concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in construing and applying the statute of frauds, K.S.A. 33-106. The Zukels’ claim against Avery is not barred solely by the statute of frauds.
However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the purchase agreement was unambiguous. An ambiguity existed between the substantive language of the contract and the manner in which it was executed. The trial court also believed this created an ambiguity and, thus, the trial court considered parole evidence in an attempt to determine the intent of the parties. The trial court found *1106that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that Avery was to be personally liable under the contract. While I may disagree with the trial court’s conclusion, the trial court’s factual determination is supported by substantial competent evidence. Based upon the appropriate standard of review, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling.