dissenting:
[ 51 I dissent from Justice Durham's lead opinion. I would affirm all of the trial court's rulings.
*1085152 First, the trial court did not err in dismissing Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet the jurisdictional time limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5. Justice Durham's opinion does not even attempt to read the statute on the basis of its plain language, but instead simply rewrites its provisions by attributing motives to the legislature. Although the requirement relating to conclusion, rather than commencement, of legal proceedings is unusual and could potentially raise constitutional concerns in certain hypothetical scenarios, this case is not one of them. Gonzalez had thirteen years in which to commence a petition for adjudication and failed to do so. Moreover, after filing her petition, she made no attempt to obtain an adjudication within the time limit. The trial court specifically found that an accelerated schedule could have been arranged if Gonzalez had sought one. This is not a case where petitioner was prevented from meeting the statutory deadline by events wholly beyond her control. Rather, it is evident from the record that Gonzalez simply failed to recognize the nature of the time limitation and falsely assumed it functioned as a traditional statute of limitations that had been satisfied at the time the petition was filed. It is not the constitutional duty of this court to rescue parties from their inability to read the plain language of a statute. I would affirm the court's decision in view of the particular facts of this case.
1 53 Second, as recognized by Justice Zimmerman's opinion, the trial court correctly denied Gonzalez's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint. Although Justice Durham undertakes an analysis of the standard of review relating to contested motions to intervene as of right, she fails to correctly reference the standard of review for the only question properly brought to us on appeal: the court's refusal to set aside the stipulation for intervention. She thus attempts to establish a new standard of review for a question not properly brought before us on appeal. This purported establishment of a new standard of review has not been joined by a majority of this court.
154 Justice Durham implicitly relies on our statement in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979), that a "court" is not bound by stipulations between parties "when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved."1 Durham Op. 132. However, this statement in First of Denver (whatever it means) clearly does not empower us to review de novo a trial court's decision to set aside a stipulation as to matters of law. Rather, First of Denver recognizes that the trial court-not the Supreme Court-is entrusted with the discretion whether to honor such a stipulation between parties. Indeed, as we further stated in that case, whether a stipulation involves issues of fact or law, "[plarties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the [trial] court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." Id.; see also 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 18, at 548 (1974) ("It is generally recognized that it is within the discretion of the court to set aside a stipulation of the parties relating to the conduct of a pending cause."). As a result, a stipulation not set aside below will be reversed on appeal only if the trial court abused its discretion. The well-established abuse of discretion standard of review requires us to "presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the ree-ord clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984).2
*1086$55 Employing the correct standard of review, I would uphold the trial court's ruling denying Gonzalez's petition to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint. In this case, the trial court carefully reviewed the particular facts and circumstances before it and rendered a reasoned opinion refusing to set aside the stipulation. It found there was a sound legal basis for Metropolitan's intervention and that Gonzalez had failed to meet her burden of showing why the stipulation should be set aside. 3
56 Finally, I would hold that Metropolitan has a right to intervene in this action. Contrary to Justice Durham's assertion, this case is not "analogous to cases where a third party attempts to intervene in a divorce action." Durham Op. 134. In a divorce action, the status of the marriage relationship (and the attendant legal and personal interests that attach to that relationship) have already been established. Because divorce constitutes such a fundamental alteration in the lives of a husband and a wife, the law justifiably presumes that a divoree will be sought for legitimate personal reasons. Intervention in divorce cases is typically sought by ereditors who claim that their interests are implicated by the disposition of the spouses' financial assets. Such interventions are disfavored because they present a substantial risk of confusing the central issues relating to the parties' already-established private relationship. Moreover, the likelihood that parties to a marriage will seek a divorce for the sole or primary purpose of defrauding or damaging a creditor is small.4 Hence, courts properly impose more stringent standards when entertaining applications for intervention in divorce cases.
