Relator KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Company seeks a writ of prohibition directing Respondent, Judge Jacqueline Cook of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, to take no further action other than to grant its motion for summary judgment in the pending civil lawsuit, Monroe Gunter v. KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co., et al, Case No. 10CA-CV01079. Gunter alleges in the underlying suit that his exposure to asbestos while working for KCP & L caused him to develop mesothelioma. KCP & L asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because Gunter’s claims fall within the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, §§ 287.120.1 and .2,1 and must first be presented to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. We hold that Gunter’s claims are not subject to the Act’s exclusivity provisions because they do not arise out of an “accident” as that term is defined in the statute. The circuit court therefore did not err in denying KCP & L’s summary judgment motion, and we accordingly quash the preliminary writ of prohibition we previously issued.
Factual Background
Gunter worked for KCP & L for thirty-four years before he retired in 1988. He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in February 2010. In April 2010, Gunter filed a lawsuit against KCP & L, sixteen manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, and various “John Doe” companies that designed, manufactured, distributed, supplied, used, or handled asbestos or asbestos-containing products to which he was allegedly exposed. In his first amended *17petition, Gunter alleged that he was exposed to asbestos during the course of his employment for KCP & L and that this asbestos exposure directly and proximately caused him to develop mesothelioma. He asserted claims against KCP & L on premises liability and negligence theories. In particular, Gunter alleged that, “[a]s an employer and user of asbestos products, [KCP & L] had a duty to maintain a safe working environment, a duty not to expose Plaintiff to asbestos and a duty to exercise reasonable care so as not to expose its workmen including Plaintiff to unreasonable risk of injury.” In its answer, KCP & L asserted as an affirmative defense that Gunter’s claims are barred because his exclusive remedy, if any, is under Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law.
Every defendant other than KCP & L was ultimately dismissed from the lawsuit by settlement or otherwise. KCP & L filed a motion for summary judgment based upon its affirmative defense that Gunter’s claims against it are exclusively compensable in a workers’ compensation proceeding before the Commission. In response, Gunter argued that, pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Act, only claims arising out of an “accident” as defined in § 287.020.2 are subject to the Act’s exclusivity provisions, and that his claims do not involve an accidental injury.2
The circuit court entered an order denying KCP & L’s summary judgment motion. KCP & L responded by filing a Petition for Writ of Prohibition in this Court.3 We issued a preliminary writ on January 28, 2011, and set the case for full briefing and argument.
Analysis
Determining whether Gunter’s claims are subject to the Act’s exclusivity provisions requires us to interpret and apply the Workers’ Compensation Law, Chapter 287, RSMo. The primary rule of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. banc 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The legislature is presumed to have intended what the statute says, and if the language used is clear, there is no room for construction beyond the plain meaning of the law.” State v. Sharp, 341 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (citing State v. Thesing, 332 S.W.3d 895, 897-98 (Mo.App. S.D.2011)); see also State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647, 649 (Mo. banc 2002) (“When the words are clear, there is nothing to construe beyond applying the plain meaning of the *18law.”). We will look beyond the plain meaning of the words of a statute “only when the language is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd or illogical result.” Akins v. Dir. of Revenue, 303 S.W.3d 563, 565 (Mo. banc 2010).
I.
The Workers’ Compensation Law distinguishes between two general categories of compensable injuries: (1) injuries by accident; and (2) injuries by occupational disease. The Act specifies that an “accident” “shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift.” § 287.020.2. “An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.” § 287.020.3(1).
On the other hand, “unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context,” an “occupational disease” is defined as “an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment.” § 287.067.1. “An injury by occupational disease is com-pensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.” § 287.067.2.
The only statutory provision which arguably bars Gunter from proceeding against KCP & L in the circuit court, and therefore the sole statutory basis for KCP & L’s request for an extraordinary writ of prohibition, is § 287.120. The statute provides in relevant part:
1. Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person. The term “accident” as used in this section shall include, but not be limited to, injury or death of the employee caused by the unprovoked violence or assault against the employee by any person.
2. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his wife, her husband, parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.
(Emphasis added.)
Although the Act draws a clear distinction between injuries by accident and injuries by occupational disease, the plain language of §§ 287.120.1 and .2 limits those sections to injuries or death caused “by accident.” KCP & L acknowledged at oral argument, and in the trial court, that Gun-ter’s claims do not arise out of an “accident” as that term is defined in § 287.020.2, although it argues that § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions should not be strictly limited to “accidents” as defined in § 287.020.2. To the contrary, we conclude that because § 287.120 only denies Gunter a common-law remedy for “personal injury or death of the employee by accident,” KCP & L’s concession that this case does not involve an “accident,” as that term is statutorily defined, defeats its reliance on § 287.120.
