of a statute cannot challenge its validity.” Id. This Court held that the appellant could not be estopped from challenging an ordinance where it was later determined that the ordinance was void when it was passed. Id.
The holding of Hillman, however, was undermined by this Court’s holding in Alexander v. Trs. of Village of Middleton, 92 Idaho 823, 452 P.2d 50 (1969). In that ease, Alexander was appealing a decision of the district court that held that he and the other appellants were estopped from challenging the validity of a city’s annexation ordinance because they had accepted the benefits of the ordinance and had delayed the assertion of their rights for a long period of time. Id. at 824, 452 P.2d at 51. In affirming the district court, this Court held “the language of Hill-man v. City of Pocatello, supra, in precluding the imposition of equitable estoppel as a defense in this type of action, is erroneous.” Id. at 827, 452 P.2d at 54. Thus, under the circumstances existing in the present case, estoppel can be used to bar one who challenges the validity of an ordinance that was void when passed.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment should be affirmed on the alternative theory that the Infangers are estopped to challenge the validity of the vacation ordinance.
Justice SCHROEDER CONCURS.