dissenting.
¶ 19 I believe the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the conduct here, in the context of a school setting, was seriously disruptive within the meaning of A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1). The principal told Julio that she wanted to talk to him about his behavior that morning and his failure to wear his uniform. Julio said “fuck you” to the principal, kicked over the chair next to him, and left the classroom. The principal was not only offended in her professional capacity, but was also disrupted from doing what it was she had intended to do. Her focus had to turn from talking to Julio about his behavior and not wearing the school uniform, to removing him as quickly as possible from the classroom.
¶ 20 The majority says that her job functions were not seriously disrupted because she was performing her duties in dealing with Julio’s behavior. Ante, at ¶ 9. But this is like saying a police officer cannot be assaulted because it is his job to deal with criminals. Her effort to talk to Julio about his behavior and his dress was disrupted. Once Julio kicked the chair, she said “that’s an officer referral, come on, let’s go.” Tr. Apr. 21, 1998 at 8. She thought it pretty serious to refer it to an officer. She had to then divert all her attention on Julio in order to get him out of the classroom.
¶ 21 This principal thought she needed the help of a police officer. It strikes me that whenever a teacher in an American classroom reasonably believes she needs the help of the police in order to control a student, and is thereby diverted from what she was doing, the evidence would be sufficient to support a finding of serious disruption. *6Here, the trial judge so found. For the reasons stated by the court of appeals, In re Julio L., 195 Ariz. 482, 990 P.2d 683 (1999), I would affirm that judgment. A teacher ought not have to wait for more violence to invoke the assistance of the juvenile justice system.