The conclusion that the Act’s exclusivity provisions are limited to injuries or death caused by an “accident” as defined in *19§ 287.020.2 is confirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. banc 2009) (“MARA”). Although MARA found the majority of the claims raised in that case to be nonjusticia-ble, the Court did enter a declaratory judgment as to the interplay between § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions, and the definitions of “accident” and “injury” in §§ 287.020.2 and .3. Based on “a simple reading of the statute itself,” 277 S.W.3d at 679, the Court explained:
The definitions for “accident” and “injury” are utilized in the exclusivity clause and amendment of those definitions impacts the scope of the workers’ compensation laws. By limiting those definitions, the scope of the act is limited. Any removal of certain injuries and accidents from the scope of the act also places the workers who have suffered those injuries outside the workers’ compensation system, and they are no longer governed by the act.
... In other words, [the Workers’ Compensation Law] is the exclusive remedy only for those “injuries” that come within the definition of the term “accident” under the act. ...
... [I]f an “injury” comes within the definition of the term “accident” as defined in section 287.020.2, then it is included within the exclusivity provisions of the act, and recovery can be had, if at all, only under the terms set out in the act. If the “injury” is one that is not included within the term “accident” as defined in the act, however, then under section 287.120.1 ... the injury ... is not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the act ....
Workers excluded from the act by the narrower definition of “accidental injury” have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act....
... It therefore is adjudged, decreed and declared that workers excluded from the act by the narrower definitions of “accident” and “injury” have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act, because they no longer fall within the exclusivity provision of the act as set out in section 287.120.
Id. at 679-80 (emphasis added).4 The holding of MARA is consistent with our decisions specifying the showing an employer must make to prevail on a motion for summary judgment asserting the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation exclusivity: the first element that must be established is that “[the employeej’s claim is based on an accident arising out of and in the course of [the employeej’s employment[.]” Treaster v. Betts, 324 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Mo.App. W.D.2010) (emphasis added); see also Fortenberry v. Buck, 307 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Mo.App. W.D.2010).
We are, of course, bound by the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding in MARA. Mo. Const. art. V, § 2. Under MARA, the Workers’ Compensation Law “is the exclusive remedy only for those ‘injuries’ that come within the definition of the term ‘accident’ under the act.” 277 S.W.3d at 679. Here — as KCP & L concedes — Gunter’s occupational disease-related claims do not arise out of an “accident” as defined in § 287.020.2. Under MARA, therefore, Gunter “ha[s] a right to bring suit under *20the common law, just as [he] could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act, because [he] no longer fall[s] within the exclusivity provision of the act as set out in section 287.120.” Id. at 680.5
The current version of the Act specifies that “reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly.” § 287.800.1. This legislative mandate provides further reason to interpret § 287.120 as it is plainly written. As we recently explained,
Strict construction means that a statute can be given no broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms. The operation of the statute must be confined to matters affirmatively pointed out by its terms, and to cases which fall fairly within its letter. A strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed.
Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo.App. W.D.2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This rule of strict construction applies both to § 287.120, and to the definitions of words used in that section. Id. at 424. Consistent with MARA, Robinson recognizes that, “[e]ven though the language of the exclusivity provision was not amended in 2005, the scope of employer immunity was narrowed by the new lens of strict construction.” Id. Under the canon of strict construction, we cannot add injuries by occupational disease to §§ 287.120.1 and .2, when the provisions unambiguously refer only to injuries caused “by accident.”6
Robinson notes an additional reason to abstain from judicial expansion of § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions: “the long-standing principle that close questions regarding the existence of common law rights should weigh in favor of retaining the common law right of action.” Id. at 425 n. 4. As we stated in another context:
Where the legislature intends to preempt a common law claim, it must do so clearly. Unless a statute clearly abrogates the common law either expressly or by necessary implication, the common law rule remains valid. A statutory right of action shall not be deemed to supersede and displace remedies otherwise available at common law in the absence of language to that effect unless the statutory remedy fully comprehends and envelops the remedies provided by common law. We strictly construe a *21statute when existing common law rights are affected, and if a close question exists, we weigh our decision in favor of retaining the common law.
State ex rel. Brown v. III Invs., Inc., 80 S.W.3d 855, 859-60 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if the issue here were close, we should resolve any doubt in favor of preserving Gunter’s common-law remedies.