57 The reasons for denying intervention in most divorce cases manifestly do not apply to the facts of this particular case. In this case, Metropolitan specifically alleged a fraudulent basis for the marriage petition. In its complaint in intervention, Metropolitan asserts that "Juanita Gonzalez's sole purpose in filing this petition is to attempt to create a relationship of husband and wife between herself and Martin Briceno for the sole purpose of obtaining insurance coverage under a policy issued by Metropolitan to Martin Bri-ceno." In other words, Metropolitan contends that Gonzalez and Briceno had not actually met the criteria of the unsolemnized marriage statute at the time of the fire and that they did not actually believe they met the criteria. If this contention is proven correct, Gonzalez's attempt to retroactively establish a legal status for the sole purpose of obtaining insurance benefits would constitute fraud and manipulation of a state statute. I submit that where there is a good faith assertion that a petition to validate an unsolemnized marriage is filed for fraudulent purposes, the principles governing permissive intervention and the statutory policies underlying the marriage statute grant a right of intervention. A party clearly has a right of intervention in an action that was brought for the sole purpose of defrauding that party,.5
*1087T58 Given the fact that Metropolitan is alleging a fraudulent basis for the petition, and because the retroactive establishment of an unsolemnized marriage does not proceed from the same presumptions of the established legal status inherent in any divorce action, no special heightened burden applies to Metropolitan's application for intervention. Consequently, the issues regarding the right of intervention are governed by the traditional standards of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).
T59 According to that rule, the four traditional requirements for intervention are met. First, there is no dispute that the application was timely; second, Metropolitan has a clear interest in avoiding the payment of fraudulent insurance claims; third, Gonzalez's petition may impair that interest if Metropolitan does not have the opportunity to demonstrate that the petition has been brought for fraudulent purposes; and fourth, no party other than Metropolitan has a clear interest or opportunity to present evidence demonstrating that Gonzalez's petition is fraudulent.
160 The trial court correctly dismissed Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet the time limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5; it did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez's request to ignore her stipulation; and it correctly refused to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. I would affirm the trial court on all grounds.
{61 Finally, I write to express my disapproval of Justice Durham's apparent attempt to give legal advice to one of the parties. She states in her section titled "Procedure on Remand" that "[allthough not discussed by any party to this appeal, we note a point that may assist in the disposition of the case on remand." Durham Op. 144. However, the issue she thereafter discusses has nothing to do with any disputed legal question this court believes is likely to occur on remand to the district court. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991). Rather, she provides an advisory opinion that is apparently exclusively related to collateral and factually distinct proceedings in federal court. She does so under the apparent presumption that petitioner's counsel has failed to locate relevant, perhaps even dispositive, authority relating to petitioner's federal claim. This court has no business giving such advice to parties represented by counsel. Nor can we provide such advice to a federal court when no questions have been properly certified from that court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (1996).
62 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON's dissenting opinion.T 63 Justice STEWART acted on this opinion prior to his retirement.
. I must confess that the scope and import of this statement, as quoted in isolation by Justice Durham, utterly escapes me. So far as I am aware, all disputed cases brought before courts involve "points of law requiring judicial determination." Hence, a literal reading of this passage would require all courts everywhere to disregard all stipulations for the sake of rendering a full-blown independent determination of the legal soundness of the parties' choices.
. In this regard, Justice Durham states that the trial court failed to consider whether Metropolitan had standing to intervene in this action. Durham Op. 132. But Gonzalez did not appeal any alleged failure of the trial court to enter specific findings that Metropolitan had standing to intervene at the time it approved the stipulation, nor is there any indication that the trial court was obligated to do so. Rather, Gonzalez appeals the later denial of her motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. With respect to that motion, the court received extensive briefing on Gonzalez's motion, heard oral argument, and entered findings of fact and rul*1086ings of law that specifically treated Metropolitan's standing to intervene. There is no basis in those careful and correct findings for us to atirib-ute an abuse of discretion.
. Gonzalez's primary argument in her motion was that she had been misled by Metropolitan's counsel into believing there were no other potential bases in the insurance contract for denying her claims. The trial court correctly found that Metropolitan had reserved its right to deny coverage under other provisions of the contract and had notified Gonzalez that it reserved the right to do so from the outset.
. It was suggested at oral argument that annulments might present a closer analogy and could be affected by our decision here. Whether or not annulment is an adequate analogy, it does not alter the fundamental policies governing intervention in the particular circumstances of this case. To the extent there is a properly supported allegation that parties to a relationship are attempting to alter their legal status, where that status (and the attendant privacy rights it entails) is in doubt, and they are attempting the alteration for the sole or primary purpose of deceit or fraud (and the other criteria of rule 24 are met), a right of intervention should be granted. Moreover, to the extent we find it necessary to craft particular rules to meet new circumstances, we may do so when the proper case arises.
. It is no answer to state, as does Justice Durham, Durham Op. supra note 9, that Metropolitan may litigate its concerns in the context of a separate contract action on the insurance policy. Metropolitan obviously cannot litigate, in the context of a separate contract dispute, a decision *1087regarding marital status that has been established and recognized by another court of competent jurisdiction.