The majority holds that under the facts established in this case, a city council acted within its legislative authority when it issued subpoenas to insurance companies requiring them to disclose information about the liability insurance coverage of individuals and businesses that were potentially responsible for local groundwater pollution. I agree.
The majority identifies three requirements for a valid legislative subpoena: (1) the subpoena has been authorized by ordinance or similar enactment; (2) the information sought is pertinent to a legislative investigation; and (3) the subpoena serves a valid legislative purpose. Again, I agrfee.
Regarding the third of these requirements, the majority assumes that a subpoena has a valid legislative purpose only if the information sought will be useful for some purpose other than litigation. The majority concedes that liability coverage information will be useful to the city in litigation that the city contemplates bringing against the individuals and businesses potentially responsible for the groundwater pollution. But the majority claims to find another, nonlitigation purpose for the subpoenas based on the city’s need to make appropriations and engage in sound fiscal planning. The majority considers this “appropriative purpose” to be a nonlitigation purpose and as such to be a valid legislative purpose. I find this reasoning strained and unpersuasive.
First, the majority does not persuade me that it is necessary to assume that a city council’s authority to issue legislative subpoenas is or should be limited to subpoenas issued for nonlitigation purposes. What is the source of this supposed limitation? Does the majority derive it from a statute, the common law, or the state or federal Constitution? The majority does not say. The majority cites no decision by any court striking down a legislative subpoena on the basis that the information sought was useful only for litigation. The majority relies entirely on a decision of the United States Supreme Court declining to strike down a legislative subpoena on the ground that the information obtained might be useful in aiding the prosecution of pending suits. (Sinclair v. United States (1929) 279 U.S. 263, 295 [49 S.Ct. 268, 272, 73 L.Ed. 692], revd. on other grounds in United States v. Gaudin (1995) 515 U.S. 506, 519-522 [115 S.Ct. 2310, 2318-2320, 132 L.Ed.2d *821444].) Because the high court found that the subpoena at issue there served both litigation and nonlitigation purposes, it did not have occasion then, nor has it had occasion during the ensuing 70 years, to decide whether Congress must have a nonlitigation purpose for a legislative subpoena.
Second, I do not agree with the majority that the city council had a purpose separate and apart from litigation for issuing the challenged subpoenas, which sought information about liability insurance coverage. By its nature, liability insurance is useful only in the event of litigation. Because liability coverage is contingent on litigation, information about liability coverage has no utility except in relation to pending or contemplated litigation. The city has virtually conceded the point. In a brief it filed in this court, the city admitted that it wants the liability coverage information “to determine whether to devote some of the City’s limited resources to litigation, as opposed to other means for raising funds.” Any party who contemplates bringing an action for damages would reason in the same way: To make appropriate financial plans, it is very helpful to know what liability insurance the potential defendants have. This information is useful to decide whether to litigate, to budget for the litigation itself, and to plan for other revenue sources if the liability coverage is inadequate. Thus, under the facts shown here, the majority’s distinction between an appropriative purpose and a litigation purpose is illusory.
The distinction is not only illusory, it is also unnecessary. If contemplated litigation is itself a matter appropriately within the purview of the city council, then a litigation purpose is a valid legislative purpose. Here, the city council has responsibility for ensuring the safety of the groundwater that city residents use for their drinking water and for other domestic needs. To discharge that responsibility, the city council is contemplating litigation against potentially responsible parties, and for purposes of this contemplated litigation it would be useful for the city council to know what liability coverage is available to the potentially responsible parties. This is sufficient, in my view, to demonstrate a valid legislative purpose.
This is not to say, however, that there are no limits on what information the city council can demand by means of a legislative subpoena under these circumstances. It would be fundamentally unfair to permit the city council to use the legislative subpoena to obtain information that no other prospective litigant could hope to discover. But liability coverage has long been discoverable. A plaintiff who has brought an action for money damages may discover information about liability insurance coverage available to satisfy a judgment, even though this information is not relevant to any issue to be *822litigated in the action against the insured. Code of Civil Procedure section 2017, subdivision (b) provides: “A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable to satisfy in whole or in part a judgment that may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. This discovery may include the identity of the carrier and the nature and limits of the coverage. A party may also obtain discovery as to whether that insurance carrier is disputing the agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in the action, but not as to the nature and substance of that dispute. . . .” (See Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 49] [discussing the history and scope of this provision].)
Even before this provision was enacted, parties could get much the same information by bringing a motion to perpetuate testimony under former sections 2083 to 2089 of the Code of Civil Procedure (repealed Stats. 1957, ch. 1904 § 1, p. 3321; see now Code Civ. Proc., § 2035, as amended by Stats. 1987, ch. 86, § 18, p. 353). When construing those provisions, this court rejected arguments that allowing discovery of liability insurance coverage before liability is established was an invalid search and seizure or gave the plaintiff an unfair advantage in settlement negotiations. (Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 749, 754-755 [235 P.2d 833].)
To obtain discovery of liability coverage information, therefore, a party generally must either commence the action for damages or bring a motion to perpetuate testimony. One Court of Appeal has given this explanation: “Formally taking a step toward litigation, such as filing a petition to perpetuate testimony or filing a lawsuit indicates there is a serious problem. Such conduct assures that the third party claimant has no ulterior purpose, such as snooping for information. [Citation.] It protects the privacy of insureds from the curious who may only wish to bring nuisance claims. By controlling the timing of the release of information we protect the premature release of confidential data.” (Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 59, 70 [281 Cal.Rptr. 165].)
None of the identified reasons for prohibiting prelitigation discovery of liability insurance apply here. The city council is not merely curious, nor can the actions it contemplates bringing be characterized as nuisance claims, and the record amply establishes that the existing groundwater pollution is a “serious problem.” Moreover, a state agency, the Department of Toxic Substances Control, has identified the parties who are potentially responsible for the pollution. Accordingly, there is no reason to prohibit the city council *823from discovering liability insurance information at the prelitigation stage. Presumably the city council could obtain this information either by a motion to perpetuate testimony under Code of Civil Procedure section 2035 or by use of the legislative subpoena. Of course, the city council should not be permitted to obtain more information by its legislative subpoena than it could obtain by a petition to perpetuate or, after filing suit, by using normal litigation discovery procedures. But, as the majority explains, the trial court on remand will determine specifically which information is properly discoverable through the legislative subpoenas.