Section 287.120.1 explicitly states that the Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy only for claims “for personal injury or death of the employee by accident.” “Accident” is defined in a manner that excludes Gunter’s claims, as KCP & L concedes. Under the rule of strict construction, § 287.120.1 “must be confined to matters affirmatively pointed out by its terms”; no matter how sensible we may believe the outcome, we are not authorized to give § 287.120.1 any “broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms.” Robinson, 323 S.W.3d at 423 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The plain language of § 287.120 leads inexorably to only one outcome: Gunter is entitled to proceed in the circuit court on his claims for occupational disease against KCP & L, and the circuit court correctly denied KCP & L’s motion for summary judgment, which sought to prevent him from doing so.7
II.
In arguing for a contrary result, KCP & L relies heavily on the construction of the Workers’ Compensation Law prior to the comprehensive 2005 amendments to the statute. In particular, KCP & L cites to Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 307 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. banc 1957), in which the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the statutory definition of “accident” in the original Workers’ Compensation Law to *22include occupational disease claims, which had been added to the statute (on an elective basis) by a 1931 amendment. We acknowledge that the Act was consistently interpreted to bring occupational disease claims within § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions prior to the 2005 amendments. Those amendments, however, changed the Act in at least four material respects, which prevent us from relying on the historical interpretation of predecessor statutes.8
1. The 2005 amendments repealed the provision of the earlier statute which provided that “[a]ll of the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare[.]” § 287.800, RSMo 2000. Applied to § 287.120, the pre-2005 canon of liberal construction required that, “where a question of jurisdiction is in doubt, it should be held to be in favor of the Labor and Industrial Commission.” Vatterott v. Hammerts Iron Works, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Mo. banc 1998) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted); see also, e.g., Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo.App. W.D.2000); Deckard v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 31 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). Thus, the pre-2005 canon of liberal construction reversed the general rule that doubts should be resolved against statutory preemption of common-law remedies. The Supreme Court observed that, while “[t]his law of construction may limit a particular individual’s recovery,” it was mandated by § 287.800, RSMo 2000, because “it ensures that more individuals enjoy the protection intended by the Workers’ Compensation Law.” Vatterott, 968 S.W.2d at 121.
This rule of liberal construction was in effect at the time of the Staples decision. See § 287.800, RSMo 1949. Section 287.800, RSMo 1949 was not explicitly referenced in Staples. Nevertheless, it is clear that Staples applied the principle of liberal construction mandated by § 287.800, RSMo 1949: Staples concluded that the definition of “accident” must be “liberalized” to accommodate occupational disease claims, and endorsed prior cases in which the “the strict definition[s]” of § 287.020 “ha[ve] necessarily been enlarged, expressly or inferentially,” “in harmony with the purpose of the amendment” adding occupational disease claims to the Act’s coverage. 307 S.W.2d at 462.
In the place of the pre-2005 rule of liberal construction, which required that doubts be resolved in favor of exclusive Commission authority to resolve particular claims, the current statute instructs reviewing courts to “strictly” construe its provisions. § 287.800.1. Although it may have been entirely appropriate, prior to the 2005 amendments, for Staples to “liberalize” the “strict definitions” of an “accident” and an “injury” in § 287.020, we have now been instructed to abstain from any “liberal” construction of the statute, and instead to hew to a “striet[ ]” construction of the words used by the legislature. While Staples ’ approach may well have been sensible, and consistent with then-prevailing law, we can no longer follow *23Staples given the legislature’s significant amendments to § 287.800.
2. The 2005 amendments made significant revisions to the definition of an “accident.” Prior to 2005, the definition of an accident provided in relevant part that
The word “accident” as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen identifiable event or series of events happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.
§ 287.020.2, RSMo 2000. The 2005 amendments replaced this definition with the following:
The word “accident” as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
§ 287.020.2.
At least two things are noteworthy concerning the amendments to the “accident” definition. First, the pre-2005 definition included a “series of events,” which provided some textual basis for construing the term to include the repeated exposure to conditions which cause an occupational disease. To the contrary, the post-2005 definition is plainly limited to a single, discrete, identifiable event or strain occurring during a single work shift. Second, and more significantly, the 2005 amendments eliminated the qualifier that the statutory definition of “accident” applied “unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context.” In contrast, the 2005 legislature retained similar qualifying language in the definitions of an “injury” and an “occupational disease.”9 The pre-2005 language provided authority for courts to adopt a broader or different definition of “accident,” in particular contexts within the statute, where necessary to give full effect to other provisions of the Act. Staples specifically referred to this qualifier as a “highly material, if not controlling” consideration in its decision, 307 S.W.2d at 462, and explained:
We believe, and hold, that the word “accident,” as it appears in the context of [§ 287.020.4, RSMo 1949], clearly indicates a broader meaning than that specifically defined in paragraph 2. As well stated by the Court of Appeals in this case: “... The context of Section 287.020(4) requires such a construction [of the word ‘accident’] in order that the terms of the law may be applied in all its aspects to industrial disease.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Court emphasized that “[t]he qualification contained in the paragraph defining ‘accident’ cannot properly be overlooked; it constituted an express recognition of the fact that there might be a necessity for a broader definition. That necessity arose when the amendment [authorizing workers’ compensation coverage for occupational disease claims] was enacted.” Id. at 463.
