dissenting.
¶ 32 I respectfully dissent.
¶33 The majority has articulated a reasonable rule of law: that a clear and unambiguous statement that the employment relationship is terminable at will negates any contradictory promises or policies adopted *295by the employer. While such a rule may be convenient in application, I believe it contradicts the precedent established by our supreme court.
¶ 34 In Arizona, “[a]n implied-in-fact contract term [may be] formed when a ‘reasonable person could conclude that both parties intended that the employer’s (or the employee’s) right to terminate the employment relationship at-will had been limited.’ ” Demasse, 194 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 15, 984 P.2d at 1143 (internal citation omitted). Evidence relevant to the factual determination of whether an at-will employment relationship has been modified “includes the language used in the personnel manual as well as the employer’s course of conduct and oral representations regarding it.” Leikvold, 141 Ariz. at 548, 688 P.2d at 174 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court is not at liberty to base its decision on the language of the disclaimer alone, but must consider the entirety of circumstances to determine whether an at-will employment contract has been modified. Furthermore, if contradictory and conflicting promises by an employer exist, doubt naturally arises about the resulting employment terms.
¶ 35 The majority, unfortunately, overlooks how such doubt is to be resolved. It correctly attributes Leikvold as directing that conflicting evidence be sent to the trier-of-fact, but then ignores that mandate. See id. (“Whether any particular personnel manual modifies any particular employment-at-will relationship ... is a question of fact.”); see also Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 383, 710 P.2d at 1038 (“[T]he determination whether in a particular case a promise should be implied in fact is a question of fact.”); accord Wagner, 150 Ariz. at 86, 722 P.2d at 254; Loffa, 153 Ariz. at 543, 738 P.2d at 1150.
¶ 36 The majority points to the clarity of the disclaimer, stating that “if the multiple disclaimers in this case do not satisfy Leikvold’s ‘clear and conspicuous’ requirement, ... we can envisage none that would.” Supra ¶ 29. While it is true that for a disclaimer to have a binding effect it must be clear and conspicuous, see Leikvold, 141 Ariz. at 548, 688 P.2d at 174, the inquiry does not stop there. Where a disclaimer, no matter how clear or conspicuous, is contradicted by another document or policy of the employer, it is for the trier-of-fact to determine whether that document or policy negates the disclaimer.
¶ 37 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme School, 166 Ariz. at 309, 802 P.2d at 1008. The majority argues that, given the disclaimers presented to Roberson, it is inconceivable that the contradictory provisions in the employee manuals could be reasonably interpreted as a limitation to Wal-Mart’s right to terminate Roberson’s employment at will.
¶ 38 If we were confronted only with the written terms of the manuals, I would concur. However, the Performance Coaching process set forth in the employee manual was backed by a uniform and consistent policy that could be interpreted by a reasonable person as a promise that an employee would not be terminated without a decision-making day. For example, the pharmacy operation manual notes that all terminations are to be done in accordance with the guidelines, policies and procedures of the Wal-Mart personnel department, and be earned out in compliance with the Performance Coaching process. Also, the testimony of Wal-Mart’s regional and district managers established WalMart’s expectation that the Performance Coaching process always be followed when the termination of an employee was contemplated. Roberson was aware of these policies and professed an expectation that he was entitled to their application. While reliance is neither dispositive nor an essential predicate to the action, it is one of several relevant factors. See Wagner, 150 Ariz. at 86, 722 P.2d at 254. In submitting the question to the jury, the trial court concluded that the dissemination of the Performance Coaching policy, Wal Mart’s admitted intent that it be applied in all terminations, and Roberson’s reliance upon it, when balanced against the disclaimer, could lead to differing conclusions *296or inferences in reasonable minds. I do not find this conclusion to be in error.
¶ 39 An employer is free to maintain an at-will employment relationship with its employees, to issue no handbook, or to issue one that uncontradictorily informs his employees that their employment is terminable at will. See Leikvold, 141 Ariz. at 548, 688 P.2d at 174. However, once an employer chooses to establish a policy or procedure, through a manual or otherwise, and by its language or actions encourages reliance thereon, he is no longer free to selectively abide by it. Id. “Having announced a policy, the employer may not treat it as illusory.” Id.
¶40 Here, there was sufficient evidence that the Performance Coaching process was such a uniformly and universally applied store policy that Wal-Mart’s employees could reasonably have expected that it would be applied to them. It was therefore appropriate to send the matter to the jury. Because the matter was properly sent to the jury, and because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that, through its actions and statements, Wal-Mart had modified the at-will nature of its employment contracts, I would affirm.