DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:As I believe our Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the language of Pa.R.C.P. 238 in Allen v. Mellinger, 567 Pa. 1, 784 A.2d 762 (2001) is controlling for the general proposition that delay damages are to be calculated on the compensatory damages legally recoverable rather than the verdict, I respectfully dissent.
In Woods v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 531 Pa. 295, 612 A.2d 970 (1992) (overruled by Allen v. Mellinger, supra), our Supreme Court concluded that the unpredictability of delay damages was a powerful factor in promoting settlement of cases. The Court rejected the calculation of damages upon the statutory cap imposed as to verdicts against Commonwealth defendants finding it to be a “distinct disincentive” to settlement “since the delay damages would be based upon a predictable constant.” Id. at 972. At that time, delay damages were routinely calculated on the compensatory damages awarded by a jury against a defendant.
In Allen, our Supreme Court revisited Woods and the interplay of Rule 238 and the statutory cap of $250,000 on the liability of a Commonwealth defendant imposed by § 8528(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8553. One of the issues in Allen was whether delay damages were to be calculated on a jury award against the Commonwealth defendant that exceeded the statutory limit, or whether delay damages were to be calculated upon the statutory limit of $250,000. There was no question in Allen that the plaintiff was entitled to delay damages, even when the effect of the delay damage award was to increase the Commonwealth’s liability beyond the statutory cap because the policy of Rule 238 was to encourage settlement. However, the Allen Court overruled its *357earlier decision in Woods, supra, which held that such damages would be calculated on the verdict rather than on the statutory cap.
In so holding, the Allen Court reexamined the language of Rule 238 and concluded that the Woods Court improperly focused on the isolated phrase that delay damages shall be added to the “verdict of the jury ... decision of the court ... or award of arbitrators ... and shall become part of the verdict, decision or award.” Allen, supra at 767. According to Allen, the Woods Court incorrectly concluded that this language was “indicative of [our Supreme Court’s] intent to have damages apply to the verdict or award itself, which represents the actual factfinder’s assessment of the plaintiffs damage, as opposed to the amount the plaintiff is legally entitled to recover.” Allen, supra at 767, quoting Woods, supra at 972. Instead, the Allen Court focused on the following language: “damages for delay shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each defendant or additional defendant.” The Court concluded:
With respect to the rule’s purpose of compensating the plaintiff for delay in receiving his or her recovery, it defies reason to suggest that the basis for calculating such compensation could be anything other than the amount the Commonwealth party could actually be responsible for paying to the plaintiff.
Id. Recognizing that plaintiffs compensatory damages could never exceed the statutory cap, the Allen Court reasoned that there could be no delay in receiving amounts in excess of that cap. Absent delay, the Court concluded that “the stated justification for compensating the plaintiff with delay damages is illusory.” Id. at 768.
The majority attempts to distinguish Allen on the ground that it involved Commonwealth defendants subject to statutorily-imposed limits on recovery. However, this Court ignored that very distinction in LaRue v. McGuire, 885 A.2d 549 (Pa.Super.2005), and applied Allen’s interpretation of Rule 238 in a case where private parties stipulated to a limit on compensatory damages. Indeed, the re-interpretation of the rule as imposing delay damages on the compensatory damages recoverable supplied the basis for our holding in LaRue.
In LaRue, we addressed the issue of whether delay damages were to be calculated on the $600,000 jury verdict or on the stipulated maximum award of $15,000. We held that Allen required the calculation of delay damages on the amount the plaintiff was legally entitled to recover, not on the actual verdict, because where compensatory damages are capped, there can be no delay in receiving amounts in excess of that cap. We found no appreciable difference between the facts in Allen, where a statute limited liability, and the facts in LaRue, where the plaintiff voluntarily stipulated to a limitation on the other party’s liability pursuant to Rule 1311.1. The effect of that voluntary choice was that plaintiff was not a “private litigant [ ] not subject to limitations on liability [,] the distinction the Allen court emphasized.” LaRue, supra at 557 (quoting Allen, supra at 768).
In the instant case, the Marlettes voluntarily elected and paid for $250,000 in UM coverage. Absent a bad faith claim, I find this self-imposed limitation on compensatory damages to be sufficiently analogous to the statutory limitation in Allen and the stipulation in LaRue to warrant the same treatment under Rule 238.1 I can discern *358no logical basis for limiting Allen to situations involving a statutory cap. As the Allen Court’s holding was premised on a re-interpretation of the language of Rule 238, it is applicable in every case where delay damages are appropriate.
I believe that the majority’s decision is based on a reinterpretation of the plain language of Rule 238 that is contrary to Allen and LaRue. The Allen Court, in overruling Woods, rejected the specific policy considerations that the majority espouses herein. In Allen, the Court was dissuaded that the primary policy consideration underlying Rule 238, the encouragement of settlements, would suffer in those situations where delay damages were calculated on the statutory limits rather than the uncertainty of a jury verdict. Indeed, the Court perceived the calculation of delay damages on the compensatory damages recoverable as more closely promoting the secondary policy underlying Pa.R.C.P. 238, which is the compensation of plaintiff for the loss of use of his money throughout the period of the delay.
Accordingly, I believe that the trial court properly calculated delay damages on the compensatory damages legally recoverable, rather than on the jury verdict, in accord with Allen and LaRue. As I cannot reconcile the majority’s position with prevailing authority, I am compelled to dissent.
. In a third-party insurance case, the plaintiffs legal recovery is not capped at the defen*358dant's policy limits. Thus, the verdict would control for the calculation of delay damages.