The statutory language on which Staples relied as “highly material, if not controlling” has been eliminated from the current *24definition of an “accident.” The current definition no longer contemplates the “necessity for a broader definition” of an “accident” depending on the context in which the word appears. Instead of the malleable definition found in prior law, the legislature has now instructed that the single, narrow definition of an “accident” found in § 287.020.2 is to be employed whenever the word is used in Chapter 287. The 2005 amendments to the “accident” definition provide a further reason why we can no longer follow Staples.
3. The 2005 amendments significantly modified the standards for compensability of occupational disease claims. Prior to the 2005 amendments, § 287.067.2, RSMo 2000 provided:
An occupational disease is compensa-ble if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compen-sable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
(Emphasis added.) The 2005 amendments rewrote this provision, so that it now reads:
An injury by occupational disease is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The “prevailing factor” is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
§ 287.067.2.10
Combined with the revisions to the definition of “accident,” the obvious intent of the 2005 amendments to § 287.067.2 was to divorce the compensa-bility of occupational disease claims from §§ 287.020.2 and .3 — the statutory provisions which define “accident” and “injury.” 11 This is confirmed not only by the elimination of the specific cross-reference to §§ 287.020.2 and .3 which formerly appeared in § 287.067.2, RSMo 2000, but also by the addition of language to § 287.067.2 excluding claims for “[o]rdinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging” — language that formerly appeared in the “injury” definition in § 287.020.3(1), RSMo 2000. The separation of the standards for compensa-bility of injuries by accident and injuries by occupational disease is further confirmed by the 2005 amendments to § 287.020.3(2)(a). While that provision formerly provided that an injury would be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment if it was shown that “the employment was a substantial factor in causing the injury,” the post-2005 provision requires proof that “the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury.”
Thus, while the pre-2005 statutory provision providing for the compensability of occupational disease claims explicitly cross-referenced the statutory provision *25defining an “accident,” that cross-reference has been eliminated, and § 287.067.2 now contains a “stand-alone” compensability standard for occupational disease claims, independent of §§ 287.020.2 and .3. Once again, this diminishes the justification for making occupational disease claims fit within the definitions of “accident” and “injury” contained in other provisions of the Act.
Notably, KCP & L itself recognizes that “some of these revisions deliberately reinforce the bifurcation of the post-2005 law between ‘injury by accident’ and ‘injury by occupational disease,’ terms that did not exist in the statutes until the 2005 revisions. See R.S. Mo. § 287.020.3 (‘An injury by accident is compensable ... ’) and § 287.067.2 (‘An injury by occupational disease is compensable ... ’).” Br. at 27.12 While KCP & L is correct that the 2005 amendments “bifurcated” the concepts of an “injury by accident” and an “injury by occupational disease,” § 287.120 refers to only one of those two distinct types of injury: “injury by accident.” Particularly under a rule of strict construction, we are not at liberty to import the other, omitted category of injury into § 287.120, simply because we conclude that doing so would be a salutary revision of the statute.
Following the 2005 amendments, the Workers’ Compensation Law establishes an independent, detailed scheme for the compensation of occupational disease claims. By contrast, when Staples was decided, the statute contained only a single provision specifying that employers could elect workers’ compensation coverage for occupational disease claims, with no specification of the compensability standards for such claims, or the procedures by which such claims should be resolved. See § 287.020.4, RSMo 1949. In these circumstances, Staples was required to adapt other provisions of the Act to accommodate occupational disease claims, in order to give any meaning to the statutory authorization to pursue such claims through the workers’ compensation system. See 307 S.W.2d at 462 (“It is almost unthinkable that the legislature would adopt the amendment in question without contemplating and intending that its previously enacted definitions be broadened to fit the necessities of occupational disease claims.”). This flexible reading was, of course, also consistent with the liberal construction afforded the pre-2005 Act. Here, however, we construe a statute which forbids liberal construction, and also contains detailed and explicit provisions specifying when and how occupational disease claims are compensable.13
4. Finally, the 2005 amendments explicitly abrogated prior case law interpreting the terms “accident” and “occupational disease.” A new statutory provision, § 287.020.10, states:
*26In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of “accident”, “occupational disease”, “arising out of’, and “in the course of employment” to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D.2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. banc 1999) and all eases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
KCP & L correctly observes that none of the cases listed in § 287.020.10 involved an occupational disease claim. Section 287.020.10 is not limited to the abrogation of the specifically identified cases, however; instead, the statute broadly “reject[s] and abrogated] earlier case law interpretations” of the term “occupational disease,” as well as caselaw interpreting the term “accident.” Notwithstanding KCP & L’s desire to do otherwise, we are compelled to apply the clear and unequivocal legislative directive contained in § 287.020.10, and disregard pre-2005 caselaw interpreting the listed terms, particularly where the relevant statutory provisions were materially altered by the 2005 amendments.
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Because the current Workers’ Compensation Law contains multiple provisions that are materially different than the corresponding provisions of predecessor statutes, we cannot rely on the 1957 decision in Staples, or other decisions interpreting earlier laws, to disregard the plain and unambiguous language of the current Act. Simply put, Staples and the other pre-2005 decisions on which KCP & L relies interpreted fundamentally different statutes than the one we construe today. Under the current statute, there is no justification for this Court to “liberalize” or expand the definition of an “accident,” as that term is used in the Act’s exclusivity provisions, beyond the unambiguous definition provided by the legislature itself in § 287.020.2.
KCP & L complains that the result compelled by the plain language of the current Workers’ Compensation Law is contrary to the long-standing interpretation of the Act as “wholly substitutional in character.” McKay v. Delico Meat Prods. Co., 351 Mo. 876, 174 S.W.2d 149, 155 (1943). According to KCP & L, we should continue to interpret the Act based on the quid pro quo “bargain” between employers and employees which underlay predecessor statutes.14 This reasoning is flawed from multiple perspectives, however. First, in addition to the provisions discussed above, the 2005 amendments made multiple, fundamental changes to the Workers’ Compensation Law as it had existed previously.15 Given the significant *27differences between the current Act and predecessor statutes, we cannot uncritically rely on a general understanding of “the bargain” underlying prior laws to override the unambiguous language of the current statute. Even if we were to conclude that the 2005 legislature intended to retain the essence of the pre-2005 “bargain,” we could not rely on this understanding to override the result dictated by the statute’s unambiguous language. The first rule of statutory construction is to look to the statute’s text; if the text yields a definitive answer to the question at hand, no further inquiry is justified or appropriate, except in limited circumstances which are inapplicable here. Akins v. Dir. of Revenue, 303 S.W.3d 563, 565 (Mo. banc 2010). We do not have license to ignore the plain language of the Workers’ Compensation Law in deference to a legislative intent which is wholly unmoored from the words of the statute itself.
The Missouri Supreme Court faced a similar situation in State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647 (Mo. banc 2002), in which a criminal defendant (Rowe) was convicted of driving with a canceled, suspended or revoked driver’s license under § 302.321, RSMo 2000. Rowe’s Iowa driver’s license had been suspended and revoked by that State. Section 302.321, RSMo 2000, however, only criminalized the operation of a motor vehicle “when [the driver’s] license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended or revoked under the laws of this state (Emphasis added; quoted at 63 S.W.3d at 648-49).
Although the Missouri Supreme Court presumed that the legislature’s intent was to punish drivers whose licenses had been revoked by other States as severely as drivers revoked in Missouri, it held that it could not judicially impose this result, contrary to the unambiguous language of § 302.321, RSMo 2000:
Despite the phrase “under the laws of this state,” it seems unlikely that the Missouri legislature intended to let out-of-state drivers with multiple offenses suffer only the consequences of a misdemeanor for driving after revocation while subjecting Missouri drivers to a felony for the same act. Legislative intent can only be derived from the words of the statute itself. [¶] Courts do not have the authority to read into a statute a legislative intent that is contrary to its plain and ordinary meaning. The legislature may wish to change the statute to cover out-of-state multiple-offense drivers such as Rowe. But this Court, under the guise of discerning legislative intent, cannot rewrite the statute.
Id. at 649-50 (citations omitted). Whatever our belief as to the 2005 legislature’s “true” intent, this Court “cannot rewrite the statute” to effectuate that intent, where it is contrary to the plain and unambiguous wording of the statute the legislature actually enacted.
III.
As KCP & L correctly notes, numerous provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law provide for the compensability of claims for occupational disease, including claims for occupational disease based on repeated exposure to particular workplace conditions. Thus, § 287.110.2 declares that
[t]his chapter shall apply to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in this state, regardless of where the contract of employment was made, and also to all injuries received and oc-*28eupational diseases contracted outside of this state under contract of employment made in this state, unless the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise provide, and also to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted outside of this state where the employee’s employment was principally localized in this state within thirteen calendar weeks of the injury or diagnosis of the occupational disease.[16]
KCP & L then argues that, because repeat-exposure occupational disease claims are covered by and compensable under the Act, the Act’s exclusivity provisions must necessarily apply to such claims. The Act does not require, however, that we treat as identical two separate questions: (1) whether repeat-exposure occupational disease claims are compensable under the Act; and (2) whether the workers’ compensation system provides a claimant’s sole remedy for such claims, and excludes common-law remedies. The existence of a workers’ compensation remedy does not by itself necessarily establish that the statutory remedy is exclusive. Instead, the exclusivity of any remedy provided by the Act depends on the scope of the Act’s exclusive-remedy provisions, found in §§ 287.120.1 and .2.
Employer liability for occupational disease claims does not depend on those claims falling within § 287.120. Section 287.120.1 specifies employer liability for “personal injury or death of the employee by accident,” and provides that the administrative workers’ compensation remedy is exclusive of other remedies with respect to such claims. Section 287.120.1 is not the only provision that imposes liability on employers for work-related injury claims, however. With respect to occupational disease claims, § 287.063 provides:
1. An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, as is set forth in subsection 8 of section 287.067.
2. The employer liable for the compensation in this section provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease prior to evidence of disability, regardless of the length of time of such last exposure, subject to the notice provision of section 287.420.
Similarly, § 287.067.2 provides for the compensability of occupational disease claims generally:
An injury by occupational disease is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The “prevailing factor” is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both *29the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
Notably — and unlike the prior statute— these provisions make occupational disease claims compensable, and make employers liable for such claims, without reference to the definition of “accident” in § 287.020.2. Thus, such claims are made compensable under the Act, and employers are rendered liable for such claims, independently of § 287.120, including its exclusivity provisions.17
Recognizing that repeat-exposure occupational disease claimants may have an available, but not exclusive, workers’ compensation remedy would admittedly represent a substantial departure from prior law. But it is not an “absurd or illogical result” that would justify this Court in ignoring the plain language of the Act’s various provisions. Akins, 303 S.W.3d at 565. In other States, workers have been recognized to have parallel remedies through the workers’ compensation system and court actions in a variety of circumstances, including in connection with claims for “[¡Intentional injury by the employer, non-physical injury torts, failure to provide safety devices, [and] employment of minors....” 6 Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation § 102.02[1] (rev. ed.2011) (footnotes omitted); see also Torres v. Cintas Corp., 707 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1285 (N.D.Okla.2010) (collecting cases involving intentional torts). Indeed, Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law itself provides that an injured worker has the option of pursuing either an administrative or judicial remedy in at least one situation: where the worker’s employer fails to maintain statutorily required insurance. See § 287.280.1; Lewis ex rel. Brown v. Gilmore, -S.W.3d-, 2011 WL 1363977, at *2-*3 (Mo.App. W.D.2011); Brookman v. Henry Transp., 924 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo.App. E.D.1996); Bailey v. McClelland, 848 S.W.2d 46, 47-48 (Mo.App. S.D.1993). While perhaps unusual, it would therefore not be unprecedented, absurd, or irrational for the legislature to have provided repeat-exposure occupational disease claimants with a non-exclusive workers’ compensation remedy.
Our holding — that § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions do not apply to occupational disease claims — is thus fully consistent with the other provisions of the statute which provide for the compensability of such claims through the workers’ compensation system. This case is therefore wholly unlike Anderson v. Ken Kauffman & Sons Excavating, L.L.C., 248 S.W.3d 101 (Mo.App. W.D.2008) (en banc), on which KCP & L heavily relies. In Anderson, an erroneous, isolated cross-reference in a single subsection of the Workers’ Compensation Law, enacted as part of the original 2005 amendments, would have had the effect of nullifying the entire Act if the cross-reference were read literally. As the Court explained, a literal reading of the erroneous cross-reference would have produced the nonsensical result “that Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law is applicable to all cases falling within its provisions, except those cases falling within its provisions,” id. at 107; stated another way, the mistaken clause would have “exclude[d] all cases arising under the Work*30ers’ Compensation Act from the Workers’ Compensation Act....” Id. Unlike in Anderson, however, where a literal reading of a particular statutory provision “would render the entirety of the Act meaningless and superfluous,” id. at 109, our reading of § 287.120’s plain and unambiguous language leaves the other provisions of the statute fully operative.
Ultimately, however, the issue here is not whether repeat-exposure occupational disease claims are compensable through the workers’ compensation system. Gun-ter is not seeking to pursue a workers’ compensation remedy for his occupational disease-related claims. Instead, he is seeking to pursue a judicial remedy. We need only decide whether his common-law claims are precluded by § 287.120, which they plainly are not.
Conclusion
KCP & L has conceded that Gunter’s claims do not arise from an “accident,” yet the exclusive-remedy provisions on which it relies to deny him his common-law rights are plainly and unambiguously limited to injury or death “by accident.” The circuit court did not err in denying KCP & L’s motion for summary judgment. Because KCP & L has failed to establish a right to a writ of prohibition, the preliminary writ we previously issued is quashed.
Judges ELLIS, HOWARD, PFEIFFER, MITCHELL, WITT and GABBERT concur.
Judge WELSH dissents in separate opinion, in which Judge SMART joins.
Judge SMART dissents in separate opinion, in which Judge WELSH joins.
. Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations refer to the RSMo 2000 as updated through the 2010 Cumulative Supplement.
. Gunter also argued that his claims are not subject to the Act’s exclusivity provisions because his exposure to asbestos at KCP & L was not the "prevailing factor” in causing his mesothelioma, and his occupational disease-related claims would therefore not be com-pensable under the Act. See § 287.067.2. Because we conclude that Gunter’s claims do not arise from an "accident,” and that § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions are inapplicable for that reason alone, we need not address this additional, alternative argument.
. A writ of prohibition is available: "(1) to prevent a usurpation of judicial power when the trial court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” State ex rel. Houska v. Dickhaner, 323 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Mo. banc 2010). In particular, "[prohibition may be appropriate to prevent unnecessary, inconvenient, and expensive litigation.” Id.-, see also State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Mo. banc 2008) (citation omitted).
. While the quoted language comes from a three-judge plurality opinion, Judge Wolff, joined by two other judges, concurred in the issuance of a declaratory judgment. 277 S.W.3d at 681.
. The Supreme Court in MARA was "not asked to decide what injuries fall within the definition of 'accident' in section 287.020.2 and, therefore, no opinion [was] expressed.” Id. While the Court was not required to construe § 287.020.2’s definition of "accident,” its opinion makes crystal clear that unless an injury arises from an "accident” as defined in the statute, § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions are not implicated. Because KCP & L has admitted that Gunter's claims do not arise from an "accident” as statutorily defined, his claims do not trigger § 287.120. As in MARA, given KCP & L’s concession we need not "decide what injuries fall within the definition of 'accident' in section 287.020.2” in order to resolve this writ proceeding.
. Section 287.800.1 states, categorically, that the principle of strict construction "shall” apply in construing "the provisions of this chapter,” not merely when interpreting a subset of Chapter 287’s provisions, such as those establishing compensability standards. Consistent with § 287.800.l’s unqualified reach, we applied the strict construction principle to § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions, and to § 287.030.1's definition of an "employer,” in Robinson. See 323 S.W.2d at 424-25. The Southern and Eastern Districts have similarly applied the canon of strict construction to § 287.495's provisions concerning judicial review of Commission decisions. See Bolen v. Orchard Farm R-V School Dist., 291 S.W.3d 747 (Mo.App. E.D.2009); Smalley v. Landmark Erectors, 291 S.W.3d 737 (Mo.App. E.D. 2009); Norman v. Phelps Cty. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 256 S.W.3d 202 (Mo.App. S.D.2008).
. KCP & L also argues that, under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction,” we should permit the Labor & Industrial Relations Commission to decide in the first instance whether Gunter’s claims arise from an "accident.” Gunter argues in response that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was abrogated by McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. banc 2009). Even if the primary jurisdiction doctrine remains viable, however, it would not require dismissal, given KCP & L's concession that Gunter’s claims do not arise from an accident. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
must be considered in light of the fact that jurisdiction remains in the trial court unless it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of workers’ compensation law. That standard is not met merely by allegations of one party, as are made here by defendant, that the commission has jurisdiction. Rather, the court must examine the facts presented and find by a preponderance of the evidence that the issue contested is one within the commission’s expertise.
Hams v. Westin Mgmt. Co. E., 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2007) (citation omitted).
Harris recognized that, as a general proposition, the question whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment was one for the Commission's initial determination. Id. (citing Killian v. J. & J. Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. banc 1991)). Despite this general rale, the Court in Harris held that primary jurisdiction was inapplicable where "the record [was] uncontested,” and ”[n]o evidence created a factual issue” as to whether the plaintiff in that case was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Id. In those circumstances, "there [was] no question for the commission to resolve,” and the Court itself decided the course and scope of employment issue. Id. at 3-4. This case presents a similar circumstance.
We also note that, because Gunter’s suit is not a ”claim[] filed under this chapter,” § 287.801 does not preclude the circuit court from reviewing it.
. Because of these statutory revisions, KCP & L misses the mark when it argues that, under § 1.120, interpretations of predecessor versions of § 287.120 remain controlling.
We note that, in Idekr v. PPG Industries, Inc., No. 10-0449-CV-W-ODS, 2011 WL 144922 (W.D.Mo. Jan.18, 2011), the district court held, consistent with KCP & L’s arguments, that a worker’s exclusive remedy for an occupational disease claim remained through the workers' compensation system, despite the 2005 amendments to the statute. For the reasons explained at length in this opinion, we conclude that Idekr was incorrectly decided, and therefore decline to follow it.
. See § 287.020.3(5) (“The[] terms ['injury' or 'personal injuries'] shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in any form.” (emphasis added)); § 287.067.1 ("the term 'occupational disease’ is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of employment” (italics added)).
. Given this rewriting, Idekr is mistaken when it asserts that current § 287.067.2 is "identical to the provisionf] in place before the 2005 Amendments.” 2011 WL 144922, at *2.
. Notably, the statutory provision authorizing workers’ compensation recovery for occupational disease claims at issue in Staples likewise tied occupational disease claims to the concept of an "accident.” See § 287.020.4, RSMo 1949; Staples, 307 S.W.2d at 461 (noting that the Court was required to "construe the term ['accident'] as used (specifically) in paragraph 4 of § 287.020”).
. Referring to the amendments to § 287.067.2, KCP & L similarly notes that in 2005 “the Legislature affirmatively deleted the reference to 'accident' in the definition of 'occupational disease,’ ” and that, "[gjiven this amendment, an 'occupational disease' cannot be required to be an 'accident' under § 287.020.2 or an injury under § 287.020.3.” Reply Br. at 12 & n. 2. KCP & L ignores, however, that even though occupational disease claims are now compensable without reference to the concept of an "accident,” such claims must still arise out of an “accident” to be subject to the exclusivity provisions of § 287.120.
. Given the creation in 2005 of a stand-alone compensability standard for occupational disease claims, it is no longer accurate to say that "[t]here is no indication in the Act that the legislature did not intend for all occupational disease claims to be subject to the same conditions and limitations as other claims.” Staples, 307 S.W.2d at 463.
. Under that '‘bargain,” "the employer forfeits his common law defenses to suits against him for his employee's injuries and assumes automatic liability; the employee forfeits his right to a potentially lucrative common law judgment in return for assured compensation.” Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Props., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Mo. banc 1991); see also Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo. banc 1991) (Blackmar, C.J., concurring) ("In return for providing compensation which is both assured and insured, the employer is relieved of the burden of civil actions for damages.”).
. See, e.g., MARA, 277 S.W.3d at 684-86 (Teitelman, J., dissenting) (describing various significant changes to the Act adopted in 2005, and concluding that, "[wjhen the cumulative impact of the 2005 amendments is considered, it is apparent that the result is a fundamental alteration of the equities of the workers’ compensation bargain”); Note, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law Negligence Back into Employment *27Law, 75 Mo. L.Rev. 1093, 1113 (2010) (“The 2005 amendments substantially changed the Workers’ Compensation Act and were intended to narrow the categories of work-related injuries awarded compensation.”).
16. See also, e.g., § 287.020.4 (providing that time limit for compensable death following an accident inapplicable to occupational disease claims); § 287.063 (prescribing statute of limitations for occupational disease claims, establishing presumption of exposure for such claims, and specifying that employer with whom the claimant was last exposed to injury-causing hazard is liable for the claim); § 287.067 (defining occupational disease, providing standards for compensability of injury by occupational disease, and recognizing injuries caused by repetitive motion, hearing loss, radiation exposure, and other causes as compensable occupational diseases); § 287.070 (recognizing occupational diseases related to cleanup of illegal drug laboratories); § 287.197 (providing for compensability for hearing loss due to industrial noise); § 287.420 (requiring employee to give employer written notice of occupational disease within thirty days after diagnosis).
. Certain language in the MARA opinions could be read to suggest that, if a claim is not subject to § 287.120’s exclusive-remedy provisions, that claim falls wholly outside the Act’s coverage. As explained in § I above, however, the holding of MARA concerned the interpretation of § 287.120’s exclusivity provisions, not the coverage afforded by other provisions of the statute.